Controle judicial das nomeações 'ad nutum': uma releitura sobre o mérito administrativo e os limites da discricionariedade
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Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora - Campus Avançado de Governador Valadares
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This article reflects on the fact that the freedom granted to public agents to
appoint people to commissioned positions, based on the criterion of trust, raises
questions as to its compatibility with the pursuit of an efficient and impersonal Public
Administration. Discretionary appointments, although legally provided for, often
disregard technical and meritocratic criteria, compromising the quality of public
management. Given this scenario, this study analyzes to what extent discretionary
appointments, when based exclusively on trust, may represent a violation of the
principle of efficiency if anchored solely on the argument of discretion. In response to
such questions, the hypothesis is defended that judicial control of administrative merit
may be a necessary tool to ensure that such appointments comply with constitutional
principles. To this end, the research is based on a qualitative, exploratory,
bibliographical and interdisciplinary approach, with analysis of official documents,
court decisions and relevant doctrines, in order to assess the impacts of the
politicization of commissioned positions in public administration.
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Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Acesso Aberto

