Possibilidade de investigação científica da sobrevivência da consciência após a morte: uma análise dos argumentos filosóficos contemporâneos

Abstract

The aim of this doctoral thesis is an analysis of contemporary philosophical arguments about the possibility of scientific investigation of the survival of consciousness and personal identity after the death of the physical body. The philosophical analysis has identified, respectively, three objections and two defenses for this possibility: (1) It is logically impossible, since the assumption of mind-body separability, presupposed in the concept of survival, would be conceptually incoherent; (2) It is factually impossible, since if minds are conceived as entirely non-spatial and immaterial, their existence after death could not be physically, and therefore empirically, detectable; (3) It is unscientific, since the natural sciences have shown that physical laws, principles, and processes are necessary conditions for the occurrence and scientific explanation of consciousness and mental phenomena, which the concept of survival rejects in its definition; (4) It is factually possible, since the ideal conditions for verifying the survival hypothesis can be conceived and defined; and (5) It is empirically probable, since there is available evidence—namely, mental phenomena that suggest the continuity of an individual's consciousness and personality after death—that raises the survival hypothesis as an explanation. Objection (1) can be challenged based on theses (4) and (5). If survival is a verifiable proposition and an available explanation for certain empirical phenomena, its logical possibility and conceptual coherence are prerequisites for it to be considered an empirical hypothesis. Objections (2) and (3) reveal that their proponents either ignore or are unaware of both the investigation of psychic phenomena and the empirical question of survival associated with these investigations, as well as the epistemological and theoretical foundations on which this question has been conceived. Given existing research on survival, objections (2) and (3) do not hold. Moreover, objection (3) is based on a specific characterization of the mind as non-spatial and immaterial substances, which is unnecessary for conceptualizing the survival hypothesis. Typically, theses (4) and (5) have been supported on epistemological grounds, adopting as empirical criteria the continuity of memory and personality traits after death. Mental phenomena empirically relevant to survival are mediumistic communications, apparitions of a deceased person at the moment of death, alleged memories of reincarnation, and transcendent experiences during clinical death. It is concluded that the objections to investigation are unconvincing, and the supporting arguments respond to them consistently. Therefore, survival is a topic open to scientific research.