O estatuto da Psicologia empírica no projeto filosófico de Johann Nicolaus Tetens (1736-1807)

Abstract

Although it is possible to observe a recent interest in Tetens’ magnum opus, Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwickelung (1777), and new editions of his other philosophical works, there are still many gaps to be filled in understanding the depth and originality of his intellectual project. This is the case, for example, of the status of empirical psychology in Tetens’ metaphysical system. Although some studies have contributed to a better understanding of the main characteristics of psychological investigation in his Philosophische Versuche, it is possible to observe that fundamental questions – such as the existence of a coherent and unified proposal of empirical psychology and its relation to ontology and rational psychology – remain poorly understanding. Based on the assumption that an analysis of philosophical and psychological writings before and after his magnum opus can help us understand these questions, the present work begins with some notes about psychology and metaphysics in the period from 1759 to 1775. Then, we describe the psychological investigations in the Philosophische Versuche. Finally, we discuss the status of empirical psychology, based on the analysis of his Metaphysik (2015). We conclude that there is no significant change in the conception of empirical psychology throughout his work, including his definition as a metaphysical discipline and the use of the analytical method, although this is not always clear in Tetens’ initial discussions. Besides, we present textual evidence to support the thesis that the affiliation of empirical psychology to metaphysics is based not only on its propaedeutic character to ontology and rational psychology, but also on a general conception of psychology, which, as a science of the soul, needs to be complemented by a rational analysis, including fundamental concepts and principles of ontology.