Como as empresas brasileiras de capital aberto escolhem sua estrutura de capital?

Abstract

Modigliani and Miller (1958) has initiated a wide discussion on the capital structure of companies. Among the theories that have emerged over the years, there are the theories base on equilibrium (trade-off) between debt costs and benefits. Also the Pecking Order Theory, which creation is attributed to Myers and Majluf (1984). According to Almeida and Campelo (2010) these theories have neglected the role of financial constraints on decision makers, concluding that the behavior of financially constrained firms could be substantially different from others. Yet, Shyam-Sunders and Myers (1999) demonstrate most empirical tests have, confirming this or that theory lack on statistic power, due to the fact that a theory coud be confirmed even if companies behave according to the alternative theory. The authors propose a new test, using simulations, to confront both theories. Using a data base of Brazilian publicly traded companies, between 2000 and 2013, an extensive test is proposed to simultaneously evaluate the main theoretical proposals about trade-off. Afterwards, a new test is proposed to the pecking order theory, with a formula that incorporates financial constraint, brought up by Almeida and Campelo (2010). Finally, both theories are confronted with the statistic power test proposed by Shyam-Sunders and Myers. Trade-off theories suggests adjustment costs and a financial slack of 7% for debt relocation towards optimal point, according to its characteristics. Pecking Order Theory with financial constraint is also confirmed and suggests that companies witch do not suffer from constraint undertake debt exactly in proportion of its deficit (including pretended investment) while in the other companies, under constraint, debt ratio is not correlated with deficit. Finnaly, both theories fail the statistic power test, because they are confirmed even when the database is simulated from the alternative theory. Moreover, another test is proposed, regarding the structure of de debt itself, considering the short term and long term debt are chosen simultaneously. Same logic applies for the simultaneous choice between private debt and issuing public debt.