A relação entre a vontade e a liberdade na filosofia kantiana

Abstract

This work presents the practical philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), focusing on the argument about freedom and determination of will that goes through the works Critique of Pure Reason (both in its first edition of 1781 how much in the second edition of 1787), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and Critique of the Practical Reason (1788).Our intention is to highlight the argumentative line that runs through the three works and culminates with the defense of the freedom of the will, conceived through the possibility of an autonomous action motivated by the form of moral law. We begin by presenting the treatment given by Kant about will, as the concept is presented in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and has its development in the Critique of Practical Reason. Then we discuss the peculiarities and differences that the author attributes to freedom in the Critique of Pure Reason, especially in the third antinomy, and its unfolding in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the conclusion on freedom in the Critique of Practical Reason. Finally, we will deal with how Kant argues in order to reconcile that moral action, which at first causes in the subject the pain of restriction of desire, is considered the action that best satisfies the definition of freedom, presenting the argument for the moral law by Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and the doctrine of the fact of reason in the Critique of Practical Reason.