O problema da explicação dos transtornos mentais na neuropsiquiatria cognitiva
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Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora (UFJF)
Abstract
Psychiatry qua medical science faces since its early beginnings a number of questions
when it tries to delineate a medical object at the level of mental phenomena. These problems
arise from the very ambiguity of the concept of mental illness. Throughout its history the
main theories have belonged to two antagonistic perspectives. On one side, psychogenetic
perspectives that seek the genesis of psychopathologies inside the internal dynamics of the
mind. On the other side, biological perspectives that seek in pathological changes of the
functioning of the human body, mainly in the brain, the pathogenesis triggering psychiatric
symptoms. In the last two decades of 20th century, the biological perspective has become
dominant in the context of psychiatric ideas and practices. However, this psychiatry has
neglected psychological investigation and elaboration of psychological theories integrated to
biological theories of psychiatric symptoms. It is in this context that in the early 1990s
cognitive neuropsychiatry became institutionalized by proposing the formulation of cognitive
models of symptom formation as an indispensable stage to find the neural structures that
realize cognitive functions. From the discussion on the mechanistic model of explanation
current in the life sciences, the neurosciences and the cognitive sciences, the problem and the
strategies of explanation of psychopathological phenomena is addressed. The original project
of cognitive neuropsychiatry, which sustains the autonomy of cognitive models regarding the
knowledge of brain functioning, is contraposed to the proposition of integration between
psychiatry and cognitive neuroscience. It is defended that this “neurocognitive psychiatry”
has a greater potential to solve the theoretical obstacles that challenge psychiatry. It allows an
integration between neuroscience and cognitive theories including in its scope data about the
phenomenology of psychiatric symptoms. Nonetheless, this psychiatry faces some difficulties
to elaborate multilevel mechanistic explanations of certain psychiatric symptoms due to the
nonmodular nature of some cognitive systems involved in its formation. Finally, we highlight
that this new biological perspective is still a research program to be accomplished. Although
it looks promising in the explanation of some symptoms, like delusional phenomena, it still
has not proven its theoretical and empirical solidity regarding the explanation of other central
psychopathological phenomena.
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