Hard problem: um panorama do estado atual da questão

Abstract

In the current study, we approach the question of the prognosis of reducing the mind to the brain from the hard problem. For this, we present, in a first moment, a brief introduction to the reductivist lines of thought in the philosophy of contemporary mind, which constitute the background of the debate about the hard problem, among them behaviorism, the theory of identity and functionalism. We present the fundamentals of the hard problem, as formulated by the philosopher David Chalmers, presenting the concepts of phenomenal consciousness and psychological consciousness. We analyze, some of the main arguments against physicalism, namely, the explanatory argument, the knowledge argument and the conceivability argument. We discuss some of the main physicalist responses to these arguments, and, following Chalmers, we group them under the label of type A, type B and type C physicalisms. Finally, we approach the phenomenal concepts strategy, which has been, over the last few years, a very present approach in the discussion concerning physicalism and the hard problem, with emphasis on the constitutional approach.