A dimensão axiológica da pessoa e as pretensões animalistas: um ensaio sobre o conceito bioético de pessoa e os direitos dos animais não-humanos

Abstract

Knowing who the the person is presents as a philosophical problem since the classical autors. Nowadays, the concept emerges as a central point in the solution of bioethical issues, brought about by technological advances, on the possibilities and limits of intervention in human life. However, the debate was not attached to members of the homo sapiens species, but, going beyond, culminated in the emergence of a real movement from the 70s of XX century, in favor of recognition of non-human animals as right holders and as beings with an inherent dignity or even their admission as people, like humans. Thus, if one parts of a concept closely connected with solutions to human affairs to justify certain argument proanimals, so these arguments have a significant impact exactly on those solutions, at least if one seeks the consistency and the systematic analysis of the ideas. In this context, the present study aims to analyze the animalistic claims as to the possibility of extending, directly or not, the personal status to non-human animals, and the consequences of this extension. Beginning with a discussion about the historical and philosophical foundations of the concept of person and its relationship to the idea of dignity and fundamental rights, the study states the need to go beyond the ontological aspect, conceiving the concept in its axiological-normative dimension as pointed out by professor A. Castanheira Neves. So the person is understood in its existential, ethical and relational aspect, elevating as one who, being the owner of an inherent value, holds rights that promote this value. Based on these ideas the arguments of the leading animalists authors are investigated identifying the interest in conceiving animals as persons. Posteriorly faces the primarily goal, i.e., ascertain whether from a axiologicalnormative sense especially regarding the requirement of reciprocity in recognition of the personal status, non-human animals can be considered as persons existing direct duties of justice towards them; or, on the contrary, by the nonexistence of animal rights, if there is only indirect duties before they.