Da relação entre o transcendental e o prático na crítica da razão pura: sobre a possibilidade de um fundamento metafísico da liberdade em Kant
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Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora (UFJF)
Abstract
This work aims to examine the concept of freedom in Kant, considering both its
transcendental and practical formulations in the Critique of Pure Reason, and to assess
whether, based on this conception, it is possible to outline a metaphysical path. To this end,
the investigation addresses: (1) the status of metaphysics in Kant, its relation to the
philosophical tradition, and the critical stance adopted against dogmatism and skepticism; (2)
the general structure of Kantian epistemology, presented briefly yet necessarily, in order to
establish the conceptual ground upon which the discussion of freedom will be developed; (3)
the formulation of freedom in the third antinomy and Kant’s proposed solution, linked to
reason’s demand for the unconditioned; (4) the role of spontaneity, initially within the
cognitive domain, through the synthesis of imagination and transcendental apperception, and
subsequently within the practical domain, as a link to freedom; and (5) the comparison
between the treatment of freedom in the Transcendental Dialectic and in the Canon of Pure
Reason, identifying the dissonance between transcendental freedom and practical freedom and
discussing its implications for the legitimacy of a possible metaphysics.
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