Possibilidade de investigação científica da sobrevivência da consciência após a morte: uma análise dos argumentos filosóficos contemporâneos
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Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora (UFJF)
Abstract
The aim of this doctoral thesis is an analysis of contemporary philosophical arguments
about the possibility of scientific investigation of the survival of consciousness and
personal identity after the death of the physical body. The philosophical analysis has
identified, respectively, three objections and two defenses for this possibility: (1) It is
logically impossible, since the assumption of mind-body separability, presupposed in
the concept of survival, would be conceptually incoherent; (2) It is factually impossible,
since if minds are conceived as entirely non-spatial and immaterial, their existence
after death could not be physically, and therefore empirically, detectable; (3) It is
unscientific, since the natural sciences have shown that physical laws, principles, and
processes are necessary conditions for the occurrence and scientific explanation of
consciousness and mental phenomena, which the concept of survival rejects in its
definition; (4) It is factually possible, since the ideal conditions for verifying the survival
hypothesis can be conceived and defined; and (5) It is empirically probable, since there
is available evidence—namely, mental phenomena that suggest the continuity of an
individual's consciousness and personality after death—that raises the survival
hypothesis as an explanation. Objection (1) can be challenged based on theses (4)
and (5). If survival is a verifiable proposition and an available explanation for certain
empirical phenomena, its logical possibility and conceptual coherence are
prerequisites for it to be considered an empirical hypothesis. Objections (2) and (3)
reveal that their proponents either ignore or are unaware of both the investigation of
psychic phenomena and the empirical question of survival associated with these
investigations, as well as the epistemological and theoretical foundations on which this
question has been conceived. Given existing research on survival, objections (2) and
(3) do not hold. Moreover, objection (3) is based on a specific characterization of the
mind as non-spatial and immaterial substances, which is unnecessary for
conceptualizing the survival hypothesis. Typically, theses (4) and (5) have been
supported on epistemological grounds, adopting as empirical criteria the continuity of
memory and personality traits after death. Mental phenomena empirically relevant to
survival are mediumistic communications, apparitions of a deceased person at the
moment of death, alleged memories of reincarnation, and transcendent experiences
during clinical death. It is concluded that the objections to investigation are
unconvincing, and the supporting arguments respond to them consistently. Therefore,
survival is a topic open to scientific research.
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