A dupla camada de exclusão no novo FUNDEB: entre a barreira técnica do VAAT e o custo político do VAAR
Loading...
Date
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora (UFJF)
Abstract
This dissertation investigates the political and bureaucratic dynamics of accessing resources
from the Novo FUNDEB, established by Constitutional Amendment No. 108/2020. The central
research problem analyzes how the institutional design of technical conditionalities — VAAT
(Total Annual Value per Student) — and political conditionalities — VAAR (Value per Student
per Year based on Results) — interacts with the asymmetries of state capacity and governability
within Brazilian municipalities. The research adopts a qualitative, exploratory, and descriptive
approach, utilizing a methodological triangulation strategy that combines bibliographic
research, documentary analysis, and secondary data analysis. The study demonstrates the
emergence of a "Double Layer of Exclusion": first, the instrumental barrier of the VAAT, arising
from the inability of local bureaucracies to manage the fiscal taxonomy of the Accounting
Balance Matrix (MSC); and second, the institutional barrier of the VAAR, resulting from
political transaction costs and the influence of "veto players" within legislative arenas. The
confirmed hypothesis indicates that the system operates under a logic of adverse selection,
producing the "Matthew Effect", in which entities with higher technical capacity and political
stability are rewarded, while vulnerable municipalities remain trapped in an "administrative
poverty trap." Finally, the study proposes an institutional engineering agenda based on
cooperative federalism, suggesting public consortia, technological standardization, and the
modulation of sanctions to mitigate federative inequalities.
Description
Keywords
Citation
Endorsement
Review
Supplemented By
Referenced By
Creative Commons license
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Acesso Aberto

