O problema da unidade da psicologia e a possibilidade de sua unificação teórica
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Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora (UFJF)
Abstract
The problem of the unity of psychology is one of the most central issues that has
permeated its history. If we observe this trajectory carefully, we can see that it has been
marked by many criticisms and declarations of crisis regarding attempts to provide a
philosophical foundation for it. Despite the polysemy and lack of rigor in the specific
literature, we can characterize it as the lack of endemic consensus regarding the ontological,
epistemological, methodological and anthropological assumptions adopted by the different
psychological approaches. Five main causes of this problem are identified: (a) the social
formation of psychology; (b) institutional factors and the structure of professional rewards in
psychology; (c) the bifurcation between natural sciences and human sciences; (d) theoretical
factors; and (e) the bifurcation between science and practice; and three main strategies for
solving this problem and their main proposals: Reductionist, Integrationist/Pluralist and
Skeptical or Positive Valuation of Dispersion. The central theme of our research is the
endemic problem of unity that psychology has faced throughout its history, as a field of
knowledge, modern science and academic discipline. Within this broader theme, the
following specific objectives are considered: the description of the problem of the unity of
psychology, contextualizing it within the history of science and its specific field, and then
analyzing the possibilities and difficulties of applying the model of explanation and
possibilist laws for the theoretical unification of psychology. It is argued here that the
possibilist model proposed by Gustavo Arja Castañon can make an important contribution to
the debate, through the construction of common evaluation criteria, an integrated conceptual
structure and the formulation of a comprehensive metatheory, in addition to being able to
help find new, more harmonious and cohesive ways of organizing the discipline
institutionally and professionally, without causing fragmentation and distancing among its
members. Since traditional models of explanation fail to explain psychological phenomena,
it is believed that this explanatory model, which aims to explain the epistemic possibility of
a phenomenon, instead of pointing out the necessary and sufficient conditions, presents
significant qualities to resolve some of the causes of the fragmentation of psychology,
improve some old proposals for unification, especially the integrationist proposals, as well
as serve as a basis for the construction of new proposals. Finally, it is concluded that the
search for unity and unification are still necessary for a scientific discipline and we believe
that their defense is fundamental for the future of psychology.
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