Three essays on cartel agreements

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Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora (UFJF)

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In this thesis, we propose three essays on cartel agreements. Assuming bounded rationality, the first chapter analyses the strategic interaction between firms from an evolutionary game perspective. We introduce new elements to discuss the mechanisms that sustain collusive agreements. In the second chapter, following the economic reasoning of crime, we propose a game-theoretical model to evaluate the stability of illegal cartels. Under this approach, punishment is also illegal. Thus, we offer new insights to antitrust authorities in inhibiting cartels as criminal organizations. Finally, the third chapter dialogues with the previous chapters through an empirical assessment of gasoline cartels in Brazil. To reach our purposes, we combine machine learning techniques with screens based on the statistical moments of the gasoline retail price distribution to correctly classify cartel behavior.

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