Voto e competição política na Primeira República: o caso de Minas Gerais

Abstract

The study analyzes the vote and the political competition during the First Republic, specifically during the battle over the Chamber of Deputies from 1894 to 1930. For the achievement of such analyzes, it was decided to take focus on the dynamics and strategies developed in a specific oligarchy, i.e. Minas Gerais. The choice for such object is justified by the fact that Minas was, until 1930, one of the Brazilian states whose oligarchy was more organized and cohesive. These characteristics were considered by the researchers as a result of the operation of oligarchic domination instruments, which had as one of the key features, the work of the Republican Party of Minas / RPM. Being theoretically able to eliminate the oppositions and the dissidences, the RPM and the verification of credentials - the one held by the House of Representatives during the preparatory sessions in the beginning of each legislature to examine the proceedings that attributed the mandate to the elected ones - would have dominated the political scene, and consequently, make the electoral competition not viable. However, the data analysis found in journals and proceedings of the National Congress (1894-1930), as well as in newspapers in the same period, indicates the existence of candidacies disputing actively and steadily; and that the fraud itself, recurrently use throughout the period, was an instrument of struggle for power used by all the contenders. Therefore, the purpose of this study, based on the political history perspective and the revision of established theories about the First Republic, is to analyze the struggle for voting and the political competition in Minas Gerais. The hypothesis now advocated is that the RPM was the dynamic center of the state policy; and that it was from their decisions that individuals were organized, especially those excluded from the list of candidates. Thus, the elimination of oppositions and dissidences was not processed only in the formation of slates, or the so-called degolas (term similar to “beheading” that was used figuratively to portray the fraudulent practice of Brazilian oligarchies that intervened directly in the results of the elections) which took place during the credentials checking. It occurred during many other stages of the elections, as a depuration process. This hypothesis may explain why the number of degolas remained at low levels, until 1930. In addition to the existence of political competition, another noticed aspect was that the electoral process, regulated by successive laws had the intention to make the pleas more and more convenient, which favored the parity of the actors in the fights over slices of power. Between 1892 and 1930, three electoral codes were sanctioned, and each of them had a different impact on the elections. The third, by the way, reduced the degolas, partly due to a greater control over the electoral proceedings count issued to the elected ones. The growing strictness of the laws limited the political will upon the process benches formation, increasing the electoral competition, which was evident in the election of 1930. Information verified in the Getúlio Vargas File documentation, in newspapers and in the memories of contemporaries, attests the rivalry occurred between the opponents in the election. Intervention strategies on the composition of counting committees are key elements in the new configuration of the electoral process.