A dupla camada de exclusão no novo FUNDEB: entre a barreira técnica do VAAT e o custo político do VAAR

Abstract

This dissertation investigates the political and bureaucratic dynamics of accessing resources from the Novo FUNDEB, established by Constitutional Amendment No. 108/2020. The central research problem analyzes how the institutional design of technical conditionalities — VAAT (Total Annual Value per Student) — and political conditionalities — VAAR (Value per Student per Year based on Results) — interacts with the asymmetries of state capacity and governability within Brazilian municipalities. The research adopts a qualitative, exploratory, and descriptive approach, utilizing a methodological triangulation strategy that combines bibliographic research, documentary analysis, and secondary data analysis. The study demonstrates the emergence of a "Double Layer of Exclusion": first, the instrumental barrier of the VAAT, arising from the inability of local bureaucracies to manage the fiscal taxonomy of the Accounting Balance Matrix (MSC); and second, the institutional barrier of the VAAR, resulting from political transaction costs and the influence of "veto players" within legislative arenas. The confirmed hypothesis indicates that the system operates under a logic of adverse selection, producing the "Matthew Effect", in which entities with higher technical capacity and political stability are rewarded, while vulnerable municipalities remain trapped in an "administrative poverty trap." Finally, the study proposes an institutional engineering agenda based on cooperative federalism, suggesting public consortia, technological standardization, and the modulation of sanctions to mitigate federative inequalities.