Fixação de honorários advocatícios em ação civil pública: uma análise da (im)possibilidade de aplicação do princípio da simetria

Abstract

This study analyzes the determination of attorneys' fees in public civil actions, investigating the possibility of applying the principle of symmetry in favor of the defeated defendant. Based on the evolution of collective procedural law and the relevance of public civil actions for the protection of meta-individual interests, the paper highlights the differences between the Code of Civil Procedure of 2015, which adopts the principle of sucumbency, and the Public Civil Action Law (Law No. 7,347/85), which establishes a special rule exempting the plaintiff from attorneys' fees, except in cases of bad faith. The research follows a deductive methodology, including a literature review and case law analysis, focusing on decisions from the Superior Court of Justice. The study demonstrates that, although case law has evolved to ensure symmetrical treatment between the parties—preventing the defeated defendant from being ordered to pay attorneys' fees when the lawsuit is brought by the Public Prosecutor's Office or a public entity—there are still debates regarding the principle’s applicability in other cases. The significance of the topic lies in the increasing importance of public civil actions in Brazil, which address matters of public and collective interest. Examining attorneys' fees in this context is crucial, as it directly relates to the effectiveness of collective justice, the balance between the parties, and the recognition of the legal profession. Furthermore, analyzing the principle of symmetry contributes to an important debate on the fair and balanced application of procedural rules in cases involving diffuse and collective interests on one side and private interests on the other.