A dimensão axiológica da pessoa e as pretensões animalistas: um ensaio sobre o conceito bioético de pessoa e os direitos dos animais não-humanos
Loading...
Date
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora
DOI
Abstract
Knowing who the the person is presents as a philosophical problem since the
classical autors. Nowadays, the concept emerges as a central point in the solution of bioethical
issues, brought about by technological advances, on the possibilities and limits of intervention
in human life. However, the debate was not attached to members of the homo sapiens species,
but, going beyond, culminated in the emergence of a real movement from the 70s of XX
century, in favor of recognition of non-human animals as right holders and as beings with an
inherent dignity or even their admission as people, like humans. Thus, if one parts of a
concept closely connected with solutions to human affairs to justify certain argument proanimals,
so these arguments have a significant impact exactly on those solutions, at least if
one seeks the consistency and the systematic analysis of the ideas. In this context, the present
study aims to analyze the animalistic claims as to the possibility of extending, directly or not,
the personal status to non-human animals, and the consequences of this extension. Beginning
with a discussion about the historical and philosophical foundations of the concept of person
and its relationship to the idea of dignity and fundamental rights, the study states the need to
go beyond the ontological aspect, conceiving the concept in its axiological-normative
dimension as pointed out by professor A. Castanheira Neves. So the person is understood in
its existential, ethical and relational aspect, elevating as one who, being the owner of an
inherent value, holds rights that promote this value. Based on these ideas the arguments of the
leading animalists authors are investigated identifying the interest in conceiving animals as
persons. Posteriorly faces the primarily goal, i.e., ascertain whether from a axiologicalnormative
sense especially regarding the requirement of reciprocity in recognition of the
personal status, non-human animals can be considered as persons existing direct duties of
justice towards them; or, on the contrary, by the nonexistence of animal rights, if there is only
indirect duties before they.
Description
Keywords
Citation
Endorsement
Review
Supplemented By
Referenced By
Rights and licensing
Acesso Aberto
