O problema da relação intelecto-cérebro em o mundo como vontade e como representação, de Arthur Schopenhauer, à luz do paradoxo de Zeller

Abstract

This dissertation has as main goal to investigate and circumscribe the problematic relation between intellect and brain in Arthur Schopenhauer’s work, under the consideration of the well known Eduard Zeller’s formulation of the problem in order to present an approach capable of solving it. It cannot be disconnected from the idea of a single thought communicated by The world as will and representation, which leads to the analysis of the macrostructure of the author’s general thinking. In this way, the concepts of intellect and brain might be considered according to the major explanation of the metaphysics of nature, having as main idea the distinction between the two ways of considering the world presented simultaneously in The world and improved and developed in the author’s posterior works. If, on the one hand, the world is object of investigation through subjectivity and its forms of existence, on the other hand it is considered through the objective way which, firstly, admit the object as existing by itself, independently of any subject. Without an independent existence, in so far each object depend on subjectivity, both modes must contribute to the complete understanding of the world as a whole as complementary parts: the intellect must be understood from the objective point of view and the brain according to the subjective analysis of the world that leads to the metaphysical conclusions of Schopenhauer’s work, whose aim include putting it in the general explanation of nature. Being aware of the existence of contemporary commentators on this matter, it is understood that this content cannot be comprehended but through the distinction mentioned above. Since it is clear that the subjective way of considering the world is superior than the objective one, it is necessary to notice that the solution to the problem may be found in the inclusion of the brain and the intellect in the Schopenhauer’s general metaphysical app