O ser e o outro do ser: a questão de Deus em Emmanuel Levinas

Abstract

This theory analyzes the subject of God in Emmanuel Levinas's thought. It seeks to show that the refusal levinasiana of approaching God in the being's horizon is due to a peculiar understanding of the being. For Levinas, the difference and the singularity are suppressed in the universality and impersonality of the being to the same measure in that we fagot the multiplicity of the Real in the compact unit of that concept had as the universal par excellence. Then that the being is related to the evil, and not to the good while transcendental notion. For that reason, Levinas judges unviable to approach God as being, although in a terms of Supreme Being. Refusing the idea that the being is the last horizon of sense, Levinas tries to place the philosophical problem of the subject of God in the ethical intrigue of the relationship between I and the other human. For such taskwork, he is been worth of three privileged reflexive paths. In the first place, the Lithuanian thinker seeks to analyze the philosophical problem of God to the light of the “phenomenologyc analysis”, attributing a felt eminently ethical to terms originating from of that domain of the knowledge. The phenomenologyc analysis, just as Levinas understands it, allows him to postulate the theory of the ethics as last horizon of the sense and to approach the subject of God for besides the ontology. In the second place, Levinas judges to find in the analysis of the subject of the time a privileged path phenomenologyc to think the problem of God no more in terms of being. Conceived in his unyielding diachrony, the time is thought as relationship with the human alterity and, for that inclination, as relationship with the infinite. Finally, the reflection on the language, understood starting from the ethics, it becomes a place of questioning of the Said, of speaking coherent of the theology and of the philosophy. Thinking in another way the subject of God demands, for its time, a speech in that the ethical Saying makes advances inside the ontological Said. These three paths, the one of the analysis phenomenological, the one of the time and the one of the language, they constitute, therefore, the inclinations through which Levinas tries to dissociate the philosophical problem of God of the plan of the ontology and to relate it definitively to the ethical intrigue of the relationship between the subjectivity and the other human. A intended overcome of the impersonality and of the being's universality occurs inside that relationship that is woven among I and the infinite of somebody else and of God, and that from now on is understood as last horizon of the sense, time and language.