A remuneração de executivos e o desempenho econômico-financeiro e de mercado das empresas: um estudo das instituições não financeiras listadas na B3

Loading...
Thumbnail Image

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora (UFJF)

Abstract

The objective of this work is to investigate how the remuneration of the executives of the Board of Directors and the Board of Executive Officers impacted the economic-financial and market performance of the non-financial Brazilian companies that make up B3, in the period from 2010 to 2019. Changes perceived in the companies' structures triggered a discussion about the professionalization of their management. This discussion finds theoretical support in the Agency Theory, which advocates that this professionalization of management gives rise to two subjects: the owner, called the principal, and the hired manager, called the agent. These two subjects can generate conflicts because they have different interests. In this way, the Agency Theory brings up important discussions about the roles of those responsible for decisionmaking and monitoring mechanisms, such as remuneration, for example. The method used was a quantile regression with panel data. The sample consisted of 188 non-financial Brazilian companies listed on B3 whose data were available in the Economática and ComDinheiro database. It was concluded that the remuneration system impacted the economic-financial indicators much more than the market indicators, with variable remuneration being the one that most impacted and, among the economic-financial indicators, Return on Assets (ROA) was the most impacted when compared to Return on Equity (ROE).

Description

Citation

Endorsement

Review

Supplemented By

Referenced By

Creative Commons license

Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Acesso Aberto