O poder de governar as companhias: a velha crise de confiança na era da Inteligência Artificial
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Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora (UFJF)
Abstract
Traditionally, corporate governance has been concerned with guiding how companies are
directed, in response to recurring crises of trust related to the definition of who should hold
the power to control them and for what purposes such power is exercised. In the Brazilian
legal framework, although Law No. 6,404/76 assigns to the general shareholders’ meeting the
authority to deliberate on corporate matters and to the board of directors the general guidance
of the company’s business, decision-making power proves to be structurally concentrated in
the figure of the controlling shareholder. Even though legally regulated, this power finds both
formal and informal means to influence decision-making bodies, directing them according to
its own interests, sometimes to the detriment of the corporate interest and other stakeholders.
Based on this premise, the present study investigates how this normative
arrangement—marked by shortcomings in constraining control power—interacts with the
incorporation of AI systems into corporate decision-making processes. The central object of
the research is thus to understand this phenomenon in light of the power structures and
corporate governance arrangements specific to the Brazilian context, given that the
international literature on the subject has predominantly developed in settings characterized
by dispersed ownership and conflicts between shareholders and managers. To this end, Part I
presents a literature review grounded in the work of authors who critically examine the
centrality of the controlling shareholder and the normative mechanisms aimed at limiting their
powers, followed by an empirical analysis of administrative decisions issued by the Brazilian
Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) between 2014 and 2024. This analysis is
conceived as a qualitative illustration of the adopted theoretical framework, with the purpose
of identifying concrete correspondences regarding the influence of control power as a factor
in destabilizing the functional autonomy of corporate bodies and in the practical
reconfiguration of formally established decision-making arrangements. Building on this
analytical foundation, Part II proposes an exploratory examination of the integration of AI
systems into decision-making by corporate bodies, considering variables such as accuracy,
transparency, risks, and levels of human oversight, according to the degree of technological
autonomy—assisted, augmented, or autonomous. From this mapping, it is possible to infer
that the greater the centrality of the decision and the more significant its effects on rights,
duties, and the company’s strategic direction, the greater the need for proportional safeguards.
In light of the Brazilian institutional and regulatory context, and in dialogue with concerns
primarily formulated at the international level, the study concludes that the incorporation of
AI systems into the deliberations of corporate bodies is not, in itself, a corrective element for
the identified shortcomings. If implemented without consideration of previously identified
distortions and the mismatch between the formal allocation of authority and the actual centers
of control, technology tends to replicate—through a new operational language—the
traditional forms of asymmetric exercise of power.
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