A mortalidade da alma como condição para a vida boa no de rerum natura de Lucrécio

Abstract

The present dissertation aims to reflect on the possibility of relating two philosophical scopes, prima facie, distinct, namely, the corporalist metaphysics of the ontological status of the soul and the theme of ethics that deals with the good life. To accomplish this objective, we analyze the arguments presented by the philosopher-poet Tito Lucrécio Caro, in Chant III of his poem De Rerum natura, to defend that the soul (animus+anima), established in its functional unit with the body (corpus) is mortal and not preexisting and survives respectively the birth and perishing of the body. Indeed, we think that these arguments, presented by the Latin poet philosopher, are only fully understood if placed in an ethical background that characterizes the Epicurean philosophy, that is, a philosophy that seeks the good life or peace of the soul (animi pax). In this sense, through the interpretation of the Hellenistic philosophy that makes the French philosopher Pierre Hadot, philosophy as a specific way of life for each school and current of thought of antiquity, we reflect on this historical period, in which Lucretius belonged, and how the philosophical discourse on the defense of the mortality of the soul seems to be based and relate to the Epicurean way of life. Thus, it is through the fight against the two main disturbances that terrorize the spirit (animus) of human beings, namely, the fear of death and the fear of the gods, that the search for the good life would become possible.