Agências reguladoras, mandatos de dirigentes e representação política no Brasil

Abstract

In this thesis, we tackle the democratic deficit on the leaders of regulatory agencies, given the mismatch of their terms with the term of the Chief Executive nominating, making suggestions for the problem. Due to the lack of a general law regulating the issue, we will be proposed by the creation of a federal law, that is, a suggestion de lege ferenda. Such a law would serve to make the overlapping mandates of the directors of the agencies with the mandate of the Head of the Executive Branch responsible for naming them. Moreover, we will strengthen the democratic aspects of other agencies, in order to offset the alleged deficit. These points would be popular participation through public hearings and consultations; greater control of the actions of leaders, through accountability to the legislature, and a higher technical education. Thus, both representative democracy as deliberative will remain preserved. Discuss what needs to be constitutionally and legally provided, analyzing the new perspectives that have been discussed about the agencies, especially the Resolution No. 4/2013 of the Senate and the PEC No. 89/2011, in progress, to date, also in the Senate Federal. The methodology used in this paper is descriptive and backed by literature, having Hence, theoretical.