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**MEDIA VISIBILITY AND ELECTORAL CAREERS: RESEARCH
COMPARING MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT IN BRAZIL AND GERMANY**

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Orlando Lyra de Carvalho Júnior

**Visibilidade Midiática e Carreiras Eleitorais: pesquisa comparativa
entre Brasil e Alemanha.**

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À minha esposa, Alessandra.

Às minhas filhas, Isabel e Beatriz,

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RESUMO

Objetivo: Este trabalho baseia-se em uma pesquisa de campo realizada com deputados brasileiros e alemães e visa comparar estratégias de comunicação e comportamento eleitoral nos dois países. A hipótese de trabalho é que as estratégias de comunicação de parlamentares variam de acordo com o padrão de votação, o tipo de voto e as conexões eleitorais. **Metodologia:** entrevistas semiabertas e fechadas foram conduzidas para avaliar as percepções e práticas de parlamentares do Brasil e da Alemanha como um exercício inicial para explorar a relação entre visibilidade na mídia e carreiras eleitorais. O desenho da pesquisa utilizou uma amostra de saturação que proporcionou um número suficiente de inquiridos para análise. Foram estabelecidas correlações estatísticas (tabulação-cruzada, logit e FA) entre as respostas e as variáveis concentração de votos, tipo de candidatura, magnitude do distrito e nível de competitividade. **Resultados:** A pesquisa comparou um país altamente desenvolvido (Alemanha) com um em desenvolvimento (Brasil) que apresenta um grande déficit em infraestrutura. No entanto, o estudo constatou semelhanças entre tipos de políticos que usam os meios de comunicação de massa, no nível nacional e regional, para se comunicar com os seus eleitores, trabalham em comitês e fazem discursos em plenário, mas cujas atividades parlamentares não estão principalmente voltadas a trazer benefícios e a atender os interesses locais dos distritos onde foram eleitos. A pesquisa também descobriu um tipo de político que usa intensamente a mídia eletrônica e impressa regional, e cujas atividades estão focadas principalmente no fornecimento de serviços e vantagens a seus distritos eleitorais. Quanto à política on-line, a pesquisa constatou que a Internet não é vista como decisiva na arena política: ela é usada em ambos os países como uma alternativa complementar aos meios de comunicação de massa, e como uma estratégia adotada principalmente por deputados que pertencem a partidos pequenos e com poucos recursos. Parlamentares filiados a grandes partidos tendem a utilizar a Internet principalmente para afirmar certa independência face às burocracias partidárias. No Brasil, a estratégia de Internet não é vista como principal meio de comunicação com os eleitores, mas com outras elites políticas. Como instrumento de comunicação política, a pesquisa descobriu que a Internet é usada pelos políticos brasileiros e alemães de diferentes formas e para diferentes fins. Não se constatou o uso da Internet como uma força de globalização, ou seja, com uma tecnologia que produz um uso pasteurizado e inelutável em todo o mundo. Em vez disso, a Internet é usada em contextos locais para atender interesses locais. **Conclusão:** Os dados coletados na pesquisa de campo confirmaram parcialmente a hipótese que sugere uma associação entre as variáveis concentração de votos, magnitude distrital e nível de competitividade com os diferentes níveis de preocupação com a presença nos meios de comunicação e com a construção de uma boa reputação política. Na Alemanha, o sistema misto gera incentivos para candidatos adotarem estratégias de campanha diferentes, dependendo do tipo de voto (majoritário ou proporcional). Esses incentivos definem a estrutura da concorrência a nível distrital e as estratégias de comunicação dos políticos. Os aspectos multifacetados das conexões eleitorais se revelaram capazes de compensar a ausência de uma cobertura adequada na mídia de massa, podendo até coroar de sucesso as carreiras eleitorais de candidatos a cargos proporcionais no Brasil e na Alemanha.

Palavras-chave: Carreiras eleitorais, visibilidade midiática, política comparada.

ABSTRACT

Objective: This dissertation draws upon field research conducted with Brazilian and German members of parliament. It aims to compare communication strategies and electoral behavior in both countries. The working hypothesis is that the communication strategies of members of parliament vary with the voting pattern, the type of vote and the electoral connections. **Methodology:** semi-open and closed interviews were conducted to assess the perceptions and practices of parliamentarians of both countries as an initial exercise in exploring the relationship between media visibility and parliamentary careers. The research design draws upon a saturation sample to provide a sufficient number of respondents for analysis. Statistical correlations (cross-tabulation, logit and FA) between the responses to the survey and the independent variables concentration and type of votes, magnitude and competitiveness were established. **Results:** The research compares a developed country (Germany) with a very good infrastructure, and a developing country (Brazil) with a great deficit in infrastructure. Yet, the study found similar established politicians, who uses national and regional media to communicate with voters, works in committees, deliver speeches at the House's floor, whose activities are not primarily related to district interests. The research also found a type of politician who heavily uses the local broadcasting and print media, whose activities are primarily focused on delivering services and pork to constituencies. As for the online politics, the research found that the Internet is not seen as a "game-changer": it is used in both countries as a complementary alternative to the mass media, and as a strategy adopted mostly by MPs who belong to small parties with few resources. Big-party MPs uses the Internet mostly to gain some independence from the party bureaucracy. In Brazil, the Internet is not seen as a valuable means of communication with voters, but with other political elites. As an instrument of political communication, the research found that the Internet is used by Brazilian and German politicians in different ways and for different purposes. It emerged not as a globalizing force, i.e., with a technological power to produce a pasteurized and ineluctable usage all across the globe. Instead, the Internet is used in local contexts to suit local interests. **Conclusion:** The field research partially confirmed the hypotheses that suggest an association between the variables concentration of votes, district magnitude and level of competitiveness with different levels of concern on positive coverage in the mass media, and on the construction of a good political reputation. In Germany, the mixed electoral system generates incentives for candidates to adopt different campaign strategies, depending on the type of vote (majority or proportional). These incentives shape the structure of competition at the district level, and the MPs' communication strategies. The multifaceted aspects of the electoral connection proved to compensate for the absence of adequate coverage in the mass media, and may even crown with success the election of candidates for proportional seats in Brazil and Germany.

Keywords: Electoral careers, media visibility, comparative politics.

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INTRODUCTION ¹

Comparative research is like entering foreign lands. Researchers who have invaded the territories of cross-national studies encounter substantial diversity resulting from country-specific characteristics. However, in the view of the development of global communication processes, which no longer stop at national borders, research studies should not focus only on particularities of a given country, as more comparative perspective is wanting. In the twenty-first century, we are confronted with developments in the realm of politics and mass communication that rule out the conception of political communication as a phenomenon that could be defined within singular national, cultural, or linguistic boundaries.

The dynamic interactions between political actors, the media, and audience members, each of whom engaged in the process of producing, receiving and interpreting political messages represent a “moving target” for researchers. Although the essence of politics over many centuries has involved by constructing, sending, receiving and processing politically relevant messages, political discourse has yielded evidence of a fundamental change as an effect of new media technologies in recent decades. This was mainly due to homogenization, modernization, secularization and mediatization processes, which reshaped the interdependencies between political players, media and citizens.

Indeed, the mass media have traditionally played an important role in representative democracies, whether as mediators or as actors in their own right. However, the relationship between elected politicians and the media is now evolving rapidly as the result of technological and social change. These changes are often deemed universal. Most modern democracies have experienced a decline in party identification and, as a result, growing electoral volatility. These changes are frequently considered to be the result of social change since the 1970s, initially affecting the advanced post-industrial democracies of the Northern hemisphere. In the meantime, these changes can also be observed in South America. The decline in party identification is often believed to have increased the impact of short-term factors such as candidate orientations and candidate images on voting behavior. In combination with technological change in the media

¹ The U.S. spelling was adopted. The credit for all foreign language translations goes to the author.

sector (expansion of television and the internet) and electoral systems allowing the cultivation of a personal vote, scholars have made observations ranging from *individualization*, *personalization* and the *presidentialisation* of political representation even in parliamentary systems of government. Suitable media strategies and the targeted, personalized interaction with specific voter groups have increasingly become an important aspect of political competitiveness and leadership in the context of *audience democracies*.

However, carefully designed comparative studies demonstrate that many of these developments are mediated by variations in *institutional incentives* and in the general *political environment*. Such studies motivate the question of how elected politicians adapt their campaign strategies to the all-encompassing media environment. More specifically, whether positive political coverage and personal media visibility are equally important for all kinds of electoral careers. It is, of course, plausible that individual candidates for political leadership positions such as mayoral, gubernatorial or presidential candidates experience strong and growing individual media scrutiny.

Those are the “politicians who are most likely to do the media interviews and write books and articles about their experiences” (Searing, 1994: xi), especially if they cannot rely exclusively on their party to attract voters. Yet, despite all the media’s leverage, do all candidates for seats in elected assemblies (city councilors, state legislators, congressmen), “backbenchers who shape Parliament’s roles but are less likely to discuss them in print or broadcast” (Searing, 1994: xi), give equal importance and emphasis to media visibility?

There has been a great deal of innovative research based on variations in the institutional incentives to cultivate a personal vote for MPs, depending on different electoral systems, starting with the seminal article by Carey and Shugart, in 1995. The hypothesis here is more strongly based on the nature of the electoral district. This research aims to investigate the claim that, just as candidates have distinct *electoral connections* (Mayhew, 2004), they might also have different media strategies for gaining mandates and getting re-elected. The nature of the electoral district, well-researched in US-based studies on representation, is understudied elsewhere.

This study is designed to compare the link between media visibility and electoral connections amongst Members of the Brazilian and German Parliaments (MPs). In many ways, such a comparison could be seen as a “most different systems design” (Przeworski and Teune, 1970) where a particular variable (such as growing media influence) has explanatory power across very different cases, even if they vary in terms of regime type (presidential versus parliamentary system), electoral system or political traditions. Both polities are federal in nature, providing voters with choices – and candidates with opportunities – at different territorial levels. This creates variation in the size of the local electorate and the nature of the *electoral connection* between voters and MPs. Scholars in Brazil and Germany have shown that the use of media in political campaigns varies according to territorial level of representation and geographic voting patterns. Such constituency characteristics have been neglected in comparative research inspired by the new institutionalism in political science.

The research explores and tests hypotheses derived from the theoretical distributive model, which starts from the assumption according to which the key element explaining the legislative production and organization is located in the outer sphere of Congress, namely, in the election time. From this perspective, the logic of Congress and the properties of legislative output are understood from the view of an *electoral connection* (Mayhew, 1974). The aim herein is to explore the types of media strategies and their relationship with the various nuances of the *electoral connection* in Brazil and Germany, according to structures of incentives translated into different geographical vote settings, party organization and type of vote.

In Germany, the working hypothesis is that direct personal visibility in the media (*Medienpräsenz*) might be a strategy that is more strongly visible at the federal level (*Bundestagswahlen*), whereas at the state level (*Landeswahlen*) this influence is more strongly mediated by party indirectly. District candidates, who compete under the majority rule, might rely more on media coverage than list-candidates under the proportional rule, who might rely more on the party label and on a good position on the *Landesliste* than on media presence.

Given the great difference between the Brazilian and German political systems in general, it is possible to study the interaction between MPs and media in different electoral contexts such as the different types of votes, position on party lists and territorial level, as well as under different geographic voting patterns. This may provide rich information on media strategies of MPs vis-à-vis the particular nature of their constituency, ranging from the party electorate for list and district candidates to the voters at different territorial levels. If the expectation that (a) the general increase of the importance of individual media strategies holds across different political systems, and (b) varies according to constituency characteristics like the ones mentioned above, it would be possible to add significantly to scholarship on electoral systems and the effect of media on political behavior.

PRESENTATION OF THE RESEARCH

This research is comprised of *six parts* divided into chapters. *Part one* includes three chapters, discusses the theoretical framework surrounding the debate, namely the key concepts of mediated politics and electoral connection. Chapter one describes changing patterns of political campaigns and elections in a cross-national perspective. Firstly, the study outlines changes that have defined the mutual interdependence between media and politics, and changes in the system of political representation brought about by the advent of “audience democracy” (Manin, 1997). In the second step the analysis shows that there can be no political participation without adequate information, given the complex nature of large-scale modern democracy, which contrasts with the simplification of authoritarian alternatives. The very complexity of the democratic system introduces a demand for reliable sources of information on what happens in the political sphere, and the capacity of citizens to understand the implications of the decision-making processes to their lives.

Chapter two examines the key concepts of mediation and mediatization. The concept of *mediation* denotes the act of transmitting messages through mass media and the overall effect of media institutions existing in contemporary society. In such perspective, “mediated communication” is opposed to direct, first-hand, or face-to-face communication and “mediated politics” is different from politics experienced through interpersonal communication or directly by the people. *Mediatization* in contrast is a

multidimensional, process-oriented concept, focused on how media influence has increased in a number of different respects, and framed on par with other societal change processes such as modernization, individualization, and globalization.

Mediatization theory assumes that communication is the core activity of human beings, and ultimately media is “a modifier of communication” (Krotz, 2009). The concept tries to grasp the social and cultural consequences of the changing conditions for communication as offered by the media’s developments. The concept of mediatization is especially important because it can unite different types of empirical data, collected within different disciplines, and from different cultural contexts, under a common label. This may be helpful to systematize and categorize the existing empirical results of the media influence and changes to the different fields of everyday life, politics, culture and society, depending on where these changes take place: the micro, mezzo, or macro level.

At this point, these two chapters are summarized by stating that the media has long ceased to be a mere technological tool to become a critical environment for society, culture and politics in general. To take into consideration media’s centrality does not imply that politics has become a mere branch of advertising or even less entertainment. Media and politics make up two different systems, keep some degree of autonomy, and their mutual influence is historical and context dependent.

Chapter three starts with an outline of the theoretical background to the idea of “electoral connection”. The presupposition is that representative democracy can only be understood through analytical tools that can make sense of the behavior of the elected representatives. Any effort to meet this challenge from a rational-choice perspective needs to specify the actors involved, their preferences, informational acquirments and strategic options given a specific institutional setting that structures the interaction between them. Where actors have clear, defined objectives and believe they have relatively good information on how to further their goals, their behavior approximates that specified in rational-choice models. The rational choice approach fits better in situations in which actors’ identity and goal are clear and the rules of the interaction are

precise and known to the interacting agents. Rationality is more reasonable when dealing with elites.

On the one hand, the rational choice approach is justified because our first unit of analysis is the individual MP, not the party. Even in highly disciplined parties where politicians are subservient to the leadership, the party comprises individual politicians in the first instance. The behavior induced by incentives shapes the nature of parties because the rules that govern how elections unfolds and how parties choose candidates affect the relationship between politicians and parties. Institutional rules of the game give politicians incentives to cultivate a personal relationship with the electorate, to focus on local constituencies, and to pay attention to state and local politics. However, one implication of the rational-choice approach is that the nature of parties depends to a considerable extent upon how politicians act, and indirectly on the rules that govern candidate selection and election.

On the other hand, the claims of historical institutionalism are valid in contexts of strong, well-entrenched institutions, as is the case of Germany, but it is not particularly insightful for Brazil, where instrumental attitudes toward parties prevail. Neither politicians nor voters are loyal to parties (except on the left) once the parties do not suit their interests. Politicians switch parties or create a new one when their interests so dictate. Voters change allegiance frequently. Contrary to the institutional perspective, actors are often not loyal to institutions beyond instrumental logic.

The remaining parts of chapter three discuss the rational-choice-based distributive model, and the institutional-based party model. After requalifying and adapting Mayhew's classical analysis of the "electoral connection" in the context of the U. S. Congress, we concluded that the concept is valid for Brazil and Germany, whose mixed-electoral system also creates incentives toward particularism and universalism. By adopting two seemingly conflicting theoretical models the aim here is at a real "dialectical overcoming" (*Aufhebung*) in the sense that disqualifying either the distributive model or the party institutional perspective is flatly refused. None of the theoretical models holds the monopoly on being able to explain the diversity of MPs' strategic attitudes and electoral behavior in countries as distinct as Brazil and Germany.

Part two includes five chapters. The first one outlines the comparative methodological framework. The role of comparative analysis in social theory plays two basic functions: concept formation and clarification, and causal inference. Comparative analysis highlights variation and similarities, and thus contributes to concept building and to the refinement of our conceptual apparatus. Chapter one briefly discusses the *most different systems design*, in which a particular variable (such as growing media influence) has explanatory power across very different cases, even if they vary in terms of regime type (presidential versus parliamentary system), electoral system or political traditions.

On the one hand, the differences between the Brazilian and German cultural, political and media systems allow the analysis of different emphasis on media strategies in different electoral contexts and geographic voting patterns. On the other hand, both polities are federal in nature, providing voters with choices – and candidates with opportunities – at different territorial levels. This creates variation in the size of the local electorate, the nature of the electoral connection between voters and MPs, and consequently in media strategies.

Thus, the comparison between Brazil and Germany is justified for a number of reasons. Brazil's representative system combines a plebiscitary presidential system with federalism, and an open-list of candidates with proportional representation. The result of such a combination is a weak and fragmented multiparty system and the formation of coalitions based on heterogeneous political forces.

Germany is a *Parteiendemokratie* (party democracy), a parliamentary government, with a mixed-member electoral system that combines very different electoral rules in the same country. This fact provides a unique opportunity and a powerful analytical environment for the comparative study of institutional effects on politics, MPs' campaign styles and media strategies under identical, social, political and economic conditions. Because Germany's mixed-member system involves the simultaneous use of the world's two dominant forms of electoral rules--proportional representation and single-member district elections-- it allows the impact of institutional variables on political outcomes and media strategies to be isolated, by holding constant

non-institutional variables such as social cleavages, socio-economic development and culture.

Chapter two explores the main elements of the representative dimension of the Brazilian political system, with focus on the party system and the structure of collaborative and competitive relationships between parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies. The nature of the Brazilian electoral system (proportional representation with open lists), combined with a permissive party law, produces strong incentives for politicians' autonomy, and the individualistic behavior of candidates. These features associated with election campaigns focused primarily on electronic media stimulate direct communication between candidates and voters. This tendency for *personal vote-seeking* is reinforced by the peculiar role played by Free Time Election Propaganda (HGPE), which on the one hand enables free access for all parties and candidates to TV and radio, and on the other favors the personalization of the electoral competition to the detriment of the party image and programmatic or ideological debate.

Chapter three outlines the essential features of the German representative system, which is essentially equivalent to a *regular* proportional representation with a 5 per cent hurdle. However, the opportunity to cast two separate votes, counted in two separate ways, creates potential strategic effects not present in *pure* closed-list PR. The normative logic behind the two-vote system depends critically on voters reacting strategically, thereby creating different electoral incentives for the district and list candidates. Because the district members face different electoral incentives from those confronting the closed-list PR, personal votes arise because voters might want their district representative to serve as a link to the government and to the majority coalition in the legislature, even if they do not agree with the positions of the governing parties.

Party discipline is strong in Germany, and opposition parties have few avenues through which to affect policy decisions. Voters who care about pork [that is, appropriations, appointments, etc., made by the government for political reasons], and other issues in which the district has a clear stake are likely to prefer a representative in a government party rather than in opposition. Incumbents actively cultivate the personal vote through constituency service or by bringing government-funded projects to the

district. Yet, at the constituency level, campaigns come closer to a “pre-modern style”, which is characterized by its relative independence from the national level. Local campaigns represent a privileged context for candidates to run the dispute in a fashion independent from the party they represent.

Chapter four deals with the Brazilian media system. We draw upon Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) analytical framework for our comparative analysis between the Brazilian and German media systems. The first dimension analyzed is the *structure of the media market*, which focus on the historical roots of the newspapers, the circulation and readership rates, the role they play as mediators in the political communication process, and the relative importance of newspapers vis-à-vis television as sources of news and information. The second dimension comprises the level of *political parallelism*, a concept that refers to the notion of party-press parallelism (Seymour-Ure, 1974), used to evaluate the degree of connection between the media and the party systems. The third criterion relates to *journalistic professionalism*, split in three aspects: autonomy, norms, and public service orientation. The fourth and last dimension deals with *the role of the state* regarding the media system, which entails censorship or other types of political pressure, economic subsidies, media ownership, and the regulatory framework.

The familiar monopoly and cross-ownership of major media organizations, associated with the partial control of local and regional TV and radio networks by professional politicians, and the lack of a partisan press linked to social minority interests with national expression, makes media in Brazil hardly consistent with the idea of a “free market ideas”. In somewhat it confirms Robert Entman’s (1989) pessimistic assessment that media systems all over the world frustrates any significant movement toward full democracy. Mass media, it seems, will often fall short of the ideal of “free market of ideas” because, ultimately, there are the economic and political interests that dominate the final product of journalism.

In countries like Brazil, where economic elites easily become political elites, there seems to be no media outlet without the goal of becoming politically influential and placed in the center of power. If the media industry also represents political

interests, such an interest most likely will frame, screen and rank the news and editorials. Yet, the media alone cannot explain this phenomenon. Should the institutions of mass communication be dedicated exclusively to produce quality news they would surely face a negligible demand, and would certainly incur prohibitive costs and risks. The notion of “free market of ideas”, based on the unrealistic assumption of autonomy, perhaps will inspire naïve journalists, but in fact it lends itself more to mystify than to clarify the role of media in politics and its contribution to democracy. Mutual dependence, undoubtedly, reduces the capacity of the media, the public and even the political and economic elites to achieve their full democratic potential.

Chapter five describes the German media system. As a highly developed society, Germany has an extensive mass media structure that has made the Germans one of the most politically informed people in the world. The broadcast market is the largest in Europe. Around 90% of German households have cable or satellite TV, and viewers can choose from a variety of free-to-view public and commercial channels. Germans spend about 219 minutes per day on television, split about evenly between public and commercial programs. The introduction of private television via cable and satellite systems offers viewers a greatly expanded range of programs, but it has also arguably reduced the quality and quantity of political information.

In legal terms, the broadcasting system in Germany falls under the authority of the 16 federal states (*Länder*). The German decentralized and complex broadcasting governance aims to foster great external pluralism and to avoid monopolization by any single political or economic force. To achieve such a goal, the public broadcasting system should mirror the different political majorities emanating from different regions in each federal state. The public broadcasters govern themselves under the direction of a council featuring representatives of the major social, economic, cultural, and political groups, including political parties, churches, unions, and business organizations. Their financial sources stem largely from the monthly fees charged to television and radio owners, as public television sells no more than thirty minutes per day of commercial advertisements. Still it provides roughly one-third of television revenues and one-fourth of radio revenues. In terms of content and quality programming, what distinguishes

public television from commercial television is the ability to offer greater coverage of public service activities, cultural, and political events.

Currently, Germany has approximately 359 daily newspapers with a combined daily circulation of about 20 million. However, only one-third of these have their own complete editorial staff. The remainder have local staff and advertising facilities rely on wire service reports or reports from others papers for local, national, and international news. If local editions of all papers are included, there are 1,512 different titles. The local and regional newspaper market is strong and important, 95% of which is subscription press.

An important degree of political parallelism does persist in Germany, above all among papers of national outreach. At this level, journalists are still involved in the process of bargaining among political forces, and to a significant extent, they do participate in the political process. Some scholars have argued that German journalists tend to have a “mission orientation”, a concern with expressing ideas and shaping opinions. They tend to combine the roles of reporter, editor, and commentator, and to hold particular values and ideas. Yet, they do not openly campaign for political parties during election campaigns. Local papers are more likely to avoid a narrow identification with single parties, are ideologically amorphous, and tend to adopt a catchall approach, in which the emphasis is on internal pluralism, whereby they express the views of all major parties.

The distinctive feature of the German media system is a duality of apparently opposing tendencies, such as strong mass-circulation commercial media and media tied to political and civil groups, political parallelism and journalistic professionalism, liberal traditions of press freedom and a tradition of strong state intervention in the media, which is a social institution rather than a private enterprise. This duality is the result of the early development of a media market, a culture of entrepreneurial capitalism, and liberal political institutions, together with a push toward literacy that followed the Protestant Reformation and a political press tied to interests and perspectives of distinct social groups.

Part three, the field research, includes two chapters, and presents the key features of the proposed research design. The first chapter explains the research question and the main hypotheses, which arises from two observations: in Brazil, where political marketing seems to shine on TV and Internet, the reality is that 90% of the candidates for the Chamber of Deputies do campaign without TV, and there is still no clear indication of the relevance of cyber-campaigns in the political arena. Like their German counterparts, the candidates for proportional elections in Brazil still rely heavily on "pre-television" strategies, such as door-to-door campaigns, meetings in clubs and associations, and a large usage of political posters. For most of them, the format of HGPE airtime which reaches an undifferentiated public, adds little to campaigns focused on specific social groups, defined by corporate bonding and district spatial characteristics.

This is due, in part, to the Brazilian electoral system of proportional representation with open lists, which heavily customizes the dispute. Each candidate simultaneously competes against his party or coalition fellow, and depends on their votes to achieve the electoral coefficient. The internal competition normally prevents a unified campaign strategy. Given the differences in dynamics between the majoritarian and proportional campaigns, the impact of the latter on TV and radio (HGPE) is much lower if compared to the former. With a relatively small number of candidates, the majority campaigns attract reasonable visibility in the media. In the proportional campaigns, with hundreds of candidates, the HGPE political advertisement often takes the form of a succession of small "clips", i.e., a parade of anonymous faces announcing their names, candidacy number, and brief exposition of proposals.

In Germany, the election campaigns are traditionally multilevel. The national level features political celebrities and party top candidates, whose main communication strategy relies on mass media, political advertisements and large-scale political rallies. The second campaign level is local and mostly populated by average citizens running on a party list or for a direct mandate in a local constituency. They usually meet their potential voters face-to-face on market squares, through visits to companies, at social events, or simply through knocking on their front doors.

Such observations encouraged us to ask whether media visibility is equally important for all kinds of electoral careers: do all candidates for seats in elected assemblies (city councilors, state legislators, Congressmen), give equal importance and emphasis in their campaign strategies to media visibility and public image building?

Hypotheses herein have drawn upon the electoral formulae and the nature of the primary electoral units, the municipalities (Brazil) and the *Wahlkreis/Stimmenkreis* (Germany). On one hand, the effects of electoral systems occur at the district level. This means that electoral laws relate directly to the district level and not to the macro level of the political system. On the other hand, geographically limited areas represent (a) the destination point of the electoral connection, (b) the arena where political competitions take place and MPs draw votes or seek coalitions. It is assumed that candidates choose different strategies of concentration or dispersion of their resources by territory. The decision of where to focus the campaign on a few or many municipalities/districts is generally associated with the political profile and the availability of each MP's resources. Candidates with strong ties to a particular constituency tend to focus their campaign on a limited geographical area. Leadership with broader political ties, not geographically concentrated, may disperse their campaign resources along various constituencies.

Hypotheses have then been derive from two variables: (a) the electoral formula and (b) the voting pattern. The former may reinforce personal vote seeking or party vote seeking campaign strategies. The latter, the "horizontal vector", projects into space the dimension of concentration of votes. We are particularly interested in analyzing and comparing the different electoral formulae and the voting patterns of MPs at the federal and state levels of representation, specifically, MPs elected in 2010 for the Chamber of Deputies in the state of Minas Gerais (MG) in comparison to those elected in 2008 for the Landtag in the state of Bavaria. MPs elected for the Chamber of Deputies in Brazil (2010) compared to MPs elected for the German Bundestag (2009). Given that the electoral formulae and geographical voting pattern produce incentives for different kinds of campaign strategies and electoral connections, as a territorial basis of representation inevitably introduces particularistic and parochial concerns into the

policy-making process, it is assumed that it also produces differences in media strategies.

Chapter two describes the main features of the data collection process and instrument. Surveys, interviews and field research are used to test our hypotheses. Fieldwork was done in the Chamber of Deputies in Brasília and in the state of Minas Gerais (MG) between May 5th and October 7th, 2011, with a follow-up trip in May 2013; in the Landtag of Bavaria, between September 5th to October 30th, 2012, and in the Bundestag of Berlin between March 13th and April 12th, 2013. The research strategy reflected the belief that it was important to observe the media and PR strategies of MPs not only at the national level, where the political contest has the greatest impact, but also at state and local levels, since political careers and electoral connections succeed or fail at the district level.

During the months spent in Brasília, access was granted to the plenary section of the Chamber of Deputies as guest of political leaders, who gracefully supported our research. This allowed personal interviews of all deputies elected by the state of Minas Gerais (N = 53). 35 MPs were also interviewed from 23 parties with representation in the Lower House, elected in 19 states and the Federal District (DF). The interviews lasted between 9 to 45 minutes, and took place in their offices, at committee sessions, or even in the famous “Green Corridor”.

In Germany, the leadership of three parties with representation in the Landtag (Munich) and in the Bundestag (Berlin) supported the survey, "Medienpräsenz und Wahl", which featured the same questions as the Brazilian version, plus some specifics about the German mixed-member electoral system. All 187 members of the 16th Legislature (2008-2013) of the Landtag in Bavaria, and all 620 members of the 17th Bundestag (2009-2013) in Berlin received a copy of the questionnaire through the internal postal service of both Parliaments. In addition, leaders of three major parties personally took the questionnaire to all members of the faction during intra-party discussions, collected the responses, and shipped them back to us. These party leaders made follow-up contacts by telephone and email in order to ensure a good response rate.

As a result, we received a considerable number of personal letters of recommendation from MPs, which accompanied the returned questionnaires.

The last three months (July, August and September) of the 2013 federal elections in Germany were followed as a *complete observer* at rallies promoted by all major parties, and as a *participant observer* at party caucuses, *Stammtisch* (talk at the restaurant table) with candidates and party leaders, and major conventions in 10 of the 16 federal states (Länder). This fieldwork resulted in 69 recorded interviews with candidates of six major parties (CDU, CSU, FDP, SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, and Die Linke). The interviews lasted between 10 to 58 minutes. Campaign panel discussions were attended sponsored by local and regional newspapers, radio and TV stations. Staff-members, PR executives and media personnel who covered these events were also interviewed.

Part four, the exploratory data analysis, comprises three chapters in which the results of the survey, “Media and Electoral Careers”, conducted in the Chamber of Deputies, in the Bavarian Landtag, and in The German Bundestag were analyzed. Particular attention was given to the selected objects of empirical analysis, namely the strength of print and broadcasting local media, e-campaign, posters and billboards, pork barrel as media strategy, and campaign financing.

Descriptive statistics were used to analyze the data and test our hypotheses. cross-tabulations were applied, “the workhorse vehicles for testing hypotheses for categorical variables” (Pollock, 2009), between the independent variable “vote concentration” (using a three-way split of high, medium and low concentration) and the dependent variables related to MPs’ media strategies. Variations on MPs’ personal media strategies were expected according to the degree of concentration of votes: high concentration of votes coupled with electoral formulae that foster personal vote seeking to significantly increase MPs’ personal media strategy and visibility.

Chapter one focuses on the 53 observations of the survey with MPs elected in the state of Minas Gerais. The findings partially confirm the hypotheses suggesting a positive association between the variable “vote concentration” and the different levels of concerns with media strategies. An increasing concern with media visibility and public image consolidation was found in the group with “medium vote concentration”

and not in the high concentration area, as expected. For the confirmation of the working hypotheses in the case of MPs from Minas Gerais, more evidence was required. The later stages of this research discuss the conflicting results found in this initial exploratory stage.

Chapter two analyzes the 130 observations collected in the Bavarian Landtag. The results indicate the general trend predicted by our hypothesis, which expected more media emphasis and media dependence on the part of those MPs with higher vote concentration in contrast with those of the medium and low vote concentration ranges, as well as among district-elected candidates.

Chapter three draws upon 100 observations gathered in the Chamber of Deputies and 230 in the German Bundestag. Despite the limits of our research design, mostly based on descriptive statistics, our exploratory analysis found variations on MPs' personal media strategies in many instances, depending on the degree of concentration of votes and the electoral formula. High vote concentration, coupled with incentives for personal vote seeking emanating from the district election in Germany significantly increased MPs' emphasis on media strategy, and importance given to media visibility.

It is worth remembering that interpreting the findings, is operating in an environment of uncertainty due, in large measure, to the complexity of the political world. The aim of this investigation is not to *explain*, but rather to *describe* a specific population, as it exists at one point in time. The concern is to look at data and seek out relationships between variables. In this specific case, the preferences of MPs in Brazil and Germany differ regarding the various types of media strategies are examined, and how these variations relate to the independent variables, i.e., concentration of votes and electoral formulae. However, the possibility of *chance results* requires caution due to the limited sample drawn from a larger group of subjects. In such cases, there is always a possibility that misleading results may occur by chance. A useful check on results is the significance test (*t-statistic*), which establishes whether two means collected from independent samples differ significantly.

A two-sampled *t-test* was conducted to check the difference in the scores for the independent variable (see appendix 3). A significant difference was found in the scores

for concentration of votes for the Chamber of Deputies ($M = .85$, $SD = .04$) and for the German Bundestag ($M = .68$, $SD = .03$), $t(323) = 3.24$, $p = 0.005$. The *t-test* is not itself a measure of the strength of a relationship but rather, a check on how likely it is that a given measure is due to chance.

From what could be observed in the previous analysis it may be concluded that despite the stark differences in the media and political systems, MPs that fall into the category of high-vote concentration in Brazil and Germany tend to give more importance to media strategy than MPs in other layers of the vote distribution. In the following sections, other possible correlations between patterns of vote concentration and the media variables are further explored.

Part five contains five chapters in which the data is further explored using different analytical models. In chapter one, factor analysis (FA) is used as a scaling technique to explore the latent factors or dimensions underlying the variable set. The current exploratory factor analysis applies to the entire population of interest. The sample used is the population, and so the results cannot extrapolate that particular sample, i.e., the conclusions are restricted to the sample collected and generalization of the results can be achieved only if analysis using different samples reveals the same factor structure.

Three dimensions of media strategy have been identified among German and Brazilian MPs: (1) *the traditional media-based strategy* refers to the predominant use of mass media. (2) *The internet-based strategy* refers to the use of so-called “self-mass-media” (Castells, 2009) or networked social media. (3) *The pragmatic promoter of local interests*, whose highest positive factor loading is on the use of benefits delivered to the electoral district as the most important mediums of attracting media attention coupled with a high negative loading on taking positions on controversial issues.

In chapter two, the results of the exploratory factor analysis for the various media strategies amongst MPs from Minas Gerais and Bavaria are presented. The first factor was the “*indirect-Internet-based strategy*”, which shows positive loadings for a number of internet tools used in campaign, and negative loadings as mediums of communicating with voters, use of local TV and radio stations as the most important form of communication with voters. The second factor was the “*traditional media-based strategy*”, which loads highly and positively on the use of national television and radio

as mediums of communication, and on the national press as primary mediums of communication.

The different dimensions of media strategy are illustrated with excerpts from the interviews conducted in the German Bundestag, the Bavarian Landtag and the Chamber of Deputies. The sample selection followed the criterion of “non-repetition”, i.e., each example corresponds to a cluster of cases with similar responses, which were omitted to avoid repetition. These samples are used as *anecdotal evidence*, which entails preferences, comments, and subjective views that do not provide direct scientific proof per se, but may help better interpret the quantitative data.

Chapter three investigates possible causal relationships between the main variables (media type/vote concentration). An econometric model is developed based on linear regressions using *Ordered Logit* regression analysis, in which the dependent variable is the preference on the use of media and the independent variable is the concentration of votes. The reason behind choosing a Logit model is that the dependent variable in this model is the MPs’ media choice, which is an ordered/ranked variable.

The results for the case of Minas Gerais disclosed a *negative pattern* of relationship between the variables under scrutiny. Although there was a positive association between concentration of votes and the importance given to TV and Radio (local), for the rest of the media types *no positive correlation* was found. MPs with high concentration of votes have 18% higher chances to give more importance to local TV and radio compared to a MP with low concentration of votes.

In the case of the Bavarian Landtag, a *negative association* was found between preference for local TV and Radio and high concentration of votes. The same was true for national TV and Radio, and for both types of print media, local and national, as well as for Internet. By contrast, there was a *positive trend for posters*. These findings partially confirm our second hypothesis according to which direct personal visibility (*Medienpräsenz*) in the mass and social media might be a strategy that is more strongly visible among candidates running for the Bundestag (Federal elections) than among candidates running for the Landtag (State elections).

In the Chamber of deputies, a *positive association* was found between preferences for local and national TV/Radio, and a *negative correlation* between concentration of

votes and the preference for Internet, and support of mayors and city counselors. These findings connote that MPs with *low concentration of votes* may tend to adopt the media strategy peculiar to a “*pragmatic promoter of local interests*”.

Logit estimates for MPs elected for the German Bundestag showed a *negative association* between preference for local TV and Radio, Internet and posters, and a *positive correlation* between preference for national broadcasting and print media. The test of the correlation between concentration of votes and the dependent variable, “support of mayors/city counselors” indicated a high positive probability among Bundestag-elected MPs. These findings suggest that surveyed German MPs elected to the Bundestag with high concentration of votes are highly likely to give more preference to the support of mayors and city counselor as a factor of electoral success than to media visibility. Thus, these MPs are more akin to “*local promoter of interests*” than to “*policy advocates*”.

Before closing our analysis, it was desirable to test some of our dependent media variables against some independent ones taken from the classical electoral studies, such as *district magnitude* and levels of *political competitiveness*. Firstly, it was observed how members of the Chamber of Deputies and the German Bundestag responded to the questions testing the importance of media visibility for their electoral success vis-à-vis the magnitude of the district where they were elected. It was concluded that the greater the magnitude, the greater the media preference. Such results are in line with the international literature, which found a positive correlation between district magnitude and increasing values of personal reputation.

Secondly, it was desirable to compare media visibility vs. competitiveness. We learned from the international literature that electoral competition is a characteristic of the territory, not of politicians, and the measurement of the competition index refers to a particular district, not to the system as a whole. The percentage margin of victory was calculated for each elected MP in order to produce an index of competitiveness for each observation. Then, those indexes were classified into six different layers, ranging from the most to the least competitive. Based on these results, it was concluded that as competitiveness increases, so does media visibility.

The multilevel character of the election campaigns in Brazil and in Germany accounted for surprising differences in MPs' media strategies. In Germany, top candidates for the federal level encompass political celebrities, whose main communication strategy rely on media, massive political advertisements, and large-scale rallies. Yet, what was found in our field research was a peculiar trend among surveyed MPs and candidates to rely more on the support of local politicians than on media coverage for their electoral success. The same tendency was observed at the state level, among MPs and candidates running for the Landtag in Bavaria. These findings are in line with the literature, which shows that incumbents in Germany actively cultivate personal vote through constituency service or by bringing government-funded projects to the district (Bawn, 1999).

Our direct observation during the peak months of the German federal and state elections of 2013 revealed that both list and district candidates ran their campaigns in small constituencies, where they usually meet potential voters face-to-face on market squares and *Bier Garten*. Or they simply knock on front doors. By contrast, Brazilian MPs rely much more on media visibility than on the support of local politicians.

These findings suggest different ways of cultivating personal reputation, and justify our research question as to whether all candidates for seats in elected assemblies (city councilors, state legislators, Congressmen), the so-called *backbenchers*, give equal importance and emphasis in their campaign strategies to media visibility and public image building. The implication that there might be different kinds of electoral connections, not necessarily dependent on mass media, which may also account for the electoral success of *backbenchers* in Brazil and Germany, found confirmation in our research. *To conclude*, it can be said that media presence may be crucial to achieve electoral success depending on the incentives emanating from the electoral system, the level of candidacy, and the nation's political culture. Yet, the multifaceted aspects of the electoral connections may compensate for poor media coverage, and crown with success the electoral careers of candidates to proportional seats in Brazil and Germany.

I - THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER 1: MEDIATED POLITICS

1.1. The Media and political campaigns

Nowadays the centrality of political communication is indisputable. For all the vast majority of citizens in modern, highly differentiated industrial society, the number of persons who experience politics directly is limited and even those who are politically active gain most of their information through the traditional mass media or through the networked media, such as the Internet and the social media. Mediated politics occurs whenever most of what citizens know about politics they know through media rather than directly or through their own experiences, and when politicians and other powerful elites depend on the media for information about people's opinion and trends in society, and for reaching out to the electorate (Pfetsch, 2003; Strömbäck and Kaid, 2008a).

Over the last decade, empirical studies have indicated that politicians and political activists have consistently increased their presence in the so-called "feedback and participatory media" (Jenkins, 2006), namely the Web 2.0's networked platforms² (e.g., blogs, microblogs, online videos, and social networking) to target people primarily interested in obtaining information or even in participating politically. Barack Obama's Web 2.0 strategy was largely responsible for the success of his electoral campaign in 2008 and 2012. This strategy created the so-called "perfect media convergence" through the multiplier effect generated by Web 2.0 and provided the tools to overcome the boundaries between Internet and traditional mass media as televised addresses and radio

² As opposed to a hyperlink-defined Web 1.0 framework, Web 2.0 platforms manage content and users through a combination of complex algorithms and protocols. What distinguishes one platform from another is the form taken by its content, e.g., videos on YouTube and short posts on Twitter or multimodal approaches on social networking sites such as Facebook.

The "Australia Vote Project" was an important turning point in the history of networked politics and two Internet giants, Google and YouTube, which collaborated with all six Australia's political parties to provide a quasi-official election site, the "Google's Australian Election Portal", with unique campaign-related content. This architecture of info-politics allowed individuals to host videos and other third-party content on their respective websites and blogs, while at the same time generating more traffics to the host social-media Web platform. The staggering amount of USD\$ 1.65 billion was invested in the project (Elmer et al., 2012, p. 71).

talk shows were aired and subsequently posted on the Internet. Social media activists then passed on the link to the video via twitter or e-mail to their friends, which in turn encouraged the newspapers to produce articles on the Internet hypertext.³ The Obama's team used the Internet to develop personal relationships with supporters. The fact that young voters chose "character" over "experience" suggests he became an individual for them, not just a distant politician. His new media communication strategy was responsible for these effects. His two election clearly went beyond such traditional variables as "experience" or "party affiliation" (Scheufele and Nisbet, 2002; Elmer et al., 2012; Jungherr and Schoen, 2013).⁴

In Germany and Brazil, parties still invest massively in agencies and professional consultants when it comes to election campaigns. However, the dramatically declining party affiliation and loyalty has indicated a change in the road campaigning towards more involvement in social media. Consequently, parties seek ways to support commitment-ready citizens in their campaign strategy. The increasing use of digital technologies, Web 2.0, and social media for directly targeting voters at the constituency level may bypass the mass media as well as the parties' organizational substructure (Römmele, 2012). Denver et al. (2003) found a decrease of traditional forms of face-to-face campaigning such as doorstep canvassing, public meetings and campaign rallies at the constituency level in Great Britain. Their analysis shows instead an increase in the use of technologically enhanced and mediated campaign tactics such as telephone canvassing, direct mailing and computer-based forms of political communication.

³ A recurrent theme across the domains of scientific research is that the Internet tends to complement rather than displace existing media and patterns of behavior. Utopian claims and dystopic warnings based on extrapolations from technical possibilities have given way to more nuanced and circumscribed understandings of how Internet use adapts to existing patterns, permits certain innovations, and reinforces particular kinds of change. Moreover, in each domain the ultimate social implications of this new technology depend on economic, legal, and policy decisions that are shaping the Internet as it becomes institutionalized (DiMaggio et al., 2001).

⁴ There are an ever-increasing number of social media tools and a rapidly growing user base across all demographics. Current measures of American adults who use social networks are at 69%. That is up significantly from the 37% of those who had social network profiles in 2008. Contrary to concerns about social media causing civic disengagement, numbers out of Pew Research show that 66% of social media users actively engage in political activism online. They estimate that to be the equivalent of 39% of all American adults. Like many other behaviors, online activities translate into offline ones. Researchers at the MacArthur Research Network on Youth & Participatory Politics report that young people who are politically active online are twice as likely to vote as those who are not (Rutledge, 2013).

Such activities are valid indicators of the strategic character of professionalized campaigns aiming to mobilize voters in the most efficient ways. Indeed, the range of content conveyed by the media, broadly understood here as sources of knowledge about phenomena and social processes, goes far beyond the immediate scope of the citizens' personal experience. According to Gerhard (1994), the media's function of relaying "factual information" enables society to perceive "reality" through "cognitive shortcuts" that allow individuals to make choices without "perfect information". Confronted with political and electoral choices, "a structurally insoluble uncertainty" (Downs 1957), citizens often make their choices using "low-information rationality": a cognitive process of social learning that combines information on political campaigns propagated by the media, and past and daily life experiences. Samuel Popkin (1994, p. 9) claims that the mass media plays a critical role in shaping the voter's limited information about the world, their limited knowledge about the links between issues and offices, their limited understanding of the connections between public policy and its immediate consequences for themselves, and their views about the kind of person a politician should be. According to the author, the mass media influence the voter's frame of reference, and can thereby change his or her vote.

Niklas Luhmann (2000) defines public opinion primarily as a "thematic structure" set up by the media. By choosing a limited number of subjects and events, the mass media bring about a "thematic reduction", whose basic sociological function is to simplify the complexity of social issues that are presented to public opinion. This process, which he defines formally through the concept of *Thematisierung* (theming), reduces the thematic universe of the public opinion essentially to what the media publishes or transmits. The thematic universe emerges primarily from the symbolic representations elaborated and circulated by the hegemonic actors in the political, economic and social subsystems.

In fact, after reading the newspapers, watching the TV news or logging onto the Internet, citizens of the advanced democracies can shape their view of political parties, governments, parliamentarians and their priorities, a phenomenon dubbed by Corey Cook (2002) "permanent campaign" (p. 753), a concept inseparable from the development of media systems. Thomas Holbrook (1996, p. 54) calls the same

phenomenon “the on-line model”. Elmer et al. (2012, p. 5) propose the “always-on-24/7 model”. They all assume that networked permanent campaigning has redefined and otherwise contributed to a new paradigm of political campaigning as the digital encoding and circulation of political communications enable voters to update their evaluations and preferences, which may have an impact on vote choice. As Sonia Livingston (2005) pointed out, “The media do not provide a window on the world, so much as a set of resources through which everyday meanings and practices are constituted” (p. 21).

1.2. Audience and representative democracy

Attuned with these major shifts in the social and political fields, Bernard Manin (1997) coined the expression “audience democracy” to describe a new model of representation,⁵ in which mass-communication becomes crucial to representative institutions by establishing itself as one of the main arenas of debate and starring in the task of mediating the relationship between the political and civil spheres. Nowadays, the *reactive* dimension of voting predominates and political decisions take into consideration the *perceptions* of what is at stake in a particular election, rather than the socio-economic and cultural dimensions. According to the author, voters seem to respond to particular terms offered at each election, rather than just express their social or cultural identities.⁶ Thus, the electorate appears as *audience*, which responds to the terms presented on the political stage (pp. 220-224).

Manin (1997) also points out that the channels of mass-political communication affect the nature of the representative relationship and each change in the system of representation implies a change in the ruling elite. With the advent of “audience democracy” the new elite of experts in mass communication has replaced the traditional political activists and party bureaucrats, since the very exercise of politics today has to

⁵ According to some scholars, the ecology of democratic representation is rapidly changing. They suggest that we are not witnessing a crisis of representative democracy, but symptoms of its mutation into unfamiliar forms. Saward (2001), Zürn and Walter-Drop (2001) claim that the state-centered model of representative democracy, with its formal reliance upon elections, parties, parliaments, a free press and a written constitution, by no means exhausts the potential of democratic representation. Representative practices are flourishing underneath and beyond states, for instance, within the complex institutional networks of civil society, such as global non-governmental organizations.

⁶ Stephen Dann et. al. (2007) pointed out the changes taking place in modern democracies, especially the shift from “citizenship” to “spectatorship”.

be done on the basis of media abilities. Through radio, television and social media, candidates can communicate directly with their constituents without the mediation of a party network: “Audience democracy is the rule of the media expert” (Manin 1997, p. 220).

At a normative level, from Aristotle’s analysis of rhetoric, to Mill’s designs for a marketplace of ideas, to Habermas’s idealization of the public sphere and Dahl’s comparative theory of polyarchy, theorists of democracy have always concerned themselves with the delivery, distribution, quality, and uses of information by citizens. Given that democracy is not one-dimensional concept, and that normatively speaking there are several models of democracy, there are also different normative implications for the media and journalism. Yet, regardless of the normative model, there is always a core demand in the concept of modern representative democracy for a free media to provide a forum for political discussions, factually correct and comprehensive news journalism in an institutional framework such as electoral systems, political parties and parliaments. The more pluralistic and high quality are the sources of information, and the more citizens participate in public life, the more representatives can be held accountable to the represented (Sartori, 2001; Strömbäck 2005; Bühlmann et al., 2008).

Often contrasted with direct democracy, aristocracy and monarchy, representative democracy came to signify a type of government in which people, in their role as voters, faced with a genuine choice between at least two alternatives, are free to elect others who then act in defense of their interests, and represent them by deciding matters in their behalf. The political representation of social interests overcame the ancient fiction of homogeneous *demos*, i.e., a small political community of educated citizens with a high degree of social and cultural homogeneity of the so-called sovereign people. It also rejected the ideal of a “general will” in favor of the acceptance of a dynamic “plurality of wills and judgments”⁷ that are permanently contested and contestable, through processes of publicity, open election and the political representation of diverse social interests (Alonso et al., 2011).

⁷ This principle of representative democracy is embedded in the German Basic Law, when it establishes that the representatives “shall not be bound by orders or instructions, and be responsible only to their conscience” (art. 38, § 1).

Representative democracy then rests on three core pillars: (a) the open public expression of social needs and interests. (b) The appointment of representatives through free and fair elections. (c) The temporary granting of powers by the represented to representatives who make laws within the framework of a written constitution. Although representatives receive their political mandate through lawful periodic elections, the representative process continues through what John Keane (2009) calls “the disappointment principle” or the apportioning of blame through “harsh words, paper or electronic rocks” for poor political performance, a way of ensuring the rotation of political leadership. The ability of representatives to hear and interpret the interests of the represented depends upon a process of permanent contact and deliberation between them that goes beyond a simple face-to-face contact. The access of citizens to their representatives and the participation in public life depend largely on pluralistic and high quality sources of information about how society and the political processes work. The access, intelligibility and variety of political information, thus, are *sine qua non* for the proper functioning of any representative democracy based on universal vote and on the idea that the legitimacy of political decisions needs the debate and competition among opinions to arrive at consensual solutions of conflicting social interests. (Habermas, 1987; Glasser and Salamon, 1995; Sunstein, 2003; Alonso *et alia*, 2011; Berinsky, 2012).

1.3. Polyarchy and political participation

Among the features of inclusive, competitive polyarchy, Robert A. Dahl (1971, 1989, 2000) adds “political participation”, which comprises not only the idea that people should follow the steps of government through “transparency and accountability”, but even more importantly, it requires the understanding of the democratic system and its political institutions. The author argues that there can be no political participation without adequate information, given the complex nature of large-scale modern democracy, in contrast to the “simplicity of authoritarian alternatives”. The very complexity of the democratic system introduces a demand for reliable sources of information on what happens in the political sphere, and the capacity of citizens to understand the implications of the decision-making processes to their lives. Legal guarantees such as freedom of speech and access to alternative and independent sources

of information have become a "pre-condition of large-scale democracies" (Dahl, 2000, pp. 72 – 83).

Dahl (1989) argues that democracy in the ideal comprises the equally empowered rule by all. Even if everyone is unlikely to participate in all decisions, no citizens in a fully evolved democracy is excluded from doing so based on restrictive participation requirements or discouraging burdens for becoming informed and expressing effective preferences. The author grants that the ideals of equal control of the policy agenda and inclusive deliberation and decision process have not been achieved in any society.⁸ In fact, most societies loosely classified as democracies display considerable differences in their degrees of citizen empowerment and participation. He proposes a “continuum of polyarchy” to distinguish different levels of popular sovereignty: the lower level of the continuum demands at least equality of opportunity to vote and the existence of free and fair elections for government officials. The upper end of the continuum approaches the ideal of democratic governance when citizens are equally included in defining, understanding, and deciding the policy agenda. The distinguishing feature of systems toward the upper end of the polyarchy spectrum is that they offer alternative and transparent policy information to citizens and that this information comes from different sources and promotes inclusive public deliberation and broad control of policy agendas and outcomes (Dahl, 1989, p. 222).

Dahl’s information and citizen inclusion criteria for defining various levels of polyarchy offer a framework within which to think about both *opinion-centered* and *process orientation* to political communication. In the first, scholars focus on patterns of individual responses to persuasive messages pertaining to particular choices. In the second, they emphasize the features of communication processes through which

⁸ Of course, there has always been a gap between the bold ideals of representative democracy and its complex, multi-layered and defective real world forms. Blumler and Gurevitch (1995) call this state of affair a "crisis of civic communication", which was once described by Harwood (1994): "If citizenship is defined as active and informed participation in public affairs and the political process, they -- the young in particular -- have become non-citizens along with millions of their elders. While our politicians and editorials writers preach to the world about the joys and successes of democracy, half the American electorate ignores our presidential elections. Voter turnouts in off-year congressional elections of all kinds are an international joke" (p. 2). According to von Beyme (2011), the weaknesses of representative democracy provide the ideal soil for the growth of either rightwing ethno-populism in Europa or leftwing redistributational populism in Latin America. The author shows that the embrace of populism thrives as a “latent auto-immune disease” whenever wide gaps develop between the ideals and the functional reality of representative democracy.

messages and political information are constructed and distributed within a political system. On the one hand, opinion as the dependent variable of choice is the most obvious core element and the leading measure of democratic processes, given the plentiful supply of accessible survey data, along with the behavioral and positivist emphases in much media studies. On the other hand, the ways in which media outlets selectively include and exclude audiences for issues are not only measurable but may be of more relevance in thinking about the quality of democratic life. These includes not only voter stability but also shrinking electorates, the declining quality of policy information over time, the rise of minutely scripted, focus-group-based messages by interest groups and candidates, and the increasing negativity of news frames and advertising, which produces citizen polarization and cynicism. (Patterson, 1993; Ansolabehere and Iyengar, 1995; Cappela and Jamieson, 1997, Eliasoph, 1998, Bennett and Entman, 2001).

The disjunction between these two perspectives may hamper our understanding of the democratic performance of political systems, and the subjective experiences of citizens and representatives within them. A more general scheme is needed for describing both information properties within systems and patterns of political engagement and disengagement with those properties. Rather than settle on one perspective over another, both individual-centered and process-oriented perspectives on political communication are sought, as discussed in the following section.

CHAPTER 2: KEY CONCEPTS

2.1. Mediation

According to Niklas Luhmann (2000) "what we know about society and yet what we know about the world we know through the media of mass communication" (p. 1). All interpersonal experiences from the micro level of identity formation to the macro level of culture and society are increasingly "mediated and mediatized", since most of what we know, or think we know, we have never personally experienced. We live in a world build upon the mediated stories we hear, see, and tell. Stories that socialize us into roles of gender, age, class, vocation, and life-style, which offer models of conformity or targets for rebellion. Mediated stories that weave the seamless web of the cultural environment that cultivates most of what we think, what we do, and how we conduct our affairs.

In fact, most contemporary societies are "media centered", that is, they rely on the media - more than family, school, churches, trade unions, political parties - to build public knowledge that makes it possible for each of its members to make everyday decisions, including the political ones.⁹ That is the reason why we cannot study mass media in isolation, as if they were a detachable part of the wider social process. The connections work in more than one direction. Media processes are part of the material world, yet their contribution to the social construction of reality must also be captured (Berger and Luckmann, 1980). Media, like the education system, are both mechanisms of representation and the sources of taken-for-granted frameworks for understanding the reality they represent (Coudry, 2003, Hjarvard 2004, 2009; Schultz, 2004, 2008; Krotz, 2001, 2007, 2009).

To describe and analyze the implications of such a phenomenon media and communication researchers use two main concepts: *mediation* and *mediatization*. According to Mazzoleni (2008), "mediation is a natural, preordained mission of mass media to convey messages from communicators to their target audiences" (p. 3047).

⁹ According to the *Pew Research Center* media consumption in urban societies is the second largest category of activity after work and certainly the predominant activity in the home (International Journal of Communication, 2007, p. 246).

Nimmo and Combs (1983) uses the term *mediation* to denote the processes through which media communication shape and reshape society and our understanding of it. Altheide and Snow (1979) claim that social life lies fundamentally on communication processes, in which the so-called “media logic”¹⁰ plays a shaping role in various political and social fields. The authors define “media logic” as “a form of communication, the process through which media present and transmit information. Elements of this form include the various media and the formats used by these media. Format consist, in part, of how material is organized, the style in which is presented, the focus or emphasis on particular characteristics of behavior, and the grammar of media communication” (p. 9).¹¹

The concept of *mediation* denotes the act of transmitting messages through mass media and the overall effect of media institutions existing in contemporary society. In such perspective, “mediated communication” is opposed to direct, first-hand, or face-to-face communication and “mediated politics” is different from politics experienced through interpersonal communication or directly by the people. From this, it follows that the mediation of politics and culture is an old phenomenon that dates back at least to the mid-nineteenth century, when the printing press was hooked up to the steam engine and increased the circulation of information in society to an unprecedented extent (Thompson, 1995).

In its core, mediated politics is a descriptive and rather static concept that simply refers to the media as the most important channels for information exchanges and communication between the people and political actors. From a descriptive point of view, it is still a relevant concept as it reveals significant features of politics in

¹⁰ Nick Couldry (2008) offers a sharp critique to the “causal linearity” implied in the concept of “media logic”, arguing that all dimensions of society receive the influence of acts of appropriation, interpretation, and resistance that are not necessarily media related. To the author, “media related pressures at work in society are too heterogeneous to be reduced to a single logic” (p. 375).

¹¹ The authors turned to Georg Simmel (1908, 1971) to frame “media logic” as a *form* of communication that has a particular logic of its own (Altheide and Snow, 1979, p. 9). As we know, Simmel argued that *form* is not a structure per se, but a *process* that renders reality intelligible, a framework through which social action takes place. Although the authors claim *form* as a key to “media logic”, they apply rather more specific conceptual tools especially *format*. The main aspects of format are *selection, organization, and presentation of experience and information*, as they latter summarized (p. 11). That is why we prefer to use the expression “media formats” in the plural, instead of “media logic” in the singular.

contemporary societies. However, it fails to capture the dynamics of modern political communication processes and how they have evolved over time.

2.2. Mediatization

Mediatization in contrast is a multidimensional, process-oriented concept, focused on how media influence has increased in a number of different respects, and framed on par with other societal change processes such as modernization, individualization, and globalization. (Lundby, 2009). The term was first used by the Swedish media researcher Kent Asp, who defines it as “the process whereby the political system to a high degree is influenced by and adjusted to the demands of the mass media in their coverage of politics” (Asp, 1986, p. 359). The underlying idea is not that the media has arrogated political power from the political institutions. Political institutions continue to exert power and steer politics, but they have become increasingly dependent on the media for communication with people and other institutions, and have had to adapt to the media formats.

Mediatization theory assumes that “communication is the core activity of human beings”, and ultimately media is “a modifier of communication” (Krotz, 2009). The concept tries to grasp the social and cultural consequences of the changing conditions for communication as offered by the media’s developments. Friedrich Krotz (2009) describes mediatization as a *meta-process*, i.e., an ongoing historical process that, in each specific epoch, takes a specific form. A *meta-theory* on how people understand and make use of different media. To the author, the concept of mediatization is especially important because it can unite different types of empirical data, collected within different disciplines, and from different cultural contexts, under a common label.¹² This may be helpful to systematize and categorize the existing empirical results of the media influence and changes to the different fields of everyday life, politics, culture and

¹² A good example of a context-driven media study is Daniel Miller's research on “Global Social Media Impact”. The University College London’s anthropologist and professor of material culture led a 15 months research team at nine towns around the world: “ignore glib claims that we are all becoming more superficial or more virtual. What is really going on is far more incredible. The way people use social media differs hugely from place to place. These are ‘social’ media, intensely woven into the texture of our relationships. They lead us straight to intimate worlds of Chinese families split by internal migration, the new Brazilian middle class, cancer victims in London sharing the experience of terminal illness, Trinidadians stalking the latest scandal and much more” (Miller, 2013).

society, depending on where these changes take place: the micro, mezzo, or macro level (p. 32).

Winfried Schulz (2004) has operationalized the concept of mediatization through four kinds of processes whereby the media change human communication and interaction: *extension*, *substitution*, *amalgamation*, and *accommodation*. First, mediatization *extends human communication* abilities in both time and space; second, it *substitutes social activities* that previously took place face-to-face. Third, the media instigates an *amalgamation of activities*; face-to-face communication combines with mediated communication, and all sorts of media infiltrate into everyday life. Finally, actors in many different social fields have to *adapt their behavior to accommodate* to the media's valuations, formats and routines. However, the process of mediatization of politics is neither linear nor unidirectional across the four dimensions proposed by the author. The idea of "media effect" is not self-evident, as the influence of the media on political actors, located within different institutions, varies according to political and cultural contexts.

On the one hand, the concept of mediatization focuses on changes in human communication and not in technology per se.¹³ Krotz (2009) and Hepp (2009) consider misleading the idea of a single, technically based logic in the media. To these authors, the logic of TV today is not the same as of a decade ago, and the logic of a mobile phone is quite different for young people as compared to old ones. As Hepp (2009) pointed out, "we cannot suppose one single general logic of the media, but we have to investigate the concrete interrelation between mediatization and cultural change for certain context fields. The idea of mediatization offers us a chance to understand media-related changes across various context fields while focusing on these fields in their specificity" (p. 154). The author then proposes a "dialectic approach" on mediatization: "we have to see both the transgressing power of the media across the different context fields as well as across different states and cultures. At the same time, this does not

¹³ The so-called "technological determinism" is a narrative that assigns determinative power and a vivid sense of efficacy to technology as the driving force of history, unlike other more "abstract" forces, such as social-economic, political and cultural formations. The sense perception and easy accessibility of the thingness and tangibility of technological devices helps to create a sense of causal efficacy and give credence to the idea of technology as an independent entity, a virtually autonomous agent of change (Smith and Marx, 1994).

result in a homology of these fields; rather, it is transformed by the ‘inertia’ of the institutions within each field” (p. 154).

2.3. Summary

At this point, the argument could be summarized by stating that the media has long ceased to be mere technological tools to become critical environments for society, culture and politics in general. To take into consideration media’s centrality does not imply that politics has become a mere branch of advertising or even less entertainment. Media and politics make up two different systems, keep some degree of autonomy, and their mutual influence is historical and context dependent. A significant share of the influence media exert arises out of the fact that they have become an integral part of other institutions’ operations, while they also have achieved a degree of self-determination and authority that forces other institutions, to greater or lesser degrees, to submit to their formats. As the degree of mediatization of politics varies across time and countries, it is more an empirical question than a theoretical one.

It also seems evident that, as a component of a broader symbolic system that creates and distributes knowledge and social recognition, the media relates to politics in an extremely complex fashion as it extends its influence far beyond electoral periods. The literature on media effects clearly shows that the media can exert considerable influence over their audiences through the processes of agenda setting (McCombs, 2004), framing (Iyengar, 1994), and cultivation (Shanahan and Morgan, 1999).¹⁴ The mass media profoundly prepossess the discourses of the representatives in Congress, have an impact in shaping the legislative agenda and even constitute a privileged forum for discussion among political elites (Hoffmann-Lange, 1992).

Above all, the mass media represents a place par excellence for the management of “public image”¹⁵ and the political sphere of “media visibility.”¹⁶ Indeed, image building and media presence have increasingly become a priority in the career of

¹⁴ The research on media effects polarizes between two perspectives: the hyper-media theories tend to see in the institutions, language, economic resources, and technology of mass communication the core feature of any social or political phenomenon. On the contrary, hypo-media theories deem culture and mass communication to be merely instrumental variables unable to bring about any relevant impact upon the nature of social phenomena.

¹⁵ See footnote 73.

¹⁶ See footnote 72.

political agents, which no longer are limited to periods of electoral competition (Negrine and Lilleker, 2002). "As usually happens to almost all individuals, it is also true for politicians that the perception of their existence as well as their political views depend on their presence in information circuits" (Gomes, 2004, p. 327).

CHAPTER 3: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION

3.1 Theoretical approach

Our research aims to test the claim that, just as candidates have distinct “electoral connections” (Mayhew, 2004), they might also have different media strategies for gaining mandates and being re-elected. The nature and magnitude of the electoral districts¹⁷ -- well researched in US-based studies on representation -- is understudied elsewhere.¹⁸ Thus, our research explores and tests hypotheses derived from the theoretical distributive model--based on rational-choice theory--, and the party model--built off neo-institutionalism--for a specific set of media strategies of MPs in Brazil and Germany (Mayhew, 1974; Fiorina, 1989; March and Olsen, 1989; Jacobson, 1992, Thomassen, 1994; Mainwaring, 1999; Ames, 2003, Carvalho, 2003).

"In order to understand representative democracy, we need to develop analytical tools by which we can make sense of the behavior of the elected representatives of the people" (Strom, 1997, p. 171). Any effort to meet this challenge from a rational-choice perspective needs to specify the actors involved, their preferences, informational acquirements and strategic options given a specific institutional setting that structures the interaction between them. We use rational-choice analysis to help explain the electoral connections in Brazil and Germany. The utility and power of rational choice theory depend on the context and actors. Where actors have clear, defined objectives and believe they have relatively good information on how to further their goals, their behavior approximates that specified in rational-choice models. The rational choice approach fits better in situations in which actors' identity and goal are clear and the rules of the interaction are precise and known to the interacting agents. Rationality is more reasonable when we deal with elites (Katz, 1980; Tsebelis, 1990).

¹⁷ The territorial divisions that form the basic unit of an election has its own expressions in each country: *constituency* (UK), *district* (USA), *Wahlkreis* (Germany), and *section* or *electoral zone* in Brazil.

¹⁸ Matthew Shugart (2005) emphasized the progress made so far in understanding the impact of electoral systems on party systems. In contrast, research on how electoral systems affect party organization and the relationship between MPs and constituencies still needs further studies. One evidence of this weakness is the limited number of comparative research analyzing the effects of the electoral system on the behavior of voters (Norris, 2004).

The international literature supports the explanatory importance of political elites in various dimensions, such as moments of historical inflection (Hunt, 2007), when its members are called to build new political and social institutions, in decision-making processes, which set the political agenda (Bacharach and Baratz, 1969), and as visible manifestation of profound structural changes in society (Putnam 1976).

One should also take into account the characteristics of the political elites to understand the functioning of political systems. On the one hand, the importance of the institutional context to explain the outputs of a given political system is taken for granted. On the other, it is plausible to assume that politically strategic actors who operate the institutions also play an important role. If the rules are important, the players are too. A research on MPs' communication strategies can therefore contribute to understand better the role that media as an institution plays in their electoral careers.

Our first unit of analysis is the individual MP, not the party. Even in highly disciplined parties where politicians are subservient to the leadership, the party comprises individual politicians in the first instance. The behavior induced by incentives shapes the nature of parties because the rules that govern how elections unfolds and how parties choose candidates affect the relationship between politicians and parties. Institutional rules of the game give politicians incentives to cultivate a personal relationship with the electorate, to focus on local constituencies, and to pay attention to state and local politics. However, one implication of the rational-choice approach is that the nature of parties depends to a considerable extent upon how politicians act, and indirectly on the rules that govern candidate selection and election.

Rational-choice theorists believe that people adhere to institutions for instrumental purposes. In contrast, historical institutionalism argues that people and groups develop identities and allegiances that may outlive the instrumental purposes that led them initially to support the institution. In this perspective, people may value institutions beyond the instrumental benefits they provide. Individuals do not constantly reassess the rationality of values, beliefs, and norms once these are institutionalized. Consequently, rules and norms can endure well beyond the rational objectives that initially inspired them. According to this view, such rules and norms can lead actors to

pursue behavior that is counterproductive from a narrow conception of rationality. Institutional rules and norms give meaning to actors and events, and such meaning may outweigh and indeed shape perceptions of rationality (Pizzorno, 1985).

The claims of historical institutionalism is valid in contexts of strong, well-entrenched institutions, as is the case of Germany, but it is not particularly insightful for Brazil, where instrumental attitudes toward parties prevail. Neither politicians nor voters are loyal to parties (except on the left) once the parties do not suit their interests. Politicians switch parties or create a new one when their interests so dictated. Voters change allegiance frequently. Contrary to the institutional perspective, actors are often not loyal to institutions beyond instrumental logic (Nicolau, 2010).

In the following sections, the rational-choice-based distributive model, and the institutional-based party model are discussed. After requalifying and adapting Mayhew's classical analysis of the "electoral connection" in the context of the U. S. Congress, it can be concluded that the concept is valid for Brazil and Germany, whose mixed-electoral systems also create incentives toward particularism and universalism. By adopting two seemingly conflicting theoretical models a real "dialectical overcoming" (*Aufhebung*) is targeted, in the sense that disqualifying either the distributive model or the party institutional perspective is flatly refused. Our understanding is that none of the theoretical models holds the monopoly of being able to explain the diversity of MPs' strategic attitudes and electoral behavior in countries as distinct as Brazil and Germany.

3.2. The distributive model

The central hypothesis derived from the distributive model is that a Legislature composed of MPs, who aim at maximizing the chances of reelection, ultimately generates an oversupply of private goods and an undersupply of public goods (Cox and McCubbins, 1993). This occurs due to electoral incentives, which makes MPs fight to bring benefits to their districts in order to ensure reelection. According to Cain et al. (1987, p. 19), "a territorial basis of representation inevitably introduces particularistic and parochial concerns into the policy-making process. A representative elected with the votes, efforts, and resources of the people of a specific geographic area naturally

attaches special importance to their views and requests, out of a sense of obligation as well as self-interest. The exact level of particularism varies with many factors especially the strength of the party system, but the potential basis for local interest advocacy always exists".

The distributive model claims that the incentives for the legislative production and organization are located in the outer sphere of Congress, namely, in the "election time". From this perspective, the logic of individual MP behavior falls under the concept of an "electoral connection" (Mayhew, 1974, pp. 49–61). David Samuels (2002) provides theoretical and empirical support for the claim that, one component of the "electoral connection" in Brazil, pork barreling, ought to have an indirect effect on votes rather than a direct effect, whereas money is more likely to have a direct effect. According to the author, about one-third of incumbents do not seek pork to win reelection, but instead seek pork to help them win a position outside of the Chamber of Deputies, such as municipal mayor or state governor. These deputies are not interested in a long-term legislative career, and an assumption of extra-legislative ambition better explains their pork-barreling strategies compared to a reelection assumption.

As for the two-thirds of incumbents who do choose to run for reelection only about one-third wins on average. Does pork contribute to reelection success, or does this rate of reelection indicate that these deputies may be wasting their time and energy? According to Samuels (2002), incumbents in Brazil have a very good reason to seek pork, but in contrast to the hypothesis that directly links pork to votes, the author argues that Brazilian politicians trade pork for money, in the form of campaign contributions. They then use this money to obtain votes. As the author pointed out in his conclusion, "My argument does not alter the view that most Brazilian politicians engage in highly individualistic and largely non-ideological campaign behavior (e.g., Mainwaring, 1999) or that Brazilian deputies seek to trade legislative support for pork barrel and patronage (Ames, 2001). Most Brazilian politicians must develop and maintain a personal-vote support base to sustain their careers. However, these findings shed new light on the reasons why deputies seek pork and, thus, on the sources of the 'personal vote' in Brazil" (Samuels, 2002, p. 862).

One important question for our research is how the electoral connection in Brazil and Germany possibly relates to the MPs' behavior and media strategies in both countries. Mayhew (1974) argues that gaining voters' allegiance involves two distinct processes: working to *obtain pork* (and/or other constituency service resources) and then *claiming credit* for the pork. The incumbents do not win reelection simply based on the absolute amount of pork they bring home or the number of cases they solve for constituents, but based on the *perception* that they are working hard to bring their constituents the public goods that provide more benefits to them. Because information about the costs and benefits of government services is imperfect for both politicians and voters, politicians have tremendous incentives to focus their energies not only on delivering the pork, but also on framing their actions in the most positive light possible.

In other words, it appears that the voters' preference somehow depends on perceptions of a candidate's ability to bring home the bacon. However, such a perception depends less on how much pork the candidate actually generates and more on whether the candidate succeeds in providing information and generating a positive spin on his or her achievements. The candidates' capacity to successfully provide voters information that puts their performance in a positive light relative to other candidates is vital for his/her electoral success, and can be assumed to that the candidate's media strategy plays an important role in that.

3.3. Requalifying Mayhew's argument

Electoral rules are critical to the success of representative democracy. Formal rules shape the extent to which parties control individual politicians, whether parties are disciplined or loose, and whether they are centralized or decentralized. By determining how votes translate into seats, electoral rules have a direct effect on political outcomes. Equally important, however, are the indirect effects that come about as voters and politicians react to the incentives created by electoral rules. The nature of the electoral system not only determines the way votes are counted, but it also influences the way they are cast.

The literature on electoral systems highlights how electoral rules shape the number of parties. The most famous and important hypothesis in the study of electoral

systems holds that first-past-the-post elections tend to have only two viable parties or candidates. This district-driven outcome is the result of *a mechanical effect* that denies representation to smaller parties because they are unable to attain the plurality of votes necessary to win election. Arising from this mechanical effect comes a *psychological* one. Supporters of smaller parties, who want to affect the outcome of elections and not “waste” their votes and/or resources, often defect strategically from their first choice to a candidate or party with better prospects, whereas weak candidates and parties, anticipating such behavior and mindful about wasting scarce resources on a losing race, will choose not to run. (Duverger, 1954; Riker, 1982; Lipjhart and Grofman, 1986; Cox and McCubins, 1993)

The German mixed electoral system, in terms of strategic effects, generates incentives in different directions: The list proportional representation creates incentives for MPs to over-respond to party leaders (who determine list position) and to ignore the needs of individual voters. By contrast, the majority representation creates incentives for MPs to over-respond to individual constituents and to try to get direct credit for solving problems rather than working to prevent their occurrence. MPs elected by the proportional system tend to be more sensitive to interests of powerful and organized groups, which exert influence on party organizations at the state and national level, but single-member districts create incentives to over-respond to local interests, and to ignore policy consequences that occur outside the district (Bawn, 1999).

In such a context, Mayhew's (1974) premise that MPs seek to maximize their chances of reelection has the advantage of parsimony, as it is reasonable to assume that winning elections is a major motivating force for most politicians in the USA as well as in Brazil and Germany. However, it seems a bit restrictive for both countries. We need to qualify his main argument in some aspects.

First, in the case of United States, securing candidacy and winning general elections can be subsumed into one category, “winning elections”, as both depend on popular vote (primary and general elections). In the case of Brazil and Germany, however, an exclusive focus on "winning elections" could wrongly deflect attention from important intraparty political struggles and incentives for securing candidacy. In

both cases, “winning candidacy” and “winning elections” comprise two different processes, since the former does not rest on a direct popular election. Party leaders exercise more control over candidate selection in both countries than in the USA.

Second, although Brazilian MPs value extended legislative careers they do so as a main springboard for vaulting into higher executive positions: being a mayor of middle-size cities, for example, affords more power and prestige than being a federal deputy. Rather than focusing solely on “seeking legislative reelections”, it is important to think in terms of “advancing political careers”.

Third, according to Mayhew (1974), it is more appropriate for U.S. representatives to win an election than to maximize votes. In Brazil, vote maximizing is more important because of the electoral system and different career patterns, as candidates for deputy run against dozens or even hundreds of competitors rather than merely one as in the United States (single-member districts), and the number of share of votes needed to win is not clear beforehand. Above all, amassing a large number of votes enhances one’s chances of becoming a state secretary, a minister or a head of a major public agency or enterprise.

Fourth, in Brazil and in Germany, the leftist parties are more ideological and less pragmatic than in the United States (Leal, 2005). They more frequently adhere to ideological or policy principles even at the cost of votes and winning office than U.S. parties. Altogether, Mayhew’s core arguments may be applied in Brazil and Germany, but we need also to take into consideration of how MPs gain candidacy, how they win elections/reelections, and how they advance their political careers.

3.4. The Party model

Modern democracy and parties evolved simultaneously as the result of the historical development of representative institutions and organizations created to solve collective action problems in different political and cultural environments. This simultaneity may have contributed to suggest that democracy cannot survive without parties. Elmer Schattschneider’s (1942) famous quotation clearly expresses this idea: “modern

democracy is unthinkable save in terms of political parties".¹⁹ From this perspective, democratic regimes can coexist with various kinds of parties and party systems. Parties have different internal configurations and connections patterns with voters, receive more or less influence from an ideology or a programmatic appeal, or are more or less cohesive in the legislative arena. Parties remain the most important agents of representation in democratic politics because they provide access to state power, and participate in three decisive moments of the representative system: (a) in the electoral moment, since politicians must belong to one of them in order to be able to run for office. (b) In the legislative moment, as they organize the law-making process and the executive offices. (c) In the policy-making moment, as they control the bureaucracy responsible for it (Nicolau, 2010).

Because of their centrality in the competition for state power, parties are the most important groups for inducing political actors to make compromises and accept some losses, and their presence encourages groups and social movements to organize along party lines. If governments lack party support, they may undermine or bypass legislatures, make direct appeals to the people, or create new bureaucratic agencies through which they can carry out their programs. Such measures have high costs in terms of democratic institution building, subjecting democracy to antidemocratic proclivities. In such a perspective, democracy depends on what kind of parties and party systems emerge.

One of most widely used models to emphasize political parties' centrality in contemporary democracies is the *responsible party model*, which features two main tenets. First, there are only two relevant actors in the political representation process: electors and parties. Second, parties are highly disciplined organizations, leaving individual politicians to play a secondary role in the political process. Although the responsible party model has earned a number of criticism, including that of being empirically invalid, since neither political parties nor voters behave according to its

¹⁹ At a normative level, however, various scholars have reviewed the operationalization and the ways of empirically measuring the concept of democracy. Is the presence of parties or competition between them a necessary attribute of democracy? In Robert Dahl's (1971) ten conditions for polyarchy, there is no mention of parties. Gary Goertz (2006) made an overview of democracy indicators (broad political liberties, competitive elections, inclusive participation, civilian supremacy, national sovereignty) proposed by nine different authors. Only one of them mentions party legitimacy and party competitions as fundamental attributes of the democratic regime.

predictions, scholars keep using the model in the analysis of the European proportional systems as an assessment parameter.

Jacques Thomassen and Hermann Schmitt (1997) summarize the specific requirements of the responsible party model as follows: (a) voters have a choice of parties in competitive elections, i.e., they can choose between at least two parties with different programs. (b) The internal cohesion, or party discipline, of political parties is sufficient to enable them to implement their policy program. (c) Voters have policy preferences. (d) Voters are aware of the differences between the programs of different political parties. (e) Electors vote according to their policy preferences, i.e., they choose the party that best represents their policy preferences.

Studying the U. S. Congress, Cox and McCubbins (1993, p. 123) concluded for the centrality of the “majority party” as a player that ensures the Congress’ top positions--the Chair of the Commissions and the House Speaker--for its members. In so doing, the majority party gains control over the legislative agenda, the processing of projects on the floor, and may exercise veto power. Although the parties occupy a central place in the authors’ model, they recognize the goal of re-election as the MPs’ underlying motivation, and point to (a) *personal* and (b) *party reputation* as the two main variables framing their electoral careers. The former is a “private good” and explains why MPs seek to reinforce it through certain kinds of activities, such as pork barreling and casework. The latter is a “public good of all party members” and plays a secondary role as electoral incentive.

In Brazil, the research agenda initiated by Figueiredo and Limongi (1995, 1996, and 1999) reached a conclusion that fits into the party model of the American literature. Based on neo-institutionalism, the authors analyzed the structures and procedures of the Brazilian Congress as independent variables of the legislative process. Data on the discipline rate in roll call voting (85%) in the Chamber of Deputies in the period 1989-1994 brought evidence that contradicted the major assumptions about the Brazilian electoral system, as a high degree of party cohesion on roll calls²⁰ and consistent

²⁰ From the methodological point of view, the authors’ research received much criticism with regard to the limitations of the roll call voting as proxies of party cohesion. The work of Thomas Saalfeld (1988) provided elements to show the incomplete nature of the analysis of roll call voting as indicating a vertical

alignment of parties and coalitions in a left-right ideological continuum were found. The authors could not verify “the weakness of parties where it was most expected to occur”, i.e., in the plenary of the Chamber of Deputies.

Two analytical mistakes, attributed by the author to the distributive model, were the probable causes of the misperception. First, the transference of the “centrifugal effects of the electoral arena” to the parliamentary arena. Second, the disregard for the “blocking effects of the highly centralized internal structure of the House”, which filters the pressures for distributive policies and the cultivation of personal reputation. The discontinuity observed between the electoral and parliamentary arenas translated into incentives for the coexistence of both particularism and individual parliamentary performance in congruence with the party leadership.

According to the authors, although the Brazilian electoral formula favors the cultivation of personal vote to the detriment of the party vote, the Legislature’s internal organization lies in the hands of party leaders, leaving little room for the backbenchers. Disciplined parties under party leadership control coupled with the President’s agenda power, which resembles that of a Prime Minister, brings the Brazilian political system close to the cabinet regimes (Figueiredo and Limongi (1995, p. 506-515).

Other scholars, however, have found evidence in the opposite direction: the nation’s political and institutional framework has not proved to be strong enough to impose a "cordon sanitaire" as to isolate the Parliament from what happens in the electoral arena. The research of Mainwaring (1999), Carvalho (2003), Ames (2003) and Samuels (1999, 2001, 2002, 2003), have evidenced that incentives originated in the electoral arena do penetrate the halls of the Chamber of Deputies, albeit with different intensity and opposite signs. These authors concluded for the methodological relevance of the

cohesion of parties in Parliament. Jairo Nicolau (2010) also pointed out the fragility of the discipline rate of parties during roll calls as indicator of party cohesion given the intense party switching of political leaders. In the period between 1985 and 2007, when a Supreme Court (STF) decision punished party switching with loss of representation, some 30% of the representatives left the party for which they had been elected before the end of their four-year term. According to the author, party performance in the Chamber of Deputies reveals a peculiar situation. On the one hand, parties remain relatively disciplined in their voting in a plenary session, but on the other hand, party switching during a term has radically altered the parties' internal composition. Paradoxically, parties in Brazil show strong signs of discipline, but not of cohesion.

electoral connection as an analytical tool, but, unlike the American case, one cannot reduce it to a single set of incentives arising from the electoral arena.

3.5. Summary

The multifaceted and complex character of the electoral connection in Brazil produce conflicting incentives toward parochialism and universalism, depending on the spatial configuration of votes as well as on the degree of competitiveness of proportional elections.²¹ MPs with a high concentration of votes tend to follow the logic of localism, and MPs with a low concentration of votes tend to adopt more universalistic policies. The nature of the political markets and ideological affiliation, identified by the electoral sociology, also positively correlates with MPs' antagonistic perceptions and behavior (Leal, 2005). Those from the capitals tend toward universalism if compared with the ones elected in the countryside. MPs from less competitive electoral districts (North and the Northeast) tend toward localism and those coming from regions of high competitiveness (South and the Southeast) tend toward universalism (Carvalho, 2003, p. 28-9).

There seem to be little probability that one single model (distributive or party) could fully grasp the nuances of MPs political and electoral behavior (Shepsle and Weingast, 1995). None of the two models has the monopoly of a theoretical framework capable of capturing the complexity of politics in America, much less the conflicting aspects of the political and electoral systems in Brazil and Germany. Only combining and adapting the distributive and party models to those different cultural and political contexts may theoretically fit into the current analyses. Both are not mutually exclusive, and build off the paradigm of organizational economics (Barney & Ouchi, 1986), whereby institutions represent devices aimed at lowering transaction costs, allowing participants to capture the gains from cooperation. In its own way, each model captures different aspects of disparate political and electoral systems and the possible implications for MPs' media strategies in both countries.

²¹ Fabiano Santos (1999) claims that the idea of "electoral connection and personal vote" do not apply in the case of Brazil, since the MPs simply "ignore the preferences of voters who contributed to their election". Without being able to identify whom and what are the interests of their constituency, the MPs could not abide their legislative behavior by satisfying grassroots' demands. Carvalho (2003, p. 52) points out that Santos' objections suffers from an "analytical formalism with little adherence to the facts."

II - COMPARATIVE FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER 1: METHODOLOGY

1.1. Most Different systems design

Comparative social and political sciences aspire to a methodological rigor that legitimates the scientific character of its discourse. To find the answers to social and political questions it does not take positions a priori, but research certain issues, systems, group of people or nations with the aim of making accurate correlations between variables. Comparing is to create categories and find relevant differences between cases as well as to analyze and generalize the findings whenever applicable. Comparative analysis essentially lets us see variations and similarities. In so doing, it contributes to concept formation, and leads to theoretical refinement. It allows us to test hypotheses about the interrelationships among social phenomena. As Bendix (1963, p. 535) pointed out, “comparative studies provide an important check on the generalizations implicit in our concepts and forces us to clarify the limits of their application.”

On the one hand, most of the literature on media and political systems of developed countries is ethnocentric, as it refers to the experience of a single country. It tends to generalize their findings, as though the model that prevails in one country were universal. On the other hand, in countries with less developed tradition of comparative research, there is a tendency to borrow the literature of these countries and apply it uncritically to local or national contexts. This may turn aspects of the foreign systems into aspects perceived as “natural”. Comparative analysis “denaturalizes” most of these assumptions, as it has “the capacity to render the invisible visible” (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995, p. 76), and to draw our attention to aspects of any system, including our own, that may be taken for granted and difficult to detect when the focus is on only one national case.

Esser and Pfetsch (2004) urge scholars to “go comparative” and appreciate the potential of comparative research on political communication. As noted by Blumler and Gurevitch (1995) comparisons help to prevent parochialism and ethnocentrism showing how one’s own country differs from the other, as it sheds new light on political

communication patterns of one's own country, leading to viewing own routines more critically. Comparison attracts attention to the macro structures, which are often taken for granted within one's own system. It offers access to a vast array of alternative solutions showing how one's own dilemmas may be solved using solutions adopted from a different country. To compare is to expand available databases helping redefine theoretical approaches on political communication, and transnational trends, similarities, and deviations from general patterns become apparent only when a perspective is taken.

Some studies on political communication have adopted a *most similar* comparative framework (MSSD), seeking to consider the roles the media and mass communication play in the exertion of power and distribution of values in democratic political systems, and their impact on the electoral behavior within the universe of established democracy. This approach isolates the effects of different media systems and electoral rules from certain common historical traditions, shared cultural values, or political experiences. In so doing, however, it turns difficult to generalize from any lessons derived from a particular regional context to another, as it is the case of the current study.

In many aspects, our attempt to compare MPs' electoral connections and media strategies in Brazil and Germany fits into Przeworski and Teune's (1982) *most different systems design* (MDSD). A particular variable (such as growing media influence) has explanatory power across very different cases, even if they vary in terms of regime type (presidential versus parliamentary system), electoral system or political traditions. On the one hand, the differences between the Brazilian and German cultural, political and media systems allow the analysis of different emphasis on media strategies in different electoral contexts and geographic voting patterns. On the other hand, both polities are federal in nature, providing voters with choices – and candidates with opportunities – at different territorial levels. This creates variation in the size of the local electorate, the nature of the electoral connection between voters and MPs, and consequently in media strategies.

In the “most different systems design”, the focus on the most contrasted cases lies at the heart of the method itself. This method assumes that the dependent phenomenon is invariant along the observations and irrelevant systemic factors are not considered. In

order to reduce the number of viable independent variables, the model seeks the maximum heterogeneity among the cases. According to Przeworski and Teune (1982, p. 36), "the starting point of this model is the lowest unit level observed, in most cases, at the individual level". Here the basic unit of analysis is individual MPs and their media strategies in Brazil and Germany. The aim is to test to what extent media visibility is important for MPs' electoral career, and its relationship with the various nuances of the electoral connection, structures of incentives translated into different geographical voting patterns, party organization and electoral formulae (Fleisher, 1976; Lancaster, 1986; Dias 1991, Carvalho, 1996; Ames, 2001; Zittel and Gschwend, 2009).

1.2. Why compare Brazil and Germany?

The role of comparative analysis in social theory plays two basic functions: concept formation and clarification, and causal inference. Comparative analysis highlights variation and similarities, and thus contributes to concept building and to the refinement of our conceptual apparatus (Przeworski and Teune, 1982). The current study is exploratory in nature in the sense it tests a hypothesis and makes some causal inferences, albeit without any pretention of generalization. The data draws upon the survey "Media visibility and electoral Careers" conducted in three parliaments (N= 507). This includes the Chamber of Deputies in Brasília, which encompasses all MPs of the parliamentary Caucus of the State of Minas Gerais (N=53) and MPs from 23 parties, elected in 19 states and the Federal District (N=100), the Landtag in Munich (N =130), and in the Bundestag in Berlin (N=224).

The comparison between Brazil and Germany is justified for a number of reasons. Brazil's representative system combines a plebiscitary presidential system with federalism, and open-list of candidates with proportional representation. The result of such a combination is a weak and fragmented multiparty system and the formation of coalitions based on heterogeneous political forces. Germany is a *Parteiendemokratie* (party democracy), a parliamentary government, with a mixed-member electoral system that combines very different electoral rules in the same country. This fact provides a unique opportunity and a powerful analytical environment for the comparative study of institutional effects on politics, MPs' campaign styles and media strategies under identical, social, political and economic conditions. Because the Germany's mixed-member system involves the simultaneous use of the world's two dominant forms of

electoral rules--proportional representation and single-member district elections-- it allows us to isolate the impact of institutional variables on political outcomes and media strategies, by holding constant non-institutional variables such as social cleavages, socio-economic development and culture.

At the state level, the southeastern state of Minas Gerais (MG), Brazil, has the largest number of municipalities (853), is the second most populous (20 million inhabitants), possesses the fourth land area (586.528 km²), and generates the third GDP of the country (360 billion USD).²² Bavaria is Germany's largest federal state in area (70.553 km²) and the second in population (12.5 million inhabitants). Located in the southeast of country, the "Free State of Bavaria" comprises seven administrative regions (Wahlkreis)²³ and 93 electoral districts (Stimmkreis).²⁴ Once a poor rural area with a weak infrastructure, Bavaria is arguably Germany's most successful state, with all but full employment and one of the country best education systems. It is also its most distinct state, as the only one that reverted after the second world war to its historical borders as a duchy and kingdom. Traditional garb is more idiosyncratic and popular here than anywhere else in Germany, and merges more easily with ultra-modern, high-tech life styles and industries.²⁵

The state is also the only one in which the country's largest party, the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) led by chancellor Angela Merkel, is not present at all. Instead, a sister party called the Christian Social Union (CSU) takes the CDU's role in Bavaria. The Christian Social Union (CSU) has been the strongest single party in all but one of the sixteen postwar state elections (1950) and has governed either alone or in coalition for all but four years since 1946. Both parties arose out of the chaos of the postwar years when previous Catholic and conservative parties merged to form new

²² Fundação João Pinheiro. (2012). *Centro de Estatística e Informação*, Belo Horizonte. (www.fjp.mg.gov.br).

²³ Each administrative region elects the following number of deputies to the Landtag in Munich Upper Bavaria, 60 deputies; Lower Bavaria, 18; Upper Palatinate, 16; Upper Franconia 16; Central Franconia, 24; Lower Franconia 20; Swabia 26, totaling a minimum of 180 representatives. In 2008, 7 extra MPs were elected due to the correction system (*Überhangsmandate*).

²⁴ Each electoral district (Stimmkreis) is territorially divided to contain an average number of inhabitants: around 125 thousand per district.

²⁵ Bayerisches Landesamt für Statistik und Datenverarbeitung, available at: www.statistik.bayern.de/statistik/vgr.

political associations. Since then, the CDU and CSU have stayed separate, even though they form a common faction in the federal parliament.

Left intact after the war, Bavaria is without question the most particularistic of all German “Länder” (states). Heavily Catholic, tradition-conscious, and political conservative, Bavaria has followed a different path from the rest of Germany since long before the Federal Republic. It entered reluctantly the Second Reich in 1871, was a hotbed of separatist and extremist sentiment during the Weimar Republic, and the only Land that did not ratify the Basic Law in 1949, although the Bavarians acceded to the will of the other states and did finally join the Federal Republic. Yet, the Bavarians consider themselves the guardians of the German nationalist tradition in an increasingly cosmopolitan and integrated Western Europe.

Although both objects of analysis posit comparative challenges, they certainly play similar political and electoral roles in both countries. Minas Gerais is a microcosm representative of the diversity of Brazil. The presidential candidate who wins the election in Minas Gerais too often also wins the national election. Bavaria may not be a representative microcosm of Germany, a country notoriously known for its historical, cultural and political diversity. Suffice it to say that Germany was unified in 1870 by Bismarck, while the Free State of Bavaria has over a thousand years. However, from the standpoint of weight and the role played by Bavaria on the German political and electoral scenario there are similarities with Minas Gerais. The modal electoral behavior of the Bavarian resembles that of Minas Gerais in the sense that any government in Germany is unthinkable without the participation of the Bavarian party, the CSU, which together with the CDU, ensures the stability of coalition governments in Germany.

In addition, the comparison between both states is justified for a number of reasons: (a) both play crucial political and economic roles at the national level. (b) Both have the second large electoral representation in the Federal Parliaments. Bavaria adopts an open-list, proportional representation given to a candidate (second vote), not to a party as it is the general rule in Germany. This electoral formula is similar to the one used in Minas Gerais. (c) Both have a historical, religious, cultural (baroque) and political

(conservatism and autonomy) tradition deeply influenced by the Catholic Church (CSU party in Bavaria), which shape the way politicians relate to voters and parties.

As for the media, it is well known that technology and economy shape media systems, but not alone. History, traditionally rooted expectations, values and patterns of media consumption, and political decisions shape media systems as well. In Germany, news media serve the common good and perceive of people as citizens and not only consumers. The Brazilian broadcasting media is 90% privately owned, and adopt a “catch-all” attitude regarding their audience. Brazil is more television-centric whereas Germany is newspaper-centric (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). The extent to which media companies are publicly traded or form a part of large global media conglomerates also varies across the countries, as does the degree of regulation of the media system. Political parallelism does not apply easily to the Brazilian media because political parties do not play a central role as they do in Germany. Brazilian journalists have defined their professional identity with reference to the American model, although they have reinterpreted it in a very particular way.

In the following chapters, the goal is to compare the political and media systems of Brazil and Germany in as much as it may provide information on the strength of political parties and the degree of MPs’ media usage in political and electoral activities in both countries. The intent is to compare the particular nature of the constituencies, ranging from the party electorate for list candidates to the voters at different territorial levels. If the expectation holds across different political and media systems that there is (a) a general increase in the importance of individual media strategies and (b) a crucial mediating role of constituency characteristics like the ones described below, it would add significantly to scholarship on representative systems and the effect of media on political behavior.

CHAPTER 2: THE BRAZILIAN REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM

2.1. Introduction

In the following section, the main features of the representative dimension of the Brazilian political system are discussed, with focus on the party system and the structure of collaborative and competitive relationships between parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies.²⁶ According to Nicolau (2010), these relationships include three processes: (a) the choice by voters of representatives for the executive and legislative branches. (b) The decision making process during representatives' term. (c) The implementation process of public policies. Considerations are provided on how these "rules of the game" shape voter and candidate strategic and tactical behavior and the possible implications for political campaign media strategies of MPs' in the Brazilian social-political context.

Brazil is a country of great magnitude districts and an open-list system, which make the community lose its privileged position occupied in systems of small-magnitude districts like Germany.²⁷ Brazil is also the only country in the world that, besides combining proportionality, a multiparty system, and an "imperial" presidential system, organizes the Executive based in large coalitions. No other democracy in the world grants politicians so much autonomy vis-à-vis their parties. The legislation reinforces the individualistic behavior of politicians and contributes to undermining the efforts to build solid political parties. It also tolerates extremely low degrees of party loyalty and discipline with the exception of the parties on the left side of the ideological spectrum.

²⁶ Brazil is a "partisan representative democracy", i.e., a democracy that does not allow loose candidacy unrelated to partisan political organizations (Federal Constitution, art. 14, § 2, V).

²⁷ According to Douglas Rae (1967), representative systems can vary in three independent ways. The first variable is the *magnitude of the districts* (M), i.e., the amount of seats the electoral law assigns to each constituency. The constituencies are single-member (SMD) when there is only one vacancy in dispute, and multimember (MMD) when the number of seats are equal or superior to two per district. In majoritarian representation --"First-past-the-post" (FPTP), predominate single-member districts. Proportional representation (PR) are associated with multi-member districts. The second variable is the *structure of the vote*, which determines the voters' degree of freedom in relation to the effective number of electoral candidates (ENEC) and the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP) in an election. The vote can be *categorical* when the elector can only choose a single candidate or party among all contenders. The *ordinal* vote gives the elector the opportunity to rank the various competitors according their preferences. The third variable is the *electoral formula*, which derives directly from the principle of representation and allows differentiate winners from losers in an election. The three main types of electoral formulas are the *plurality*, the *absolute majority*, both pertaining to the *majority principle of representation*, and the *proportional representation*. The combination of these three variables generates the various electoral systems.

These institutions promote highly individualistic campaign strategies. Challengers sometimes have greater name recognition than incumbents, since the multimember district system forces incumbents to share political credit with other players as well as with politicians in state and local government. Politicians who hold office in state or municipal government have significantly more control over execution of public policy and over the distribution of pork-barrel projects, which provide more opportunities to be the center of media attention.

The literature on parties recognizes the weakness of the party system and the great autonomy of politicians combined with the growing importance of the mass media in the electoral process in Brazil. This weakness is historically associated with the discontinuity of the party system caused by numerous institutional ruptures: in the last five decades, Brazil has adopted three distinct party systems, two multiparty periods, and a mandatory two-party system period (Schmitt, 2000). These adverse circumstances have prevented not only the formation of a partisan political culture (Souza, 1976), but also a process of political socialization based on partisan loyalties that could be transmitted from generation to generation.

According to Mainwaring (1991), the nature of the Brazilian electoral system (proportional representation with open lists), combined with a permissive party law, produces strong incentives for politicians' autonomy, and individualistic behavior of candidates. These features associated with election campaigns focused primarily on electronic media stimulate direct communication between candidates and voters. This personal vote-seeking tendency is reinforced by the peculiar role played by Free Time Election Propaganda (HGPE), which on the one hand enables free access to all parties and candidates to TV and radio, and on the other favors the personalization of the electoral competition to the detriment of the party image and programmatic or ideological debate (Albuquerque, 1999a). In summary, the combination of the historical weakness of Brazilian parties, the existence of electoral and party legislation that encourages individual action of the candidate and the centrality of the mass media in the electoral process, especially TV, may well characterize an "audience democracy" (Manin, 1995).

2.1. Institutional arrangements

The 1988 Federal Constitution established the current representative system, over which the Superior Electoral Court (STE) exercises jurisdictional control. Brazil uses three systems in elections for political offices: The National Congress is comprised of the Chamber of Deputies (Lower House)²⁸ and the Senate (Upper House). The Senate features 81 senators (three per state) elected by a plurality system (FPTP) for an eight-year-term (two-thirds in one election, one-third in the next election). The Chamber of Deputies (Câmara dos Deputados) has 513 members elected in the states through open list pro rata proportional representation system (open-list PR), in which voters may cast ballots for individual candidates, rather than the party, to determine both the share of votes won by parties and the candidates that win the seats for those parties. The district magnitude, the number of seats available in an electoral district, varies from between 8 and 70. Elections for state Legislatures (Assembleia Legislativa) and for the City Councils (Câmara dos Vereadores) follow the same open-list PR system. The absolute majority system (run-off) frames the election for president. If no candidate receives more than 50% of the valid votes, a new election occurs between the two most-voted for candidates. The president's term lasts four years, and the incumbent can be re-elected for another consecutive term. The same system apply in elections for state governor and mayors.²⁹

Brazil's representative system combines a plebiscitary presidential system with federalism, and open-list of candidates with proportional representation.³⁰ The result of such a combination is a weak and fragmented multiparty system³¹ and the formation of

²⁸ Our research focus only on the MPs' media strategies in the elections for the Chamber of Deputies.

²⁹ Municipalities with more than 200 thousand voters may have the contest decision in a second round.

³⁰ The use of the open-list PR system in Brazil is remarkable for a number of reasons. The first is longevity. No country in the world uses the open list for so many years (since 1932). The second derives from the size of the Brazilian electorate, 135.8 million in 2011, in contrast to other countries using the same model: Poland, 30.7 million (2011); Peru, 15.9 million (2011), Chile, 13.5 million (2011); Finland, 4.1 million (2011). As is known, the number of voters is particularly important to define some patterns of relationship between representatives and their constituencies. The third reason is associated with the combination of open list PR with other attributes of the electoral system: large electoral districts, possibility of electoral coalitions, simultaneous elections for various legislative (state and federal MPs) and executive offices (president, governors and senators), and under-representation of some federal states in the Chamber of Deputies (Nicolau, 2006).

³¹ Pippa Norris (2008) shows that the average of effective number of electoral parties (NV) across 138 countries is 4.1. In Brazil, this index is 8.8. Out of 32 registered parties, 11 have less than 3% of representation in the Chamber of Deputies. The two major party caucuses have around 20% of representation each (Laboratório de Estudos Experimentais, 2010). In 2006, the Superior Court of Justice (Supremo Tribunal Federal - STF) declared unconstitutional the electoral threshold (Sperrklausel) of 5%

“great coalitions”³² based on heterogeneous political forces. Unlike other countries (Chile, Finland and Poland), a voter has two options when choosing representatives for the Lower House: either to pick the candidate’s number or a party’s label (legend) in the electronic ballot box. After pressing the correct button, a photo of the selected candidate or a reference to the party chosen appears on the screen, but the vote on a party counts only for the seat apportionment among competing parties, having no effect on the distribution of seats among candidates (Mainwaring, 1999; Ames, 2003; Mulholland and Rennó, 2008; Nicolau, 2010).³³

Nicolau (2010) points out that, in order to achieve representation, a party or coalition must exceed the electoral quota calculated by dividing the total votes cast to the parties and candidates by the number of seats in dispute. Percentage wise, an electoral quota is the result of dividing 100% by the number of seats available in the elections (Hare quota system). Calculation for seat apportionment follows a two-stage process. In the first stage, the total party or coalition votes is divided by the electoral quota. Each party will receive as many seats as how many times it achieves the electoral quota. The second stage apportions the remaining seats according to the D’Hondt formula, which divides the total of votes by the number of seats already obtained by the party plus one. Parties having the higher averages receive seats not apportioned in the first stage.

as the minimum share of votes required for a political party or coalition to secure any representation in Parliament. Approved in 1995 (Law 9.096/95), the "barrier clause" would be applied for the first time in the 2006 elections. Only 7 out of 29 parties, which disputed those elections, would meet the 5% criterion (STF, 2006, ADI 1351/DF).

³²According to the Federal Constitution, a political party is a legal entity of private law (art. 17 § 2). Coalition (*coligação*) or alliance is the union of two or more parties seeking to win an election (art. 7 caput, Law 9096/95 and art. 7, Resolution 19.406/95 - TSE). A coalition possesses its own label, sometimes known as “the super-label” (*super legenda*), and its representative has the same juridical powers as the president of a political party before the electoral court. Coalitions and alliances are born through the Party Regional Conventions, which must submit the coalition proposal to the local electoral jurisdiction four month prior to the election (art. 8, Law 9.504/97).

³³ Since 1932, voting is compulsory in Brazil (Federal Constitution of 1988, Article 14, subsection 1, paragraphs I and II). The reasons given by many scholars for the provision read as follows: a) Voting is a “power-duty.” b) The voters do participate in the electoral process. c) Voting is an important exercise of political education. d) The current state of the Brazilian democracy does not allow the adoption of voluntary voting. e) Compulsory voting belongs to the Brazilian and Latin American tradition. f) The obligation to vote is neither a burden to the country nor an embarrassment to voters if compared to the benefits for the political and electoral processes. The average voter turnout in the last six federal elections was 80% (IDEA, 2011).

The electoral constituencies conform to state boundaries. There are 27 states districts, and the number of seats in each constituency is quite large, ranging from eight to seventy, a total of 513 seats being available. Central party organs do not control nominations for federal deputy. Instead, state-level (district-level) party organs choose candidates for congressional office. Parties can nominate one-and-a-half candidates per seat in each district, and multiparty alliances can nominate twice as many candidates as there are seats. Seats won by parties or coalitions are held by the top candidates from each list. It is important to underline that, coalitions between parties function as a single list: elected are the top rated of the coalition, regardless of to which party they belong.

Brazil is the only country in the world that, besides combining proportionality, a multiparty system, and an “imperial” presidential system, organizes the Executive based in large coalitions. Abranches (1988, p. 21) dubbed this peculiar trait of the Brazilian political system "presidentialism of coalition": a system of governance that delegates to the Executive great legislative and bargaining powers.³⁴ The Nation’s Chief Executive has to compose a base of support in a multiparty Parliament without a sufficient majority even to ensure the adoption of ordinary laws, which requires a simple majority for approval. Thus, the Executive is bound to govern with a coalition of political parties since the President's party rarely reaches 20% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and uses its transaction resources to consolidate the coalition's support (Cintra, 2007).

³⁴ According to the author, a hallmark of our historical economic development is a growth model that has deepened, notably, the structural heterogeneity of the Brazilian society: The contradictory image of a social order on the threshold of industrial maturity, but marked by profound imbalances and mismatches in their social, political and economic structures. At the macro level, this heterogeneity reveals serious distributional conflicts, technical differences and disparities in income between people, companies, sectors and regions. Some socio-economic sectors exhibit patterns of production, income and consumption close to those prevailing in the advanced industrialized countries. At the same time, a considerable portion of the population persists in typical socio-economic conditions of developing regions, characterized by rates of economic instability and social mobility. No less significant part of the population lives in conditions of destitution similar to those prevailing in poor countries. The author points out that the multiplication of demands emerging from Brazil’s economic development model exacerbates historical trends for state interventionism. This tendency unfolds in incentives and subsidies, which expands the network of protection, state regulations and programs to benefit different clienteles. Every government then faces a huge budget bureaucratic inertia that makes it extremely difficult to eliminate any program or to reduce subsidies and incentives, and reorganize and rationalize the public spending. There is, therefore, the weakening of the government's ability to face crises more effectively and to solve the most acute problems that emerge from our own model of development (Abranches, 1988, pp. 2-3).

A remarkable feature of the Brazilian democracy since the end of the military dictatorship in 1985 is the increasing state regulation of party activity. From the legislative control of enrollment and listing members, to the increasing intervention of the judiciary in the representative system, through the promulgation of decisions that have a strong impact on parties and elections, there is an ongoing judicial interventionism (“judicialização”) in the political party competition.³⁵ In addition, parties are becoming more and more dependent on state-controlled party funds and free propaganda time on radio and television (HGPE). These conditions ensure that the Brazilian party system is one of the most regulated among all democratic countries (Ferraz, 2008; Karvonen, 2007).

2.2. Constituency Campaigns

Mainwaring (1991) points out that several aspects of Brazil's electoral system have either no parallel or few parallels in the world and that no other democracy grants politicians so much autonomy vis-à-vis their parties. The Brazilian electoral legislation reinforces the individualistic behavior of politicians and contributes to undermining the efforts to build solid political parties. The legislation tolerates and even encourages extremely low degrees of party loyalty and discipline found in the major parties (excepting several parties on the left). In turn, limited party discipline and loyalty have contributed to the singular underdevelopment of political parties. As for the political elite, the author claims that there has been a clear option for electoral systems that weaken parties. They have done so in part because they perceive party discipline as authoritarian, and fear that executives would otherwise be able to control them ruthlessly. Their preference for antiparty electoral systems reflects their belief that they can more effectively represent their own clienteles and win the election if party organizations are weak.

Yet, individualistic behavior of politicians faces some restrictions in Brazil. John Carey's (2009) research on the relationship between *legislative decisiveness*, i.e., the capacity of legislatures to reach decisions on policy and to implement those decisions, and legislators' individual and collective *voting behavior*, presents a dilemma in terms

³⁵ The Superior Court of Justice, (STF) and the Superior Electoral Court, (TSE) have intervened in at least five emblematic cases: vertical coalitions, the number of councilors in municipal elections; legal threshold (Sperrklausel); party fund and party loyalty.

of what kind of accountability is possible, given that legislators are responsive to the preferences and demands of different “principals”. The author argues that the ability to withdraw favor, and so deny the resources that fuel professional advancement, is the enforcement mechanism behind accountability. “Principals” are political actors who command some measure of loyalty from legislators, and whose interests a legislator might represent and pursue in an official capacity.




Fig. 1: List of potential principals placing demands on legislators in Brazil (Carey, 2009).

Figure 1 depicts the “structure of accountability” vis-à-vis several competing principals proposed by Carey (2009) for the Brazilian representative system. For MPs elected by a purely personal vote, the support constituency is clearly the primary principal, but even in such cases MPs confronts other powerful principal, such as party leaders, who control a great deal of political and financial resources within the legislature, even though the electoral rule encourages individualism. Yet, the potential for principals to compete for legislator loyalty and the effects of this on legislative individualism go beyond party leaders versus electoral constituency. In the Brazilian political system, other actors control other resources that affect the legislative process or the ambitions of legislators.

Most prominent is the president, who is elected independently from legislators, but who is constitutionally endowed with a vast array of legislative authority, such as vetoes, decree-and-rule-making powers, besides the control over appointments to public offices. Unlike presidents, governors do not exercise direct authority over the national legislative agenda. Yet, in Brazil’s decentralized system, they command significant

resources that are essential to legislative reelection prospects, and control the widely valued appointments to state-level cabinet posts.

Barry Ames (2001) argues that Brazil's electoral system generates strong incentives for legislators to seek pork: incumbents run under open-list proportional representation rules where each of Brazil's states serve as an at-large electoral district, with large district magnitudes. Under these rules parties do not rank order their candidates, so in order to win candidates must compete against their list mates as well as against candidates on other lists. These institutions promote highly individualistic campaign strategies to which incumbents respond by seeking pork to reinforce their personal vote base. According to the author, "politicians, faced with the institutional structure of Brazilian politics, find it necessary and feasible to trade blocs of votes for pork barrel and patronage" (pp. 107–8).

Samuels (2001) points out that, given the relatively low payoff to holding a seat in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, incumbents gain little advantage in terms of name recognition from holding office. Challengers in Brazil sometimes have greater name recognition than incumbents, and Brazil's electoral system offers incumbents little protection. Brazil's multimember district system forces incumbents to share political credit with other incumbents as well as with politicians in state and local government.³⁶ This reduces deputies' capacity to build a personal vote base by claiming credit for delivering pork.³⁷ Because they gain relatively little from serving in the Chamber,

³⁶ There seems to be a "voters' conviction gap" during the elections in Brazil: voters' consciousness seems more proactive over the dispute for executive power than the competition to the legislature. The vote for president, governor and mayor seems more "confident". The level of spontaneous abstention is much lower for these positions than for MPs and city councilors. Voters usually define their candidates for executive offices before choosing the candidates for legislative positions (Ribeiro, 2003).

³⁷ A prominent question in comparative electoral studies concerns the so-called "personal vote." Typically, scholars approach this question at across national as opposed to across party level. David Samuels (1999), however, focuses on the characteristics of parties, as opposed to the characteristics of electoral systems, as determinants of candidates' personal vote seeking. The author argues that candidates' adoption of an individualistic or collective strategy depends largely on centralized or decentralized nomination control in their party, party's alliance options, and access to and control over funding and patronage. According to Cain et al. (1987), "The personal vote refers to that portion of a candidate's electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and records. The part of the vote that is *not* personal includes support for the candidate based on his or her partisan affiliation, fixed voter characteristics such as class, religion, and ethnicity" (p. 9).

incumbents face an uphill struggle in terms of increasing—or even maintaining—their name recognition.

Incumbents compete for media attention both with other incumbents in their state as well as with challengers. Politicians who hold office in state or municipal government have significantly more control over execution of public policy and over the distribution of pork-barrel projects, which provide more opportunities to be the center of media attention. Because incumbents do not have clearly delineated districts below the level of their state, their vote bases are also vulnerable to “attack”—from either co-partisans or candidates from other parties and from both other incumbents and challengers. Many challengers—especially ex-governors, state secretaries, and mayors—are particularly good at stealing incumbents’ votes because they may have recently held a more powerful political position and have a proven track record of providing particularistic services.

These institutional elements, coupled with a lack of central-party nomination control and large district magnitudes, promote highly individualistic electoral campaigns. Most candidates eschew programmatic appeals and concentrate on differentiating themselves from other candidates by providing and promising particularistic benefits. Because individual candidates must raise all their own funds, Brazil’s campaign finance law accentuates this individualism. The electoral law grants individual candidates the responsibility for raising and spending campaign-funds, and this spending is unrestricted. They can raise, spend and directly account to the Electoral Court, without the need for the party to endorse spending.

Candidates for Congress have considerable autonomy to organize their own campaigns. The type of the political campaign depends on their political profile and available resources. They usually set the schedule of events, and decide how and where to make and distribute canvass. Virtually all of them organize activities that allow direct contact with voters in public places, rallies, pamphlet distribution, visits to public areas or private home. Candidates advertise their candidacy through flyers, posters, buttons, and banners, and those with supporters in rural areas provide transportation by truck or bus to the polls on Election Day. They usually distribute printed material with

biographical information, and hand out giveaways, t-shirts, caps and calendars to voters. In addition to this direct contact, candidates seek to spread posters with their names and candidacy number in homes and on autos.³⁸

Brazil's multimember at-large district system makes voter identification of creditworthy candidates relatively more difficult. In an effort to outspend their competitors, candidates engage in a wide variety of costly campaign activities, since they know that the best way to increase their name recognition with voters is to spend lavishly on self-promotion. However, candidates cannot purchase radio or TV ads because access to TV and radio is free and determined according to a formula based on party representation in the Chamber of Deputies.

Parties are entitled to broadcast national and statewide programs via open television channels and radio stations biannually (HGPE).³⁹ All channels broadcast HGPE programs simultaneously, which last between 10 to 5 minutes, depending on the parties' vote quota won in the elections for the chamber of Deputies. Parties are further entitled to broadcast 30 second to 1 minute-spots during commercial time on radio and television. Nationwide propaganda is aired four days per semester, lasting a total of three to five minutes per day; parties share equal time for statewide program broadcast. Program production is the parties' responsibility, but the network enjoys tax exemption for the time used for party propaganda.

The HGPE airtime varies according to the parties' proportional representation in the Chamber of Deputies. Larger parties have more airtime to expose their candidates, but the time of appearance of each name is very limited. Although most candidates believe in the efficacy of HGPE as a form of communication with voters, little is known still about the extent to which it is crucial to electoral success. Schmitt, et al., (1999) found a reasonable correlation (Pearson's $r = 0.5$) between the success of the candidates for Congress and their HGPE airtime on television. To the authors, HGPE may be an indicator of the importance the parties attach to their images as political organizations. Under such perspective, airtime for political advertising may constitute a privileged

³⁸ In 1999, Law n. 9.840 forbade candidates to donate, offer, promise or give advantages to electors in exchange for their vote. Offenders, in addition to paying a fine, may lose their registration or even mandate.

³⁹ HGPE stands for "Horário Gratuito de Propaganda Eleitoral" (Free Time for Political Advertising).

space to affirm party's identities that otherwise could not manifest. The appreciation of party image in HGPE is a decision that will run on the degree of control exercised by the leadership on building the list of candidates as well as the articulation between the majority and proportional campaigns.

2.3. Summary

There are also huge differences in the way that Germans and Brazilians represent and interact with their political institutions. German political institutions are deeply rooted culturally, genuinely native, and constitute a very important trait of national identity. In Brazil, political institutions and values have an alien origin (Hollanda, 1936). As a result, political disputes have been pretty much about which foreign models to adopt. When the Republic was proclaimed in 1889, there was a major dispute to decide about which political model should be adopted: the French Jacobinism, the French Positivism or the American-like Liberalism (Carvalho, 1990). A further effect is the ambivalent attitude towards these institutions and values. They are considered good in principle, but not well suited to the Brazilian cultural environment. Thus, their adaptation to Brazil is seen as both a problem and a solution. A practical way to solve the dilemma is to adopt the foreign-born institutions and values in a very formal way – as signs of modernity and civilization – while, actually, very different native rules are put into practice.

The literature on parties recognizes the weakness of the party system and the great autonomy of politicians combined with the growing importance of the mass media on the electoral process in Brazil. This weakness is historically associated with the discontinuity of our party system caused by numerous institutional ruptures: in the last five decades, Brazil has adopted three distinct party systems, two multiparty periods, and a mandatory two-party system period (Schmitt, 2000). These adverse circumstances have prevented not only the formation of a partisan political culture (Souza, 1976), but also a process of political socialization based on partisan loyalties that could be transmitted from generation to generation. According to Mainwaring (1991), the nature of the Brazilian electoral system (proportional representation with open lists), combined with a permissive party law, produces strong incentives for autonomy of politicians, and individualistic behavior of candidates. These features associated with election

campaigns focused primarily on electronic media stimulate direct communication between candidates and voters. This personal vote-seeking tendency is reinforced by the peculiar role played by Free Time Election Propaganda (HGPE), which on the one hand enables free access to all parties and candidates to TV and radio, and on the other favors the personalization of the electoral competition to the detriment of the party image and programmatic or ideological debate (Albuquerque, 1999a). In summary, the combination of the historical weakness of Brazilian parties, the existence of an electoral and party legislation that encourages individual action of the candidate and the centrality of the mass media in the electoral process, especially TV, characterizes an “audience democracy” (Manin, 1995).

CHAPTER 3: THE GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE SYSTEM

3.1. The Federal Council (Bundesrat)

Germany is a parliamentary system of government with a Federal Chancellor (*Bundestkanzler*) running the government, and a Federal President (*Bundespräsident*), head of state, mainly with ceremonial and supervisory duties. The authors of the Federal Constitution chose an indirect form of presidential election because they believed it would produce a head of state who was widely acceptable and yet at the same time insulated from public pressure and lacking in sufficient popular legitimacy to undermine other institutions of government.⁴⁰

A Federal Convention, convened solely for that purpose, elects the President for a five-year term of office. It consists of all members of the Federal Parliament, Bundestag, and an equal number of delegates, not necessarily MPs, elected through proportional representation by each state legislature (Landtag). It is convened and chaired by the President of the Bundestag, normally on 23 May, the date of the foundation of the Federal Republic in 1949, no later than thirty days before the expiration of the term of office of the President.

Among his attributions are to represent the Federation for the purposes of international law, conclude treaties with foreign states, accredit and receive envoys on behalf of the Federation (Basic Law 59 § 1, 2). To appoint and dismiss federal judges, federal civil servants, and commissioned and noncommissioned officers of the Armed Forces (Basic Law, art. 60 § 1). To give direction to general political and societal debates and to exercise "reserve powers" in case of political instability or "legislative emergency", provided for by Article 81 of the federal constitution. He must sign all federal laws before they come into effect, except those he believes to violate the Basic Law.⁴¹

⁴⁰ "The Federal President shall be elected by the Federal Convention without debate" (Basic Law, art. 54 § 1).

⁴¹ The German constitution did not create an office of vice president. If the President is outside of the country, or the position is vacant, the President of the Bundesrat, a position that is rotated among the state

The basic idea underlying the democratic and federal constitution of Germany is the division of power (Fig. 2). In the performance of their tasks, the Federation and the Länder (states) should work within a mutual checks-and-balance system but also practice mutual co-operation and consideration. The main difference between the German form of federalism and other federative systems when it comes to the division and execution of tasks is that the individual federal state governments participate directly in the decisions of the national state or Federation. This is the function of the Federal Council, or Bundesrat (Basic Law, arts. 50 to 53).




Figure 2: The representative system of the Federal Republic of Germany

The Bundesrat is one of the five constitutional bodies in Germany. Its members are not elected by popular vote. Within this system of division of power and combined performance of tasks, the Bundesrat has three central functions: it defends the interests of the Länder vis-à-vis the Federation and indirectly vis-à-vis the European Union

premiers on an annual basis, temporarily assumes the powers of the President until a successor is elected without assuming the office of President as such. While doing so, he or she does not continue to exercise the role of chair of the Bundesrat. If the president dies, resigns or is otherwise removed from office, a successor is to be elected within thirty days.

(Basic Law, art. 50). It ensures that the political and administrative experience of the Länder be incorporated in the Federation's legislation and administration and in European Union affairs. Like the other constitutional organs of the Federation, the Bundesrat also bears its share of overall responsibility for the Federal Republic of Germany. In addition to functioning as a counterweight to the Bundestag and the Federal Government, the Bundesrat also plays the role of providing a link between the Federation and the federal states. The Bundesrat represents both the state as a whole (the Federation) and the constituent federal states (the 16 Länder).⁴²

On one hand, the Bundesrat is the federative constitutional organ in the Federation through which the Länder as member states can play a direct part as the Federation develops its position in particular policy areas and thus, within the framework laid out in the constitution, participate in formulating the political objectives of the overall national state. On the other hand, through the Bundesrat the Federation can make use of the political and administrative experience of the Länder and, with the consent of the Bundesrat, extend the impact of its actions to their territories. This is accomplished through bills, ordinances and general administrative provisions, as well as indirectly through European Union legislation.

As for the legislative process, each state must cast its vote en bloc, since it is not the member's, but rather the individual state position that is expressed in the Bundesrat (Basic Law, art. 51, § 3). This means that every state government must reach an agreement on the issue at hand before voting takes place in the plenary session. Particularly in federal states governed by a coalition, decisions on how to vote in the Bundesrat can give rise to serious tensions and can try a coalition to breaking point. The rules on casting votes en bloc also ensures that the votes of a federal state do not cancel each other out, with some members voting in favor of a bill and others against it. Only the state government can issue voting instructions.

The Basic Law provides that neither Minister-President (governor), who is only empowered to issue instructions on the law of the Land, nor the state parliament is

⁴² "Each Land shall have at least three votes; Länder with more than two million inhabitants shall have four, Länder with more than six million inhabitants five, and Länder with more than seven million inhabitants six votes" (Basic Law, 51 § 2).

authorized to issue voting instructions in the Bundesrat. The state governments therefore also hold parliamentary responsibility and the Land parliament may decide to "topple" the government in their Land because of its stance in the Bundesrat. Pursuant to Article 52, Sub-section 3 of the Basic Law, decisions in the Bundesrat requires an absolute majority and amendments to the constitution require a two-thirds majority. The Bundesrat Rules of Procedure do not provide for secret votes.

3.2 The Federal Parliament (Bundestag)

The Germany's parliament comprises one chamber, the Bundestag or Federal Diet, which stands at the center of the country's political life. It is the only state organ directly elected by the people, from whom "all state authority is derived" (Basic Law, art. 20 § 2), the forum par excellence where differing opinions about the policies the country should pursue are formulated and discussed. The President and Vice-Presidents of the Bundestag constitute its Presidium, elected for the duration of the electoral term (art. 40 § 1, 2). A large proportion of the discussions and legislative formulation take place in the permanent committees, each of which is set up for the duration of the electoral term. Since 1999, the Bundestag has had its seat at the Reichstag Building in Berlin.

The plenary (Plenum) consists of the entirety of the Members of the German Bundestag (MdB), which sits and conducts its sessions in public. The Council of Elders first discusses date and agenda for each sitting, and then forwards the legislative agenda to the Federal Government and the Bundesrat. The President or one of his or her deputies chair the sittings. On a motion tabled by one tenth of its Members or the Federal Government, the Bundestag may exclude the public by a two-thirds majority. The public may not be present when the plenary votes on motions of this kind (Basic Law, 42 § 1).

The Bundestag nominally has 598 members, elected for a four-year term. Half, 299 members, are elected by *popular vote* in single-member districts (SMD) by a plurality system (FPTP), while a further 299 members are elected for *Bundestag seats* from

statewide party lists (closed-list PR) ⁴³ to achieve a proportional distribution in the legislature according to a mixed member proportional representation system (MMP). This system, also called “linked system”, provides seats from the PR (or compensation) tier of the system to parties in order to overcome disproportionality created by the SMD (plurality) tier of the system. Some scholars have referred to Germany’s electoral system as “personalized proportional representation” because the party list vote (PR) determines the parties’ share of total seats and SMD seats merely determine the specific individuals to fill half of those seats. The result is a distribution of seats almost fully controlled by the PR vote (Figure 3).




Figure 3: Results of the 2009 Federal elections in Germany

As a rule, no single party wins a clear majority in the Bundestag. The most voted party has the right to propose a candidate for Federal Chancellor. Extensive negotiations between parties aiming to form coalitions precede the election of the Chancellor, the only elected member of the Federal Government. The results of these coalition negotiations are enshrined in the coalition treaty. Only after these steps is the Chancellor elected. The constitution empowers the Chancellor to choose his/her

⁴³ This differs from the open-list PR arrangements in Brazil, where voters have the option to instead cast ballots for individual candidates, and then votes for all candidates of a given party are summed together to determine the vote share won by that party.

ministers, who head the most important political authorities, to determine the number of ministries and their responsibilities, and to lay down the guidelines of government policies. This authority gives the Federal Chancellor a whole array of instruments of leadership that easily stands up to a comparison with the power of the President in a presidential democracy.

Should there be no political consensus between the parties, general elections for a new Bundestag are due. Removing the Chancellor from office is also an alternative. Should a constructive vote of no confidence pass in Parliament, it must elect a new Chancellor at the same time. This repeal of parliamentary confidence forces the parties represented in the Bundestag to form a new, functioning government majority before they bring down the Chancellor. There have only been two previous attempts to bring down the Chancellor, only one of which succeeded, namely in 1982 when a vote of no confidence was passed against the Chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD), who was replaced by Helmut Kohl (CDU).

However, at any time the Federal Chancellor him/herself can also propose a vote of no confidence in the Bundestag to test whether he/she still enjoys the unlimited support of the governing parties. Should the Chancellor lose the vote this indicates that parts of the government majority are drifting away from the Chancellor, leaving the Federal President to decide whether the Bundestag should dissolve and a general election be held. The Federal President can also request the parties represented in the Bundestag to try to form a new government.

According to Saalfeld (2002, p. 104), the high degree of stability of the German party system reflects the relatively high level of organizational adaptability of the main parties. The author argues that, despite the difficulties organizations generally have in adapting to rapid environmental change, the German main parties are well equipped to cope with political and economic changes due to their access to state resources and their ability to shape the political agenda. Another factor improving the adaptability of German parties pointed out by the author is their decentralized nature in a federal system of government, which facilitates intra-organizational learning through the

diffusion of successful practices, which have been tried at a lower level of the organization.

3.3. The electoral system

The elections to the Bundestag are so-called first-order elections, and the national level is the most important level in the system of multi-level governance. As we have seen, the Bundestag is the only government body of the federal level directly elected by the German people. Hence, it is the institution with the strongest and immediate legitimation. It has four main functions: Articulation, election, control, and legislation. In contrast to the Brazilian Congress, the classical antagonism between government and parliament does not exist for the federal level. Since the government emerges from the parliamentary majority and is dependent on its support, there is an antagonism between government and parliamentary majority on the one side and the parliamentary minority (the opposition) on the other. This affects the importance of each function for the two adversaries. The majority mainly use election and legislation functions, while control and articulation are the instruments of the opposition (Rudzio, 2003).

The articulation function comprises the representation of all opinions of the electorate in the Bundestag. This function exerts influence on all activities of the parliament. It is the most basic and at the same time, the vaguest function of any parliament. Although the composition of the Bundestag is not representative for the German population in every respect, it should provide a great diversity of ideas, opinions and interests in order to keep a high level of legitimation. The German electoral system does contribute to the linkage of the members of parliament (MPs) to the population and its interests in two ways: the proportional representation system leads to a considerable variety of parties and interests in the Bundestag. The first vote (FPTP), which is for a candidate in the constituency, creates a closer link between the population and its representatives than a pure proportional representation system would do.

The electoral functions of the Bundestag are of decisive importance for the political system. The parliament is directly or indirectly responsible for the appointment

of all other government bodies at the federal level, sometimes together with the Bundesrat. The most important election is for the Bundeskanzler, the head of the German government, the most important and the most powerful politician at the federal level. In addition, the Bundestag elects the Bundespräsident, half of the judges of the Supreme Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*), and some other office-holders.

There are elections in Germany approximately every four years, resulting from the constitutional requirement for elections 46 to 48 months after the assembly of the Bundestag. The exact date of the election is chosen by the Federal President and must be a Sunday or public holiday. Should the Bundestag be dismissed before the four-year period has ended, elections must take place within 100 days. There are 62 million eligible voters. Vote is optional, and nationals over the age of 18 who have resided in Germany for at least three months are eligible to vote. Eligibility for candidacy is essentially the same.

The German election system is extremely complex and combines a classic first-past-the-post system (FPTP) with proportional representation (PR). Each person casts two votes on a ballot paper. In the first vote, people elect their chosen candidate in their electoral district to the Bundestag or to the state legislatures (Landtag) and the winner takes up the district's seat. In the second vote, people choose their preferred party from the parties participating in the election by a complex system of proportional representation. All PR votes, which are cast for parties, are aggregated to determine the proportion of the total vote won by each party, and each party then is allotted a share of the seats in the list tier that is roughly equal to its share of the PR vote. Prior to the election, each party compiles a ranked list of candidates. Seats are awarded to these candidates according to their ranking on the list and the total number of seats the party wins based on the results of voting in the list tier. If a party wins three seats in the list tier, the top three candidates on that party's list win its PR seats.

At the same time, the entire country is divided into multiple SMDs. In this way, each voter is simultaneously a resident of both the larger PR/list tier and one single-member district, which is distinct from all other SMDs in the country. SMD or nominal votes, which are cast for individual candidates, are aggregated within each SMD

separately. Whichever candidate, irrespective of his or her party affiliation, takes the largest share of these votes becomes the sole SMD representative from the district. This means that each voter, no matter in what SMD he or she resides, cast a vote for a party, which helps determine the total number of seats won by each party in the large PR/list tier. However, each voter's SMD ballot determines the single candidate winner only from his or her district. Party PR votes from SMD 1 are added to the party PR votes in every other SMD (2, 3, 4...) to help determine the total number of votes and seats won by each party in the large list tier. However, each nominal tier vote from SMD 1 is added only to other nominal tier votes in SMD 1 to determine the single candidate who wins the SMD 1 seat (figure 4).

To put it differently, when all the first (*Erststimmen*) and second votes (*Zweitstimmen*) have been counted, the number of direct candidates is subtracted from the number of seats won through the second vote (PR) and the remainder is awarded to politicians in the order they appear on the list. If a party scores three "direct" seats (SMD) through the first vote but is eligible for 10 seats through the second vote (PR), the top seven names on the party's state list would be awarded Bundestag seats.




Figure 4: The overlapping of district (SDM) and list votes (PR) in the German mixed-member system.

The exception to this rule is the election for the Bavarian Landtag, which includes 90 members elected by plurality in single-member constituencies (SMD), with the remaining 90 seats being compensatory within each of the seven regions. The distinctive feature of the Bavarian system is that unlike what happens elsewhere in Germany, the second vote (PR) is *not* cast for a *party list*, but for one *specific candidate* within a party list. For that purpose, two distinct ballots are printed for each constituency. The first one, used for electing the constituency member (SMD), is small and includes only the name and party affiliation of each constituency candidate. The

second one is much larger, about the size of an unfolded broadsheet newspaper, and includes the names of all list candidates fielded by each party in the region. In the largest regions, this means around 500 names (Massicotte, 2011).

In any case, if a party obtains more direct seats (SMD) through the first vote than its proportion of seats through the second vote (PR) would justify, it keeps these seats as so-called "overhang" seats (*Ausgleichsmandate*). For example, in 2005, the Christian Democrats were eligible for 28 seats in the state of Baden-Württemberg via the second vote (PR), but actually won 31 direct seats through the first vote (SMD), thereby gaining three "overhang seats." As a result, the Bundestag often has more than its legal minimum of 598 seats. This quirk of the system is crucial to deciding what party will be part of the government coalition. The lower number of the Union "overhang seats" (10 votes instead of 20 expected) prevented Angela Merkel's center-right bloc from winning the absolute majority in the 2014 election for the Bundestag. Normally two strong parties and some other third parties manage to get over the 5% hurdle of the Electoral Law. However, the 2014 federal election brought a big surprise: for the first time in postwar Germany, the Liberals (FDP) did not make it into the Bundestag. A "grand coalition" of the Union parties (CDU/CSU) and the social democrats (SPD) formed the new Cabinet. The Union (CDU/CSU) got 311 seats, SPD 193 seats, Die Linke 64 seats and the Greens 63 seats (total 631 seats).⁴⁴

To sum up, looked at in completely mechanical terms, the German system is essentially equivalent to "regular" proportional representation with a 5 per cent hurdle. However, the opportunity to cast two separate votes, counted in two separate ways, creates potential strategic effects not present in "pure" closed-list PR. The normative logic behind the two-vote system depends critically on voters reacting strategically, thereby creating different electoral incentives for the district (SDM) and list candidates (PR).

⁴⁴ There were 29 overhang seats in the 2014 election: CDU 13, SPD 10, Die Linke 4, Bündnis/Die Grünen 2. In July 2008, the Federal Constitutional Court declared part of the German electoral system unconstitutional. It obliged the Parliament to reform the electoral law by June 2011 at the latest. The Court found the so-called negatives "Stimmgewicht", the negative weight of the vote, which may result by subtracting the single member constituency seats from the number of list seats that parties gained by the proportional distribution of seats at the state level, incompatible with the constitutional principles of equal and direct suffrage.

Kathleen Bawn (1999) analyzed patterns of voting in six German elections and demonstrated that voters do indeed react strategically to the two-vote mixed system.⁴⁵ Not only do they avoid “wasting their district votes” as Duverger (1954) predicted, but also they are more likely to give district votes to incumbents and to candidates from parties that are expected to be in power. The district races affect the behavior of voters, even if they do not affect aggregate seat shares. This means that district candidates (SMD) face electoral incentives different from their list counterparts (PR), “pitting ambition against ambition” as foreseen by the authors of the Constitution in 1949.

Because the district members (FPTP) face different electoral incentives from those confronting the closed-list PR, personal votes arise because voters might want their district representative to serve as a link to the government and to the majority coalition in the legislature, even if they do not agree with the positions of the governing parties. Party discipline is strong in the Bundestag and opposition MPs have few avenues through which to affect policy decisions. Voters who care about pork and other issues in which the district has a clear stake are likely to prefer a representative in a government party rather than in opposition. Incumbents actively cultivate personal vote through constituency service or by bringing government-funded projects to the district (Bawn, 1999).

Personal votes may also arise if the candidate is exceptionally appropriate for the district, in terms of personal style, background, policy positions and priorities. Many district candidates have positions on the party lists too, so it is possible to lose a district race (FPTP) and still be elected via the PR list. This obviously would attenuate but not eliminate the incentive to cultivate personal vote. It certainly does little harm to place popular candidates, who are likely to win their district seat (SMD), high on the PR list. Since they are likely to win the district seat the candidates below them are unlikely be affected by their lower ranking.

⁴⁵ Since the 2002 elections, the proportion of "strategic votes" among voters of the Green Party (Die Grünen) almost doubled: in 2002, 3.3% of the first vote were given to CDU and 0.7% to CSU. By 2013 Federal elections, these shares rose steadily to 6.5% and 1.3% respectively (Statistisches Bundesamt, Pressemitteilung Nr. 044 vom 10.02.2014).

3.4. Constituency campaigns

Election campaigns are a staple of modern democracies, and despite being conducted within the context of varying media systems, political systems, and political cultures, campaigns are being increasingly waged around the demands and rhythms of the mass media, in particular, the news media. To characterize politics as being mediatized goes beyond a mere description of system requirements. Mediatized politics has become dependent and shaped by interactions, in its central functions, on the mass media. In this section, how incentives coming from the German mixed-member system affect (a) the electoral campaigns, and (b) candidates' media strategies are analyzed.

Mixed-member electoral systems are incentive structures, which pattern the strategic behavior of candidates based on given goals (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001; Lancaster and Patterson, 1990; Klingemann and Wessels, 2001). These incentives can be of marginal impact on campaign behavior in a given structural context along with many other incentives affecting the behavior of political actors at the same time. According to the theoretical framework adopted in this research, it is assumed that the preferences for candidates for political office follow a hierarchical path, the highest priority being elected or re-elected (Mayhew, 1974; Strøm, 1997). It is further assumed that specific electoral systems offer specific strategies to implement this priority (Hall and Taylor, 1996).




Figure 5: Results of the “candidate vote” in the 2009 Federal elections

Specific campaign styles are strategic reactions to specific electoral incentives. The increasing impact of these incentives may define the structure of the competition at the district level (Fig. 5). Under certain electoral circumstances, party-driven campaigns may be the best strategy to implement certain set of goals (Fig. 6). In other contexts, individualized strategies of campaigning might seem most promising to candidates. The German mixed-member electoral system tends to provide marginal incentives for candidates running in single-member districts (SMD) to adopt more individualized campaign strategies compared with list-PR candidates (Zittel and Gschwend, 2008).




Figure 6: Results of the “party vote” in the 2009 Federal elections

According to Pippa Norris’ (2000) topology, there are three distinct patterns of electoral campaigns: *pre-modern campaigns* feature a highly independent, intense local campaign, hardly connected to the national level. *Modern campaigns* comprise those national level, mass media oriented campaigns, which pay little attention to the district level. *Post-modern campaigns* combine a strong focus on the voting districts with a high degree of centralized party-driven coordination.

The international literature on post-modern campaigning considers media technological changes as a crucial driving force in the process of the modernization of election campaigns. According to Plasser and Plasser (2002), the central tenet of post-modern campaigns is the emergence of professional campaign consultants. The authors demonstrate in a comparative analysis that campaign professionals form the core of candidate-centered organizations and that these organizations continue to be largely independent from the national party headquarters. Post-modern campaigners use media digital technologies to target voters in more differentiated and efficient ways, bypassing

mass media outlets and the parties' organizational substructures, as to augment their efforts to offset the declining electoral value of party labels (Römmele, 2002; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000). The growing saliency of top candidates' personal qualities tend to relegate political issues to the backstage of the political contest, as campaign personalization seems to be silent at the constituency level (Brettschneider, 2002). The increasing focus on frontrunners in candidate-centered, personalized campaigns has triggered a growing gap between the party organization and the party leadership (Poguntke and Webb, 2005).

Researching on the impact of party organization as a factor that explains campaign behavior in Germany, Zittel and Gschwend, (2008) reject the notion of political parties as being unitary actors determining the behavior of their members based on common ideologies and policy preferences. To the authors, this is especially true in times of party affiliation general decline in the electorate. Such weakening spills over to the organizational level leaving parties less homogeneous in ideological terms (Katz and Mair, 1995). Parties are incentive structures, which patterns the choices of candidates, but leaves room for strategic considerations depending on the type of candidature. Incumbents, for example, who won a district in previous elections, are less vulnerable regarding their re-nomination and thus more autonomous regarding their campaign style.

The authors claim that campaigns in Germany, at constituency level, come closer to a "pre-modern campaign style", which is characterized by its relative independence from the national level. Local campaigns represent a privileged context for candidates to run the dispute in a fashion independent from the party they represent. They use the concept of "individualized campaign" to label this phenomenon. The concept focuses on the structural implications of postmodern campaigns embracing the elite level at national and local arenas. In its ideal type, an "individualized campaign" would comprise candidates (a) seeking a personal vote (Cain et al., 1987), (b) relying on candidate-centered organizations, (c) setting a candidate-centered agenda, and (d) using candidate-centered campaign resources.

Their argument draws upon the distinction between the two modes of candidacy: half of the votes for the Bundestag comes via single-member districts (FPTP), which provide incentives for individualized campaign behavior as consequence of the direct and visible relationship between a geographic subset of voters and a particular candidate. Such a relationship results in an “identification effect” on the part of the representative, which translates into behavioral predispositions. The other half comes via a party list in a multi-member district (PR). This mode of candidacy stresses the party factor and provides incentives for a party-driven type of campaign as candidates run as representatives of their parties in multi-member districts without being directly accountable to their voters.

Looking further into the structure of the competition in German single-member districts (FPTP), the authors found that this mode of candidacy tends to override the list mode (PR) in cases of double candidacies, a legal option in the German electoral system, and that the incentives for individualized campaigning increases as the candidate’s chance to win increases. The direct mode of candidacy will have a rather weak effect on campaign strategy in case of slight chances of the candidate to win the district election. In this case, the strategic and tactical differences between candidates running on party lists (PR) and candidates running in districts are minimal. Only those district candidates who have a fair chance to win the mandate are subject to strong incentives to adopt individualized campaign strategies.

This is due to deviations from the prediction that voters should end up casting a vote for their most preferred party or candidate (“sincere vote”), a phenomenon called “strategic vote”, whereby voters do not merely take into account the *utility* of voting for the most preferred party or candidate, but also the *expectation* about the outcome of the election. Research results yield support for the claim that district magnitude and frequency of strategic voting at the district level correlate negatively: the higher the district magnitude the less strategic voting we should expect (Sartori, 1968; Gshwend, 2010).

Based on this assumption, Zittel and Gschwend (2008) established a relationship between the chances of a candidate to win election at the district level (FPTP) and the

degree of individualized campaigning. The chance to win a district vote should be considered by incumbents first and foremost, as they normally possess visibility and recognition, and are able to secure a different kind of pay-off in terms of resources. Members of the Bundestag with direct mandates are more likely to lead to particular committee assignments, a way of extracting benefits for the district. Committee assignments may serve to form a close relationship with constituents, as they may bring money and infrastructure to the districts. Such successes might boost MPs' profile and foster some independence from the party (Stratmann and Baur, 2002).

However, non-incumbents may also be subject to equally strong incentives depending on the results of the previous elections in terms of the margin between the first and the second winner at the district level (FPTP). If the margin was narrow in the previous elections, the chances to win are high and may foster the subjective ambitions of challengers to enter into "strategic considerations", i.e., count on "strategic votes" to mobilize the extra 3% or 4% needed to win a direct mandate. In contrast, candidates without any chance of winning a district election (FPTP) know perfectly well that they will have to rely solely on their ability to secure a favorable list position (PR) to gain a mandate. Such candidates will thus be more inclined to campaign in a party-driven rather than in an individualized way. The possibility for double candidacies in the German electoral law potentially reinforces the lack of incentives to adopt individualized campaign strategies on the part of candidates without any chance to win a direct mandate. If candidates occupy a secure list position while at the same time running in a hopeless district then why should they bother to run an individualized campaign? In these cases, the incentive to apply individualized campaign strategies rests solely on the "identification effect".

Based on the German Candidate Study 2005 (GCS, 2005), Zittel and Gschwend (2008) were able to prove the existence of an "individualized style of campaigning" in contrast to a "party-centered campaign style" at various levels of analysis. A significant number of candidates had a clear preference for campaign activities that focused the voters' attention on their own persons rather than on their parties. A significant number of candidates run their campaign based on an agenda and an organizational structure that pointed in the direction of being "candidate centered". A significant number of

candidates used means of campaigning designed to increase the visibility of the candidate by downplaying their own party. In Germany, individualized campaigns at the constituency level are no exceptions to the rule but rather more general phenomena that come in different shapes and different levels of intensity.

From the perspective of political communication, individualized campaigns are an important subject matter per se. The systematic description of such campaigns and the explanation of national and cross-national differences reinforce the central hypotheses that point to variations in MPs' media strategies according to incentives emanating from the electoral connections, district nature, and electoral formulae.

3.5. Historical and political contexts

The representative system in Germany is unique in itself, much admired, and equally much misinterpreted. When designing the German electoral system after World War II, the idea of adopting a pure first-past-the-post (FPTP) system had strong support among several members of the parliamentary council. Post-war military government and the Christian Democrats (with support from the German Party, DP) strongly favored FPTP over proportional representation (PR). However, opposition by Social Democrats (SPD) and the Liberal Party (FDP) eventually led to the adoption of a mixture of PR and single-member districts (SMD), which became the prevalent mixed-member system. Every voter has two votes: the first for the constituency candidate, and the second for a specific party. In this way, the voter should be able to vote for a person of confidence, without feeling obliged at the same time to vote for his/her party.

In the relationship between political parties and democracy in the early years of the postwar Germany there was the central question of how to block the reemergence of extremist parties, given the fact that the ex-National Socialist German Worker's Party (NSDAP) still had about 8 million members at the end of the Third Reich. In the first postwar elections in 1949, there were 11 parties represented in the Bundestag. This result, then considered a "serious party fragmentation," inevitably brought back memories of the Weimar Republic and the associated fear of incapacity to govern the newly founded republic. The introduction of several complementary provisions in the constitution, such as the concept of the so-called "defensive democracy" (*wehrhafte*

Demokratie) and the 5% threshold for legislative seats in the Bundestag, gave the administration and courts the instruments with which they could prevent such developments. These included the right of the State and Federal Constitutional Courts to pronounce a party illegal, disband or prohibit non-party organizations with extremist tendencies (Basic Law, art. 21 § 2). Among the instruments of “defensive democracy” are the ability of the Federal Constitutional Court to revoke the citizenship of individual persons for a limited or unlimited period (Basic Law, art. 18, 19). Also the right of resistance of the individual as a last resort to fight for the survival of the Federal Republic of Germany and the upkeep of the constitution (Basic Law, art. 20 § 2).⁴⁶

The so-called “electoral miracle” (*deutsches Wahlwunder*), a period of political stability with three parties represented in the West German Parliament, the Union parties (CDU/CSU), the social democrats (SPD) and the liberals (FDP), which began in the early 1953 and lasted almost three decades. With the end of the social-liberal coalition in 1982, a new party came into Parliament in the elections of 1983: The Greens, the first party to get into the Bundestag under its own steam since the tightening of the barriers in the Federal Election Law. A new phase of four-party or two camp system had begun.

At first, The Greens presented themselves in many respects as an anti-party, thoroughly critical of the existing political system, a melting pot of anarchists and eco-socialists, and various other would-be system changers united in a party, which had many of the characteristics of a movement. Observers and professionals gave the Greens only a slight chance of survival. However, a fundamental change in social values -- brought about by the so-called non-parliamentary opposition and the student movement, the arrival of new topics not sufficiently covered by established parties, like the ecological problems, and the enduring psychological effects of the Chernobyl catastrophe -- was responsible for the long-term establishment of the Greens. The party was somewhat successful in implementing ecological and alternative lifestyle policies

⁴⁶ "The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state. All state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the people through elections and other votes and through specific legislative, executive and judicial bodies. The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the executive and the judiciary by law and justice. *All Germans shall have the right to resist* any person seeking to abolish this constitutional order, if no other remedy is available" (Basic Law, art. 20 § 1-4).

between 1998 and 2005. Since then it has dropped out of the federal and most state governments.

Germany's reunification in 1990 led to a further differentiation in the party system. The Greens merged with the East German Alliance 90 (Bündnis 90). This eastern expansion of the Greens progressed simultaneously with similar expansion of all the West German parties, and gave birth to a new political power: the Party of Democratic Socialism, PDS (*Partei der Demokratischen Sozialismus*). The new party got into the Bundestag at the first reunified German election in 1990 thanks to the help of the Federal Constitutional Court, because in reunified Germany it did not have enough votes to get over the 5% hurdle of the Federal Election Law. The Court decided to divide Germany into two election areas, a west area encompassing the old federal states, and an east electoral zone with newly reunited federal states, as to create equal opportunities between West and East German parties.

After the alliance with the WASG (*Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit*), a West Germany party founded by social democrats dissatisfied with the economic and social policies of the Schröder-Fischer government, the PDS established itself as the strongest political power east of the Elbe. Its recipe for success consisted of a program that combined long-term, democratic socialism and old Swedish welfare state, along with the flag of a protest party. This pan-German left-wing alliance resulted in the creation of Die Linke (the Left), and the reshaping of the political landscape into a two-camp, multiparty system without clear coalition perspectives, with the SPD caught between a conservative middle and a left-wing competitor party, whose program seemed to be more social democrat and more for a welfare state.

3.6. Political participation

Compared to other European countries and considering that vote is not compulsory, the participation in election campaigns in Germany is high. Since 1949, the rate of participation in West Germany reached 85.3%, which is very high for a country where voting is not obligatory (Norris, 2002). We can observe the same trend in earlier stages of German history, when on average 81% of voters used to cast the ballot (Gabriel and Holtmann, 2005). During the Federal elections held in 1972, the

participation reached 91.1% of eligible persons. Since then, the numbers of participating voters have declined, bringing about a crisis of party representation (Wiesendahl, 1998). During the first elections after the unification, the percentage of voters reached 74.5%. This is an interesting phenomenon, when one bears in mind that the moment of reunification built an important point of departure for the future development of the country. The relatively low number of voters was viewed as an indicator of the relatively small interest in politics.

Indeed, the present development of the German party system reveals a declining voter participation, an age-specific varying decrease of interest in politics, a change in information behavior, especially among the younger generation, and an increasing distrust of the parties and their representatives. While among the older age group, over 50, hardly any change can be detected in self-confessed political interest, the decrease of interest among the under 40 group and especially among those under 30 is highly visible. Although voter participation at Bundestag elections is still at the international average level (69%), it has fallen dramatically at the state elections. The overrepresentation of the youngest among nonvoters has never been as large as it is now. Fewer than 30% of the 18 - to 30-year-olds describe themselves as being politically interested or very interested. This in spite of the increase in education, which in the meantime has led to almost 40% with a high school diploma or university entrance qualification, while it is less than 20% with the 60-year-olds (GLES, 2009).

The decrease in voter participation is not an isolate event. There has been a gradual and persistent shrinkage of the parties' membership. Since 1990, the SPD has lost a third of its members. The CDU has lost 200,000 members since the reunification. With the exception of the Greens and the Left party, this trend is valid for all parties. Only the CSU has managed to remain relatively constant compared to the reunification year (Niedermayer, 2008). During the same period, there was a downward trend in the number of people with long-term fixed associations with a party. In 1980, four out five on the electoral register indicated a party identification. In 2005 it was only two out of three, a loss of 13%. About one third of the voters change parties from one election to another (Schoen, 2000).

According to Falter (2010), the decrease in political interest over the generations relates to a change in information behavior. Daily and weekly newspapers and the information programs of public television and public radio stations are hardly used by the generation under 30. There is a great difference in the television habits of the generations. The first and the second German public television networks (*Erstes and Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen*) and the regional channels of public television (*Dritte Programme*), with their comparatively high percentage of political programs, are watched by an audience that on average is over 50, but are scarcely watched by anyone under 30 years old. The younger and middle generations, especially the youngest viewers and listeners, rely almost entirely on private stations, which on average have very little political coverage. Entertainment has a higher subjective value than information, and the news without the human touch is barely followed. The political apathy is reinforced by media-compatible, candidate-centered and program-diffuse election campaigning. The parties make populist promises and thereby produce unavoidable voter disappointment.

The author also points to the turning away of many people from collective forms of organization and the concomitant turning toward stronger private, sporadic, and individual-structured participation forms as possible causes of these tendencies. Large organizations, such as trade unions and church affiliation have dramatically decreased. The rate of unionization in Germany has declined from 34.4% in 1991 to 23.3% in 2002. The share of the Christian denominations (Catholic and Protestant) was reduced nationwide from 72.3% in 1990 to 62.6 % in 2004. For the first time in History, polls in the Federal Republic showed slightly more Roman Catholics than Protestants church members. These tendencies are important because the unions and the churches, especially the Catholic Church, have played an important role in structuring the German party system. The unions, closely associated with the SPD, provided a natural recruiting base for the SPD and served as transmission belts bringing social democratic beliefs into the factories. For decades, both Christian denominations formed the roots of the CDU and CSU. As these organizations shrink, so does voter support for both large parties.

The processes of Europeanization and globalization, the expansion of an increasing borderless world, finance capital and large companies, including the communication branches, are no longer taxable to the same extent as before. They have become largely free of party politically motivated actions. Politics now lacks the instruments of control, since national state instruments are becoming insufficient and transnational and supranational instruments have not yet been adequately developed. Doubt of the party competence to find solutions grows and with it a diffuse systemic criticism.

CHAPTER 4: THE BRAZILIAN MEDIA SYSTEM

4.1. Introduction

In “Comparing Media Systems”, Daniel Hallin and Paolo Mancini (2004) introduced a framework for comparing media systems and a set of concepts adapted from comparative politics and political sociology that have important relationships with media systems. The author proposed three models that include several conceptual devices to describe the relationship between media and politics in a group of eighteen countries of Western Europe and North America. The models draw upon four dimensions: 1) the development of media markets and particularly of the print media, 2) political parallelism, 3) journalistic professionalism, 4) the role of the state. As for the political systems, the authors elected the following factors: patterns of conflict and consensus, electoral rules (majoritarian or proportional), political values (pluralism versus individualism), and rules of a legal-rational type in governance. Crossing the characteristics of both systems defines and classifies each empirical case. The authors acknowledge, however, that the proposed models are far from capturing the full complexity either of the media or political systems of particular countries, and the patterns of relationships among the major variables identified in the research. They also point out that media systems are not static, but subject to a permanent process of change.

The *Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist* model, prevalent in Southern Europe, features an elite-oriented press with relatively small circulation and a corresponding centrality of electronic media, a weak professional culture in journalism, combined with a long tradition of commentary-oriented or advocacy journalism. Strong party-press parallelism, i.e., the degree to which the structure of the media system parallels that of the party system, further characterizes this model. A high level of media manipulation, through which outside actors, such as parties, politicians, social groups, movements, and economic actors seeking political influence use the media system to intervene in the world of politics. Freedom of the press and the development of commercial media came late in the history of those countries, and the state plays an important role as proprietor, regulator, or source of financial support for the media industry.

The *North/Central European or Democratic Corporatist* model, found in North and Central Europe, comprises an early and solid development of a mass press, very high newspaper circulation, strong professional associations and a well-established professional culture in journalism, a tradition of state intervention in defense of the ideological plurality of the media, and a public service model of broadcasting. Political parallelism is historically high, as the political press coexist with commercial media.

The *North Atlantic or Liberal* model, dominant in the Anglophone countries, entails a market-dominated media system, with a high-circulation print media, where commercial newspapers dominate, the role of the market is traditionally strong and state intervention is relatively limited; political parallelism is low, although journalistic autonomy is under commercial pressures. Public broadcasting and broadcast regulation organize after professional models, with relatively strong insulation from political control. Since the 1980s, the “values” of the liberal model, such as the relationship between press and market freedoms, and correlated practices, such as the media’s commercialization and market concentration, have spread around the world, as consequence of the process of economic globalization.

For comparative analysis between the Brazilian and German media systems Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) analytical framework can be used. The first dimension analyzed is the *structure of the media market*, which focuses on the historical roots of the newspapers, the circulation and readership rates, the role they play as mediators in the political communication process, and the relative importance of newspapers vis-à-vis the television as sources of news and information. The second dimension comprises the level of *political parallelism*, a concept that refers to the notion of party-press parallelism (Seymour-Ure, 1974), used to evaluate the degree of connection between the media and the party systems. The third criterion relates to *journalistic professionalism*, split in three aspects: autonomy, norms, and public service orientation. The fourth and last dimension deals with *the role of the state* regarding the media system, which entails censorship or other types of political pressure, economic subsidies, media’s ownership, and regulatory framework.

4.2. The structure of the media market in Brazil: print media

According to Azeredo (2006), some persistent features of our media system remain unchanged. The author refers to the family monopoly and cross-ownership of the largest media outlets, the conservative bias and weak external pluralism, i.e., the diversity of political viewpoints, low readership and circulation rates, a journalism culture oriented primarily to the elite and permeable to the influence of strong interest groups. The late emergence of the print media, the centrality and dominance of television, the relatively recent return of democracy and freedom of the press, and the current presence of a polarized pluralism (moderate), fit perfectly in the framework of the Mediterranean model. Yet, a convergence process due to the globalization of media markets has accentuated the penetration of large transnational media conglomerates, and brought with it new players such as global telecommunications companies and manufacturers of smart TVs, Google, Amazon, Apple, Netflix and others. The Brazilian communications market currently faces huge competition challenges brought about by foreign media groups.

Brazil displays a very low rate of newspaper readership and circulation. The major barrier to the expansion of circulation of newspapers and magazines in Brazil is the low level of education: 10.2% of illiterates and individuals over 10 years of study did not exceed 25% of the population (IBGE, 2010). The total daily circulation of the ten largest Brazilian papers⁴⁷ does not even reach the circulation of a single German paper, *Bild*, which runs 3.3 million copies/day with an estimated readership of approximately 12 million or one-fifth of Germany's adult population. Another reason that contributes for the low circulation and penetration of newspapers in Brazil is the elite orientation of the major papers, whose target readership comprises the higher social-economic strata of the population. Those papers adopt an opinionated journalism and a sober, cultured language, which prioritize the political and economic coverage. The elite-oriented papers make up for the low penetration in the lower classes with a great capacity to

⁴⁷ According to the Institute for Verification of Circulation (IVC/2013), the ten largest newspapers in Brazil are: *Folha de S. Paulo (SP)*, *O Globo(RJ)*, *Super Notícia (MG)*, *Extra (RJ)*, *O Estado de S. Paulo (SP)*, *Zero Hora (RS)*, *Correio do Povo(RS)*, *Diário Gaúcho (RS)*, *O Dia (RJ)*, *Lance (RJ)*.

produce agendas, frame the public debate, and influence the perceptions and behaviors both in the political and government levels.

According to the Institute for Verification of Circulation, in 2013 the average circulation of paid newspapers was 8.8 million copies daily, with 26% of penetration among the adult population. This represents an increase of 1.8% of paid circulation in relation to 2011, and a steady growth compared with a decade ago, when some scholars predicted the extinction of this traditional means of information. The three largest weekly magazines are *Veja* (1.098.642), *Época* (417.798) and *Nova Escola* (413.100). The three major periodicals of daily paid circulation are *Folha de São Paulo* (297.650/copies), *Super Notícia* (296.799/copies), published in the state of Minas Gerais, and *O Globo* from Rio de Janeiro (277.876/copies).⁴⁸ Except for *Super Notícia*, a popular readership, the other two papers adopt a cultured writing style and give priority to economic and political themes.

Under a historical perspective, the Brazilian press experienced a late development. During the colonial period, Portugal made consistent efforts to reduce the economic, political, and intellectual autonomy of Brazil. Portugal limited the education of the Brazilians and forbade them to have printing facilities until 1808, when the Portuguese Court moved to Rio de Janeiro, escaping from the invasion of their country by Napoleonic troops. The independence of Brazil in 1822 stimulated a rapid expansion of the press. During the rest of the XIX century, most publications were leaflets, pamphlets, and short-lived newspapers, dedicated chiefly to polemics. Only at the turn of the XX century did a more consolidated and institutionalized press come to exist in Brazil, mainly in Rio de Janeiro, then the capital. Under the influence of the Belle Époque, Brazilian intellectuals dreamed of emulating the French *République des Lettres*, i.e., trying to make a living sole from literary production, but were largely frustrated with the poor performance of the publishing sector in the country (Chalhoub, 1986; Lustosa, 2000).

The rise of radio in the early 1920s and its rapid popularization in the next decade represented the beginning of the era of mass communication in Brazil. The media mass

⁴⁸ Retrieved from: <http://www.anj.org.br/penetracao-dos-jornais-diarios>.

market came true with the later arrival of television in the 1950s, and with the expansion of radio and television outlets in the 1970s, when massive state investments in communication technology allowed for the creation of nationwide broadcast networks. The effective modernization of the print media industry occurred in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet only in the 1980s did the Brazilian media system gain a clear feature of a mass industry, with television occupying a central place in the national market of entertainment and information (Abreu, 2002; Albuquerque, 2005a; Azevedo, 2006).

4.3. Television and Radio

Data from IBOPE/MEDIA/2012 (table 11) ⁴⁹ indicate that at least two thirds of the population receives their basic information about the country and the world through electronic media (TV, radio and Internet). Political issues are not a priority for viewers and Internet users. At election time, however, the main source of information is still the TV/Radio Free Time of Electoral Propaganda (HGPE). TV/Radio electoral debates for executive offices, such as presidential and gubernatorial races, attract most of audience attention.

Brazilian Media-Reading/Watching Time (minutes/day)	Newspaper	Magazine	Radio	Television	Internet
2012	35	39	127	129	170
2011	36	42	132	173	173
2010	35	42	135	128	167
2009	35	41	134	126	161
2008	35	41	131	129	156

Table 1- Source: Ibope Media (Brazil). Target Group Index - Year 2012

In contrast with the low newspaper's readership and circulation, and despite the growing presence of the Internet and social networks, television still plays a unique role if compared to other mediums of communication in Brazil. The only area of political life over which the impact of TV has been "scientifically demonstrated" is public opinion. For most people, "the world of public issues reveals itself mainly in the *son et lumière* of television programs", which effectively dictate the political agenda of a

⁴⁹ Retrieved from: www.ibope.com.br.


country. Social issues conveyed by TV network coverage become priority in the eyes of most viewers (Iyengar, 1994, pp. 12).

According to IBGE/2010, 94.5% of the Brazilian households have TV sets, which only falls behind the stove (97.04%).⁵⁰ The impact of the TV broadcast can also be measured against the rates of education underdevelopment, which in Brazil amounts to 10.2% of illiterates and 30% of “functionally illiterate” (IBGE, 2010). Unlike the print media, visual media, especially TV, breaks down cognitive barriers, which normally split the audience into categories such as literate, illiterate and semiliterate, and provide viewers with a more direct, fast, and simplified apprehension of the media messages. The emergence of television dramatically expanded and homogenized the knowledge and the quality of information with which people usually construct social realities all over the world. According to Mathiesen (2001, p. 38), “When it comes to TV, the masses do not usually have access to competitive information. They are in the same situation of those who believe in a religious message.” The influence of television tends to be higher in poverty than in wealth, greater in places such as Brazil than Germany. In rich countries, institutions like political parties, print media, family and school tend to offset the influence of television. According to Bucci (2000, p. 25), “Framing and priming in the Brazilian television are rather dramatic than factual, more fictional than real. In general, TV programs offer a simplistic worldview with suspense, moral lessons, bad and good characters as in cartoon-superhero stories.”

Besides the presence of TV sets in households, the participation in the volume of advertising investments and net annual profit are also strong indicators of the centrality of the television in Brazil. Data on the annual share of advertising investment leave no doubt about the weight and importance of television: In 2011, air and paid TV received 67.5% of all advertising investment in contrast with 11.8% newspapers, 7.1% magazines, 3.9% radio and 5.1% Internet (Fig. 7).

⁵⁰ Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics.

Fig. 7. Annual Advertising Share by Media - 2011



Source: Project Inter-Media / Medium & Message

TV Globo Network, the second largest broadcaster in the world, covers 98.44% of the national territory, reaches 99.50% of the population through 122 stations, produces 90% of its programming, and employs 70% of all players, anchors, artists, authors, journalists, producers and technicians in the country. These professionals produce about 2,500 annual hours of soap operas, a world record, in addition to more than 1,800 annual hours of journalism. The media conglomerate holds 55% of the national TV audience and has a net revenue six times larger than the net revenue of all others media networks together. TV Globo Network is the only media group in Brazil able to survive global competition in the medium term. All other media conglomerates are tiny against foreign competitors, and may occupy only very specific market niches. The absence of long-term media public policies has generated serious imbalances in the Brazilian media market with possible impact on the political system.

4.4. Political parallelism

One of the most obvious differences among media systems lies in the fact that, in some countries, media systems have distinct political orientations and in others, they do not. In Germany, for example, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* is right center; the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* left center, *Die Welt* further still to the right and the *Frankfurter Rundschau* further to the left. The concept of “party-press parallelism”, proposed in

some of the earliest work on comparative analysis of media systems (Seymour-Ure, 1974; Blumler and Gurevitch, 1975), captures the degree to which the structure of the media system paralleled that of the party system, whose “ideal type” occurs when each news organization represents a party’s views in the public sphere. This kind of one-to-one connection between media and political parties is increasingly uncommon today, as the overwhelming tendency of most media outlets in Brazil and Germany is not to associate with particular parties, but with diffuse political proclivities.

There are various components and indicators to assess the degree of political parallelism of a media system. Perhaps the most basic are media content, organizational connections between media and political parties or other kinds of organizations, including trade unions, cooperatives, churches and the like, the tendency for media personnel to be active in political life, partisanship of media audiences, and journalistic role, orientations and practices, among others. Closely related to the concept of political parallelism is the distinction between two manners in which media systems handle diversity of political loyalties and orientations, which the literature refers to as “internal and external pluralism”. *External pluralism* deals with the macro level of the media system, and measures the range of media organizations reflecting the points of view of different groups and tendencies in society. Systems that feature external pluralism tend to have higher levels of political parallelism. The opposite term, *internal pluralism*, gauges the degree to which each individual media outlet achieves pluralism, avoids institutional ties to political groups and attempts to maintain “balance” in their content. A system characterized by internal pluralism tends to have lower levels of political parallelism (Hallin and Mancini, 2004).

External parallelism, defined as the diversity of information and opinion, which gives access to competing political perspectives, is an extremely critical dimension in the relationship between media and political systems in contemporary democracies (Dahl, 1971; Habermas, 1987). Media systems that features both a strong business press committed to non-hegemonic social causes, and a strong partisan press with political proclivities, frame a theoretically optimal configuration of the journalistic field. Most central and northern European countries have this type of media setting, albeit the partisan media loses ground as the business media progresses and the public interest for

politics plunges. In Brazil, where the commercial media is dominant, and the partisan press irrelevant, the democratic principle of plurality depends on the presence of *internal pluralism* that allows the clash of differing opinions and balanced coverage in each media outlet.

The strategic importance of *internal pluralism* comes to the fore as the mass media visibility of public issues in contemporary democracies, which operate in socially differentiated and highly complex political environments, plays a central role. In such a context, as is the case of Brazil, a number of themes and issues compete for public attention, but they only become “public issues” when they gain visibility in the mass media. An incessant struggle between the various public agendas and different social and political actors, including the media itself, takes place in the newsrooms of media, as the visibility or invisibility of political actors, issues and demands depend largely on the degree to which media organizations adopt internal and external pluralism.

Fraser (1992), analyzing communicative inequality of gender relations, created the categories of “strong and weak publics” to analytically differentiate between active and passive actors in the process of shaping public opinion. “Strong publics” comprise social groups with sufficiently strong political, symbolic or economic resources to set the agenda of public issues, and to sway the political decision-making process. “Weak publics” do not possess enough resources to configure the public opinion according to their political and social interests, nor decision-making power in the political and economic spheres. The concept of Fraser is operationally interesting to analyze the historical association between the political and economic elites and the media, especially the large newspapers and TV and radio stations, which enhances the ability of the various segments of the “strong public” to set the agenda in the mass media, and influence the public opinion.

Until 1988, the provision of broadcasting services was the exclusive prerogative of the President, who used it as a “currency” for political exchange. An “electronic coronelism”⁵¹ (Azevedo, 2006) emerged in consequence, with politicians controlling

⁵¹ *Coronelismo* refers to a pattern of social organization in which patrons (*coronéis*) control the access to social resources, and deliver them to clients in exchange for deference and various kinds of support. It is a particularistic and asymmetrical form of social organization, and contrasts with forms of citizenship in

and using local or regional media to their political interests. Even with the new rules laid down by the 1988 Constitution the practice of distributing broadcasting services continued, as only fifteen families control 90% of the Brazilian media system.⁵² In addition, 31.12% of TV stations and 40.19% of radio stations belong to politicians or ex-politicians. Under the pressure of globalization and deregulation, the Congress has passed new legislation in recent years, which allows foreign ownership of media outlets. However, the effects of these legal changes have not yet resulted in changes as to the control of major media organizations in Brazil. More than two decades after the return to democracy, the Brazilian media system still features a reduced and poor external diversity (Lima, 2001; Azevedo, 2006; Albuquerque, 2012).

4.5. Professionalism, norms, and public service orientation

The concept of “professionalism” or “professionalization” draws upon the liberal ideal of systematic knowledge or doctrine acquired only through long prescribed training that prepares someone for the practice of a profession, such as medicine and law. Journalism has no such systematic body of knowledge or doctrine. Of course, formal professional training has become increasingly common, and does often play an important role in defining journalism as an occupation and social institution. Yet, it is not essential to the practice of journalism, and there is not a strong correlation between professionalism and formal training (Hallin and Mancini, 2004).

In some countries, like the United States, formal training is unnecessary, and entry to the profession of journalism is free of further regulations. The notion of journalistic professionalism forms the basis for journalists’ claims of *autonomy*, and relates to the idea that journalists serve a public interest that transcends the interests of particular political parties, owners and social groups. The degree of journalistic autonomy varies considerably across media systems and from one type of news

which access to resources depends on universalistic criteria and formal equality before the law (Leal, 1994).

⁵² Two major players dominate the regional TV networks in Brazil: (a) the churches, such as the Celinauta Foundation (Paraná), which owns Rede TV. The Petrelli family (Paraná), which owns TV Record. (b) The politicians: only a handful of family groups, most of them affiliate of Globo Network, dominate the whole television regional market. For example, Sarney family (Maranhão); Magalhães family (Bahia); Câmara family (Goiás); Coutinho family (Minas Gerais and São Paulo); Zahram family (Mato Grosso do Sul); Romulo Maiorana family (Pará); Lemanski and Cunha family (Paraná); Sirotsky family (Santa Catarina and RGS); Daou family (northern region). According to Santos and Capparelli (2005), these two players form the base of a “patronage network” in the Brazilian media system.

organization to another (quality and popular papers, print and broadcasting). Autonomy presupposes some control over the work process of journalism. Unlike doctors and lawyers, who provide personal services, journalists work in an industry where mass production is the norm, and where very few possess their own mediums of production. In this sense, journalism has never enjoyed a great deal of autonomy. Autonomy within media organizations is only possible through internal and collegial control exercised primarily by fellow journalists (Hallin and Mancini, 2004).

The idea of autonomy in journalism as well as demands for more universalistic information put forward by new social groups, the growth of professional norms, and the development of universalistic political cultures, belong to a set of values normally associated with the liberal notion that media history entails a linear, evolutionary movement toward greater differentiation from other social bodies. In this sense, media autonomy means differentiation particularly from those historically active groups in the political sphere, such as parties, interest and religious groups (Alexander, 1981).

In Bourdieu's field theory, a field is a sphere of social action with its own "rules of the game", standards of practice, and criteria of evaluation. To say that journalism or the media have emerged as a *field* is to say that they have become differentiated from other fields as a sphere of action. As Benson (1998, p. 465) pointed out, "A field's autonomy is to be valued because it provides preconditions for the full creative process proper to each field and ultimately resistance to the 'symbolic violence' exerted by the dominant system of hierarchy." In contrast with the liberal evolutionary process toward greater autonomy, Bourdieu's perspective assumes that fields acquire autonomy through a process of struggle among agents working within them, and the direction of change is not predetermined. What has actually happened in the globalized and mediatized world is that the media field has become more distant from the field of politics, but closer to the increasingly dominant field of economics. Within the media field itself, the elite print press has lost ground to the heteronomous pole represented by commercial television, and other cultural fields have lost autonomy, as they are increasingly influenced by the mass media (Bourdieu, 1998, Marlière, 1998; Neveau, 2001).

In Brazil, private-owned media operate in tandem with political alliances and ambitions, leaving little room for the autonomy of journalism. This tendency is most evident in the case of regional newspapers and broadcasting companies owned by local oligarchs, who use them for political ends. The major national newspapers, based in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, operate more independently, but still reflect personal feuds and friendships between owners and political leaders. The dominant television network (TV Globo) follows the political views and values of a family clan (De Lima, 1988; Amaral and Guimarães, 1994; Costa and Brener, 1997; Motter, 1994).

Another important component of the concept of professionalism in journalism is the notion of *public service orientation*, which claims that journalism should serve the public interest. This professional “altruism” may sound a bit naïve under a critical perspective, as it often conceals an ideological struggle for power and cold capitalistic calculations. Yet, the emergence of journalism as “public trust” is a historically specific view of the role of media in society with important consequences for the practice of journalism and its relation to other social and political institutions. Public service orientation contrasts with the *instrumental conception of journalism*, whereby media organizations serve as vehicles for political intervention rather than operating as a “public trust”.

Professionalism also relates to a set of norms, principles and obligations, i.e., horizontally organized, self-imposed codes of ethics, such as the protection of confidential sources of information, the separation between editorial content and advertising, and standards of newsworthiness, among others. Major Brazilian and German newspaper have developed a weekly supplement, which is partly devoted to a rigorous, introspective self-analysis of their content, news frames and mistakes. Many scholars, however, use the norms and practices of the American journalism as a universal parameter against which they measure the performance of media organizations abroad. The problem with this approach is that American journalism is the outcome of a specific culture, and, as such, it cannot be transferable or serve as a universal standard for other countries’ journalism.

The key values of the American model, the “fourth-branch role” and “objectivity”, derive from the Anglo-Saxon tradition of “checks and balances” political institutionalism, which has long given the press a status comparable to a “fourth branch” in the division of powers. According to this tradition, the division of powers does not entail *independent* branches competing for power, but *interdependent* branches sharing power. American journalists see themselves committed to this “check and balances” tradition. There is a need for communication between the various branches of government and the public, and the news media are the main way to accomplish that role. As Cook (1998, p. 5) pointed out, “It is not in spite of, but because of, their commitments to norms of objectivity and impartiality that [American] journalists are nowadays important political actors.”

Such narrative has been adapted in a very particular way by Brazilian journalists, as they perceive themselves as mediators between the political elites, rather than between the elites and the audience, like in the United States. Their primary mission is to hold forth institutional order and exert influence over the political branches, rather than being a factor of balance between them. In Brazil, the Public Prosecutor Office (“*Ministério Público*”), to whom belongs the exclusive constitutional power to initiate public lawsuits, is the real institutional “fourth-branch player”, whose extended legal prerogatives entail a considerable margin of autonomy in relation to the three classical branches of the political powers. The news media play an important, but secondary role of whistles blowers and denouncing wrongdoings (Albuquerque, 2005).

In contrast with the Anglo-American model of professional neutrality, journalism in Brazil tends to emphasize commentary and opinion from distinct political perspectives. “Objectivity”, another key value in American journalism (Schudson, 2002), is also a consequence of peculiar cultural and political conditions, largely absent in Brazil. Till recently, professionals saw journalism as a literary activity. “Objectivity” was a “technique” that in many instances could only impoverish journalism’s verve and ingenuity. Nelson Rodrigues, a famous publicist and literate, used to call ‘objectivity idiots’ those American journalists who “live by the facts, depend on the facts, would drown without the facts” (quoted by Ribeiro, 2003, p. 290). The idea of “objectivity” relates more to common-sense personal virtues such as honesty and dedication to

assigned tasks, than to the “web of facticity”, such as the use of quotation marks, the presentation of “both sides” of a subject, and the use of detached third-point perspective (Tuchman, 1978; Campbell, 1991).

Even major newspapers’ stylebooks reject the American notion of “objectivity”. “Objectivity does not exist”, says the *Folha* stylebook. “When a journalist selects an issue, writes a text and edits it, he/she make decisions that are largely subjective, influenced by his/her personal opinions, habits and emotions. However, this does not exempt him/her from the duty to be as objective as possible” (Folha de S. Paulo, 1992, p. 19). Thus, “objectivity” is not a practical norm, since journalists are not supposed to believe in it, but just a general principle.

4.6. The role of the state

The state can play different roles vis-à-vis the media, depending on the political system, culture, and tradition. We understand culture in its relationship to politics and democracy as the particular manner in which a specific human community experiences, imagines, and represents its capacity to coexist. Political liberal cultures, such as the United States, tend to restrict the role of the state in society and its intervention in the media system, whereas welfare cultures, like Germany, aim to integrate social groups into the political process, and the media system is a public institution. The German tradition of an active state has complex historical roots in pre-liberal aristocratic rule and modern tradition of social democracy. Traditionally, the welfare state in Germany has played an active role in mediating disputes between capital and labor or in maintaining the public health and education systems. Likewise, it intervenes in the media market to accomplish a variety of collective goals, such as the guarantee of political pluralism, the quality of democratic life, racial harmony, and the development of the national culture and language.

Some scholars have found a clear and direct connection between patterns of consensus or majoritarian rule (Lijphart, 1999) and systems of broadcast governance and regulation (Humphreys, 1996), which tend to follow patterns similar to those that prevail in other spheres of public policy. Majoritarian, long-standing democracies, which feature catch-all political parties, with vague ideological identities, competing for

the right to represent the nation as a whole, also tend to develop a catch-all media type, a journalism oriented to a wide public across social divisions, internal pluralism, and “neutral” service of the general public. Consensus systems, on the other hand, with multiparty systems, power sharing, and compromise between opposing forces, are more likely to develop media systems with strong political parallelism, external pluralism, and power sharing in broadcast governance.

Although from a strictly institutional point of view, presidential systems can be as stable as parliamentary ones (Cheibub, 2007), the “winner-take-all” logic of the former tends to marginalize minority views, promote personalism and weak political parties. In addition, the temporal rigidity of presidential and congressional mandates facilitates institutional deadlock, either when there is a very unpopular president or stiff opposition between the president and the congress (Linz, 1990, 1994). In Brazil, the presidential system of government has affected the relationship with the media system in two main ways. First, media tends to focus on the president as an individual person to the detriment of collective agents such as political parties. Second, the media tend to reinforce the emphasis on the administrative aspects of government, rather than on party politics. Both tendencies contribute to promoting a generalist, catchall attitude in the media system (Porto, 2012).

As a republic, Brazil has switched between democratic and authoritarian periods of government. The role of the state reflects a combination of authoritarian traditions of intervention and democratic traditions of the welfare state similar to those of Europe. Both the Nazi-fascist-inspired “Estado Novo” (New State), under President Getúlio Vargas (1930-1945), and the military regime (1964-1985) systematically censored the media, albeit in different fashion. Under the “New State”, censorship was an institutional praxis exercised by the “Press and Propaganda State Department”. In contrast, the military regime attempted to disguise media censorship from the public. There was no formal institution responsible for censoring the media, just “words-of-order from above”, which tampered with editorial lines or simply cut off entire pieces of news report. The military regime adopted all sorts of cultural fear, intimidation, and physical violence. Many journalists were tortured and murdered in the prisons of DOI-

CODI.⁵³ After the end of the military regime, censorship almost ended in Brazil, except in small towns, where violence against journalists remain significant.

The state has never played an important role as an owner of media organizations in Brazil. However, state subsidies have played a very important role in the economic life of media organizations, as low readership and scarce investment from private advertisers rendered impossible the full development of a market-based print media in Brazil. State owned banks have provided generous loans for media outlets, and state controlled companies were responsible for a large part of their advertising budgets. During the military regime, the state made huge investments to build the first satellite-based infrastructure of telecommunication in South America, to allow television broadcast across 8 514 876 km² of territory (47% of South America), in the name of “national integration”. TV Globo Network was the first beneficiary of such infrastructure, jumping from a local TV station to one of the biggest in the world (Mattelart and Mattelart, 1989).

For 20 years, the Brazilian military regime controlled, watched, and regulated even the simplest activities of everyday life. Yet, they were extremely parsimonious in regulating the broadcasting system they created. Indeed, the Brazilian media system were freer of regulations than the American one. In consequence, the transmission of sound and image became highly monopolistic during the military dictatorship, which concentrated about 400 channels into a few corporations. A similar trend of monopolistic capitalism without regulation persisted thereafter, and contributed to establish a media system that does not fall under any social or public control, as The Ministry of Communications controls neither the network’s ownership nor its structure. The state simply distributes TV and radio broadcasting licenses, permissions, and authorizations to private owners, interest groups and political elites, which support the government in power (Mattos, 1980; Guimarães and Amaral, 1989; Herz, 1987; Lima, 1988).

⁵³ DOI-CODI stands for “Destacamento de Operações de Informações - Centro de Operações de Defesa Interna” (Information and Operation Center for Homeland Defense) was an intelligence unit subordinate to the army, which prosecuted political dissidents of the regime inaugurated by the military coup of 31 March 1964.

4.7. Summary

The familiar monopoly and cross-ownership of major media organizations, associated with the partial control of local and regional TV and radio networks by professional politicians, and the lack of a partisan press linked to social minority interests with national expression, makes media in Brazil hardly consistent with the idea of a “free market ideas”. In somewhat it confirms Robert Entman’s (1989) pessimistic assessment that media systems all over the world frustrate any significant movement toward full democracy. Mass media, it seems, will often fall short of the ideal of “free market of ideas” because, ultimately, there are the economic and political interests that dominate the final product of journalism.

In countries like Brazil, where economic elites easily become political elites, there seems to be no media outlet without the goal of becoming politically influential and placed in the center of power. If the media industry also represents political interests, such an interest most likely will frame, screen and rank the news and editorials. Yet, the media alone cannot explain this phenomenon. Should the institutions of mass communication be dedicated exclusively to produce quality news they would surely face a negligible demand, and would certainly incur prohibitive costs and risks. The notion of “free market of ideas”, based on the unrealistic assumption of autonomy, perhaps will inspire naïve journalists, but in fact it lends itself more to mystify than to clarify the role of media in politics and its contribution to democracy. Mutual dependence, undoubtedly, reduces the capacity of the media, the public and even the political and economic elites to achieve their full democratic potential.

CHAPTER 5: THE GERMAN MEDIA SYSTEM

5.1. Introduction

Hallin & Mancini (2004) classify the German media system according to the *Democratic Corporatist model*, as it features an early development of mass circulation press, a high degree of political parallelism that coexisted with a high level of journalistic professionalization, and inclination towards an advocacy model of the journalist's role perception. Journalism was born and bred to play an important role in the defense of political and religious causes. From the beginning of the print era, in the time of the Reformation, political advocacy was a central function of the press. It shaped not only religious beliefs, but also political structures and media practices, including the fact that the emerging print media became vehicles for expression of deeply rooted, conflicting political and religious subcultures.

By the late XVIII century, when the newspaper began to emerge as force in political life, journalists used to see themselves as a publicist whose mission was to influence public opinion in the name of a political faction or cause. By the late XIX century a contrasting model of political journalism was beginning to emerge, in which the journalist became a "neutral arbiter" of political communication, standing apart from particular interests and causes, providing information and analysis "uncolored" by partisanship. This liberal and normative ideal of objectivity and neutrality coincided with the shift from partisanship to professional journalism. After the World War II, the German media emerged from the devastating influence of the Nazi regime. West Germany and the GDR, dominated by the Soviet bloc, developed at fully different paces, which induced different patterns of media consumption in the West and in the East.

The evolution of the modern German media system is a success story. According to the World Association of Newspapers (2014), Germany is the fifth world largest in newspaper sales and the biggest print market in Europe. The German-speaking book publishers produce about 700 million copies of books every year, with about 80,000 titles, nearly 60,000 of them new publications. Germany is in third place on

international statistics after the English-speaking book market and the People's Republic of China. The Frankfurt Book Fair is the most important book fair in the world for international deals and trading and has a tradition that spans over 500 years.

5.2. The structure of the media market in Germany: print media

The birth of a print market in Germany is clearly associated with the early growth of mass literacy due to the Protestant Reformation, which stressed the principle that “every person should learn to read and to see with their own eyes what God bids and commands in his Holy Word” (Würgler, 2013, p. 16). Organized literacy campaigns were common during this period, generally supported by the Church and the State. Some parts of Germany had compulsory education in the XVII century. The development of mass literacy is related to the process of industrialization and the growth of market institutions, which contributed in a variety of ways to the growth of print media. An increasing demand for information, as well as the political motivation for establishing newspapers as a voice of the emerging bourgeoisie was the economic and cultural context within which the press was established as business enterprises, funded by advertising and circulation revenue.

The Protestant Reformation also accounts for all sorts of religious, ethnical and linguistic cleavages, which combined with the class divisions in the late XIX century, created a pattern of a “segmented pluralism” (Lorwin, 1971) that continued to shape the media system. Like political parties, media institutions are rooted in communities divided into political, religious, and cultural identities, a fact that preserved the tradition of an ideologically plural press with strong advocacy functions of shaping and mobilizing opinions, and at the same time a market press as source of information for merchants (Eisenstein, 1979). Partisanship, however, related primarily to ideology and social class, more than to religion or ethnicity. Liberal and radical papers, including the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, one of whose founders was Karl Marx, emerged with the revolution of 1848, and Social Democratic papers, like *Vorwärts*, appeared in 1860. As Max Weber (1946, p. 99) pointed out, the German journalist of this period was a “publicist”, one who propagated ideas, more than a reporter, a “type of professional politician.”

The sharp political polarization of the Weimar period (1918-1933) and its aftermath also saw the creation of the highly politicized commercial media empire of Alfred Hugenberg, a supporter of the Nazis and a leading member of the extreme right-wing German National People's Party (DNVP), who created Europe's first multimedia conglomerate, involving mass-circulation newspapers, news and advertising agencies, and film production. Hugenberg's media empire dominated both the party press and the traditional quality commercial papers during this period, and clearly served both political and commercial ends. With the Nazi seizure of power in 1933 (*Machtergreifung*), control of the press as an instrument of political propaganda was established, and remained until the end of World War II (1945).

The Allies' policy toward the reconstruction of the German media system was twofold. On the one hand, the United States tried to export the U.S. model of a neutral commercial press. On the other hand, in an effort to promote "desnazification", the Allies initially licensed newspapers linked to individuals and organizations that took a clear position against the ideology of the defeated Nazi regime. The British occupying forces, meanwhile, were particularly explicit in supporting the idea of the so-called *Partei richtungszeitungen* (party-oriented newspapers), a plural press organized along diverse ideological orientations (Blanchard, 1986; Humphreys, 1994).

Currently, Germany has approximately 359 daily newspapers with a combined daily circulation of about 20 million. However, only one-third of these have their own complete editorial staff. The remainder have local staff and advertising facilities which rely on wire service reports or reports from other papers for local, national, and international news. If local editions of all papers are included, there are 1,512 different titles. The local and regional newspaper market is strong and important, 95% of which is subscription press. The largest national papers are: *Bild Zeitung*, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (SZ), *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ), *Welt*, *Frankfurter Rundschau* (FR), *Tageszeitung* (TAZ). They claim to be independent and "above parties", but most cover a liberal and conservative spectrum, with strong coverage given to politics as well as business and financial news.

The top-selling paper of Europe is the *Bild Zeitung*, with a daily circulation of 3.3 million and an estimated daily readership of approximately 12 million, about one-fifth of the adult population. Flagship of the *Axel Springer Group*, the tabloid features a skillful blend of sensational sex, crime, and populist politics. Claiming to speak for the ordinary citizen in advocating “commonsense politics”, the paper has generally supported the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and other conservative groups. While generally ignored by intellectuals, politicians take the *Bild Zeitung* very seriously as the true voice of the average voter. Another type of paper, which became popular after 1945, is the weekly newspaper. They offer less up-to-date news, but more analysis and background information. The most successful is *Die Zeit* (525,000 copies), a liberal and independent paper.

The magazine sector is extremely buoyant with some 906 periodicals (circulation of 117.9 million copies) and 1,218 specialized magazines (13.6 million copies) currently on the market. A weekly news magazine, modeled after the American *Time Magazine* and with a virtual monopoly of the political market is *Der Spiegel* (1.1 million copies). With investigative style of journalism, it represents the most influential political publication in Germany, which contrasts with the less opinionated, youth-oriented *Focus*, a product of the *Burda Publishing Group* from Munich (800 thousand copies). Both periodicals face the direct competition of the mass-market, widely read *Stern* with one million copies and some political content. The four largest publishers, *Bauer, Springer, Burda, and Bertelsmann* cover about 60% of the magazine market.

Overall, the press market structure features a high but decreasing dependency on advertising income and a significant degree of economic concentration. The *Axel Springer Group* is the largest publishing organization, with 22.1% of the market share, followed by *Verlagsgruppe Stuttgarter Zeitung*, a regional publisher with nearly 8.5%. In the third position comes the WAZ Group (*Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*) with 6% and *Du Mont Schauberg* in Cologne with 4.2%. The *Ippen Gruppe* takes the fifth place with 4%. The top 10 publishers of dailies together control 44.8% of the market.

Newspaper publishers have all the prerequisites for being able to emerge as winners from the process of digital change in the media sector. They are pursuing a

three-pronged strategy. Firstly, they are continuing to develop their established business with printed products. Print continues to be a successful business area and the potential of paper is far from being exhausted thanks to new digital technologies. Secondly, newspaper publishers are actively developing digital markets with products designed for use by readers and advertisers both on the Internet as well as on mobile phone networks. The third prong is diversification; this includes the involvement of newspaper publishers in the provision of career and supplementary training, event management, mail delivery, and business-to-business services. Revenue from the traditional print market constitutes only one part of overall sales by newspaper publishers. Sales in this market segment stagnated in 2011. For the third year in a row newspaper sales brought in more than advertising. The old rule of thumb that two-thirds of sales in the newspaper business stem from advertising and one-third from distribution lost its validity at the time of the first major business and advertising downturn in the period from 2001 to 2003. The fact that this ratio has now been reversed clearly reflects the structural changes that have taken place in the German press market.⁵⁴

5.3. Television and Radio

As a highly developed society, Germany has an extensive mass media structure that has made the Germans one of the most politically informed people in the world. The broadcast market is the largest in Europe. Around 90% of German households have cable or satellite TV, and viewers can choose from a variety of free-to-view public and commercial channels. Germans spend about 219 minutes per day on television, split about evenly between public and commercial programs. The introduction of private television via cable and satellite systems offers viewers a greatly expanded range of programs, but it has also arguably reduced the quality and quantity of political information.

Mindful of the Nazis' abuses of the airwaves, the Basic Law prescribes a decentralized administration of Radio and television organizations. The intent behind the pattern of regional decentralization is to prevent the exploitation of the media by a strong national government, as had happened under the Nazi dictatorship. The Federal Constitution assigned the sole responsibility for radio and television to the constituent

⁵⁴ All data on the German press retrieved from: <http://www.wptdatabase.org/reports/2012/germany>.

states. State-based, nonprofit public corporations administer TV and Radio stations, which by law are to be free from direct political influence. Boards of control, representing the major social, economic, cultural, and political forces, including political parties and interest groups, have supervisory powers over these corporations. There are currently ten such broadcasting corporations operating in the sixteen Länder (states). They comprise the Association of Public Broadcasting Corporations of the Federal Republic (*Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, ARD), a consortium of Germany's regional public-service broadcasters, founded in 1950 to represent the common interests of the new, decentralized, post-war broadcasting service, in particular the introduction of a joint television network.

The ARD is the world's second largest public broadcaster after the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), with a budget of 8.5 billion USD and 23,000 employees. The budget comes primarily from the fees every household, every company and even every public institution like city governments are required to pay, except for households living on welfare. For an ordinary household the fee is currently 24 USD per month, collected by a public organization (*Gebühreneinzugszentrale*). ARD maintains and operates a national television network, called *Das Erste* (The First) to differentiate it from ZDF, *Das Zweite* (The Second), which started 1963, as a separate public TV-broadcaster. The ARD network began broadcasting on 31 October 1954 under the name of *Deutsches Fernsehen* (German Television), becoming *Erstes Deutsches Fernsehen* (First German Television) with a corporate redesign in 1984; it adopted its current name (*Das Erste*) in 1994. ARD's programs are aired over its own terrestrial broadcast network, as well as via cable, satellite and IPTV (World Values Survey, 2014).⁵⁵

The major commercial television organizations are ProSieben and SAT.1 Media AG, owned by an Anglo-American investment fund, RTL Group S.A, which belongs to the German giant Bertelsmann, the world's largest bookseller and the biggest media company outside of the United States. There is a variety of independently owned, special-interest TV channels, most of them subsidiaries of international conglomerates

⁵⁵ Data retrieved from: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp>.


such as Viacom, Disney, and NBC Universal. In large cities such as Berlin and Hamburg, local commercial TV also operates. The audience share of all public service broadcasters in television is about 43.6% percent, of which ARD has 13.4%, ZDF 13.1%, and the third channels 13.2%. Among the private channels, RTL has 11.7%, SAT1 10.3%, and ProSieben 6.6%. The television advertising market participates in the advertising market with a share of 43.7% in contrast with 46% of the print media, and 6.2% of Radio.

Radio is a popular medium in Germany, with a daily consumption of 176 minutes (2014). Slightly more than half of radio service comes from public broadcasters, which usually offer a number of programs on a regional basis, sometimes with local limitations, concentrating on general audiences as well as special target groups (culture, news, and youth). There are two national radio stations, one based in Berlin (*Deutschlandradio Kultur*) and the other in Cologne (*Deutschlandfunk*) both funded by the state. Commercial radio is licensed in all Länder, therefore it follows mostly a regional pattern. There are no national broadcasters, but some that are active in several Länder (NRJ for youth, Klassik Radio). In two Southern states, local commercial radio is the rule. In North Rhine-Westphalia, the largest state, 46 local stations work commercially but with local, non-commercial windows. Non-commercial radio exist, but their regulation differs in each state. Some states allow community stations; others prefer public access (also for television), educational stations, and campus stations.

Computer and Internet use has proliferated in recent years. There are approximately 69 million Internet users, a penetration rate of 84%, one of the highest in the world (Brazil has almost 100 million Internet users, but a penetration rate of only 49%). In 2014, 80% of the population reported using the Internet regularly, ranging from 41% of the sixty-five to seventy-four age group and 98% of the sixteen to twenty-four group (graph 1). Yet only 37% of Germans use social media, mainly due to

sensitivities about privacy and security.⁵⁶ German is the second most popular language for Web content (6%) only after English (55.5%).⁵⁷

Graph 1: Internet usage by age group in Germany



Source: ARD/ZDF-Onlinestudie

5.4. Political parallelism

Until the mid-1970s, the partisan orientation was still visible in German newspapers, but the latest decades have witnessed a break-through for modern professional journalism, predominantly of the Anglo-Saxon type (Holtz-Bacha, 2002). The true party press hardly exists today, and the level of political parallelism of the whole media system has decreased quite significantly. De-politicization of newspapers has occurred together with a process of more general secularization of society, as traditional mass parties have declined in their membership base and have lost much of their symbolic and representative functions in face of the increasing role of other socialization agencies, increased fragmentation of society and the disappearance of structured social cleavages. This process has clearly weakened the ties between the media and the political system. Viewers and readers are no longer *followers* of a particular social, political or religious affiliation, but essentially individual *consumers*.

⁵⁶ Statistisches Bundesamt (2014). Available at: www.destatis.de/DE/Startseite.html. Access on: 10.02.2014.

⁵⁷ Data retrieved from: World Wide Web Technology Surveys (2014). Available at: <http://w3techs.com>. Access on: 10.02.2014.

Today, the trend is clearly toward a catch-all style of journalism, rooted in a globalized market and not in the world of politics (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2002).

As significant as this trend is, an important degree of political parallelism does persist in Germany, above all among papers of national outreach. At this level, journalists are still involved in the process of bargaining among political forces, and to a significant extent, they do participate in the political process. Some scholars have argued that German journalists tend to have a “mission orientation”, a concern with expressing ideas and shaping opinions. They tend to combine the roles of reporter, editor, and commentator, and to hold particular values and ideas. Yet, they do not openly campaign for political parties during election campaigns. Local papers are more likely to avoid a narrow identification with single parties, are ideologically amorphous, and tend to adopt a catch-all approach, in which the emphasis is on internal pluralism, whereby they express the views of all major parties. Even the most political conservative tabloid, *Bild*, does not openly proclaim any sympathy for the center-right parties (CDU/CSU). As its banner heralds, the paper is “independent and non-partisan.” (Köcher, 1986; Donsbach, 1995).

5.6. The role of the state

In Germany, the classical idea of liberalism gave way to the concept of an all-embracing democratic state (*sozialer Rechtsstaat*) whose legitimacy stems from the political representation in parliament. This implies a strong reliance upon political parties and a natural permeation of factional politics in every aspect of German life, including the media system. Yet, parties are not the only players. Other organized social groups, such as trade unions, employer associations, religious communities, and many other sorts of “socially relevant groups” also play a central role in the German polity. These “peak organizations” represent the interests of their members in bargaining with other groups. Such groups formally integrate into the policy-making process, and in many cases have the status of public institutions, exercising what in Brazil would be state functions.

This pattern of strong civic life, in which local communities have significant rights of self-governance, is reflected in the media and juridical systems. The Federal

Constitution bestows many “intermediary corps” the power to carry out a number of state regulatory duties, such as the allocation of public funds to charities, collective bargaining, public insurance, and the mandate to participate in the regulation of broadcasting. The Federal Constitutional Court plays an extremely important role in the supervision and protection of an independent broadcasting system. The Court has granted many “intermediary forces” and “socially relevant groups”, including the trade unions, churches, industrial and professional associations, proportional representation in the governance of the public broadcasting media in each state. The boards that regulate private broadcasting organize themselves along similar lines (Porter and Hasselbach, 1991).

In legal terms, the broadcasting system in Germany falls under the authority of the 16 federal states (*Länder*). The German decentralized and complex broadcasting governance aims to foster great external pluralism and to avoid monopolization by any single political or economic force. To achieve such a goal, the public broadcasting system should mirror the different political majorities emanating from different regions in each federal state. The public broadcasters govern themselves under the direction of a council featuring representatives of the major social, economic, cultural, and political groups, including political parties, churches, unions, and business organizations. Their financial sources stem largely from the monthly fees charged to television and radio owners, as public television sells no more than thirty minutes per day of commercial advertisements, still it provides roughly one-third of television revenues and one-fourth of radio revenues. In terms of content and quality programming, what distinguishes public television from commercial television is the ability to offer greater coverage of public service activities, cultural, and political events.

Private broadcasting was virtually nonexistent until 1981, when the Federal Constitutional Court recognized the right of the federal states to grant broadcasting licenses to private companies. Enabling legislation took the form of a new broadcasting treaty enacted by the states in 1987 that allowed the creation of private broadcasting companies to compete with public stations. In general, private broadcasters do not have an internal supervisory council, but the states in which they broadcast can exercise supervisory rights. The private sector finances their operations solely with advertising

revenues. Beyond the substantial capital costs associated with starting up a new television channel, private broadcasters have to rely on satellite and cable transmission because the airwaves do not offer unlimited capacity. Thus, viewers have to pay an additional fee to get access to private channels. In 1983, the federal government undertook a large-scale program of wiring the country for cable television. In March 1993, 70% of the households had access to cable service, but only 60% of those eligible households had chosen to subscribe to cable TV.

5.7. Summary

The distinctive feature of the German media system is a duality of apparently opposing tendencies, such as strong mass-circulation commercial media and media tied to political and civil groups, political parallelism and journalistic professionalism, liberal traditions of press freedom and a tradition of strong state intervention in the media, which is a social institution rather than a private enterprise. This duality is the result of the early development of a media market, a culture of entrepreneurial capitalism, and liberal political institutions, together with a push toward literacy that followed the Protestant Reformation and a political press tied to interests and perspectives of distinct social groups.

A strong form of advocacy press developed in this context, in which the mass media served as instruments of public discussion, representing the different social, political, and economic interests that fostered struggle for consent and built symbolic grounds that makes agreement possible. An ideology of collective responsibility for the welfare and participation of all groups and citizens, crystallized in the notion of “social state”, reflected in the media field by a remarkable consensus that the state must play a positive role as the guarantor of equal opportunities of communication for all organized social voices in the pursuit of the “common good”. Despite the process of homogenization that has led to a shift in the balance between the commercial and political press and the diffusion of the model of “neutral” professionalism, a significant degree of political parallelism still characterizes the media system in Germany.

III – THE FIELD RESEARCH

CHAPATER 1: QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES

Based on the theoretical framework discussed in the previous chapters, it can be assumed that the media plays an important role in representative democracies, whether as mediator or as actor in its own right (Strömbäck and Esser, 2009). Media visibility and political image building represent a competitive advantage for political leadership in the context of the "audience democracy" (Manin, 1997), in which "spectatorship" tends to overcome the traditional "citizenship" (Harris and Rees, 2000). The relations between politicians and journalism is now evolving rapidly as the result of technological and social change. These changes are universal (Krotz, 2007; Schultz, 2012). Most modern democracies have experienced a decline in party identification and, as a result, growing electoral volatility. The decline in party identification have increased the impact of short-term factors such as candidate orientations and candidate images on voting behavior (Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000).

The technological changes in the media field coupled with representative systems that foster the cultivation of the "personal vote" (Cain et al., 1987; Carey and Shugart, 1995) have prompted scholars to make observations ranging from the "individualization", or personalization of political representation (Zittel and Gschwend, 2008, 2012), to the "presidentialisation" of politics even in parliamentary systems of government. (Mughan, 2000; Poguntke and Webb, 2005). However, carefully designed comparative studies demonstrate that many of these developments are mediated by variations in institutional incentives, the general political environment, and the level of the political contest (Bennett and Entman, 2001; Hjarvard, 2008; Lundby, 2009).

1.1. The research question

According to Zittel and Gschwend (2008), election campaigns in Germany are traditionally multilevel. The national level features political celebrities and party top candidates, whose main communication strategy rely on mass media, political advertisements and large-scale political rallies. The second campaign level is local and

mostly populated by average citizens running on a party list or for a direct mandate in a local constituency. They usually meet their potential voters face-to-face on market squares, through visits to companies, at social events, or simply through knocking on their front doors.

In Brazil, where political marketing seems to shine on TV and Internet, the reality is that 90% of the candidates for the Chamber of Deputies do campaign without TV, and there is still no clear indication of the relevance of cyber-campaigns in the political arena. Like their German counterparts, the candidates for proportional elections in Brazil still rely heavily on "pre-television" strategies, such as door-to-door campaigns, meetings in clubs and associations, and a large usage of political posters. For most of them, the format of HGPE airtime,⁵⁸ which reaches an undifferentiated public, adds little to campaigns focused on specific social groups, defined by corporate bonding and district spatial characteristics.

This is due, in part, to the Brazilian electoral system of proportional representation with open lists, which heavily customizes the dispute. Each candidate simultaneously competes against his party or coalition fellow, and depends on their votes to achieve the electoral coefficient. The internal competition normally prevents a unified campaign strategy. Given the differences in dynamics between the majoritarian and proportional campaigns, the impact of the latter on TV and radio (HGPE) is much lower if compared to the former. With a relatively small number of candidates, the majority campaigns attract reasonable visibility in the media. In the proportional campaigns, with hundreds of candidates,⁵⁹ the HGPE political advertisement often takes the form of a succession of small "clips", i.e., a parade of anonymous faces announcing their names, candidacy number, and brief exposition of proposals (Albuquerque, 1996, 2005, 2009).

⁵⁸ HGPE stands for "Horário Gratuito de Propaganda Eleitoral" (Free Time for Political Advertising). According to the Party Law (No. 9.096/1995), all radio and television stations operating in the VHF and UHF channels and paid TV under the responsibility of municipalities are required to transmit the party and coalitions advertising spots. Free two-hour airtime (one hour at lunch and one hour at dinner) runs for 45 days until three days before the first round of the election and two days before the second round.

⁵⁹ In the 2010-elections, there were 4878 candidates for federal deputy in all states. This represents a competition of 9.5 candidates per seat in the House of Representatives, considering the country as a whole and not taking into account differences in the size of electoral districts (<http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/eleicoes-anteriores/eleicoes-2010/estatisticas>).

Most candidates need to rely on their creativity to figure out efficient ways to reach voters and make a successful campaign, even without any electronic medium, through the sounds, colors, images and words that make up the peculiar scenario widely known by the people in inland towns of Brazil. This is the “election time”, a “kairotic time, a point in time filled with significance, charged with a means derived from its relation to the end” (Alexander, 2010, p. 17). A “time of promises”, a period of face-to-face politics and “dreams of collective life”, characterized by the presence of visual and discursive symbols distributed over a territory, comparable only to other religious and festive rituals (Barreira, 1998, 2006).

Such perspectives encourage the question whether media visibility is equally important for all kinds of electoral careers. It is, of course, plausible that individual candidates for political leadership positions such as mayoral, gubernatorial or presidential candidates experience strong and growing individual media scrutiny. Those are the “politicians who are most likely to do the media interviews and write books and articles about their experiences” (Searing, 1994, p. 11), especially if they cannot rely exclusively on their party to attract voters. Yet, despite all media’s leverage, do all candidates for seats in elected assemblies (city councilors, state legislators, Congressmen), “backbenchers who shape Parliament’s roles but are less likely to discuss them in print or broadcast” (Searing, 1994, p. 12), give equal importance and emphasis in their campaign strategies to media visibility and public image building?

1.2. The operationalization of the working hypotheses

Our hypotheses draw upon the electoral formulae and the nature of the primary electoral units, the municipalities (Brazil) and the *Wahlkreis/Stimmenkreis* (Germany). On the one hand, the effects of electoral systems occur at the district level. This means that electoral laws relate directly to the district level and not to the macro level of the political system (Sartori, 1986; Gary Cox, 1997). On the other hand, geographically limited areas represent (a) the destination point of the electoral connection, (b) the arena where political competitions take place and MPs draw votes or seek coalitions. Candidates choose different strategies of concentration or dispersion of its resources by territory. The decision of where to focus the campaign on a few or many municipalities/districts is generally associated with the political profile and the

availability of each MP's resources. Candidates with strong ties to a particular constituency tend to focus their campaign on a limited geographical area. Leadership with broader political ties, not geographically concentrated, may disperse their campaign resources along various constituencies.

Our hypotheses then derive from two variables: (a) the electoral formula and (b) the voting pattern. The former may reinforce personal vote seeking or party vote seeking campaign strategies. The latter, the "horizontal vector", projects into space the dimension of concentration of votes. This study is particularly interested in analyzing and comparing the different electoral formulae and the voting patterns of MPs at the federal and state levels of representation, specifically, MPs elected in 2010 for the Chamber of Deputies in the state of Minas Gerais (MG) in comparison to those elected in 2008 for the Landtag in the state of Bavaria. MPs elected for the Chamber of Deputies in Brazil (2010) compared to MPs elected for the German Bundestag (2009). Given that the electoral formulae and geographical voting pattern produce incentives for different kinds of campaign strategies and electoral connections, since a territorial basis of representation inevitably introduces particularistic and parochial concerns into the policy-making process (Cain et al, 1987), it can be assumed, it also produces differences in media strategies.

Our main hypotheses read as follows:

(1) Concentration of votes: MPs' media strategy varies according to (a) variation in the electoral formula and (b) in the horizontal vector. Electoral formulae that foster *personal vote seeking* reinforces personal media-oriented campaign strategies. Electoral formulae that encourages *party reputation* reinforces party-driven campaigns. Variations are expected in MPs' personal media strategies according to the degree of concentration of votes: high concentration of votes coupled with electoral formulae that foster personal vote seeking significantly increase MPs' personal media strategy and visibility.

(2) Candidature level/type of vote: It is assumed that media strategies among German MPs will vary according to (a) the level of candidature (*Landeswahlen* versus *Bundestagswahlen*) (b) the type of vote (list versus direct seat). It is expected that direct

personal visibility (*Medienpräsenz*) in the mass and social media might be a strategy that is more strongly visible among candidates running for the Bundestag (Federal elections) than among candidates running for the Landtag (State elections). It is also supposed that this media influence depends on the type of candidature (list and district): list candidates receive incentives derived from the proportional electoral formulae that encourages party-driven campaigns, whereas district candidates seek personal vote and rely more on media-oriented campaign strategies.

In order to measure the MPs voting pattern in Brazil, the database of the *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral* (TSE) was used to calculate the vote concentration index (c) of each individual MP elected in 2010 to the Chamber of Deputies in Brazil, who responded to surveys and interviews (Minas Gerais $N = 53$; Brasília $N = 100$). MP voting patterns were operationalized through the following equation: $c = (x/y).100$, where x is the number of nominal votes obtained by the MP in the first 10 municipalities, and y is the sum of valid votes in the first 10 municipalities.⁶⁰

In the case of Bavaria, the databank of the *Bayerisches Landesamt für Statistik und Datenverarbeitung* was used.⁶¹ The following equation was used to measure the vote concentration index: $c = x / (x + y^l - z)$, where x is the number of first vote (*Erststimmen*) in the district (*Stimmkreis*), and y is the number of the second vote (*Zweitstimmen*) on the party's list (*Wahlkreisliste*). The same procedure was adopted for the Federal Parliament (Bundestag), using data from the *Bundeswahlleiter*.⁶²

The following criteria were adopted to construct the vote concentration index:

- (a) *Low vote concentration*: less than or equal to 39 % of the votes in the 10 first districts.

⁶⁰ Data available at <http://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/eleicoes-antiores/eleicoes-2010/estatisticas> Access: July 19, 2013.

⁶¹ Data available at: <http://www.landtagwahl2008.bayern.de/tabf09.html>. Access: July 19, 2013.

⁶² Data available at: http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/bundestagswahlen/BTW_BUND_09/ergebnisse/wahlkreisergebnisse/index.html. Access: July 19, 2013.

- (b) *Medium vote concentration*: between 40% and 64% of the votes in the 10 first districts.
- (c) *High vote concentration*: equal to or greater than 65 % of the votes in the 10 first districts.⁶³

The hypotheses were tested by applying cross-tabulations, regressions and factorial analyses on different indicators that measure types of media strategies and visibility. The quantitative data were taken from the survey, “Media and Electoral Careers”,⁶⁴ conducted in the Chamber of Deputies in Brasília (2011 and 2013), in the Landtag in Munich (2012), and in the Bundestag in Berlin (2013). The qualitative data draw upon in-depth interviews with MPs from the states of Minas Gerais (MG) and Bavaria (BA) at the subnational level, and Brasília (DF) and Berlin at the national level. Those interviews were used as anecdotal evidence to assist in the interpretation of quantitative data. The results of this initial exercise may feed into the process of refining the model in the national and international surveys.

⁶³ These criteria draw upon the empirical studies of Barry Ames (2001), Scott Mainwaring (1999) and Nelson Rojas de Carvalho (2003).

⁶⁴ See appendix I and II.

CHAPTER 2: DATA COLLECTION

2.1. Introduction

Social science normally use survey instruments like questionnaires and interviews to generate data. We draw upon surveys, interviews and field research to test our hypotheses. Despite increasing concerns about survey quality, surveys remain the cornerstone of research on political, economic, and social phenomena across academic, commercial and government sectors. When properly designed, surveys are a powerful tool for collecting information about the attitudes, characteristics, and behaviors of individuals and organizations. One can measure the quality of a survey by whether it tries to minimize all sources of errors and delivers reliable and valid data. In this section, full methodological disclosure is provided about the survey, the locations, dates of data collection and the field research.

Fieldwork was done in the Chamber of Deputies in Brasília and in the state of Minas Gerais (MG) between May 5th and October 7th, 2011, with a follow-up trip in May 2013; in the Landtag of Bavaria, between September 5th to October 30th, 2012, and in the Bundestag of Berlin between March 13th and April 12th, 2013. The research strategy reflected the belief that it was important to observe MPs' media and PR strategies not only at the national level, where the political contest has the greatest impact, but also at state and local levels, since political careers and electoral connections succeed or fail at the district level. During the months spent in Brasília, access was given to the plenary section of the Chamber of Deputies as guest of political leaders, who gracefully supported the research. This allowed personal interviews of all deputies elected by the state of Minas Gerais (N = 53). 35 MPs from 23 parties with representation in the Lower House were also interviewed, elected from 19 states and the Federal District (DF). The interviews lasted between 9 to 45 minutes, and took place in their offices, at committee sessions, or even in the famous "Green Corridor".

The survey, "Media and Electoral Careers" was delivered by the internal postal service of the Chamber of Deputies to all 513 members of the 54^a Legislature (2011–2015). In order to prevent measurement errors, the wording of the questionnaire underwent a cognitive pretesting, in which a draft of the survey questions were

administered to randomly selected politicians in Brazil and in Germany. The purpose was to collect information about how individuals interpret and process the questions, to detect and correct possible sources of misinterpretation, and to ensure that the survey questions resulted in measures that were both valid, i.e., they fully and accurately measured the proposed concepts and hypotheses, and reliable, i.e., they measured the constructs in a reproducible manner.

The questionnaire had the following characteristics: (a) a personal letter addressed to each Deputy in logo-headed paper introducing the questions, printed in easily readable font size and attractive layout. The letter provided clear and concise instructions for completing the questions and returning the survey. (b) In order to avoid long and tedious questionnaires, a factor of low return rate (Cole, 1996), the instrument was limited to a four-page questionnaire, with 15 questions covering the main variables that tested our hypotheses. Political leadership made direct appeals by telephone and e-mail as a strategy for improving return rates.

In Germany, the leadership of three parties with representation in the Landtag (Munich) and in the Bundestag (Berlin) supported the survey, "Medienpräsenz und Wahl", which featured the same questions as the Brazilian version, plus some specifics about the German mixed-member electoral system. All 187 members of the 16th Legislature (2008-2013) of the Landtag in Bavaria, and all 620 members of the 17th Bundestag (2009-2013) in Berlin received a copy of the questionnaire through the internal postal service of both Parliaments. In addition, leaders of three major parties personally took the questionnaire to all members of the faction during intra-party discussions, collected the responses, and shipped them back to us. These party leaders made follow-up contacts by telephone and email in order to ensure a good response rate. As a result, a considerable number of MPs' personal letters of recommendation were received, which accompanied the returned questionnaires.

The last three months (July, August and September) of the 2013 federal elections in Germany were followed as a *complete observer* at rallies promoted by all major parties, and as a *participant observer* at party caucuses, *Stammtisch* (talk at the restaurant table) with candidates and party leaders, and major conventions in 10 of the 16 federal states


(Länder). This fieldwork resulted in 69-recorded interviews with candidates of six major parties (CDU, CSU, FDP, SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, and Die Linke). The interviews lasted between 10 to 58 minutes. We attended campaign panel discussions sponsored by local and regional newspapers, radio and TV stations. Staff-members, PR executives and media personnel, who covered these events were also interviewed.

2.2. The survey's design, administration and response rates


The research's design called for a postal, elite, self-administered, census survey, one which gathers information on all elements of the target population, i.e., the group of people whom the survey intends to generalize. The survey was administered to all individuals of the population, because it targeted a very specific elite group (Members of Parliaments). In so doing, sampling and margin errors, uncertainty in the estimate, and significantly increase representation and response rate could be eliminated. Precisely because it is not a representative sample of subnational and national lawmakers from Brazil and Germany, the analysis and conclusions presented here should not be extrapolated beyond the group of interviewees.

In Brazil, the target population was all members of the Chamber of Deputies (N = 513) as well as all MPs elected in the state of Minas Gerais (N = 53) in 2010. In Germany, the target population was all members of the Bundestag (N = 620) and all members of the Bavarian Landtag (N = 187). The lists of the MPs available at official websites were used to identify the target population. In this case, the failure to give some persons in a target population a chance of participating is minimal, since these lists capture the entire population and all individuals had the same chance to respond to the survey.

The Chamber of Deputies comprises 513 seats, as indicated in the Pie chart below.




The questionnaire was sent to all 513 members of the 54^a Legislature (2011–2015) of the Chamber of Deputies between May and June 2013. The return rate was 20% (N = 100), distributed proportionally according to the party representation in plenary, as the relation “representation /respondents” clearly shows (chart below): PT = 18% / 22%. PMDB = 15% / 20%. PSDB = 9% / 10%. DEM = 5% / 5%. PSD = 8% / 6%. PSB = 5% / 5%. PP = 2% / 3%. Bloco PP-PROS 11% / 9%. PPS = 1% / 2%. Bloco PR, PT do B, PRP = 7% / 5%. PSC = 2% / 2%. PC do B = 3% / 3%. PDT = 3% / 2%. PRB = 2% / 4%. PMN = 1% / 1%. PSOL = 1% / 1%. PT do B = 3% / 2%.



In the Bavarian Parliament, the questionnaire was administered to all members of the 16th Legislature (2008-2013) between October 17 and November 14, 2012. The response rate was 69% (N = 130) out of 187 MPs distributed as follows (chart below):


Christian Social Union (CSU), 92 deputies; Social Democratic Party (SPD), 39 seats; Independent Party (FW), 21 representatives; Bündnis 90/Die Grünen with 19 seats and the Liberal Party (FDP) with 15 deputies and 1 non-partisan representative.

DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN THE LANDTAG (2013)



The relation “representation / respondents” was the following (chart below): CSU 43% / 40%. SPD 19% / 21%. FW 10% / 12%. Bündnis 90/Die Grünen 9% / 15%. FDP 8% / 12%.


RETURN RATE - LANDTAG (N = 130)



In Berlin, the survey was dispatched to all 620 members of the 17th Bundestag (2009-2013) between March 13 and April 12, 2013. The distribution of seats in plenary was as follows (chart below): CDU/CSU 237. SPD 146. FDP 93. DIE LINKE 75.


BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN 68. The Response rate was 36% (N = 224).

DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS IN THE BUNDESTAG (2013)



The relation “representation / respondents” was the following (chart below): CDU/CSU 38% / 40%. SPD 23% / 23%. FDP 15% / 15%. DIE LINKE 12% / 12%. BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN 10% / 10%. In the following chapters, we analyze and discuss the results the survey.

RETURN RATE – BUNDESTAG (N = 224)



IV – EXPLANATORY DATA ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 1: REPRESENTATIVES OF MINAS GERAIS IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

1.1. Introduction

As has been previously seen (part 3, chapter, 1, 1.2), the hypotheses draw upon two variables: (a) the electoral formula and (b) the voting concentration pattern. On the one hand, it is assumed that the proportional representation (PR) coupled with open list of candidates reinforces personal vote seeking strategies. On the other, the “horizontal vector” projects into space the dimension of vote concentration. It is assumed that differences in media strategies vary according to incentives for different kinds of campaign strategies and electoral connections, as a territorial basis of representation inevitably introduces particularistic and parochial concerns into the policy-making process (Cain et al, 1987).

In this and following chapters, descriptive statistics are used to analyze our data and test our hypotheses. We apply cross-tabulations, “the workhorse vehicles for testing hypotheses for categorical variables” (Pollock, 2009), between the independent variable “vote concentration” (using a three-way split of high, medium and low concentration) and the dependent variables related to MPs’ media strategies. The data build on the survey “Mídia e Carreiras Eleitorais” (Media and Electoral Careers) conducted in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies on two different opportunities, from May 5th to October 7th, 2011. In this first step, the parliamentary representation of the state of Minas Gerais in Brasília (“Bancada Mineira”) were targeted, and 100% of responses (N = 53) were received. In May and June of 2013, we sent the same questionnaire to all 513 members of the 54^a Legislature (2011–2015), and received 20% of response (N = 100). Variations on MPs’ personal media strategies according to the degree of concentration of votes were expected: high concentration of votes coupled with electoral formulae that foster personal vote seeking significantly increase MPs’ personal media strategy and visibility. The “vote concentration” comprises three levels:

- *Low concentration of vote*: less than or equal to 39 % of the votes in the 10 first districts.
- *Medium concentration of votes*: between 40% and 64% of the votes in the 10 first districts.
- *High concentration of votes*: equal to or greater than 65 % of the votes in the 10 first districts.

1.2. The role of local and national broadcasting media (TV/radio)

The first question tests MPs' perceptions on the importance of different types of media for their election/re-election. MPs in the medium vote concentration range (45.5%) were more emphatic in their responses than the MPs in the high and low layers (chart 1, below). Internet-based strategy (47.7%) surpassed broadcasting media (40.9%) in MPs preference, in a stark contrast with traditional forms of media (print, 4.5%, and posters, 6.8%). These results only partially support the hypothesis, which positively associates *high* vote concentration with *greater* emphasis on media strategies.

One possible interpretation for the poor performance of MPs in the high and low concentration ranges is that the territorial extension of the electoral district, which overlaps with the state borders, seems not so important as the dominance of votes in certain portions of that territory.⁶⁵ Contrary to what one could expect, geographically fragmented votes, a pattern that would normally suggest a need for broader media coverage, might not necessarily demand special emphasis in media strategy. MPs' media strategies may also vary according to incentives emanated from vote dominance and not only from the territorial extension per se (Ames, 2001; Carvalho, 2003).

According to Barry Ames (2001), when a candidate gets a larger share of votes in a township, it becomes electorally important and normally attracts more investment in publicity and media. To the contrary, areas with fragmented votes have weaker ties

⁶⁵ Barry Ames (2003) divides the *spatial distribution of votes* (the horizontal vector) into two dimensions: *vote dominance* and *vote concentration*. The idea of vote dominance relates to the ability of MPs to receive higher percentages of the total valid votes from municipalities that contributed to the bulk of their individual vote. According to the author, dominant MPs are located in rural and less developed regions of Brazil. Vote concentration means that the municipalities in which MPs get the bulk of their votes are physically close to each other (pp. 185-86).

with voters, who may feel misrepresented in Parliament. When the candidate's quota of personal votes in a township is low, it tends to become electorally unimportant. There is not much interest in campaigning in such townships or making special efforts to keeping the voters informed on the candidacy through local or regional media. The author argues that, the fragmentation of votes usually occurs when candidates have no electoral connection with the municipality. Faced with a plethora of anonymous candidates who appear irrelevant to them, voters from such constituencies tend to vote blank (Ames, 2001, pp. 91-92).




Chart 1: "Evaluate which media were important for your election/re-election."

Fragmented balloting patterns and low emphasis on media strategy may also be associated with other factors identified in the open-question interviews with MPs of Minas Gerais (MG), such as *public images previously consolidated* by occupying top position in the party, *good executive performance* or *strong electoral ties* demanding little media coverage. A representative (PT/MG) with low vote concentration explained: "My media visibility is due to being the state party's chairman and not to my individual performance in Parliament. After being promoted to the party's leadership, my votes jumped from 80,000 in 2006 to 180,000 in 2010, a voting pattern spread over more than 700 districts". Another deputy (PSDB/MG) with low vote concentration, but with a long executive career, pointed out: "I put much emphasis on the Internet because I dream of a kind of 'digital democracy' with permanent referenda through the social media. I am also a syndicated columnist in two large newspapers in Brazil. Yet, I could say, I was

elected thanks to my 4 years as the State Secretary of Health. During that time, I always enjoyed good media coverage, and could establish strong ties with mayors of small towns. My target issue was always the public health in the state, and the support of health-related organizations, a powerful lobby that gave me 160,000 votes in more than 750 townships” (Interview with the author: Brasília, May 6, 2011).

A low concentration vote deputy (PSB/MG) pointed out that “Media outlets may generate visibility and make a candidate well-known in the region or even in the state. Yet, under the rule of proportional, open-list elections, which feature thousands of candidates competing among themselves for a few seats in the Chamber of Deputies, no media power is capable of making every voter know their candidate. It is impossible for the media to determine the outcome of a proportional election in Brazil. I find it impossible!” With similar voting pattern, another MP (PMDB/MG) commented jokingly: “With media, without media or against media I would have been elected anyway! I use 0% of my resources for media strategy! [*Laughs*]. I built my career defending farmers and agro-business. I only use the institutional media of my party” (Interview with the author: Brasília, May 10, 2011). Therefore, a possible correlation between pre-consolidated public image, fragmented pattern of votes and low investment in media resources finds some ground on MPs’ interviews.

Despite all Internet hype, another surprise was that regional radio stations emerged as one of the most important political communication tools for representatives of Minas Gerais. A recently elected MP (PT/MG), with medium concentration of votes, highlighted the importance of the Radio for his electoral success: : “I normally use the Internet, above all the social media, such as Tweeter and Facebook, to keep in touch with young voters and supporters, because those are the tools closer to the youth, my target public. However, radio still dominates most of the audience in the countryside of my state where the access to the Internet is low and people are not used to following political issues through the social media. That’s why, for me, radio remains the most democratic vehicle of mass communication in my state. Through radio I keep in touch with people and am accountable for my mandate” (Interview with the author: Brasília, October 6, 2011).

Finally, the negative correlation between fragmented voting patterns and emphasis in media strategy found among MPs from Minas Gerais may be associated with types of electoral connections not directly dependent on credit claiming through media coverage. Chart 2 shows that 20.8% of MPs with low concentration of votes considered "important and very important" the support of mayors and councilors, while only 13.2% of MPs with high vote concentration positively evaluated this kind of support for their electoral strategies. Altogether, the three vote layers (71.7%) clearly confirm the importance of local politics and the role of mayors and councilors in the electoral dynamics in Brazil's hinterland.




Chart 2: "Choose, in order of importance, which factors contributed most to your electoral success: Support of Mayors and Town Councilors."

1.3. The strength of local politics

As the former Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies, Ulysses Guimarães, once said, "citizens do not live in the union or in the states, but in towns" (Cited by Carvalho 2003, p. 68). His intuition finds confirmation in the classical political and anthropological literature on the relevance of the municipalities, unions and social movements for political relations at the national and local level in Brazil (Queiroz, 1976; Arato and Cohen, 1994; Leal, 1997; Alvarez et alia, 1997; Costa, 1997; Bezerra, 1999).

Although the electoral constituencies conform to state boundaries, the real voting unit is the municipality, where mayors and councilors play a very important role. In contrast to the politically autonomous, middle-class, big-city electorate, the small-

town electorate live in an environment dominated by oligarchies that influence the electoral success of candidates. To understand and adapt to such "structures of power" is a *sine qua non* for a successful local political campaign (JACOB et al., 2010).

Chart 3 (below) highlights the importance of *pork barrel*⁶⁶ as a strategy to capture media attention in contrast with other more universalistic strategies. MPs with low vote concentration were those who more intensively used “inauguration of projects and allocation of resources to municipalities” as a way to capture media attention (20.5%). A meager 2.3% of those cited “position taking on controversial issues”, and only 4.5% preferred “speech in plenary” as media strategy. We would expect the opposite, as statewide-oriented policies would better fit their electoral profile. The strong emphasis on project inauguration and amendments designating funds to municipalities may suggest a demise of the *policy advocate* and the rise of the *pragmatic promoter of local interests* as it seems to emerge from the survey.

These findings are also in line with Samuels’ (2002) analysis that the Brazilian politicians trade pork for money, in the form of campaign contributions. According to an informal “typology”, suggested by a MP (PSDB/MG) with large experience in Parliament, there are four basic types of mandates: “The ‘media-star’ is like the comedian Tiririca⁶⁷ and the former football star, Romario,⁶⁸ who depend entirely on media coverage to have a land-sliding victory on the ballot box. The ‘religious candidate’ draws upon highly disciplined constituencies, who vote for them regardless of media. The ‘policy advocate’, a dwindling minority, relies mostly on big media outlets to make visible their position taking, and credit claiming strategies. Finally, the ‘local promoter of interests’ only worries about the demands of local leaders such as mayors and trade union bosses. This type depends more on large amounts of cash than on media strategy to run the campaign and win a seat in Parliament” (Interview with the author: Juiz de Fora, May 5, 2011).

⁶⁶ Government grants to local administrative bodies.

⁶⁷ Francisco Everaldo Oliveira Silva (PR/SP), the most voted Congressman in the 2010 elections with more than 1.3 million votes from the city of São Paulo, SP. He gained fame on TV in the role of a country bumpkin, and had to face a literacy test under parliamentary rules before taking his seat in the Chamber of Deputies.

⁶⁸ Romario de Souza Faria (PSB/RJ), world-champion and best football player (1994), won a seat in Parliament as representative of the city of Rio de Janeiro, RJ, in 2010.




Chart 3: “What strategy do you usually use to capture the media attention?”

With low vote concentration, a MP (PT/MG), who identifies himself as a ‘*policy advocate*’, said that, according his estimation, only one-sixth of the seats in the House of Representatives is occupied by “opinionated-MPs”. “In my view, MPs of this breed are dependent exclusively on mass communication to have their voice heard by the public, but the media gives them little attention, because the issues they are concerned about do not always fit into the media’s entertainment agenda. The only way to attract media attention is to create factoids and *fait-divers* in order to provoke scandal or amusement” (Interview with the author: Brasília, May 12, 2011).

With respect to unions and social movements (chart 4), a typical reaction was recorded by a newly elected MP (PTB/MG) with low vote concentration: “The contact with my constituents is not done via media, but through syndicates, agricultural cooperatives, and even directly with farmers. Due to this large network of relationships, I was voted upon in almost all municipalities of my state” (Interview with the author: Brasília, May 11, 2011).

These results clearly indicate the importance of pork barrel to local politics and the role of mayors and councilors, confirming Bailey’s (1971) insight on the importance of “small politics”, then considered “unworthy of intellectual attention”. His perception

on local politics represented a departure from the “great-man-great-issue argument” according to which citizens’ destinies would “lie in the hands of great men – cabinets and shadow-cabinets – who deal or would like to deal grandly with great issues” (Bailey, 1971. p. 5).




Chart 4: “Choose, in order of importance, which factors contributed most to your electoral success: Relationship with unions and social movements”.

Federal lawmakers’ motions to the Union’s Annual Budget are strongly oriented towards the transfer of federal funds to their constituencies in the municipalities. The bonds of municipalities and their representatives with maintaining their local political networks have a prominent place in the variables essential for understanding the political dynamics at the local, state and federal levels.

1.4. Media visibility and public image

Presenting oneself to voters is vital for one’s electoral success. It occurs not only in the mass and social media, but also through parties’ and candidates own communications. Candidates use a broad array of communication channels to draw the voters’ attention: canvassing, handing out flyers, frequenting markets, and publishing advertisements in the mass media. Because visibility, both in paid and unpaid mass media has electoral consequences, this topic has received ample scholarly attention (Cwalina, et al., 2000).

The expressions "media visibility" and “media presence” are used here in reference to the amount of *positive media coverage* received by a political agent at a certain lapse

of time. In the broad sense, it means the *usage of media* as part of the political agent's public relations strategy to keep contact with the electorate and to conquer votes during electoral campaigns. According to Cain et al. (1987), "visibility is the cornerstone of an effective district strategy. Without visibility, representatives cannot have independent standing in the electorate's collective mind, and without independent standing they cannot anticipate personal success in otherwise unfavorable circumstances" (p. 27). The authors used "name recall and recognition" in simple survey's questions to measure visibility among candidates in the United States and Great Britain. Their findings confirm that visibility dramatically increases voters' self-described political attentiveness, which correlates positively with candidates' efforts to publicize their activities and accomplishments (pp. 30-33).

The term *image* may give rise to confusion. It may contrast to *substance* and denote a vague and superficial perception devoid of political or social content, which in turn could imply an intrinsic crisis in representation. Although vague, the idea of *image* stems from the notion of *perception*, which always includes a certain content or substance. As Cain et al. (1987) pointed out "candidates with image problems" may have difficulty in raising funds, finding campaign volunteers and may attract strong challengers (p. 36). Richard Fenno (1978) calls the array of activities directed to producing favorable images of the candidate the representative's "home style": a unique, individualized response of MPs to their districts, the natural inclinations of their personalities, and the public's stylized perceptions of MPs and their responsibilities. Home style is a two-way communication process, through which the MPs learn information that they need in order to be good agents in the process of soliciting the voters' support. The choice of an issue-oriented home style rather than a more service-oriented style depend on the district's spatial characteristics and voter's expectation of MPs (Fenno, 1978, pp. 50-56).

The next two tables capture the MPs' perceptions regarding "media visibility" (chart 5) and "public image" (chart 6). The results show that 47.2% of the MPs found media visibility "important or very important" for their electoral success, against a majority of 52.8% of "media skeptics", who considered the media's role "not important or less important" for their campaigns.




Chart 5: “Choose, in order of importance, which factors contributed most to your electoral success: Media visibility.”

The multifaceted character of the electoral connections among MPs of Minas Gerais may explain why the correlation “vote distribution/media visibility” did not confirm the working hypothesis, according to which high vote concentration coupled with electoral formulae that foster personal vote seeking would significantly increase MPs’ personal media strategy and visibility. The results of chart 5 (above) point to an opposite direction, as MPs with high vote concentration were the least to emphasize (“important and very important”) the role of media visibility (24.5% against 49.1% and 26.4%).

This picture changes dramatically, when “public image” comes to scrutiny (chart 6): 79.3% of respondents deemed “important or very important” the consolidation of “public image” for their electoral success, against a clear minority of 20.7%, who denied importance to this factor in their campaigns. These results may suggest a confidence in other kinds of connections, which are *not* mass media dependent, for their electoral success as previously discussed.

MPs: MINAS GERAIS (N=53)




Chart 6: "Choose, in order of importance, which factors contributed most to your electoral success: Consolidation of your Public Image."

References to non-media electoral connections appeared in the interviews with MPs. A newly elected MP (DEM/MG), with a low concentration of votes, explained: "Although I try to keep an efficient PR staff, the main connection with my electorate is not made via mass media, but through the trade unions, associations of employees and even directly with farmers. Because of this large network of relationship I received a number of votes in almost all municipalities in the state of Minas Gerais". Another deputy (PMDB/MG) elected for a second term, with high vote concentration, said: "I am a believer in communalism. Before going to the Chamber of Deputies, I had been the mayor of a small town near the state capital (Belo Horizonte) for almost 18 years. I can tell you with great pride that I've never needed the coverage of the mass media to have electoral success. My 'media' is and has always been the sole of my shoes!" (Interviews with the author: Brasília, May 6 and 7, 2011).

A representative (PSDB/MG) elected for a fourth mandate, with a medium vote concentration, explained: "Before my parliamentary career, I worked as a state Attorney. Later, I was appointed state Secretary. I have never used media staff in my office. Nothing against the media, on the contrary, but I think my style is averse to publicity and my constituency like that. I have never been out there trumpeting the benefits I eventually bring to my community, because I think that public service is an obligation, not an adornment. I can therefore say that in the last three terms I have entirely dispensed with media publicity. Only during my fourth term has the media

spotlights focused on my activities due to my participation on a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry, which investigated an important case of corruption in the federal administration” (Interview with the author: Brasília, May 11, 2011).




Chart 7: “How do you appraise your relationship with the local media?”

Chart 7 displays the results to the question on how MPs appraise their relationship to the local media. A clear majority of respondents (72%) considered this relationship “important and very important.” Considering the three scales (“not important, important and very important”), there is an increasing level of improvement among MPs with high vote concentration (4%, 8%, 12%), suggesting a more optimistic perception on the role of local media for their electoral strategies. The same does not apply for MPs with medium (16%, 14%, 20%) and low vote concentration (8.0%, 10%, 8%).

As for local media coverage, MPs of the three vote layers have indicated a modal position that received more than 10 references to their names in the local media (61.5%, chart 8). Such numbers are in accordance with the international literature, which describes the local media as an important locus for political debate.




Chart 8: "How many times, approximately, have you had your name mentioned in the local media in the last three months?"

However, charts 9 and 10 (below) somehow relativize hyper-media simplistic conclusion according to which media variables are the most relevant in contemporary electoral processes. On one hand, MPs have clearly indicated the importance of media as a privileged space for political discussion (chart 8). On the other hand, the same MPs have refrained from being overoptimistic about the media role in the electoral arena. Questioned about how important was media visibility for their electoral success, 38.5% of the respondents strongly disagreed or simply did not agree with the proposition, and 53.8% agreed conditionally (chart 9).




Chart 9: "How do you assess the following statement? 'Thanks to the visibility in the media I've got electoral success'".

This more realistic perception on the part on MPs from Minas Gerais finds confirmation in chart 10 (below), where 43.4% of them did not agree, strongly disagreed, and 52.8% agreed conditionally with the proposition, "My relationship with my constituents depends on the local media."




Chart 10: "My relationship with my constituents depends on the local media."

Considering the modal positions of the three groups of vote concentration in charts 9 and 10 (above), the conditional agreement to the proposition "Thanks to the visibility in the media I've got electoral success" (53.9%) far outpaced the disagreement (5.7 %) and the emphatic agreement (7.7%). The responses to the proposition "my relationship with my constituents depend on the local media" follow a similar trend: the conditional agreement 52.8% contrasts with the extreme positions (5.7% and 3.8%), clearly suggesting the need to avoid the pitfalls of the hypo/hypermedia conclusion.

These findings mirror the scientific literature on the issue: more than just media visibility, MPs demand a good "public image" associated with their profile. If on one hand media presence may be crucial to achieve electoral success, on the other hand the multifaceted aspects of the electoral connections may compensate for the lack of media coverage. Few of the political actors may neglect the development of communication strategies for the construction of their public image, which only reinforces the general tendency towards the internalization of typical media values, language and logic by the political field.

Finally, the data partially confirm the hypotheses suggesting an association between the variable “vote concentration” with different levels of concerns with media strategies. An increasing concern with media visibility and public image consolidation was found in the group with “medium vote concentration” and not in the high concentration area, as expected. For the confirmation of the working hypotheses in the case of MPs from Minas Gerais, more evidence is required. In the later sections of this research, the conflicting results found in this initial exploratory stage will be discussed.

CHAPTER 2: REPRESENTATIVES OF THE BAVARIAN PARLIAMENT

2.1. Introduction


In this chapter, the responses of MPs elected in 2008 for the parliament of Bavaria are analyzed and compared with those MPs elected in 2010 for the Chamber of Deputies in the state of Minas Gerais (MG). The Bavarian Landtag comprises 90 MPs elected by direct vote (FPTP) in single-member constituencies (SMD), and 90 elected by list vote. The distinctive feature of the Bavarian electoral system is that, unlike what happens elsewhere in Germany, the second vote (PR) *is not cast for a party list*, but for one *specific candidate* within a party list, which is an *open list* similar to the Brazilian proportional system. Voters receive two distinct ballots in each constituency. The first one is small and includes only the name and party affiliation of each district candidate (FPTP). The second one is much larger and includes the names of all list candidates of the region (PR).

In addition to the “horizontal vector”, which projects into space the dimension of concentration of votes, analyzing and comparing the variations in media strategies according to the type of vote (list versus direct seat) is of particular interest. Direct personal visibility in the mass and social media is expected to be a strategy that is more strongly visible at the regional level, among direct elected MPs with high vote concentration.

2.2. The strength of print media


There is a significant discrepancy between the perceptions of the Bavarian MPs in relation to their counterparts in Minas Gerais as far as local print media and TV and Radio are concerned. In Bavaria, 60.4 % of the respondents considered local broadcasting media “not important” or “less important” for election/reelection (chart 1) in contrast with 40.9% of the Brazilian respondents, who rated these vehicles of mass communication “important” and “very important” (table 1, chapter 4). While the Brazilian MPs in the whole spectrum of distribution of votes bestowed insignificant levels of importance to print media (4.5%), almost the totality of the Bavarian deputies (96.1%) accorded a prominent role to local newspapers and magazines (“important or very important” scales) for their electoral strategies (Chart 2).

Landtag (N=130): Chart 1 - Evaluate which media were important for your election/re-election: TV/RADIO (LOCAL)




The correlation "vote distribution/local print media" (chart 2) shows an upward trend of importance ("important and very important") conferred by Bavarian MPs according to the layer of vote concentration: the low range (17.1%) escalates to the medium range (27.9%) and peaks in the high concentration range (45%), thus confirming the working hypothesis. The role of local print media also superseded by far those of local TV and Radio when it comes to keeping contact with voters in Bavaria (charts 3 and 4).

Landtag (N=130): Chart 2. Evaluate which media were important for your election/re-election: Print media (local)




As shown in chart 3, 62.8% of the respondents in all ranges deemed TV and Radio "not important" or "less important" for their political communication with constituency.

Landtag(N=130): Chart 3. Evaluate which media is important to keep in contact with your constituency: TV/RADIO (local)



These results contrast with those of local print media: 96.2% of the respondents deemed local newspaper and magazine “important or very important” to keeping in contact with voters (chart 4).

Landtag (N=130): Chart 4. Evaluate which media is important to keep in contact with your constituency: Print media (local)



One possible explanation for the low ranking of TV and Radio in MPs’ perception is the relatively short airtime granted by public and private radio and TV broadcasters to political campaigning. There is a strong consensus of the German states that the political parties may not purchase advertisement time from broadcasters. This prohibition is valid at any time, not only during the campaign period. Nevertheless, the public can find high quality, factual political information in the broadcast media because the broadcasters have the mandate to inform the public on political matters and

they air programs in which politicians participate in discussions or interviews (Walther, 1989).

Since 1984, the German broadcasting system features public and private channels. According to a series of decisions by the Federal Constitutional Court, the two public TV channels (ARD and ZDF) have to fulfill the task of informing the public. To do so in the context of elections, public television not only covers the campaign but also provides free airtime for the campaign spots of every political party allowed to participate in an election. In national elections, each channel provides airtime for eight spots with a maximum length of 90 seconds for the two major parties CDU and SPD, four spots for all other parties represented in the national parliament, and two spots for small parties not represented in the national parliament. Because the number of free spots is strictly limited, the number of spots produced for the campaigns is very small. Usually, the parties produce only a single spot. Parties also air campaign spots on private TV channels, where they have to buy commercial time at regular market prices. In order to keep the costs within reasonable limits, the parties usually shorten the spots produced for private TV channels (Holtz-Bacha, 2000).

In Bavaria, the campaign spots of the public broadcasters run for a period of thirty-one days before the election. The same timeframe limits the private broadcasters of most of the states by a joint communication of the state supervisory agencies for private broadcasters. Thus, the campaign spots on the broadcast media may not appear a very sizeable benefit. Thus, the campaign spots on the broadcast media may not appear to provide a very sizeable benefit. Not only do Radio and TV spots run for a short campaign period, but also they may not exceed broadcasting times of one and one-half minutes or two and one-half minutes per advertisement. Moreover, only major parties have access to a handful of campaign spots, which is relatively more difficult for smaller parties. In 2009, the state supervisory agencies for the private broadcasters allocated twelve minutes per campaign period per broadcaster for the two largest political parties, while smaller parties got only six or three minutes, depending on their size. The parties were to decide how to break this time down, whether, in the case of

the larger parties, they wanted eight one and one-half minute slots, or twenty-four half-minute periods.⁶⁹

To what extent does the local political context account for the positive correlation between high levels of vote concentration and high demand of some types of media, such as the local print media? A number of international studies indicate that local politicians traditionally prioritized local politics primarily through the print-media news flow. Politicians get most of their information about local issues from the local print media, thus endowing the press with more power and framing capacity than Radio or TV.

The most ambiguous effect of such priority is the reification of the very ideas that local officials deem central to their work in the community. Local elites take the local press reports as an indicator of the social problems and processes within their city. If they find in the local paper the majority of news bits that they themselves have generated, this will reinforce their initial perceptions of the problems within their country (Dunn, 1969; Jarren, 1984; Kaniss, 1991; Kurp, 1994, Lang, 2003).

The interviews with Bavarian MPs somehow confirm these findings. A directly elected, high vote-concentration MP (CSU/BA) explained: “Television plays a central role in the world we live in. Yet, print media is still of greater importance. That is, when one appears on TV, one still needs to be in the local paper. I know that young people prefer to deal with Facebook and Twitter. For me personally, this modern way of communication is not so important. I find that when you carry out the events, and the local newspapers report on them, you appear in the pictures, you are present in people’s mind. You know, people are very visually oriented, and especially sensitive to local print media (Interview with the author: Munich, October 5, 2012).

⁶⁹ Satzung über die Wahlwerbung in Angeboten nach dem Bayerischen Mediengesetz, Feb. 4, 1999, BAYERISCHER STAATSANZEIGER No. 6, as last amended by Satzung, May 8, 2008, § 8, Bayerischer Staatsanzeiger No. 20, available at: <http://www.blm.de/apps/documentbase/data/de>. Access on March, 4, 2014.





Chart 5 reports that 66% of the MPs in Bavaria surveyed have a “good or excellent” relationship with local media in general. MPs with higher vote concentration exhibit higher index of satisfaction (31.8%) than those in the medium and low ranges (17.1% each) thus confirming our main hypothesis. Chart 6 (below) further endorses our hypothesis, as 45.7% of MPs in the high vote concentration layer are the ones who received most of local media coverage compared to those in the medium and low layers (27.1% and 23.3%).

Comparative research confirm variations between countries with regard to the level of political influence exercised by local print media. At the structural stance, adverse socioeconomic conditions and low literacy levels in Brazil inhibit the demand for newspapers and magazines. According to the Indicator of Functional Literacy, the percentage of literate population has grown from 61% in 2001 to 73% in 2011. Yet, only one in four Brazilians fully masters the skills of reading and writing. These results imply that the majority of the population has not fully integrated into the literate society. Such social segment does not represent an appropriate commercial target for the general use of print media, even in rich regions, such as São Paulo, where the leading newspaper (*Folha de São Paulo*) has a daily circulation of 300,000 copies for a metropolitan area of over 20 million inhabitants.

Landtag (N=130): Chart 6. How many times, approximately, have you had your name mentioned in the local media in the last three months?



Even in the best scenario, the Brazilian papers reach only a minimum percentage of the population. This makes print media unattractive for political campaign strategies, and even for commercial advertising if compared to the electronic mass media. In addition to the tangible variations in the level of literacy, structural factors such as the degree of economic development, type of organization, production and distribution, regulatory frameworks and level of democratization influence the assessment of the political impact of print media (Norris, 2003).

In contrast, Germany has the largest European market for print media in general. The local print media, long embedded in the larger interpersonal and organizational communication arenas of localities, have now the support of new technologies that help to sustain and develop political audiences on the local level. The consequence is that “one still feels at home while reading the local newspaper” (Klingler, 1999, p. 32), which are an important cultural asset and one of the pillars of democracy, as they foster the socio-political-economic debate, helping to build and shape the public opinion in the country. Empirical findings indicate that interpersonal political communication is one of the distinguishing features of local political publics in Germany. The main source of local political information is still the local newspaper (Lang, 2004).

Roth (1994) argues that an important share of participatory political activities takes place at the local level. In many small towns and communities, readers find information about local politics in one local newspaper. In the different regional

editions, the newspapers focus on local news and reader's interests and needs, despite all cutbacks in staff and loss of autonomy in recent years due to mergers and concentration processes. In this respect, an opposition party leader in Bavaria's Parliament shared his experience: "Only media is not enough. You cannot just lie at home and count on media coverage. You have to be with people all the time. Yes, you need to work on your reputation, but it is not only media presence. You've gotten to be a hard-working man, who travels a lot, and is available to everybody. One needs both the media and the media presence to convey a positive image to people" (Interview with the author: Munich, September 5, 2012).

Asked about fair political coverage from local newspapers, a party-faction leader (CSU/ER) in Parliament, explained: "There was a time in Bavaria when there was almost no room for local politics in the papers. It was then very difficult to get access to local print media. For example, once I made a speech at a political event, the local papers covered the event, but did not mention my name. The editor then received many calls from people wondering why the newspaper had not mentioned my name. I think it is important that the media mention the name of all those who participate in the events. In the last few years, however, it seems there has been an editorial change, as readers of papers have become more and more interested in local political debate, parties and candidates" (Interview with the author: Munich, September 6, 2012).

Sabine Lang (2004, p. 154) distinguishes the local communication sphere from the national and global publics by highlighting four aspects of local communication practices. First, the *cognitive dimension* refers to shared knowledge about the history and facets of the common public space. Second, the *symbolic dimension* points to the experience of being part of a locality in which people engage in specific cultural, social, and political practices. Third, the *interactive aspect* alludes to the local as providing relatively more "face-to-face" interactions and interpersonal communications than larger publics. Fourth, the *democratic dimension* addresses the inherent democratic potential of local publics by way of providing easy access to political communication and participations forums.

The reasons given by a directly elected, veteran MP (CSU/EF) may serve as an illustration of these dimensions: “It has been 23 years since I was elected MP for the first time. To me local newspapers are the most important media outlet. The national media is not so important, except for the rural areas. I know that nowadays the trend is the Internet and the social media. Yet, I am over 60, and I simply refuse to go along with the so-called ‘new media’. I let the young MPs of my party (CSU) get involved with the new media. In my district, there are three newspapers. In addition to the direct contact approach, these local media provide a supplementary gateway for me to communicate with my constituency at large. I have good contacts with local journalists and editors, who usually promote press conferences and discussion panels on local political issues. Nevertheless, I am firmly convinced that nothing substitutes the direct contact with the electorate, such as participation in local events, associations, festivities, *Stammtisch* (conversation at the restaurant table) and the like, which give me a much better feedback on people’s demands and opinions” (Interview with the author: Munich, September 5, 2012).

The Germans can choose from 351 different titles, 128 of which in Bavaria, with nearly 19 million daily copies (278.7 copies per thousand inhabitants),⁷⁰ against 727 titles in Brazil, 50 of which in Minas Gerais, with a circulation of 8.8 million a day or 53.5 copies per thousand inhabitants.⁷¹ In Bavaria, the vast majority of the newspapers comes from regional publishers who do not publish nationwide. Local and regional newspapers are currently reaching more readers than ever before in print, on computers, as well as on smart phones. Two out of three Germans over the age of 14 regularly read a daily newspaper (72.4% of the adult population), whereas in Brazil newspaper penetration average 26% of the adult population (IVC, 2012). In Germany, nearly 40% of newspaper readers over the age of fourteen access daily the online version of print media. Some 2.5 million readers visit the website of a regional newspaper at least once a week using a smart phone. In the case of 14-to-29-year-olds, a target group hard to reach with print publications, newspaper publishers have managed to increase online readership by 10% to a current level of 62.6% (Pasquay, 2014).

⁷⁰ Available at: <http://www.zeitungen.com/l/bayern>

⁷¹ IVC - Instituto Verificador de Circulação, 2012. Available at: <http://www.ivcbrasil.org.br>.

Until the early 1970s, local media was a synonym for the print media, i.e., for the local daily paper, and political local coverage was paramount (Jonscher, 1991). The press had become the catalyst and focus of the local political life. It framed local policy process, commented on political decision-making, reflected local controversies, and helped to organize political participation. The disillusionment with “grassroots politics” and “politics from below” and the general perception of local publics as too parochial for theoretically useful research, coupled with a relative lack of autonomy of local media due to mergers and concentration process, sparked bitter criticism of the capacity of local media to keep track of local audience and focus on local affairs.

There are numerous indicators that the local as a communicative arena has made a strong come back in recent years in Germany and Europe. In the countries of the European Union (EU), cities and communities have learned that funding from Brussels depends often on active improvement of communication between local governments and citizens. Political institutions and organizations make use of interactive communication technologies (ICT) for engagement processes on the local level. Traditional local media, long embedded in the larger interpersonal and organizational communities, have now received support from new technologies and alternative media (Neller, 1999).

Today, the daily print press in Germany navigates between the demands of economic concentration in the industry and the spatial as well as social differentiation of its readership. Increasingly diverse, partly regionally and partly locally oriented print media arrange themselves in four competition levels: the large metropolitan dailies integrate the international, national, and regional with local reporting. Underneath this level, so-called satellite dailies operate that cover some regional pieces, but focus more on the local news in their suburban community. On the next level down are strictly suburban papers, serving localities beyond the reach of satellite dailies. The fourth level comprises the alternative media.

2.3. The weight of CSU in Bavaria

In the specific case of Bavaria, two factors may explain the persistent political relevance of local print media reflected in the responses to our survey: First, the “sense

of belonging” to local communities. Under a micro-sociological perspective, we know that people acquire political and social capital primarily through the socialization process that occurs in the closest environment to individuals: the communities (Bourdieu, 1982; Putnam, 2000). The “sense of belonging” to one or more local spaces seems to be the common denominator that transcends other tangible variations between community types found in different political cultures (Lang, 2003). Theorists of democracy has always privileged the spatial geographic radius of communities as the locus of initiation and engagement in democratic practices. In this sense, local political communication is a prerequisite for sustainable civic engagement. Indeed, for many citizens, participation in local political life offers possibilities for opinions to turn into political action, whether through participation in partisan organizations or social networks.


The second factor that may account for the political importance of local print media in Bavaria is the long hegemony of CSU in the state. Due to deep historical and cultural roots, the Christian Social Union (CSU) was able to develop a vast network of extra-parliamentary organizations that brings together thousands of activists in virtually every community of the “free state”. These activists (“the middlemen of politics”) play the role of bridging the gap between constituents, candidates, and parliament (Patzelt, 1993; Müller, 2000). They work to promote events and maintain the CSU politicians always in touch with their communities. This strategy generates a great pressure on the local newspapers, which usually dedicate a considerable part of their content to local political issues. The electoral fruits of this “rooting in communities” are visible through the elections’ outcome and the political hegemony of the CSU in Bavaria, where the electoral competition for candidates of the opposition parties is always “for the second place” (table 11).⁷² If it were not for the proportional representation (PR), which guarantees the survival of small parties, Bavaria would probably be a single-party Land (Patzelt, 1993).

The CSU “hegemony” in Bavarian naturally tends to mirror the responses to the survey conducted in the Landtag, as indicated: (1) *Party affiliation*: 40% of the

⁷² In 2013, the CSU regained the absolute majority of the seats in the Landtag, which they lost 5 years ago after about 50 years of one-party-government.


respondents are members of the CSU, against 21% of the SPD, 12% FDP, 12.% FW, and 15% Bündnis 90/Die Grünen.

Respondents/party affiliation (Landtag: N=130)




(2) *Vote type*: 69% of the CSU deputies, who responded the survey, were elected by district vote (FPTP) compared to 5% of the SPD, FDP 18%, 7% FW and 1% Bündnis 90/Die Grünen.

Party/district-elected MPs (Landtag: N=130)




(3) *Vote concentration*: The majority of the respondents (34%) belong to the high concentration range. Among those, 74% are members of the CSU, against 15% SPD, 5% FDP, 3% FW (Independents), and 3% Bündnis 90/Die Grünen.

Party/high-vote-concentration (Landtag: N=130)



(4) *Media strategy*: 40% of the respondents, who preferred local print media, belong to the CSU, in contrast to 21% of the SPD, 12% FDP, 12% FW and 15% Bündnis 90/Die Grünen.

Party/local print media (Landtag: N=130)



Asked about the historical formation of the CSU, a veteran member of the Landtag (CSU/BA), elected by direct vote, explained: “After the end of World War II, the population of the communities had to roll the sleeves and take up the task of rebuilding the country. Associations of all sorts mushroomed from the bottom up all over Bavaria. They all organized themselves according to the principles of subsidiarity and self-management. In the 1970s, however, these communities, restructured and expanded, formed new constituencies. The sense of belonging ⁷³ to a specific community changed with this restructuring engineered in Berlin. As a result, conflicts of interest emerged, as local demands no longer coincided with constituency interests. The federal government artificially divided the communities in various levels of political representation, generating tensions inside the communities, since they had their representation power seriously weakened.”

⁷³ Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl


Table12: Results for the 2013-election in Bavaria (Landtag)									
Party	Ideology	Vote total	Vote % (change)	Seats (Change)			Seats %		
Christian Social Union (CSU)	Center-Right	5,632,272	1,028,312	47.70%	4.3	101	9	56.10%	
Social Democratic Party (SPD)	Center-Left	2,436,515	464,078	20.60%	2	42	3	23.30%	
Free Voters (FW)	Center-Right	1,062,244	-23,652	9.00%	-1.2	19	-2	10.60%	
Alliance '90/The Greens	Center-Left	1,018,652	19,541	8.60%	-0.8	18	-1	10.00%	

“Now, the CSU electoral bases had always coincided with the boundaries of the old electoral districts. After the redesign of the new constituency lines, the party lost much of its roots: it fell from 68% to roughly 47% in the first election after the restructuring. This led to an increasing gap between communal and partisan politics at the federal level. The CSU strategy also changed. ‘Politics from the people, for the people’. This means that communal politics aims not so much at partisan politics, but at people’s interests. I do not mean that parties are no longer important. On the contrary! This idea that you can do politics without parties is a dangerous fallacy, which can open the doors to all sorts of adventurers. Political parties warrant the rooting of politics in the communities and filter individualistic initiatives, which very often aim only at personal interests and self-promotion. So I think that membership in political parties is a way to counterweight the growing individualism of our culture, because nobody is a member of a political party without first belonging to a community. That’s why I think party membership strengthens the “sense of belonging”, and help solve problems together” (Interview with the author: Bamberg, July 23, 2013).


2.4. Pork barrel as media strategy

The question "What strategy do you most often use to capture media's attention" (charts 7 to 9), aims at testing the correlation between certain media strategies and vote distribution. The options vary from distributive-slanted strategies, such as “transfer of state funds to constituency” (chart 7), to more universalist-inclined ones, such as “speech in plenary” and “stance on controversial issues” (charts 8 and 9). The majority of MPs at the high concentration level (32.6%) opted for pork as a strategy that best captures media attention, in contrast with 10.1% of MPs in the medium layer and 7.8% in the low concentration range (chart 7).

Landtag (N=130): Chart 7. Indicate what strategy you usually use to capture the media attention: Inauguration of projects and allocation of funds for your electoral District.




Landtag (N=130): Chart 8. Indicate what strategy you usually use to capture the media attention: Speech in the Chamber.



In great contrast with pork as media strategy, only 4.7% of the MPs in the high layer preferred “speech in plenary”, followed by 3.1% in the medium and 5.4% in the low concentration ranges (chart 8). Likewise, the option “stance in controversial issues” (chart 9) did not seem attractive as media strategy for MPs in the high concentration range (5.4%). Yet, it was the preference of 9.3% of the MPs in the low range (in contrast with 7.8% for pork, chart 5), and of 10.1% in the medium layer.

Landtag (N=130): Chart 9. Indicate what strategy you usually use to capture the media attention: Position taking on controversial issues.



The relationship between high vote concentration and pork barrel as preferred media strategy warrants the question whether one can associate pork barrel with *directly elected candidates* in the case of the Bavarian Parliament. According to our hypothesis, media strategy varies according to the level of candidature (state and federal) and the type of vote (district and list vote). We suppose that there might be an association between *pork as media strategy* and directly elected MPs, as it is plausible to assume that *credit claiming for pork barrel* might be of greater importance for district-elected MPs than for party-list elected ones.

Our argument draws upon the empirical support for the claim that directly elected MPs are more dependent on their constituents in terms of re-election than candidates elected via party list, who seem more vulnerable to interference from upper levels of the partisan organization. There are empirical indications that MPs elected via party list place a higher priority on party contacts as a prerequisite for their re-election compared to directly elected MPs. There is also data that confirm a relatively high degree of decentralization of the nomination process for district candidates compared to list nominations (Poguntke, 1994; Wessels, 1997; Detterbeck, 2002; Schüttemeyer and Sturm, 2005).

Thus, district elected MPs seem to cultivate personal votes through constituency service or by bringing government-funded projects to the district, in contrast with party affiliation. Research by Lancaster (1986, 1998), Lancaster and Patterson (1990), and Stratmann and Baur (2002) found significant differences between candidates elected by district vote and the list vote in relations to different amount of pork barrel brought to

constituents. Examining the differences in the legislative committees of the Federal and state Parliaments in Germany, and how legislation are modified to benefit voters, the authors concluded that deputies elected by district vote tend to occupy the committees that allow them to better serve the geographic base of their electorate. In this respect, district MPs have a clear competitive advantage over their peers elected by list vote.




CHART 10: Landtag (N=130)

On one hand, the majority of the respondents (33.3%), who belong to the high vote concentration range, are districted-elected MPs (chart 10) in contrast with 9.4% elected by party list (chart 11). These figures have an obvious impact upon the survey’s outcome regarding the relationship between pork barrel and media strategy.





CHART 11: Landtag (N=130)

On the other hand, the responses to the question “participation in legislative committees” (chart 12), paradoxically, have found the preference of only 6.2% of the MPs in the high concentration layer (even less in the other ranges), although most of the


literature associates certain types of committees with credit claiming and pork barrel (Stratmann and Baur, 2002).

Landtag (N=130): Chart 12. Indicate what strategy you usually use to capture the media attention: Participation in legislative committees.



However, the majority of MPs at the high concentration level (37.2%) considered the support of mayors and councilors “important and very important” (chart 13), which confirms the importance of the local ties as an electoral strategy as discussed before.

Landtag (N=130): Chart 13. Choose, in order of importance, which factors contributed most to your electoral success: Support of Mayors and Town Councilors



To sum up, the Bavaria’s mixed-member electoral system provides a complex institutional setting in which legislators seeking re-election need to take into account the interests of two distinct electorates in order to maximize the probability of regaining a legislative mandate. A distributive tendency is found on the part of directly elected MPs with high vote concentration (33.3%), who prefer pork as a strategy to capture media’s attention (32.6%). The importance attributed to the support of mayors and councilors


(37.2 %) reinforces this trend. These findings confirm our hypotheses that Bavarian MPs adopt different media strategies depending on the type of vote (district vs. list), and its concentration level (low, medium and high).

2.5. Posters and billboards

While Radio and TV spots depend on broadcast media to reach the public, posters have a direct and immediate appeal to voters. Political posters of all sorts, from simple carton posters to light-columns, electronic media walls or blow-up, large-sized posters (100 to 1000 m²), hang from posts and billboards on every street corner, a presence from which the fleeting attention of passersby and mobile population cannot escape. Poster campaigns aim to mobilize voters, strengthen party supporters, persuade the undecided, and eventually become the talk of the town. Their size, slogans, and layout differ greatly depending on placement, target public, party and candidate's political profile. Standard designs include scenes from everyday life, metaphorical use of political symbols, animals and everyday objects as well as seemingly simple text. Yet, they do not argue. Argument and derivation remain the realm of other media types. Message and content fuse in a holistic statement in the shortest form. The striking nature and the easy grasping of the poster message are the basic conditions for its success. More than any other medium, successful posters involve a blend of persuasive forms of communication and aesthetic considerations. To succeed in the everyday battle for voters' attention, they need to feature immediately understandable statements and striking eye-catching displays.

Researchers have long noted that, unlike Radio and TV-spots, political posters live longer after the election period in the party archives, history books, and museum exhibitions. Yet, billboards, posters, and flyer distributions are limited to a short period preceding the election. In Bavaria, the State Ministry of the Interior issues guidelines on the use of public streets and roads for campaign purposes. It limits the use of loudspeakers and billboards on state-owned roads to six weeks before the election for federal and European elections, to four weeks for state elections, and to two weeks for municipal elections. In addition, it recommends that the local communities enact similar rules for the roads owned by them (Lessinger and Holtz-Bacha, 2010).

Landtag (130): Chart 14. Evaluate which media were important for your election/re-election: Posters




When asked how much importance they attach to *Plakat*,⁷⁴ 45% of the MPs in the high vote concentration considered it “important or very important” for their election/re-election, 24% in the medium range, and 16.3% in the low range, totaling 85.3% of preference for this medium of political communication (chart 14). These results represent a sharp contrast with the meager 6.8% found among the MPs of Minas Gerais (Part IV, Ch. 1, 1.2).

Slightly lower results emerged in the responses to the question on the role of posters for the MPs’ personal communication with voters. 36.4% of MPs in the high concentration layer found it “important and very important”, 19.4% in the medium layer, and 13.9% in the low concentration range, totaling 69.7% of preference in contrast with 37.2% of the MPs who preferred TV and Radio (charts 1 and 3).

A directly elected MP (CSU/BA), with high vote concentration, explains her view on posters: “We need posters to motivate people to attend the elections and to remind them of the election-day. Sometimes, politicians think everyone knows the basic features of the electoral process, elections, campaigns and candidates. Actually, there is a remarkable information deficit among ordinary people in this regard. I think that the foremost value of the poster is to keep the political campaign, the most important moment of any representative democracy, in people’s memory and mobilize them for it.”

⁷⁴ Poster in German. The adjective *plakativ* derives from *Plakat*, and conveys the idea of “efficient like a poster, ostentatious, and clear”.

Landtag (N=130): Chart 15. Evaluate which media is important to keep in contact with your constituency: Posters



“Posters played a decisive role in my first election, ten years ago, because people saw the new face of a young woman, something unusual for a conservative party like the CSU. I received then many positive repercussions for the poster campaign. Today, however, I feel that people judge my mandate for what I do in the Parliament, not for that image of a young and dynamic woman of the past. I would say, poster alone is of no avail, because what really wins peoples’ preference in the long run is the candidate’s work in Parliament” (Interview with the author: Bamberg, July 23, 2013).

As effective political communication depends on a variety of mostly unpredictable exogenous interactions, which require a quick response, political campaigns always have to deal with crisis management. In such an environment, posters have become an "ad hoc medium" par excellence for parties and candidates to correct their campaign’s approach in time, and adapt it to new, unexpected circumstances. The best example of such quick adaptability was the 1986 election campaign in Lower Saxony, when suddenly the public opinion mood turned against the CDU government under Ernst Albrecht,⁷⁵ a trend triggered by the meltdown of Chernobyl’s atomic plant in Ukraine. The world’s largest nuclear reactor accident, six weeks before the election represented a worst-case scenario for the CDU pre-planned advertising approach. Overnight,

⁷⁵ Ernst Carl Julius Albrecht was the governor of the state of Lower Saxony from 1976 to 1990. He became famous for his decision to make the County of Lüchow-Dannenberg a state’s nuclear district. During his tenure, Albrecht was embroiled in an unusually large number of political scandals. In 1980, he ran a campaign for being appointed Chancellor, but did not prevail against his fellow conservative Franz-Josef Strauß. In 1990, he lost the state elections to Gerhard Schröder, who later became Chancellor.

however, the CDU had a new message designed and thousands of scattered posters and advertising material replaced with new slogans and approach.

Melanie Leidecker's (2010) experimental study has found that positive posters have a better competitive edge compared to negative ones. According to the author, posters that rely only on attacking the contenders and fail to mention the party's own positions and goals seem frivolous and unsympathetic to most German voters. Even the "hybrid version", the one blending positive and negative messages, does not get positive rating if compared to non-attacking posters. Based on her findings, it appears that a mere negative poster campaigning does not generate any positive effects on the electorate. The results of her experience are in line with other studies. Maier and Maier (2007, p 337), for example, made a clear judgment about negative TV-spot campaign in Germany: "The last thing what a campaign spot in Germany should do is to be provokingly aggressive, or attack the political opponent". Attacking election advertising seems to be complex and not clearly predictable and is therefore risky for the attacking party.



Picture 1: Passersby walk along campaign posters of the Munich SPD for the 2013 state election.

In summary, we could conclude that posters' strong and almost ubiquitous presence in the daily traffic flows during campaign time, their placement flexibility and local delimitation, associated with a relatively low cost, may account for the debunking of TV and Radio as MPs' preferred media strategy in Bavaria. Precisely because they are suitable to increase political awareness on personal and partisan profiles, posters fit into candidate-centered campaign styles, as personality and appearance push policy and program to the backstage.

2.6. E-campaign

Comparing electoral systems in general and political communication in particular between Brazil and Germany is always difficult, because they differ by area, population, history, and culture. Comparing the use of the Internet in e-campaigns and the use of Web 1.0 and 2.0 strategies between both countries represents a further hardship for at least three reasons. First, the large amount of empirical data on the general use of the Internet contrasts with the relatively few reliable quantitative studies on the political Internet use in Brazil and Germany.⁷⁶ Second, this rather modest data situation for the political use of the Internet is due in part to the several methodological challenges scholar face when measuring political communication via Internet. For instance, the intense political mobilization of the election campaign period is not transferable to other occasions without further notice. Third, compared to recipients of traditional media, Internet use varies considerably. Today, one can read messages on the websites of papers and magazines, watch the news items online, listen to the news posts on classical radio station or follow the trend in the social media and independent bloggers. All these formats can produce different effects on the audience.

⁷⁶ In Germany, there are reliable data sources of information about the general usage of Internet, but few focus on the usage for political campaigns. The Media Commission ARD/ZDF-Online-studies, for example, has been publishing an annual report based on telephone surveys of representative samples of the German population aged 14 and over on the general usage of the Internet and the Web 2.0 services since 1997 (<http://www.ard-zdf-onlinestudie.de>). Other examples comprise the D21 initiative published under the title "(N) ONLINER Atlas", an annual survey of Internet use in Deutschland, which documents the Internet use in different socio-demographically and geographically defined segments of society (<http://www.nonliner-atlas.de>). The German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) releases an annual report based on follow-up surveys that makes it possible to observe the behavior of anonymous individual investigate questions about causal relationships (<http://www.diw.de/soep>). There are also data from the recent studies in the framework of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), which are available at <http://www.gles.eu>.

In today's ever-changing news and information environment, citizens and politicians are eagerly adapting new technologies to engage in political activities and exercise power. The rise of the Internet ⁷⁷ and New Technologies of Information and Communication (NTIC) that promote immediacy of communication and information gathering is often associated with the idea of "new media" and "new media environment", although scholars have had difficulty pinpointing a definition that could grasp the full implications of the multifaceted character of this new wave of technological innovations. Since 2004, alone, we have witnessed the ascendance of social network sites, the advent of YouTube and Twitter, the widespread use of hand-held devices with full Internet capabilities (iPads, iPhones, and Droids), blogs and news websites. These new media sources and tools provide citizens with new opportunities to express and organize themselves around their political interests (Davis and Owen, 1998).

In this new information environment, engagement and participation have changed for the politically minded citizens, as they regularly send pictures via cell phone, posts to Facebook daily, access news and political information from the Web, make online financial contributions to political candidates, and organize online communities on behalf of a cause. These developments represent a sharp contrast from only a few years ago, when engaged citizenship meant writing a letter to an elected official, joining an interest group or participating in a rally.

Due to the technical qualities of online communication (ubiquity, capacity, topicality), political actors are said to free themselves from the discretionary power of the mass media and to reach voters in an unfiltered way. The ideas of "e-democracy" and "e-campaign" are often associated with the Internet's ability to circumvent journalistic principles of news selection and presentation, a process described as "disintermediation" (Coleman, 1999a), which offers both new opportunities and challenges to representative democracy. The idea of electronic democracy traces back to the early 1970s, when it became an empirical-analytical concept used by normative theorists who perceived the new digital media as tools for democratic reform. From the

⁷⁷ We use the term "Internet" as synonym of "World Wide Web", the global computer network, which encompasses all sorts of digital applications, from e-mail to IP telephony.

beginning, the notion carries a cyber-optimism driven by the far-reaching diffusion of computer networks and digital media in general, and the assumption that those developments are changing the nature of political communication and democratic government.

However, the evolution of the concept of electronic democracy has done little for its clarification, as it has turned into an umbrella concept for all sorts of political uses of Internet. This usage of the term falls into the trap of conceptual stretching, which produces vague and amorphous analytical categories. According to Thomas Zittel (2010, p. 10), "Without the empirical referential, the question whether the normative debate over electronic democracy has a practical significance for actor's behavior remains open." While comparative research is in need of general concepts to travel across the boundaries of single cases, electronic democracy appears to be a category that defines no boundaries at all. As a result, it does not provide a clear and coherent model of the phenomenon at stake and it gives little conceptual guidance to empirical comparative research.

On one hand, the Internet might allow parties and candidates to provide citizens with more substantial information about the campaign. In particular, it could overcome those patterns of election coverage that have been held accountable for growing political alienation and civic apathy in the public, i.e. strategic horse-race depictions, shrinking sound bite news, and extensive negativism. In this scenario, the World Wide Web would put an end to the mediatization of offline politics and would allow for an enriched campaign environment. For many scholars, the Internet could bridge representation gaps and foster strong democracies (Coleman et al., 1999b, Blumler and Gurevitch, 1995; Bimber, 2003; Schulz, 2004; Kaid and Strömbäck, 2008).

On the other hand, political actors might use the Internet just as another medium of self-communication (Castells, 2009), and continue to rely on traditional tactics in cyberspace that have been proven successful in real-world politics. This includes a deliberate adaptation to journalistic needs and interests as to secure public attention. As consequence, the presentational opportunities on the Web could be left untouched in favor of a traditional "politics as usual", which reflects the offline world. This so-called

“normalization” of e-campaign has been observed for several Web practices in the past (Druckman et al., 2009).

The evaluations of the democratizing role of the Internet depend on how one defines “democratization”. Many scholars assume that the Internet enhances the quality of democracy based on general pronouncements, which are difficult to refute normatively, but fail to demonstrate empirically how exactly it occurs. Political scientists, who gauge improvement in democratic practices by looking at specific outcomes, including more informed citizenry, increased political participation, greater freedom of expression in the market place of ideas, have consistently found mixed results in their empirical research. Bruce Bimber (2003), one of the first scholars to analyze the connection between new media and politics, concluded that the Internet does not generate higher levels of political participation in the United States. Kent Jennings and Vicki Zeitner (2003) uncovered no evidence of a positive relationship between Internet use and civic engagement. The results of Pippa Norris’s (2001) cross-national study suggest that the Internet simply engages those who already are involved in political activities. The same is true in the United States, where Markus Prior (2007) has argued that the Internet increases levels of political knowledge and engagement among those who are already politically active.

As for the extent to which the new media environment promotes a participatory political culture, investigators have identified two troubling aspects: first, many scholars identify potentially problematic “personalized spheres of information”, i.e., the ability of citizens to tailor very specifically the news and information they perceive to their own personal interests and ideologies. Terms such as “Daily Me” (Sunstein, 2007), “public sphericules of information” (Gitlin, 1998), and “personal infosphere” (Manjoo, 2008) were coined to describe how people can navigate to the news in which they are interested and completely avoid information or viewpoints that run counter to their preexisting perspectives. Tailoring the news applies to policy makers as well. This type of “narrow-casting” of the news can fragment the sense of community and legitimacy that underpins central governments and erode a common frame of reference for debate and deliberation of the most important issues.

The second unfavorable consequence of the new media environment that some scholars have focused on involves the decline of conventional journalistic norms. As citizens have come to rely more and more on online news sources, they have experienced increasingly unfiltered news and information. Most online news outlets and political blogs lack a traditional journalistic hierarchy in which an editor, who has the power to withhold publication, can demand writer accountability and accuracy before relishing unconfirmed news and rumors. Although the quantity of news and information sources has dramatically increased worldwide, the evidence suggests diminished citizen interest in “serious” news, as well as a decline in its overall quality (Nye, 2002; Baum, 2003; Prior, 2007; Davis 2009).

In 1998, David Resnick proposed one of the most influential theories of e-campaign. In an article entitled, “Politics on the Internet: The normalization of cyberspace”, he challenged the assumption that the World Wide Web could improve the conditions of democratic competition. Rather, he argued, the Internet will replicate typical shortcomings and deficits of offline electioneering. In particular, he referred to the unaltered power relations between major and minor political actors in cyberspace (relational normalization). Later research has applied his normalization thesis also to the formal style of online political communication (functional normalization) and to the argumentative patterns of e-campaigning (discursive normalization).

All these dimensions have received empirical support in past studies on Web 1.0 and Web 2.0⁷⁸ politics: in diverse cultures and varying electoral settings, party and candidate home pages underutilize the media-specific, interactive capabilities of on-line communication in favor a rigid top-down approach of controlled information delivery (Kluver et al., 2007). Moreover, researchers found persistent gaps between major and minor political actors on the Internet in terms of the overall scope and professionalism of their websites (Strandberg, 2008). Finally, studies proved that typical offline practices of electioneering, such as strategic news, negative campaigning, or


⁷⁸ Tim O’Reilly (2005) coined the expression “Web 2.0” to describe all freely accessible, collaborative, user-centered and non-hierarchical online applications that enable an “architecture of participation”, such as wikis, blogs, Twitter accounts and social networking sites (Facebook, My Space) as well as multimedia or file-sharing platforms (YouTube, Flickr) and information management services (web feeds or social bookmarking options). Because of their decentralized structure, their self-maintenance nature and the low entry barriers for users, these applications seemed particularly suited to facilitate political participation.

personalization, also prevail on the World Wide Web (Benoit, 2007; Schweitzer, 2010). In total, these findings underscored Resnick's claim and thus confirmed a functional, relational and discursive normalization in online political communication. The degree to which these recent changes in the news and information have altered the form and substance of MPs' media strategies is thus an open empirical question. In order to escape generalizations, which are no longer useful if we are to assess accurately new media's effects on MPs campaign strategies, questionnaire was focused on the most used 1.0 and 2.0 Web political tools in Bavaria: Twitter, blogs, social networks, websites and mailing lists.

The first question deals with the Internet in general (chart 16). Asked about the importance of the Internet for their election/reelection efforts, 36.4% of the MPs in the high concentration layer responded "not important or less important", followed by 12.4% of MPs in the medium range and 13.2% in the lower range. All together 62% of the Bavarian MPs deemed the Internet *not relevant* as media strategy, a sharp contrast with 47.7% of MPs from Minas Gerais, Brazil, who positively assessed the Internet as the most important media tool for their campaigns (table 1). Put in a context of 62 million German Voters, 53.4 million Internet users, 14.6 million users of social network sites, and 1.4 million members of political parties, this is a rather surprising result particularly because Bavaria held its state parliamentary election in September 2008, when Obama's campaign was in full swing.⁷⁹

There is nothing in such outcome that may suggest any spilling of the so-called "Obama effect", i.e., the integrated Internet e-campaign deemed as the key to electoral success of the 44th President of the United States, over the Bavarian election. These findings are in line with a study at the University of Hohenheim, by Thilo von Pape and Thorsten Quandt (2010), which concluded that only one third of the German population has ever informed online about the elections campaigns of the previous years. This surprisingly low importance of the Internet for political opinion formation contrasted with newspapers and television, which respondents identified as optional political information sources.

⁷⁹ ARD/ZDF-Onlinestudie. Retrieved from (<http://www.ard-zdf-onlinestudie.de>).



One possible explanation for Internet’s poor performance amongst Bavarian MPs is demography. The population’s medium age in Bavaria is almost 50.⁸⁰ The age group who traditionally elects the major two parties (CDU-CSU/SPD) concentrates in such range and above (figures 6 and 7). According to Hellbrügge (2013), these older age groups have a clear preference for traditional target group-specific media, such as the “Pharmacy Newsletters” (*Apothekenumschau*), which have a great relevance and wide usage for the elderly population in Bavaria.



Fig. 6: Federal Election 2013. Union voters (CDU/CSU) by age group

In Germany, the further a party is located to the left of the ideological spectrum, the more their voters use the Internet as a political communications tool: CDU / CSU, 74%, SPD 76%, FDP, 76%, Die Linke, 80%, Die Grünen, 90%. Although most young first voters rely on the Internet for information on politics, the Internet does not

⁸⁰ Data retrieved from: <https://www.destatis.de/bevoelkerungspyramide>.


determine the outcome of elections even among the “born-digital generation”, the digitally skilled young people. Thus, demographically speaking, there is no need for change, since the parties in Germany do not win elections with Internet-savvy young voters. Although there was a remarkable increase in Internet use from the 2002 to the 2009 election, MPs of the Federal and state levels remained interested in the Internet just as one of many media tools. Both offline and online campaigns existed, but the emphasis was on the road and door-to-door campaigning using the traditional media (Zittel, 2010; Gasser and Gerlach, 2012).



Fig. 7: Federal Election 2013. SPD voters by age group

Yet, when it comes to “keeping contact with voters” (chart 17, below), the result clearly indicates a considerable improvement in scores: 74.5% of MPs in the three vote concentration layers deemed “important or very important” the Internet and social media for that purpose. Based in these findings, it could be summed up by stating that the Internet has not taken the center stage in political communication among the researched Bavarian MPs. In contrast with the general trend, which perceives the growing importance of e-campaign, most Bavarian MPs still do not see the role of the Internet as a “game-changer”.

Landtag (N=130): Chart 17. Evaluate which media is important to keep in contact with your constituency: Internet/social media



Even as a medium for communicating political information, it remains only one of many channels of political communication. It seems that parties and politicians seek to tailor their e-campaigns to the informational needs and expectations of the mass media. This conclusion is in line with empirical studies showing, on the one hand, that the Internet in Germany has become an important means of journalistic research. On the other hand, studies have confirmed that journalists are more likely to report about those campaign messages that adhere to traditional, news values. In this way, the mass media increase the circulation of these messages and create additional opportunities for voter persuasion (Machill et al., 2009).

2.6.1. Party and personal Websites

Party website is defined here as a piece of digitalized information that is published by a party or a parliamentary bureaucracy, which provides partisan information in uniform handbook format, and which can be retrieved using the World Wide Web. Websites are the oldest and most common tool in e-campaigns, and play a significant role for parties' digital self-presentation, as they are the most widely used format among German MPs, journalists and citizens. Their contents are most salient on the Internet, particularly text-based messages published in a prominent position on the homepage. Their messages usually appear on other platforms, such as parties' newsletters, blogs, social network sites and discussion forums. However, if compared to street posters or TV spots, which voters can inadvertently recognize through "accidental exposure", political websites require user's proactivity. Their audience is rather limited


to relatively small groups of engaged people that are already committed to a party or candidate. In order to reach other target groups, political actors dependent on the publicity created for their campaigns by traditional news reports (von Pape and Quandt, 2010).

In Bavaria, party websites generally offer animated media boxes with video streams, short text teasers, and photos on the front pages. They encompass dynamic news sections in the upper half of the screen as well as basic mobilization features for voters, such as options for donations, volunteering, membership, and promotional hyperlinks to all other Internet platforms, such as Twitter and YouTube. The choice of colors and fonts as well as the spatial alignment of their websites contributed to brand-like corporate identities. In this way, the parliamentary groups sought to unite their various online platforms under a common stylistic umbrella that was easy to recognize and to remember for voters.

The CSU continued to use blue-white in the background as a reminder of the regional affiliation to the state Bavaria. The most colorful and flashy websites were the homepages of SPD and Greens, almost completely branded with the traditional party colors of red and green. The Left Party appeared to be an exception as it used deep red (its signal color) only as shading for the start menu and for navigational items on the front page. The Left was also the only parliamentary party that kept up a primarily text-laden Internet presence with strong vertical orientation. In this way, party websites not only became tools for direct resource generation, but also worked as digital collections of parties' official activities on the Internet, a starting point for users to delve deeper into the site.

Chart 18 reports the result to the question on the usage of party sponsored website in campaign: 59% of the surveyed Bavarian MPs rejected the proposition "I used a website designed and maintained by my party." It is worth noting that 23.3% of MPs in the high layer used the party's website in their e-campaign, a sharp contrast with 8.5% and 9.3% of MPs in the medium and low ranges respectively.

Landtag (N=130): Chart 18. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used a website designed and maintained by my party.




One possible explanation for the relatively low interest in party-sponsored websites among Bavarian MPs is that parties are responsive in their online communication to the offline happenings, which are partly or fully controlled by the mass media. The same is true for the content of the party's website, which focus primarily on the interaction between party policies and journalism rather than on candidates' personal features. The media logic shapes particularly those parts of the websites that have the greatest significance for parties' digital self-presentation, thus turning it less attractive to individual candidates.

This argument finds support in the responses to the question on "personal website". Here, the picture changes abruptly, as 69.1% of MPs adopted this kind of communication tool in their e-campaign (chart 19, below). This outcome confirms our working hypothesis, as MPs in the high vote concentration range (29.5%) were the ones to put more emphasis on this instrument of e-campaign than MPs in the medium (22.5%) and low concentration layers (17.1%).

In 2002, only 42% of candidates in Germany had personal websites, in contrast to 59% in 2005, and 85% in 2009 (Zittel, 2010). However, the political relevance of personal websites is dependent upon the quality of their textual content and media-specific qualities of online communication. Digital outlets, which provide comprehensive and accessible policy information, may mobilize and educate citizens on political issues and legislative behavior of their representative and thus increase the

accountability of the office holders. In contrast, digital brochures with colorful pictures and some general personal information have little relevance in this respect.

Landtag (N=130): Chart 19. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used a personal website designed and maintained by my campaign team.



The analysis of the quality and quantity of textual information on personal political websites reveals a suboptimal usage among MPs in Germany. Most websites contain a “welcome page” with a picture of the MP, a postal address for contacting the member, and some basic information such as biography or his/her committee assignments. Some pages offer gimmicks such as recipes of the members’ favorite dish. Press releases prevail as most frequent content, indicating that the mass media rather than the ordinary citizen remain the focus for political representatives and that these websites are not being used as a direct channel for political communication (Zittel, 2010; Gasser and Gerlach, 2012).

International scholars have found that while political websites have become more professionalized over time, they continue to favor traditional top-down elements (press releases, offline paraphernalia, information about the candidates) over interactive bottom-up features such as blogs, chats, or wikis (Carlson and Strandberg, 2008; Gulati and Williams, 2007). According to these authors, the neglect of the media-specific qualities of online communication is due to strategic as well as logistical considerations: strategically, parties and candidates fear to lose control over their political messages and their image building if they open up free online discussions with Internet users. Such a kind of voter involvement may represent a challenge to the overall campaign centralization in electioneering. Logistically, the utilization of interactive features

requires additional resources (such as staff, money and time) that political actors often cannot afford. Hence, they refrain from this function and concentrate instead on the online provision of text-based materials. As consequence, the disparities between top-down and bottom-up features continue over time.

2.6.2. Weblog, E-mail and Twitter

In contrast to traditional mass media, weblogs support the interaction of authors (bloggers) with their readers by offering services to comment on articles, the so-called “blog posts”. They also support the interaction with other bloggers by facilitating hyperlinking to other blogs and blog posts. The totality of weblogs, the “blogosphere,” today forms a new communicative space on the Internet as alternative channels for the distribution of information as well as mobilization tools, because of their ability to spread news very quickly in a more personal, direct, and often location-specific style of report. Blogs can be a tool for opinion formation, as they may influence the agenda setting and framing processes (Drezner and Farrell, 2004).

In the last few years, campaign blogging has become an international trend, at least in western democracies. Studies have examined campaign blogging all over the world, and have shown that blogging is widespread among candidates, partisans, and campaign observers. Most of them document that blogs help new actors enter the public sphere, making their voice heard (Coleman and Ward, 2005). These new actors do not take new political positions, but add new information and viewpoints to the debate. The majority of politicians use weblogs as mere soapboxes for self-marketing or as an alternative source of information (Abold and Heltsche, 2006).


According to a survey of German weblogs conducted by Schmidt and Wilbers (2006) there are four dimensions of weblog use in Germany: first, the activity of blogging i.e., who posts and to what extent. Second, the connectedness of weblogs with the blogosphere by means of blog rolls or the lists of hyperlinks to other weblogs. Third, the authenticity of the bloggers’ expression, that is, personal subjective style. Bloggers update their sites daily or at least several times a week. Weblogs readers may post their opinion, although very few do so. The authors conclude that the blogging routine and users’ expectations shape a certain practice that establishes a new format of public

expression. This format in turn follows its own logic: it rewards active involvement in Web publishing, fosters dialogue, and may establish lasting social relations.

Chart 20 (below) indicates that the majority of surveyed Bavarian MPs (86.9%) did not use weblog as a tool for campaigning. Empirical studies on the campaign blogosphere in Germany may shed light on how to interpret this poor result. Schmidt and Wilbers (2007) found out that the majority of politicians uses campaign blogs just for the short period of the campaign, and not as a tool for building up and managing long-term social relations, one important feature of the blogging culture. Albrecht, Lübcke and Harting-Perschke (2004) have also found that many German politicians create weblogs as a media-friendly tool to give the impression of being comfortable with getting up-close and personal with voters. Very few attempt to establish a long-term web presence and try to establish sustained dialogue with their constituency. Davis (2012) points out that blog boasting is partly driven by a strategy of self-protection.

As each new medium arrives, it must elbow its way into the universe of existing media to survive. This strategy requires not only advertising its own virtues but also disparaging the existing order of competition. That mediums bloggers must engage in continual comparison with traditional media to acquire their own audience niche. Yet, bloggers heavily rely on traditional media, and the majority of A-list bloggers come from traditional journalism, what blurs the distinction with professionals and overlaps the two groups.


Landtag (N=130): Chart 20. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used a personal Blog during my election campaign.



The symbiotic relationship between bloggers and journalists comprises a mutual dependence on one another, as bloggers have become an integral part of the news-reporting process. Journalists read blogs and use them as news sources. In turn, bloggers depend on the traditional news product for hard news that they then repeat and use as the basis for blog commentary and analysis. In a word, bloggers have no problem with commentary. Their hardship is the inability to match the news media’s surveillance capability. Like everyone else, bloggers have to rely on the mass media for news.

A quite different picture emerges in chart 21, as the “old” e-mailing list received 45.7% of approval from MPs in Bavaria. According to Hellbrügge (2013), the relative success of this medium of political communication is due to its “target approach”, i.e., the ability to reach out to specific group of voters. This result contrasts sharply with the usage of Twitter. Although the advent of Twitter has afforded politicians new mediums for communicating directly with their constituents, as they can tweet in real time, and impart to their followers and friends information about legislative goals and accomplishments, the result reported in chart 22 is striking: as 85.3% of surveyed MPs in Bavaria simply do not use twitter for communicating with voters.


Landtag (N=130): Chart 21. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used the Mailing List to inform and organize the activities of my campaign.



The apparent Twitter’s low profile is especially significant among MPs in the high vote concentration layer (44.2%), which represents the most conservatives in the political spectrum (see 2.3 above). Asked why Twitter was not part of her media strategy, a female CSU representative, featuring a very high vote concentration and


enjoying a large popularity, said: “I think Twitter is very impersonal. I just cannot convey anything relevant to my constituents in 140 characters! Twitter may be good for sending telegraph messages, but not for keeping in touch” (Interview with the author: Bamberg, 23.07.2013).

Landtag (N=130): Chart 22. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used Twitter to communicate with voters.



As for social networks, the result shows a similar downward trend, as 79.8% of the surveyed MPs did not use “social media” in their campaign effort (chart 23).

Landtag (N=130): Chart 23. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used other social networks to communicate with voters.




To sum up, we could say that, in contrast with the conventional wisdom that assigns great expectation to e-campaigns, the surveyed Bavarian MPs have shown a clear preference for traditional mass media in their campaign strategies. The results provide empirical evidence that MPs adopt a rather conservative approach in their media strategies, as 96.1% preferred local newspapers, and 85.3% opted for posters in a

sharp contrast with 63% rejection of online campaign, 79.8% of social media, 86.9% of weblogs and 59% of party websites. Among all the online tools surveyed, only personal websites (59%) and e-mail list (45.7%) found some positive responses. These results seem to support the view that the technical potentials of the World Wide Web and online campaign style are far from replacing the old mass media and offline political communication. Research therefore need to ascertain whether the theoretical hopes that surround the diffusion of e-campaign are realistic in practice. With regard to the research question, our initial hypothesis fares well in the light of the findings presented in this section, as there is a general tendency of high-vote concentration MPs to give more importance to media strategy than the ones in the medium and low ranges.

2.7. Campaign financing

Germany has provided public funding to the political parties since 1958. Since then, the Federal Constitutional Court has frequently ruled on the fair distribution of government funds to the parties and on the tax treatment of private donations, thus causing frequent changes in legislation. Currently, the overall annual amount allotted to parties is €133 million. Parties receive funds in proportion to the latest election results plus a partial matching of €0.38 per donated Euro for private donations up to €3,300. The parties, in return, must submit yearly financial statements to the legislature. Only contributors of more than €10,000 per year must appear in these financial reports. Private individuals may deduct 50 percent of their donations below €3,000 (twice that for joint returns) from taxable income, or claim a tax credit of €825 (€1650 for joint returns). There are no limits on private or corporate contributions. Aside from a prohibition on influencing the voters on Election Day in or near the polling place, Germany has no federal legislation on political advertisements. Political speech may be robust, but it is not exempt from the governance of the criminal laws, and these contain stringent provisions against various forms of hate speech, insult, and defamation. There are no limits on campaign spending.


Landtag (N=130): Chart 24. Indicate, please, approximately, the percentage of the expenditure on media advertising paid by your party.



Data from the survey show that the MPs in the high concentration layer received 47.3% (5% to 100%) of the funds from the party in contrast with 26.4% of the medium layer and 21.5% of the low layer (chart 24).


Significant is the level of donations for media campaign (chart 25, below): a majority of MPs in the high concentration layer rallied 46.6% of all donations (5% to 100%) against 24.6% and 21% in the medium and low layer respectively. This figures may indicate levels of MPs' electoral connection in the district, the grass roots' participation in the campaign efforts, and the proximity between representative-represented, typical of Bavarian political culture. Private funds invested in media campaign amount to 48.1% among MPs with high vote concentration, 26.3% in the medium layer and 23.3% in the low layer (Chart 26, below). Donations and private funds amount for 2/3 of media funds for all vote layers.

Landtag (N=130): Chart 25. Indicate, please, approximately, the percentage of the expenditure on media advertising paid by donors.



Known as a “party democracy”, Germany keeps their political parties as tightly run organizations that finance campaigns, nominate candidates, exact membership dues from their members, and subject members in Parliament to strict caucus rules. The parties receive government funds and are subject to some disclosure requirements. However, campaigns in Germany, at the constituency level, come closer to a “pre-modern campaign style” (Norris, 2003), which is characterized by its relative independence from the national level.

Landtag (N=130): Chart 26. Indicate, please, approximately, the percentage of the expenditure on media advertising paid by private funds.



Local campaigns represent a privileged context for candidates to run the dispute in an independent fashion from the party they represent. Directly elected MPs tend to adopt an “individualized campaign strategy”, be more assertive in serving the interests of the electorate, and consequently less dependent in partisan money to finance their campaigns, including resources for media advertisement (Zittel and Gschwend, 2008).


2.8. Summary

As we know, central to all investigations of the information-generating aspect of campaigns is the role of mass media. Samuel Popkin (1991) pointed out that a campaign event that occurs in isolation, but does not reach the public, is similar to a tree that falls in the woods: It makes a sound only if someone is there to hear it. According to Gelman and King (1993), the media play a crucial role in all phases of the campaign activities, such as speeches, conventions, debates, accusations, issue positions, and in the process of helping voters make “enlightened” choices. Yet, the specific degree of mediatization


of politics in Bavaria and the media strategy of their MPs remain an empirical question. The central question of this exploratory study is whether media visibility is equally important for all kinds of electoral careers. Candidates for political leadership positions such as mayoral, gubernatorial or presidential offices all experience strong and growing individual media scrutiny, especially because they do not rely exclusively on their party to attract voters. Yet, do all candidates for seats in elected assemblies (city councilors, state legislators, Congressmen), the so-called *backbenchers*, give equal importance and emphasis in their campaign strategies to media visibility and public image building?

The last two charts (27 and 28 below) summarize the view of the surveyed Bavarian MPs, and provide some clues to answer the research question. The questions test their perception on the overall role of media for their electoral success and for keeping in contact with their constituency. A majority of 59.7% agrees with the assertion “Thanks to the visibility in the media I’ve got electoral success”. This result (chart 27, scales “agree” and “agree strongly”) follows the general trend predicted by our hypothesis, which expected more media emphasis and media dependence on the part of those MPs with higher vote concentration (23.3%) in contrast with those of the medium (17%) and low vote concentration ranges (19.4%).

Landtag (N=130): Chart 27. How do you assess the following statement: "Thanks to the visibility in the media I've got electoral success."



Landtag (N=130): Chart 28. How do you assess the following statement: "My relationship with my constituents depends on the local media".



When asked to assess the statement, “My relationship with my constituents depends on local media” (chart 28, below), the result is quite different, as 72.2% of the surveyed MPs opted for a conditional agreement or even a disagreement with the proposition. Only 27.8% showed a clear agreement in contrast with 59.7% of the previous question (chart 27). These findings mirror the scientific literature on the issue. On the one hand, media presence may be crucial to achieve electoral success, on the other hand the multifaceted aspects of the electoral connections may compensate for the lack of media coverage. Few of the political actors may neglect the development of communication strategies for the construction of their public image, which only reinforces the general tendency towards the internalization of typical media values, language and logic by the political field.

CHAPTER 3: THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES AND THE GERMAN FEDERAL PARLIAMENT (BUNDESTAG)

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the responses to the survey, “Media and Electoral Careers” (see appendix I and II), delivered by the internal postal service of the Chamber of Deputies to all 513 members of the 54th Legislature (2011–2015) on May, 2013, and to all 620 members of the 17th Bundestag (2009–2013) on March, 2013 are analyzed and compared. During the time spent in Brasília, access was available to the plenary section of the Chamber of Deputies as guest of political leaders, who gracefully supported this research. In addition to the responses to the closed questionnaire obtained per post, 35 MPs from 23 parties with representation in the Chamber of Deputies, elected in 19 states and the Federal District (DF) were personally interviewed. The interviews lasted between 9 to 45 minutes, and took place in their offices, at committee sessions, or even in the famous “Green Corridor” of the Chamber of Deputies.

In the Bundestag (Berlin) the survey, “Medienpräsenz und Wahl” was conducted, which featured the same questions as the Brazilian version of the questionnaire, plus some specific questions about the German mixed-member electoral system. Leaders of three major parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, and 90Bündnis/Die Grünen) personally took the questionnaire to members of the faction during intra-party discussions, collected the responses, and shipped them back to us. These party leaders made follow-up contacts by telephone and email in order to ensure a good response rate. As a result, a considerable number of MPs’ personal letters of recommendation were received, which accompanied the returned questionnaires.

Furthermore, the last three months (July, August and September) of the 2013 federal elections in Germany were followed as a *complete observer* at rallies promoted by all major parties, and as a *participant observer* at party caucuses, *Stammtisch* (talk at the restaurant table) with candidates and party leaders, and major conventions in 10 of the 16 federal states (Länder). This fieldwork resulted in 69-recorded interviews with

candidates of six major parties (CDU, CSU, FDP, SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, and Die Linke). The interviews lasted between 10 to 58 minutes. Campaign panel discussions sponsored by local and regional newspapers, radio and TV stations were attended. Staff-members, PR executives and media personnel, who covered these events were also interviewed. These interviews have been used as *anecdotal evidence*, which entails preferences, comments, and subjective views that do not provide direct scientific proof per se, but may help better interpret the quantitative data.

In the following sections, the perceptions of the Brazilian and German MPs regarding the various types of media and media strategies were analyzed and compared against two main variables: vote concentration and electoral formula. The vote concentration variable comprises three indexes or layers: *High concentration* if MPs received more than 65 % of the votes in the 10 first districts. *Medium concentration* if MPs received between 40% and 64% of the votes in the 10 first districts. *Low concentration* if MPs received less than or equal to 39 % of the votes in the 10 first districts. The electoral formula variable entails the two types of votes adopted in the German mixed system: direct or district vote and indirect or list vote.

Given that the electoral formulae and geographical voting pattern produce incentives for different kinds of campaign strategies and electoral connections, as a territorial basis of representation inevitably introduces particularistic and parochial concerns into the policy-making process, it also is assumed to produce differences in media strategies. Variations on MPs' personal media strategies are expected according to the degree of concentration of votes: high concentration of votes coupled with electoral formulae that foster personal vote seeking significantly increase MPs' personal media strategy and visibility.

The analysis of the role of traditional media (TV / radio and print media) for MPs' electoral strategies comprise a basic differentiation between the local and national levels. This distinction requires a brief explanation on the meaning of *local* in terms of political communication. Firstly, it must be remembered that it is of the intrinsic nature of mass media to transgress boundaries of space and time. Secondly, the notion of geographic limits as the sole determinant of local media has proven to be insufficient to

explain all historical and cultural identities, the linguistic diversity, and the political and ideological interests that shape local media organizations. More than geographical perimeters, local media deals with cultural specificities of communities, which frame what one can see, touch, learn and understand. Localities are spaces that define the contours of our daily life, where social personality emerges, and social learning takes place (Bourdin, 2000).

In terms of communication, local and national media are defined primarily by the type and quality of the political information of a given physical space. Although local media is grounded on the information generated within a given locality or region, it is not monolithic, as it depends on the editorial policy of each communication outlet, on the journalistic representation of a territory, and on the recipients and content of the messages. Yet, the underlying idea of local media comprises the conceptual link between their geographical location and the contents and recipients of their messages. It is assumed therefore that local media deals with "information of proximity", which enables a direct monitoring of events by personal experience in contrast with media representation (Camponez, 2002).

Local media cater to a regional and local demand, as people are interested in seeing the themes of their locations portrayed in the media. There is also interest in occupying the regional space in order to achieve marketing goals. Local media seems more vulnerable to constraints arising from political ties and economic interests, which, besides compromising the quality of information, ends up reproducing styles and underestimating the strength of what is local as a source of information. In Brazil, for example, local media journalism relies mostly on official sources of information and declaratory journalism plays an important role due to the ties linking holders of political and economic powers. This phenomenon is not exclusive to local media, but at the national level it is much harder to confront political facts and media representation (Albuquerque, 2005b).


In Germany, most of the local print media, for instance, features side editions of regional papers based in large towns, with little editorial independence. The tendency is to reproduce the mainstream press and imitate the style of information processing or dedicating large spaces for national and international news as an operative strategy. The contracts with news agencies and famous syndicate columnists, and the appropriation of

national themes by local papers leave little room for specific local issues that might require costly journalistic investigation (Norris, 2003; Neller, 1999).


3.2. The role of local and national broadcasting media (TV/Radio)

The question that tests the role of local TV/Radio showed that the majority of the Brazilian MPs deemed the local broadcasting media “important or very important” (charts 29a and 29b) for their electoral strategies. 89.6% of the MPs in the high vote concentration layer, 73% in the medium, and 80% in the low concentration vote layers clearly confirmed the importance of local TV and radio for their election/re-election strategies as well as for keeping in contact with voters (87.5% high concentration, 81.1% medium, and 93.3% low concentration).

Brasília (N=100): 29a. Evaluate which media were important for your election/re-election: TV/RADIO (local)




Brasília (N=100): 29b. Evaluate which media is important to keep in contact with your constituency: TV/RADIO (local)




By contrast, the German MPs have shown much less enthusiasm for local broadcasting media as election/re-election strategy: 48.9% for the high vote concentration layer, 30.1% for the medium vote, and 48.9% for the low vote layer (chart 29c). These results are almost the same for the question on the importance of local TV/Radio for keeping in contact with voters (chart 29d). Both scales (“important and very important”) amount to 48.8% in the high vote concentration layer, 37.7% and the medium, and 43% in the low range.

Berlin (N=224): 29c. Evaluate which media were important for your election/re-election: TV/RADIO (local)




Berlin (N=224): 29d. Evaluate which media is important to keep in contact with your constituency: TV/RADIO (local)



As for the type of vote (chart 29e), personal-vote seeking, district elected MPs have expressed more emphasis (“very important”) on local TV and Radio (20.2%) compared to their counterparts elected by list vote (6.5%), although in both scales (“important and

very important”) list-elected MPs (46.5%) have given slightly more importance to this type of local media than direct-elected MPs (43.8%).


Berlin (N=224): 29e. Evaluate which media were important for your election/re-election: TV and RADIO (local)



In both countries, despite the stark differences in the media and political systems, high-vote concentration MPs tend to give more importance to local broadcasting media than MPs in other layers. If we take into consideration the scales “important and very important” in the four charts (29a, 29b, 29c and 29d) and calculate the median values, the results clearly show an ascending trend from the lowest (33.5% Brasília and 21.5% Berlin) to the highest vote concentration layers (46.3% Brasília and 48.9% Berlin), thus confirming our hypothesis (chart 29f, below).⁸¹ As previously explained, variations on MPs’ personal media strategies according to the degree of vote concentration are expected: high vote concentration coupled with electoral formulae that fosters personal vote seeking would significantly increase MPs’ personal media strategy and visibility (part III, chapter 1, 1.2).

⁸¹ We used the equation $M = \{(n + 1)/2\}$ (n = number of scores) to calculate the median values (M) for the set of observations extracted from the “important and very important” scales.

Chart 29f: Median vote concentration - Local TV and Radio




Television in Brazil is the most pervasive of all mass media, and one of the most important agents of cultural cohesion and diffusion of the innovations in a country 24 times larger than Germany. The expansion of television and other new communication technologies took place before the consumption of the more traditional media (newspaper and magazines) became universal. Television grew among a population with a high illiteracy rate and that remained very close to oral traditions of communications. Since 2001, the number of households with a TV set is larger than the ones equipped with radio. Every Brazilian spends almost five hours a day watching television (IPOBE, 2013), and 95% of the 51 million households in the country are equipped with a television set, according to the official national census figures (IBGE, 2010).

Political campaigning on television and radio has become more and more decisive in the electoral process in Brazil. All political parties and candidates have the right to free time for their party political broadcasts on radio and television (HPEG). Candidates and parties spend huge amounts of money to produce TV and radio spots, and such programs exert a decisive influence on patterns of voting behavior. Moreover, at every new election the number of candidates who owe their popularity to their appearances on television programs appears to rise. All major candidates keenly seek the endorsement of radio and television idols. The extraordinary growth of several religious groups, mostly Evangelical, that exploit the charismatic and presentational styles of their leaders on the broadcasting media, is supported by the third largest and popular TV network, *Record*, owned by one of these groups, and has large audience shares in other Portuguese speaking countries, such as Mozambique and Angola. The so-called


“Evangelical caucus” in the Chamber of Deputies is very influential and features several tele-evangelists and religious broadcasters.

Brasilia (N=100): 30a. Evaluate which media were important for your election/re-election: TV/RADIO (national)



Despite the indisputable importance of TV in Brazil, it seems, however, that the regional/national factor moderates such importance in terms of MPs’ media individual strategy (chart 30a). Brazilian MPs expressed a very different perception regarding the national broadcasting media, as only 35.5% of MPs in the high vote concentration layer deemed it “important and very important”, a stark contrast with 89.6% at the local level (charts 29a and 29b above). The other layers mirror the same reaction: 16.2% for the medium layer, in contrast with 73% at the local level, and 13.5% for the low concentration layer, in contrast with 80% of the previous question (chart 29a).


Brasilia (N=100): 30b. Evaluate which media is important to keep in contact with your constituency: TV/RADIO (national)



However, when it comes to “keeping in contact with constituency” (chart 30b) this trend is reversed, as 60% of the MPs in the low vote area granted more importance


(“important and very important” scales) to local broadcasting media than MPs in the high concentration layer (39.6%) and MPs in the medium layer (40.5%). These results may suggest a split perception amongst Brazilian MPs regarding the role of TV/radio: at the national level, broadcasting media seems not so important for their individual campaigns, but important as a tool to keeping in contact with voters, above all for MPs with fragmented voting pattern. The legal restrictions of buying TV/radio spots might explain this perception. The only alternative for candidates to have access to broadcasting media is to fight for an insertion of his/her name into the free-air time granted to parties in Brazil, 45 days before Election Day (Law no. 9,096/1995).

In Germany, although TV spots are aired directly before or after the major evening newscasts as well as in between entertainment programs, and usually draw a large audience, a major part of this audience consists of voters with low levels of political interest (Müller, 2002). Watching campaign spots has little impact on political involvement or on voting intentions. Some scholars have found that campaign spots do not change, but reinforce political attitudes. Compared with newspapers, the credibility of campaign advertising on TV is low. In addition, the parties have to pay the cost of TV spots. Thus, it is unrealistic to expect any great changes of opinions by watching campaigns spots. Most German campaign managers think that televised ads are not a very important type of advertising (Holtz-Bacha, 2000). This low expectation concerning the impact of campaign spots might explain the low assessment of broadcasting media by German MPs (Esser, Holtz-Bacha and Lessinger, 2005).




This low appraisal for broadcasting media becomes clearer at the national level, as only 25.6% of MPs in the high vote layer, 26.6% in the medium, and 27% in the low vote range, responded favorably (“important and very important”) to this type of media, following a similar trend found among Brazilian MPs.

Berlin (N=224): 30d. Evaluate which media is important to keep in contact with your constituency: TV/RADIO (national)



These figures are almost identical for the question on TV/radio (national) as an instrument to keeping contact with voters (Chart 30d): 25.6% of MPs in the high concentration area, 26.6% in the medium, and 27.7% in the low range (“important and very important” scales).


Berlin (N=224): 30e. Evaluate which media is important to keep in contact with your constituency: TV/RADIO (national)



List-elected MPs (27.7%) bestowed slightly more importance (“important and very important” scales, chart 30e) to broadcasting media at the national level than district-elected MPs (24.7%). The median values (chart 30f) confirm the upward trend for Brazilian MPs, as 17.7% of MPs in the high vote area, 12.1% in the medium and 10% in the low range considered important or very important the broadcast media at the

national level. Yet, German MPs disclosed slightly divergent results: 12.8% for the high vote are, 10.2% for the medium, and 13.5% for the low layer.

Chart 30f: Median vote concentration: TV/radio national




3.3. The strength of local print media


By contrast, the questions that test the importance of local print media for Brazilian MPs show surprising results (charts 31a and 31b). In both cases, as election/re-election strategy and as means of keeping in contact with voters, local print media received high scores (“important and very important”) in all vote concentration layers (85.4% / 87.5% in the high layer, 62.1% / 70.2% in the medium range, and 73.3% / 80% in the low range). These results sharply contrast with the survey conducted with MPs in the state of Minas Gerais (Part IV, Ch. 1).

Two factors may explain this outcome. First, the political arrangements that provide local print media in Brazil with different kinds of income in exchange for the support of political parties or leaders, which make it possible for city-based local newspapers to succeed in state-of-the art formats, although their advertising revenues and circulation are normally very low. The same phenomenon happens with television: households are equipped with modern color TV sets that receive sophisticated programming despite the fact that the local market does not provide the conditions for the financing of such programs.

Brasilia (N=100):31a. Evaluate which media were important for your election/re-election: Print media (local)



Brasilia (N=100):31b. Evaluate which media is important to keep in contact with your constituency: Print media (local)




Second, the cross monopoly of the media industry in Brazil tends to reproduce at the local level the concentration of the national level, where, generally, the largest TV and radio broadcasters are also the main owners of local and regional papers, which gets their news mainly from Globo News Agency and associates (Amaral and Guimarães, 1994). The political and cultural consequences of this monopoly are significant and might influence the perceptions of Brazilian MPs, who seem to have incorporated both local TV/Radio and print media in their electoral strategies (charts 29a and 29b).


As for Germany, the vast majority of print media is regionally located, newspaper sales take the form of subscriptions, and 84% of the readership is composed of readers

aged between 40 and 69, reflecting the country's federal structure and the strong attachment to local press among the population (Schütz, 2005).

Berlin (N=224): 31c. Evaluate which media were important for your election/re-election: Print media (local)



Berlin (N=224): 31d. Evaluate which media is important to keep in contact with your constituency: Print media (local)




As expected, local print media remained the most important media for German MPs. The results at the federal level (Bundestag) are even higher if compared with those at the state level (Landtag), as 100% of MPs in the high and medium vote concentration layers deemed this type of media “important or very important” for their election/re-election, followed by 96.3% of MPs in the low range (chart 31c). The same apply for the relationship with constituency: 95.5% in the high concentration layer, 93.3% in the medium, and 94.9% in the low range (chart 31d).

In both countries, a slight improvement in the low vote concentration layer emerged from this set of data, as indicated by the median values in chart 31e. Yet, our hypothesis that connects high vote concentration with higher emphasis in media strategies finds


partial confirmation, as the highest median values are in the high vote concentration range (Brasília, 43.7% and Berlin, 50%).

Chart 31e: Median vote concentration - Local Print Media



As for the electoral formula, 100% of the district-elected MPs, which comprise high levels of vote concentration and personal vote seeking candidates, and 96.4% of the list-elected MPs, which entail fragmented vote pattern, and party vote seeking candidates, deemed local print media “important and very important” for their election/re-election, further confirming the hypothesis (chart 32).


Berlin (N=224): 32. Evaluate which media were important for your election/re-election: Print media (local)



The relevance of local print media for Brazilians and German MPs finds further confirmation in the questions that test the amount of media coverage received by MPs in the last three months, and in the ones that assess MPs’ relationship with local media. In both countries, the level of coverage is very high, reaching 95.8% for Brazilian MPs in the high vote concentration layer (chart 33a) and 93.0% for the German MPs in the same range (chart 33b). Interestingly, the downward, diversion points are found in the

medium layer (81.1%) in the case of Brazilian MPs and in the low range (74.5%) for the German ones.

Brasilia (N=100): 33a. How many times, approximately, have you had your name mentioned in the local media in the last three months?



Berlin (N=224): 33b. How many times, approximately, have you had your name mentioned in the local media in the last three months?




Chart 33c reports that the assessment (“important and very important”) of the Brazilian MPs in the low vote concentration layer (93.3%) regarding the relationship with local print media is better than the one in the other layers (91.6% high and 78.4% medium).





Chart 33d shows a prevalence of 69.8% of the high vote German MPs in their appraisal (“important and very important) of their relationship with the local media, against 64.5% in the medium concentration layer and 67.2% in the low range.

Berlin (N=224): 33d. How do you appraise your relationship with the local media?



These findings reiterate the importance of local media in both countries, and confirm the classical political and anthropological literature on the relevance of Municipalities (Brazil) and *Stadtgemeinde* (Germany), where voters actually live.


3.4. National print media

Local media denotes communication based on proximity information. In practice, it is pervaded by distortions motivated by the way that the relations of production of news and other media contents are processed, but generally serves an important social function. In countries with huge regional differences in the structuring of the media market and the competitiveness of party systems, one cannot speak of the press as if it

were a homogeneous entity. Rather, there are varying degrees of external constraints, whether commercial or political, that delimit the autonomy and independence of the press in relation to the interests of economic and political groups.


Chart 34a reports that 39.6% of the Brazilian MPs in the high vote concentration layer deemed “important and very important” national print media for their election/re-election strategies, followed by 15.5% in the medium range and 13.4% in the low vote concentration layer.

Brasilia (N=100):34a. Evaluate which media were important for your election/re-election: Print media (national)




These results contrast with a clear improvement in the medium and low vote concentration areas (21.6% and 60%), and a downturn in the high vote layer (33.4%) when it comes to “keeping contact with constituency”, as reported by chart 34b.

Brasilia (N=100): 34b. Evaluate which media is important to keep in contact with your constituency: Print media (national)




The German MPs showed a better assessment on the role of national print media, as 39.6% of MPs in the high vote concentration range, 42% in the medium, and 39,4% in the low layer deemed “important and very important” this type of media for their electoral strategies (chart 34c).

Berlin (N=224): 34c. Evaluate which media were important for your election/re-election: Print media (national)




Similar results emerged from chart 34d, which reports that 41.1% of MPs in the high concentration area, 42.2% in the medium, and 40.8% in the low considered the national print media “important and very important” for keeping in contact with voters.

Berlin (N=224): 34d. Evaluate which media is important to keep in contact with your constituency: Print media (national)




In Germany, contrary to what was expected, the tendency in the preference for national print media is towards vote fragmentation and not vote concentration, as one can conclude from the median vote concentration values reported in chart 34e. The median values of the Brazilian MPs clearly confirms the hypothesis, whereas the German MPs displayed odd results.

34e: Median vote concentration: National Print Media



This trend towards fragmentation finds further confirmation in the fact that list-elected MPs (46%) bestowed more importance to this kind of media than district-elected MPs (33.6%). We can explain these results if we take into consideration the German mixed-electoral system, whereby list candidates necessarily have to go after votes outside the electoral territory of district candidates in order to stand some chance of success through the party list. The national print media may seem more appropriate for that purpose (chart 34f below).

Berlin 34f. Evaluate which media is important to keep in contact with your constituency: Print media (national)



3.5. The role of on-line politics

In Brazil, the Internet continues to be the fastest growing medium of political and social communication. According to Ibope/Media (2014), Brazil has become the 5th country with the largest number of Internet users (102 million), 40% of the population access the web daily, and 87% go online at least once a week. Social media users

increased 400% in 2013. The main access is through public Lan Houses (31%), followed by home computer (27%), and friends' computer (25%). Altogether, Brazil comprises 105 million of "netizens", who spent, on average, 60 hours per week browsing the World Wide Web.⁸²

The increasing presence of the internet in Brazilian households in recent years has brought about major changes in behavior of television and print media consumption. The first change was the habit of watching TV programs at the same time as browsing and posting comments on the internet, mainly on facts that are fun, controversial, different or unexpected. The second was an increase in the perception of the Internet as a reliable source of information, albeit the print media remain number one in this ranking. The content shallowness and the speed with which news spread through the Internet contrast with the in-depth interpretation of facts typical of quality print media. This trend points to a greater diversity of roles, the print media focusing on investigative journalism, leaving the factual reporting to the online media (Aggio, 2001).

In Germany, the Internet has developed in a very short time from a niche to a mass phenomenon. According to the ARD/ZDF online study,⁸³ the number of Internet users rose from 4.1 in 1997 to 49.5 million in 2014, more than tenfold. The use of the Internet became one of the everyday life, standard operating procedures not only for digital natives, but also for the growing number of "silver surfers", albeit the usage among under 60-year-olds is significantly higher than that of the over-60s. The group of 30-to-39-year-old is currently the most active user group. 76.5% of the population older than 14 has internet access, 75% of users receive information about politics and society from the Internet, and seem better informed on political events than offline-citizens.

The increasing focus on Internet especially by younger German recipients is due to the combination of an "all round-medium", which comprises informative, entertaining and social networking functions. Yet, Internet use does not lead to the withdrawal of users into a virtual online world. Instead, the Internet seems to be an additional tool to learn about current events. This online media convergence leads to an increasingly higher exposure to online services. Surfing, four times per week on

⁸² Data retrieved from: <http://www.ibope.com.br>.

⁸³ Available at: <http://www.ard-zdf-onlinestudie.de>.

average, takes place especially at home or at work, and the most commonly search is for news and information.⁸⁴

Three major sources of political information characterize the digital environment in Brazil and Germany. The first, associated with traditional media, refers to the coverage sponsored by mainstream press and broadcasting media in the form of large portals that offer all kinds of updated information about politicians and campaigns. A second major source of information is the committees of each candidate's own campaign (including websites and profiles on social networks), responsible for providing access to updates and information, videos, photos, audio and text. Thirdly, the franchising of information, which enables users with different levels of interest and technical skills to participate in the campaign by sharing opinionated material in the social networks (e.g., videos showing gaffes of candidates).

In both countries, the rise of digital media has brought multiple possibilities to political communication, such as a clear segmentation of messages based on different targets. In fact, the use of the Internet enables political organizations and candidates to establish direct contact with specific segments of the electorate, and operate a viral marketing that may overcome the traditional means of mass communication, such as the selection and editorial criteria of print media.

However, the online information generated directly by candidates and parties increases the competition for users' attention, and requires the feeding of websites and profiles with constant updates. A decade ago, it was enough for candidates to have an email to assure their presence online. A few years ago, a website could do the job. Nowadays, candidates must log into all social networks and update information round the clock in order to keep up with the ubiquitous and asynchronous demands of online politics. Users see favorably not only closer interaction with the electorate, but also transparency in the management of social networking and how genuine the candidates' messages are or appear to be. When the users receive messages from politicians on Twitter, for example, they tend first ask whether it was the candidate who drafted the text or someone else, and then give them different levels of attention (Smith, 2009).


⁸⁴ Data retrieved from: <http://www.ard-zdf-onlinestudie.de> and <http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten>.

Yet, direct communication with voters also implies obligations and risks for political actors. E-campaign implies greater demand for mobilization, as the so-called *pull media* require active users, unlike the mass media, which are essentially *push media*, in which the content reaches the recipients without requiring greater user activity. The main feature of the *pull media* is the three-way participatory communication, which represents a departure from the top-down, highly controlled communication environments typical of traditional political communication. It enables conversations that can involve multiple users in an open forum, like in social media. Conversations can be either synchronous (ideally), but also asynchronous with users contributing at numerous points within what some refer to as a global conversation. Clearly, the directions of communication allow different levels of user control over communication, with one-way communication offering the least and three-way the most (Chadwick, 2009).

As Stromer-Galley (2000) pointed out, there are reasons why candidates should carefully consider the costs and benefits of campaigning online and closely interacting with users. The difficulty of controlling what users say and reverberate in the Internet represents a risk for campaign coordinators and image managers, whose main goal is to prevent embarrassing situations or controversial questions that may not fit into the candidate's profile or campaign platform. A video about the blooper during a presentation in the campaign or an embarrassing comment made by mistake propagate worldwide within seconds through the Internet. How can candidates control their own agenda in such an environment, where a significant portion of users demand interactive applications in order to suggest topics for debate, modifications in candidates' programs as well as controversial questions?


Despite all these pitfalls, chart 35a reports that 83.3% of the Brazilian MPs in the high vote concentration layer considered the Internet and the social media "important and very important" for their election/re-election, followed by 67.1 % of MPs in the medium range and 66.7% in the low range.

Brasilia (N=100): 35a. Evaluate which media were important for your election/re-election: Internet/social media



These figures jumped to 93.8%, 83.7 and 100% (high, medium and low ranges) when it comes to keeping in contact with the electorate, clearly showing a strong adhesion on the part of Brazilian MPs to the new media (chart 35b).

Brasilia (N=100):35b. Evaluate which media is important to keep in contact with your constituency: Internet/social media




These results confirm the increasing importance of e-politics in Brazil. In the elections of 2002 and 2006, the Internet played mostly a subsidiary role reproducing the jingles and videos aired on TV and radio during the Free Time of Electoral Propaganda (HGPE). In the 2010-election, e-politics assumed an unprecedented importance, and forced political actors to pay much more attention to online politics. For the first time, candidates developed a kind of intimacy with various social media, a strategy meant to attract the sympathy of users, although it did not necessarily converted into votes. Campaign advisers finally adhered to the "culture of social networks", based on the

reciprocity of interactions mediated by the digital media, exchange of information, and the collective construction of projects (Marques, Aggio and Sampaio, 2011).

In Germany, candidates to the Bundestag seem to have followed similar trend, as 83.7% of MPs in the high vote concentration layer, 57.8% in the medium, and 75.2% in the low considered the Internet/social media “important or very important” (chart 35c). These results stand in significant contrast with the Internet’s poor performance amongst Bavarian MPs (12%, 15%, and 10.1%).⁸⁵ The multilevel character of election campaigns in Germany might explain this difference. The Federal level tend to feature political celebrities and top candidates, whose main communication strategy rely on media, political advertisements and large-scale political rallies. At the state level, average citizens run the political campaigns mostly on a party list or as direct candidate in a local constituency. They usually meet their potential voters face-to-face on market squares, visiting associations, taking part in social events, or simply knocking on their front doors (Zittel and Gschwend, 2008).


Berlin (N=224): 35c. Evaluate which media were important for your election/re-election: Internet/social media



The upward trend continues when it comes to contacting voters: 93% of MPs in the high vote concentration area, 86.6% in the medium, and 94.2% in the low range deem the Internet and the social media “important and very important” for their PR strategies (chart 35d).


⁸⁵ Part IV, Ch. 2, 2.6.

Berlin (N=224): 35d. Evaluate which media is important to keep in contact with your constituency: Internet/social media




As for the vote type (chart 35e), district-elected MPs (79.8%) displayed higher scores of preference for the Internet and social media compared to list-elected MPs (69.5%). These findings confirm our second hypothesis, according to which district candidates tend to rely more on media as a strategy to seek personal vote than list candidates, who mostly run party-driven campaigns.

Berlin (N=224): 35e. Evaluate which media were important for your election/re-election: Internet/social media.




The median vote concentration values for the Internet and social media in both countries (chart 35f) partly confirm our first hypothesis: the higher scores tend to follow higher vote concentration, except for the medium layer of the German MPs, which fell short 5.7% points in relation to the low vote concentration layer (42.3% and 36.6%).

Chart 35f: Median vote concentration: Internet and social media



With regard to the level of candidacy, we expected stronger media emphasis among candidates running for the Bundestag (Federal election) than among candidates running for the Landtag (State election). The median vote concentration values for Bavaria (Internet/social media) clearly confirm this expectation (chart 35g).


Chart 35g: Median vote concentration: Internet and social media



3.5.1. Party and personal websites


Until 2010, the electoral legislation in Brazil imposed an anachronism to online campaigns, since the use of social networks was blocked. Brazilian online campaigns could only take place in the internal environment to the official web sites of candidates and parties, which might have contributed to the poor assessment on party websites (Aggio, 2010). In Germany, the media logic shapes particularly those parts of the websites that have the greatest significance for the party digital self-presentation, thus turning it less attractive to individual candidates (Zittel, 2010).

Brasilia (N=100): 36a. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used a website designed and maintained by my party.



Charts 36a and 36b report that the majority of the surveyed Brazilian (86.7% low, 70.3% medium, 75.0% high vote concentration) and German MPs (67.9% low, 73.3% medium, 62.8% high vote concentration) did not use a website designed and maintained by their parties. These findings dovetails neatly with the results found amongst Bavaria MPs at the state level (Part IV, Ch. 2, 2.7). In both countries, party websites focus primarily on the interaction with mass media rather than on candidates' personal features.

Berlin (N=224): 36b. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used a website designed and maintained by my party.




During the 2009 Federal election, the websites of German political parties adhered to traditional campaign functions, such as information provision and resource regeneration. Their Internet presences were highly standardized and showed only few differences in their overall design and technical sophistication. Yet, Web 2.0 features were introduced for the first time by all parties. These allowed site visitors to subscribe to newsletters and RSS feeds, share content with other users through social bookmarking or forward material within their social networks. In addition, citizens could respond to parties' news releases via online feedback forms or leave comments on their YouTube channels. Despite their extensive usage, though, these web 2.0 features


remained more or less aesthetic tools embedded in order to drive perceptions, as opposed to connecting with voters at a more substantial level. Genuine political discussions were scarce (Lilleker and Jackson, 2011).

By contrast, the responses to the question on the usage of “personal website” revealed an abrupt increase, as 93.3% low, 89.2% medium, and 97.9% high vote concentration Brazilian MPs, and 92.0% low, 84.4% medium, and 81.4% high vote concentration German MPs adopted this kind of communication tool in their e-campaign (charts 36c and 36d). Since Howard Dean’s innovative use of personal websites for the 2004 Democratic primary in the United States, when he raised 41 million dollar online, and mobilize 185 thousand supporters through his “Meetup.com”, politicians all over the world started to figure out that a well-designed personal website is much more than just a place to download press releases.

Brasilia (N=100): 36c. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used a personal website designed and maintained by my campaign team.




Berlin (N=224): 36d. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used a personal website designed and maintained by my campaign team.




Yet, the political relevance of personal websites depends on the quality of their textual content and media-specific qualities of online communication. Digital outlets, which provide comprehensive and accessible policy information, may mobilize and educate citizens on political issues and legislative behavior of their representative and thus increase the accountability of the office holders. In contrast, digital brochures with colorful pictures and some general personal information have little relevance in this respect.

With regard to the vote type, charts 36d reports a slight higher preference for party website amongst district-elected German MPs (33%) compared to list-elected MPs (29.6%), despite the fact that the second-vote election campaign would suggest a focus on the online activities of the party instead of the candidate. Chart 36e reproduces the same trend, as 89.9% of district-elected MPs said to have used personal websites against 87.6% of list-elected MPs.

Berlin (N=224): 36d. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used a website designed and maintained by my party.



Berlin(N=224): 36e. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used a personal website designed and maintained by my campaign team.




3.5.2. Mailing list

Despite all the Web 2.0 hype, e-mails represent 85% of all internet traffic in Brazil and Germany, falling short only to search engine traffic (90%). The low transaction costs and massive economies of scale of e-mails can substitute work previously done with older technology such as post mails, phones, or face-to-face, and radically alter the strategies campaigns employ in every facet of political competitions. In principle, once the initial list of e-mail addresses and database infrastructure are in place, there is no cost to contacting voters via e-mail.


In both countries, political parties and candidates use e-mails for specific campaign goal such as voter mobilization, fundraising, and supporter's turnout. In the past, direct mail was an effective, albeit expensive, means of increasing voter mobilization (Gerber et al., 2003). Evidence from field experiments in the United States, however, has shown that, despite the similarity between direct mail and e-mail, there is no evidence upon the value of centralized mass e-mails as a means of registering individuals and moving voters to the polls. The reason is that the most personal old-fashioned grass roots mobilization techniques, such as face-to-face canvassing or peer-to-peer networks, work better than the least personal techniques, like e-mails. This does not imply that e-mail is ineffective as a campaign and organizational tool. Quite the opposite, it is an extremely efficient way of communicating information and instructions to supporters, organize rallies, raise donations, and solicit volunteer labor (Nickerson, 2009).

Charts 37a and 37b show that e-mail is more popular among Brazilian MPs than German MPs, above all in the low vote concentration range (93.3% against 73.7%).

Brasilia (N=100): 37a. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used the Mailing List to inform and organize the activities of my campaign.




Berlin (N=224): 37b. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used the Mailing List to inform and organize the activities of my campaign.



List-elected MPs showed a higher level of preference compared to district-elected MPs, as reported in chart 37c (73% against 61.8%).

Berlin (N=224): 37c. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used the Mailing List to inform and organize the activities of my campaign.



3.5.3. Twitter

Among the various possibilities of online politics, Twitter rise to prominence when it comes to providing a continuous stream of political events in real time, combine news updates of 140 characters, and organize “connective action” out of atomized and


subjectively experienced stories. As a medium of self-expression, until recently restricted to private message exchange between users, Twitter has become the digital alternative for political activists to inform, and mobilize collective action and protests as well as create media attention for their demands. The rhythms of storytelling on Twitter reveal hybrid forms of journalism, interconnected and mutually dependent. Although the volume of comments on Twitter tend to rise according to the volume of mass media coverage, it is not everything that receives mass media attention that leads to equal attention on Twitter (Chadwick, 2011; Bennett and Segerberg, 2013; Jungherr, 2014).

The strategic use of twitter during the 2010 political campaign in Brazil indicates that it served as a channel to integrate nontraditional political actors into the political debate, mobilize supporters for party rallies, and bring the attention of mass media journalists to political events. A few months before the election there was an intense debate among political observers about the possibility of candidates to reproduce the "Obama effect" in Brazil. The question was whether candidates with little chance of winning the presidential election could exceed the traditional obstacles represented by party bureaucracies and large advertising machines through the massive use of the Internet and social media. Optimistic predictions raised the possibility that the Green Party presidential candidate, Marina Silva, could somehow reproduce the amazing performance of the Green Party presidential candidate, Antanas Mockus Šivickas, whose candidacy prospered through the social networks in Colombia (Braga, 2011).

There was evidence that online politics had some influence in the course of the 2010 presidential campaign in Brazil. However, very little is yet known about the pattern of Internet and social media use by politicians at other levels of representation due in part to the ban on Internet campaign then prevailing in the archaic electoral legislation. According to Sergio Braga (2011), the 2010 majority election (governors and senators) pointed to a new pattern of online politics. First, he detected a more equitable and widespread use of the Internet among candidates from different regions of the country. Secondly, the use of Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube by candidates tended to replace other interaction mechanisms, such as blogs, forums and chats.

These results dovetail with our findings reported in chart 38a, where 83.3% of Brazilian MPs in the high vote concentration area, 83.8% in the medium, and 66.7% in the low range used twitter in their campaign efforts.


Brasilia (N=100): 38a. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used Twitter to communicate with voters.



In Germany, empirical research on social media has focused on questions of whether online politics follows the same pattern of communication as offline politics, and more specifically whether mass media visibility leads to greater presence on Twitter. Contrary to most international research, which positively correlates powerful offline political actors and powerful presence online, Germany represents a notable exception. The Pirate Party, a young and vibrant political organization with 100% roots in online activism, and an undeniable hegemony of the online political sphere, was not able to win a single seat in the Bundestag. Parties, candidates and voters, it seems, use twitter to varying extent and with distinct purposes, but such use has not changed the traditional features of political campaigns, which still cling to mechanism of top-down and self-reported dissemination of information flow. The voting decisions of citizens seem alien to the influence of the information circulating on Internet, twitter and social media (Jürgens and Jungherr, 2011).


As documented in chart 38b, 60.5% of German MPs in the high vote concentration range, 53.3% in the medium and 70.1% in the low said they did not use Twitter to communicate with voters. One possible reason for this poor performance found in our interviews is the length limitation of messages on Twitter (160 characters), which seems to focus more on prominent topics, such as televised debates, and contesting public statements of leading politicians (see Part IV, Chap. 2, 2.6.2).

Berlin (N=224): 38b. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used Twitter to communicate with voters.



As regards the type of vote (chart 38c), Twitter proved more popular amongst districted-elected MPs (40.7%) than list-elected MPs (27.8%). This result reinforces our hypothesis according to which district MPs tend to rely more on media as a strategy to seek personal votes than list MPs, who mostly run party-driven campaigns.


Berlin (N=224): 38c. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used Twitter to communicate with voters.



3.5.4. Other social network

In recent years, social media providers, such as Facebook and YouTube, have become important tools for political communication, as parties and politicians incorporated these services into their campaigns, journalists have use them as sources of information, and the public feeds them with comments and participates in political events and debates. In Brazil, the 2010 election represented a turning point in this regard, as the use of Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube by candidates exceeded other online tools, such as blogs, forums and chats (Braga, 2011).

Brasilia (N=100): 39a. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used other social networks to communicate with voters.



The responses of the surveyed MPs mirrors this trend, as reported in chart 39a, where 91.7% of the MPs in the high vote concentration layer, 78.4% in the medium, and 86.7% in the low range said they used other social networks in their campaigns.


In Germany, between 2002 and 2010, there was a clear trend towards a professionalization in German e-campaign that corresponds to international developments in computer-mediated political communication. The largest growth rates appeared for the implementation of several Web 2.0 options, such as YouTube (74.1%), Twitter (42.9%), and other social networks (39.3%). All parties with representation in the Bundestag adopted almost all new Web 2.0 technical innovations in the 2009 national election (Schweitzer, 2011b, p. 320).

While these findings hold true for parties, the same does not seem to apply for individual candidates, who used Web 2.0 tools only selectively. On the one hand, political websites concentrates primarily on the respective parties as collective entities, while candidates are pushed into the background. The degree of personalization in German e-campaign has continuously decreased since 2002 on all levels of analysis and across all parties. In the last election, the political leaders appeared in one-third of all messages, and featured in only about one-quarter of all photos that accompanied the articles. This trend sharply contrasts with the intense personalization observed in German offline mass media coverage since the end of the 1990s (Esser and Hemmer, 2008; Schweitzer, 2011b).

On the other hand, to assume that this general growth in professionalization would inevitably lead to a growing political use by individual candidates risks hiding a central feature of e-politics: it requires appropriate motivation. The eventual competitive edge of Web 2.0 dialogical interactivity, for example, contrasts with the logistical

implications of such endeavor, given the amount of effort required for this kind of activity and the lack of time to organize dialogues through emails, forums or chat rooms. This might explain the poor performance of the Web 2.0 amongst surveyed German politicians, as the overwhelming majority (79.1%, 71.1% and 80.3%) did *not* use the social media in their political campaign to communicate with voters (chart 39b).

Berlin (N=224): 39b. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used other social networks to communicate with voters.



3.5.5. Political Blogs

The theory of gatekeeper comprises the idea of vertical information flow, stemming from the mass media, which determines what the audience receives. Weblogs, instead, was born from the idea of a stream of horizontal communication, which generates information produced by the interaction and dialogue between a primary interlocutor (the blogger) and a secondary (readers). There are different levels of interaction according to the blog. Some are more intervention-friendly and open to debate than others, since it is still up to the blogger to set the agenda, and decide what comment goes online.

As free spaces of online interaction, political blogs are loci for collective discourse and political conversation, organized around a central figure, and open to debate with multiple actors. They are subject to contentious debate and tensions, since the exposure of personal opinions and subjective personality are part of their appeal for readers. Political blogs have the potential to expand the universe of people involved in the production and search for political information. They aim to guide readers in the quest for content and cognitive pathways.


The concept of timeliness links closely to the journalistic genre of blogs, etymologically interpreted as a daily journal, related to the periodicity, which becomes

central to online journalism with round the clock updates. Although political blogs have no obligation to maintain any frequency of updates, they mirror the journalistic debate that discusses daily news and events. In this sense, blog is a kind of hybrid between updated journalism and personal chronicle (Aldé et al., 2007).


In Brazil, candidates who most used the Web to organize election campaigns in 2010 were not outsiders to the traditional political game, but the big parties of the center and center-left, especially the ruling coalition, with greater campaign resources. Candidates used blogs mostly for discussion of proposals and information, much less to mobilize and organize public opinion around ideological platforms (Braga, 2011).

Chart 40a documents that 68.8% of the MPs in the high vote concentration area used a personal blog as part of their media strategy, whereas 62.2% of the MPs in the medium layer and 53.3% in the low concentration range adopted such tools for political campaign. The ascending trend from lower to higher usage of blogs reinforces our main hypothesis, which expects more media emphasis among MPs featuring high vote concentration scores.

Brasilia (N=100): 40a. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used a personal Blog during my election campaign.



Berlin (N=224): 40b. Regarding the use of the Internet and Social Networking in the election campaign, answer yes or no: I used a personal Blog during my election campaign.



Following the same trend found in all previous cases of Internet usage by German MPs surveyed, personal blog was no exception: less than one-quarter of MPs responded positively to blogs (23.3%, 13.3% and 23.4%).

3.5.6. Posters and billboards

Posters and billboards belong to the genre of advertising media, which unlike other genres (print, broadcasting and digital) is more a media of exposure than of consumption (Dordor, 1998). The special conspicuousness of posters increases the awareness of candidates and parties in the daily struggle for people's attention. They are not only a persuasive form of political communication, but also art applied to politics. Their iconic impact triggers an instant dialogue with passersby, and is more effective than any other advertising medium. Designers use art to achieve this goal: to graphical key ideas, bordering sometimes on cynicism and humor, they add striking eye-catcher layout, yet not intrusive, in order to produce immediately understandable statements.




Green Party poster: 2010 Federal election in Brazil

The effectiveness of posters in political marketing is strongly dependent on size, shape and placement, which determine the public or private character of the poster. Nowadays the tendency is toward visual and ideological homogeneity. If a poster or billboard convey strong political ideas, they risk alienating the undecided and those in the center of the political spectrum. They have become increasingly neutral and graphically similar, more rational instruments of conquest of power, than aesthetic manifestations of political ideas. Where designers have more freedom to work with posters is in small parties, and advocating for independent causes (Queiroz et al., 2012).

In Brazil, the electoral legislation, which sets the rules and timeframe for poster usage in campaigns, bans billboards from political campaigns (Law 12.891/2013, article 39, § 8). Yet, chart 41a reports that the strongest reception (“important and very important”) to posters came surprisingly from MPs in the lowest vote concentration area (60%), the least in the medium layer (32.4%), and in the high range (39.6%). Despite all the innovations of online politics, this finding indicates that posters are still a powerful propaganda weapon, and that most candidates continues to make their campaigns on streets and public places.

Brasilia (N=100): 41a. Evaluate which media were important for your election/re-election: Posters



In Germany, posters are one of the oldest instruments of political communication. They have secured an important place next to the supposedly more modern campaign channels. In the six weeks before Election Day, no other medium occupies more the public space and draws more people’s attention than posters, as they still accompany voters up to the polling station and therefore represent to a certain extent the last memory of parties and candidates before voting. Due to the large-scale production, posters and billboards create attention-generating, democratic dialogue and the necessary political climate to mobilize voters through their emotive force and call-for-action appeal.


The six-week poster campaign normally runs in three phases, and provides for a final offensive in the last 72 hours. The poster Union campaign (CDU/CSU), for instance, comprised approximately 492 699 small and medium size posters, 1500 billboards, 4771 mega-lights, and 120 large surface posters scattered all over the country. The SPD party instead produced 278 000 posters and 15500 billboards for their advertising campaign. In addition to traditional street posters, the party also promoted an online poster campaign (Lessinger and Holtz-Bacha, 2010).



CDU Poster: 2013 Federal Election in the state of Hessen


Chart 41b documents that 88.4% of surveyed MPs in the high vote concentration layer deemed posters “important and very important” for their election/re-election, whereas 75.5% of MPs in the medium layer, and 70% in the low area had similar perception. The upward trend from lower to higher vote concentration confirms our hypothesis for the German Bundestag.

Berlin (N=224) 41b. Evaluate which media were important for your election/re-election: Posters.



Personal-vote seeking, district-elected MPs (82%) also put more emphasis on poster campaign than party-driven, list-elected MPs (70%) further reinforcing our expectations regarding the incentives emanating from the German electoral systems (chart 41c).

Berlin (N=224): 41c. Evaluate which media were important for your election/re-election: Posters.



3.6. Summary


In the previous section (3.5.1 to 3.5.6), how Brazilian and German MPs have incorporated digital tools in their media strategies was discussed. It was assumed that different media allow for different modes of information production and consumption, which depend on the technology and the institutions producing and disseminating those media. The advent of the Internet introduced different technological capabilities for the production and consumption of news in general, while offering new opportunities for political communication in particular. Politicians have to cope with a communication environment dominated by drastically lowered costs for publication and information retrieval.

Researchers interested in the relationship between online buzz and subsequent electoral results might find interesting clues in the case of Brazilian and German MPs. In both countries, this comparative analysis has found that online politics indeed offers opportunities for MPs to compensate for eventual offline disadvantages, such as lack of publicity and fewer financial and human resources. Yet, the traditional print and broadcasting mass media still appear more important for their election/re-election strategies as well as for keeping in contact with voters.

When the median values for the Internet are compared, it is found that 43.7% of Brazilian MPs in the high vote concentration area, 35.1% in the medium layer, and 33.3% in the lower range considered the Internet “important and very important” for their media strategies. German MPs showed a similar trend, as 46.5% of MPs in the

high vote concentration area, 36.6% in the medium range, and 42.3% in the low had the same assessment (chart 42a).

Chart 42a: Median vote concentration: Internet and social media



These figures contrast with 46.3%, 40.5% and 33.5% (high, medium and low ranges) for Brazilian MPs when it comes to local TV and radio and with 48.9%, 31.1% and 21.5% for German MPs (chart 42b).

Chart 42b: Median vote concentration/ Local TV and Radio





Chart 42c: Median vote concentration: Local Print Media



Local print media (chart 42c) clearly appear more important than Internet for German MPs (50%, 47.7%, and 48.1%), and also important for Brazilian

representatives (43.7%, 33.7% and 36.6%). These findings suggest that Brazilian and German MPs used the Internet as a communications tool that complements, but in no case replaces the off-line activities, especially the traditional voter contact and articulation of canvassers, as well as the use of print and broadcasting media. Far from replacing the “old” media, the Internet seems to consolidate them in a relation of complementarity, in which the logics of various technological and social media systems mix to form a “hybrid media system” (Chadwick, 2013). This serves to show once more that the debate about political communication has to abandon the demarcations of communication in traditional and new media systems but instead move on to map how these systems interact.

For the surveyed MPs, the so-called “Obama effect” appears to be a distant parameter, a far-away horizon rather than a political reality that is checking and spreading in countries with different political and socio-institutional contexts. To illustrate this point, it suffices to bring to memory the case of the Pirate Party as the most Internet savvy, civic movement founded in Germany in 2006, which employed almost all available interactive options in their campaign (chat room, discussion forums, blogs, wikis) to foster an immediate exchange with their supporters and to coordinate their offline campaign. Likewise, the Socialism and Freedom Party (PSOL) in Brazil ran one of the most intense online campaigns. The Pirate Party has not managed to conquer one single seat in the Federal Parliament, and the PSOL remains a fringe party with three seats in the Chamber of Deputies. These two cases clearly show that during the 2010 campaign in Brazil, and the 2009 campaign in Germany, e-politics showed little, if any, systematic relationship with subsequent votes on Election Day.

3.7. Pork barrel as media strategy: Chamber of Deputies


Most Brazilian politicians engage in highly individualistic and largely non-ideological campaign behavior (Mainwaring, 1999), and seek to trade legislative support for pork barrel and patronage (Ames, 2001). In this section, *pork barrel* is briefly discussed, i.e., government grants to local administrative bodies, as a credit-claiming strategy to capture media coverage. Before initiating this analysis, it is worth noting that, according to Barry Ames (2003, pp. 185-186), MPs featuring high level of vote concentration in Brazil tend to have a closer relationship with voters, participate

more in local community organizations, and be more subject to scrutiny and accountability than MPs with fragmented voting pattern. Vote concentration, he argues, makes it easier for voters to perceive what benefits their representatives bring to their communities.


Thus, their electoral careers tend to be more party independent, more community-rooted, and less vulnerable to the influence of municipal or regional political bosses. Given their increased accountability, the author concludes, high vote concentration MPs are more inclined to develop a legislative agenda, and therefore, are more interested in expanding the power of the Congress in order to increase their bargain advantage before the Federal government. Applying these assumptions here to the main explanatory hypothesis, it would be expected that high vote concentration MPs were: (1) more dependent on pork and credit claiming, (2) less dependent on local political bosses, such as the support of mayors and town councilors, (3) more dependent on media visibility.

However, the figures reported in chart 43a (below) point to the opposite direction of the first assumption, as MPs with low vote concentration were those who more intensively used pork (“inauguration of projects and allocation of funds to electoral districts”) to capture media visibility (73.3%). By contrast, MPs in the high vote area were the ones to least use pork (52.1%) for that purpose, followed by MPs in the medium layer (54.1%). These findings resonate with those documented in Chart 43b (below), where 93.4% of MPs in the low concentration range considered the support of mayors and town councilors “important or very important” for their electoral success, in contrast with 64.6% of MPs in the high concentration layer, and 67.6% in the medium concentration area. Would it indicate a more independent stand vis-à-vis local bosses on the part of high vote concentration MPs, as expected in the second assumption?

Brasilia (N=100): 43a. Indicate what strategy you usually use to capture the media attention: Inauguration of projects and allocation of funds for your electoral District.




Brasilia (N=100): 43b. Choose, in order of importance, which factors contributed most to your electoral success: Support of Mayors and Town Councilors



One possible explanation for the deviant results is that MPs do not win reelection simply based on the absolute amount of pork they bring home or the number of cases they solve for constituents, but on the *perception* that they are working hard to bring their constituents the public goods that provide more benefits to the community (Mayhew, 1974). Because information about the costs and benefits of government services is imperfect for both MPs and voters, politicians have tremendous incentives to focus their energies not only on delivering the pork, but also on framing their actions in the most positive light possible. Thus, what these results indicate is that MPs with fragmented voting pattern bestow more importance on creating the perception of bringing home the bacon through the media. Yet, this perception does not necessarily means how much pork the MPs actually generate, but rather points to their success in creating a positive spin on his or her achievements.

This strong emphasis on project inauguration and allocation of funds to MPs' constituency contrasts with two indicators of more universalistic strategies: "position taking on controversial issues" (chart 43c), and "speech in the Chamber" (chart 43d). The meager preference (6.7%) for taking position on controversial issues on the part of MPs in the low vote concentration suggests they definitively avoid this kind of strategy to capture the media attention. In the opposite directions, MPs in the medium (59.5%) and in the high concentration area (58.3%) are more inclined to do so (chart 43c).

Brasilia (N=100): 43c. Indicate what strategy you usually use to capture the media attention: Position taking on controversial issues.



Brasilia (N=100): 43d. Indicate what strategy you usually use to capture the media attention: Speech in the Chamber.






Chart 43d documents a similar trend regarding "speech in the Chamber": only 13.3% of the MPs in the lower range deemed this strategy "very important" to capture media attention, whereas 45.9% of MPs in the high layer, and 29.7% in the medium considered it "important or very important". We expected the opposite, as statewide-oriented policies would better fit the electoral profiles of MPs with fragmented voting pattern. These findings may signal the demise of the *policy advocate* and the rise of the *pragmatic promoter of local interests* in the Chamber of Deputies (see Part V, Ch. 1, 1.4 for details).

Brasilia (N=100): 43e. Indicate what strategy you usually use to capture the media attention: Participation in legislative committees.



Participation in legislative committees received a considerable score as a preferable approach to attract media coverage: 52.1% from MPs in the high vote concentration area, 37.8% in the medium, and 46.7% in the low layer (chart 43e). Although party leaders, not individual MPs, hold the power of appointment to those committees, choices are made so that MPs could leverage the provision of benefits to their constituencies, and collect specialized information for their parties. (Rocha and Barbosa, 2008).

Brasilia (N=100): 43f. How do you assess the following statement: "Thanks to the visibility in the media I've got electoral success."



When confronted with the statement, "Thanks to the visibility in the media I've got electoral success" (chart 43e), Brazilian MPs took a clearly cautious position, suggesting some qualification of media influence on their electoral success, as 72.9% of MPs in the high vote layer, 62.2% in the medium, and 80% in the low range agreed conditionally with the assertion. If the two more positive scales ("I agree" and "I agree

strongly”) are take into consideration, a trend is noted amongst MPs in the higher concentration areas (20.8% and 32.4%) to bestow more importance to media visibility than MPs in the lower area (13.4%), thus partially reinforcing our third assumption.


3.8. Pork barrel as media strategy: Bundestag

The possible relationship between media strategy and pork barrel in Germany warrants some previous considerations. On the one hand, it is known that the allocation of pork barrel projects is one way MPs often seek to increase their chances of reelection (Mayhew, 2004; Fiorina, 1977; Fenno, 1978; Cain et al., 1987). In the specific case of German MPs, research by Lancaster (1986, 1998), Lancaster and Patterson (1990), and Stratmann and Baur (2002) found significant differences between candidates elected by district vote and the list vote in relations to different amount of pork barrel brought to constituents. Candidates choose different strategies of concentration or dispersion of its resources by territory.


On the other hand, the decision of where to focus the campaign on a few or many districts is generally associated with the political profile and the availability of each MP’s resources. Candidates with strong ties to a particular constituency tend to focus their campaign on a limited geographical area. Leadership with broader political ties, not geographically concentrated, may disperse their campaign resources along various constituencies.

According to the hypotheses presented here, media strategy varies according to the voting pattern, the levels of candidature (state and federal) and the type of vote (district and list vote). It can be supposed that there might be an association between pork as media strategy and directly elected MPs, as it is plausible to assume that credit claiming for pork barrel might be of greater importance for district-elected MPs than for party-list elected ones. Based on these assumptions we could ask (1) whether German MPs at the federal level (Bundestag) perceive pork allocations as a preferred media strategy, as they did at the state level (Landtag: Part IV, Ch. 2, 2.4). (2) Does the representative’s propensity to secure bacon to their constituency correlates with voting pattern? Higher scores are to be expected in the high vote concentration area. (3) Whether pork barrel policies are used more by district-elected MPs as a strategy to capture media coverage.

Berlin (N=224): 44a. Indicate what strategy you usually use to capture the media attention: Inauguration of projects and allocation of funds for your electoral District.



Berlin (224): 44b. Indicate what strategy you usually use to capture the media attention: Inauguration of projects and allocation of funds for your electoral District.




When asked if inauguration of projects and allocation of funds for their district was part of their media strategy, only 18.6% of the surveyed MPs in the high vote concentration range, 28.9% in the medium, and 20.4% in the low range deemed it “very important” to capture the media attention (Chart 44a). A clear majority (76.7% high, 51.1% medium, and 72.3% low ranges) considered “less important” this kind of strategy. These findings confirm neither the first nor the second assumption, as higher scores were expected at the federal level and in the high vote concentration area (at the state level, the scores were 32.6% for MPs in the high vote area, 10.1% medium, and 7.8% in the low vote range). Regarding the third assumption, chart 44b confirms that district-elected MPs (25.8%) uses more pork barrel as a way to attract media attention than list-elected MPs.

The following questions aim to contrast the findings on pork barrel as media strategy with other types of strategies usually adopted by MPs in Germany. The first

one relates to “participation in legislative committees”. Chart 45a reports that a clear majority of respondents in the three vote ranges (74.4% high, 46.7% medium, and 60.3%) consider that participation in legislative committees is “less important” to increase media coverage. Only a minority of MPs (23.3% high, 33.3% medium and 33.8% low) deemed it “very important” as a strategy for capturing media attention.


Berlin (N=224): 45a. Indicate what strategy you usually use to capture the media attention: Participation in legislative committees.



One intuitive explanation for this poor performance is the fact that, in the German Bundestag, every representative is a member of a committee. Each committee consists of a Chairman and a certain number of members appointed by the party leaders. Each party is entitled to a certain number of members in the committees according to the balance of power in Parliament. Although the standing committees play an important political role as preparatory decision-making bodies, almost all MPs belong to one or more of these committees or sub-committees. A very few are members of the relevant ones, who eventually come out on the media spotlight.


Examining the differences in the legislative committees of the Federal and state Parliaments in Germany, and how legislation are modified to benefit voters, Lancaster and Patterson (1990), and Stratmann and Baur (2002) found that deputies elected by district vote tend to occupy the committees that allow them to better serve the geographic base of their electorate. According to the authors, district-elected MPs have a clear competitive advantage over their peers elected by list vote.

Berlin (N=224): 45b. Indicate what strategy you usually use to capture the media attention: Participation in legislative committees.




Despite this competitive advantage, list-elected MPs were the ones to give more importance to participation in legislative committees (35.8%) compared to district-elected MPs (25%).

Berlin (N=224): 46a. Indicate what strategy you usually use to capture the media attention: Speech in the Chamber.




When it comes to “speech in the Chamber” (chart 46a), the figures lean toward a more balanced perception, as 48.8% of the MPs in the high concentration area, 53.7% in the medium, and 46.7% in the low range deemed it “important or very important” as a strategy to get media coverage. 46% of district-elected MP and 50.3% of list-elected MPs considered “speech in the chamber” a good media strategy (chart 46b).

Berlin (N=224): 46b. Indicate what strategy you usually use to capture the media attention: Speech in the Chamber




The Bundestag’s MPs showed a clear preference for “taking position on controversial issue”, as 72.1% of the MPs in the high concentration range, 68.9% in the medium, and 79.6% in the low area found this kind of strategy “very important” to attract media coverage.

Berlin (N=224): 46c. Indicate what strategy you usually use to capture the media attention: Position taking on controversial issues.



List-elected MPs (78.8%) were the ones to bestow more importance on debating controversial issues than district-elected MPs (70.8%). This result reflects the fact that most candidates elected by the list belong to the opposition parties, which normally tend to take stronger stances on political issues in Parliament.

Berlin (N=224): 46d. Indicate what strategy you usually use to capture the media attention: Position taking on controversial issues.




3.9. Media visibility and personalization

Media visibility plays an important role in the production of political capital since positive exposure in the media constitutes appreciation not only within the parties, but also within the various dimensions of the electorate. Media visibility, when favorable, has the power to *consecrate* a person, event, or idea as worthy of wider consideration, as a relatively wide range of stories appear somewhere in today’s media-saturated societies, but only a handful are picked up by the mass media and attract widespread public attention. The extent to which a particular candidate is able to capture positive media coverage is “the cornerstone of an effective district strategy. Without visibility, representatives cannot have independent standing in the electorate’s collective mind, and without independent standing they cannot anticipate personal success in otherwise unfavorable circumstances” (Cain et al., 1987, p. 27). Visibility dramatically increases voters’ self-described political attentiveness, which correlates positively with candidates’ efforts to publicizing their activities and accomplishments.

Another concept related to media visibility is *media personalization*, a multidimensional concept, whose first level of analysis refers to “the notion that individual political actors have become more prominent at the expense of parties and collective identities” (Karvonen, 2009: p. 4). The personalization refers not only to a change in on whom the coverage focuses, but also in what it emphasizes. In this sense, it goes beyond the visibility of individuals, instead referring to an increasing focus on their personalities and character, such as performance-related features, soft-personal traits, and details of their private lives. The focus on personality has brought about the “privatization of the personal sphere” (Holtz-Bacha, 2014), and the “politicization of the private persona” (Langer, 2011).


Many studies have explored quantitative changes over time and focused on one dimension of media personalization: *individualization*, i.e. the visibility of candidates vis-à-vis parties. In most cases, personalization trends in parliamentary systems, if present at all, are weaker than generally assumed. The significant differences across countries are largely dependent on the institutional arrangements of the respective political and electoral systems accounting for most of the differences (Vliegthart et al., 2011; Kriesi, 2012). The following set of questions aims to test MPs' perceptions on the importance of media visibility for their electoral success.

Chart 47a reports that 64.6% of MPs in the high vote concentration layer, 43.2% in the medium, and 67.7% in the low area, believe that media visibility was “important and very important” for their electoral success.




When confronted with a more incisive statement, "Thanks to the visibility in the media I've got electoral success" (chart 47b) Brazilian MPs clearly disclosed a balanced perception on the role of media for their electoral success. The majority agree with the importance of media, but only “conditionally”, thus suggesting that they might have other channels of communication and connections with voters (72.9% high vote, 62.2% medium vote, and 80% low vote concentration). Media, it seems, is not a *sine qua non* for their electoral careers.

Brasilia (N=100): 47b. How do you assess the following statement: "Thanks to the visibility in the media I've got electoral success."




A similar trend was found amongst German MPs: 83.8% of representatives in the high vote concentration layer, 60% in the medium range, and 83.2% in the lower area yield great importance to media visibility.

Berlin (N=224): 47c. Choose, in order of importance, which factors contributed most to your electoral success: Media visibility




Berlin: 47d. Choose, in order of importance, which factors contributed most to your electoral success: Media visibility



District-elected MPs (85%, Chart 47d) were the ones to grant slightly more importance to media visibility (“important and very important”) than list-elected MPs (83.2%).

Like the Brazilian MPs, the German representatives reacted with caution before the proposition on media as the main cause for their electoral success: 74.4% of MPs in the high vote layer, 57.8% in the medium, and 65.4% in the low range acquiesced only conditionally with the statement (chart 47e).



3.10. Political public image

The term *public image* derives from the notion of *perception*, which, despite its subjective nature, always relates to a certain content. Yet, image-making politics is a process of permanent construction. It is not a fixed entity always equal to itself, since it can be built, destroyed and rebuilt again. The mechanisms of political public image production may turn simple facts and statements into messages and symbolic values intended to produce a certain perception on the public. According to Wilson Gomes (2007), "Image-making politics aims to identify the deep trends of the public opinion, and gauge what people already deem worthy having, and then fit a political actor into a public image" (p. 276).

Cain et al. (1987) points out that “candidates with image problems” may have difficulty in raising funds, finding campaigns’ volunteers and may attract strong challengers (p. 36). Richard Fenno (1978) calls the array of activities directed to producing candidates’ *favorable images* the representative’s *home style*: a unique,

individualized response of MPs to their constituency, the natural inclinations of their personalities, and the public's *stylized perceptions* of MPs and their responsibilities. According to the author, *home style* is a two-way communication process, through which MPs learn information that they need in order to be good agents in the process of soliciting the voters' support. The choice of an *issue-oriented home style* rather than a more *service-oriented style* depends on the district's *spatial characteristics* and voter's expectation of MPs (Fenno, 1978, pp. 50-56).





Chart 48a presents the Brazilian MPs' reaction to the question on public image, as a factor for electoral success: 95.8% of the MPs in the high vote concentration layer, 95.6% in the medium, and 94.2% in the low area ("important and very important") expressed almost unanimity on the importance of consolidation of their own public image.


The German MPs responded with even greater emphasis: 97.6% in the high vote area, 95.6% in the medium, and 94.2% in the low concentration range regarded the consolidation of public image "important and very important" (chart 48b). There is no doubt about the fact that image building has become a great concern inseparable from contemporary politics. Somehow, it is more than simply visibility: it is creating on the public a certain positive image out of media visibility. That may be why politicians are normally more sensible to public image than to visibility itself.

Berlin (N=224): 48b. Choose, in order of importance, which factors contributed most to your electoral success: Consolidation of your Public Image



District-elected MPs, as expected, put more emphasis (97.8%) on consolidation of public image than list-elected MPs (93.6%, chart 48c).

Berlin (N=224): 48c. Choose, in order of importance, which factors contributed most to your electoral success: Consolidation of your Public Image



3.11. Media campaign financing: Chamber of Deputies


The study of political finance helps to understand the workings of representative democracy. For Alexander (1989) money is an element of political power, because it buys what is not or cannot be volunteered. Moreover, money is one important constituent because finance also dominates the organizational and electoral aspects of political life. The importance of money in politics then is fundamental, for it affects political spending (Johnston, 1985) and contributes to debates concerning political equality (Oliver, 1992; Fisher, 1999).

In Brazil, politicians can legally receive money from parties, individuals and companies to finance extremely expensive election campaigns.⁸⁶ Candidates at all levels receive most of the money necessary for their election from corporate sources. Companies, especially those vulnerable to government intervention, such as banks and the building industry, are the biggest contributors. They can contribute directly to candidates, and there is no clear limit for their contribution. The presidential race is almost entirely funded by the business sector, but disputes for the Chamber of Deputies tend to rely more on personal funds. Party contribution for individual candidates is irrelevant. This model brings candidates closer to their contributors, which fosters service-oriented, rather than policy-oriented electoral disputes. Donors expect a specific *service* that only public office can offer in return for their investment. Most of the MPs' efforts to propose amendments to the federal budget relate more to obtaining funds for contractors and related interests than to the direct conquest of votes (Bezerra, 1999).

Claessens and associates (2008) have demonstrated that political connections matter through preferential access to finance, and that Brazilian firms that provided contributions to elected federal deputies experienced higher stock returns than firms that did not around the 1998 and 2002 elections. This suggests that contributions help shape policy on a firm-specific basis. The authors found that contributing firms substantially increased their bank financing relative to a control group after each election, indicating that access to bank finance is an important channel through which political connections operate. They estimate the economic costs of this rent seeking over the two election cycles to be at least 0.2% of gross domestic product per annum (Claessens et al., 2008).


⁸⁶ The electoral law (1997) prohibited Unions and organizations representing the private sector, foreign business, corporation dependent on state licenses or permits to operate as well as charitable, religious and sport organizations from contributing to political campaigns. Individuals can donate up to 10% of the income declared to the IRS. For businesses, the maximum amount of donations in a campaign corresponds to 2% of revenues in the previous year.

Brasilia: 15a. Indicate, please, approximately, the precentage of the expenditure on media advertising paid by your party:




How such a political context mirrors on the individual level of MPs' media campaign financing? Charts 15a, 15b, and 15c describe the various percentage of the different tier of contribution received by MPs during their campaigns (party, donors, and private funds).

Brasilia: 15b. Indicate, please, approximately, the precentage of the expenditure on media advertising paid by donors:



Brasilia: 15c. Indicate, please, approximately, the precentage of the expenditure on media advertising paid by private funds:



Considering the median values for party contribution, represented in chart 49a (below), we perceive that 18.8% of the MPs in the high vote concentration layer, 16.2% in the medium, and 23.3% in the low area received financial support from their parties for advertising on the media. By contrast, the median values for donors' contribution (chart 49b) reveal that 23.9% of the MPs in the high vote paid their media campaign with money from donation, against 21.6% of MPs in the medium layer, and only 6.7%

in the low vote range. Median values for personal money (chart 49c) disclose that 14.6% of the MPs in high vote layer, 5.4% in the medium, and 13.3% in the low area, invested private funds in their media strategies.

Chart 49a: Median values - percentage of expenditure on media advertising paid by party




Chart 49b: Median values - percentage of expenditure on media advertising paid by donors





Chart 49c: Median values - percentage of expenditure on media advertising paid by private funds



These figures uncover that Brazilian MPs with fragmented votes have their media campaigns mostly paid by *party money* (23.3%), and high vote concentration MPs receive most of their media campaign money from *donors* (23.9%).

3.12. Media campaign financing: The Bundestag

German parties spend most of their funds on the routine operation of an impressive full-time organization, nationally and in the field. There are two major and two minor sources of revenue for German parties. On average, public subsidies as well as membership dues each provide one third of all party income. The final third of total revenue is raised from donations and by assessment of incumbents, mostly in the districts (Table 14).

Table 14: Revenues of parties represented in the German Parliament 2011 (in million €)

Party	Membership dues	Public subsidies	Donations	Assessment of incumbents	Other revenue
CDU	40.1	44.6	21.8	17.5	16.9
SPD	47.5	42.4	12.1	22.6	31.1
FDP	7.4	13.6	6.6	3.3	3.3
Left Party	9.7	12.1	1.9	3.9	1
Green Party	8	13.8	4.8	7.7	2.5
CSU	10.2	10.4	5.9	3	7.5

Source: Parliamentary paper (Bundestags-Drucksache) No. 17/12340⁸⁷

By October of each year, political parties file a financial report for the previous calendar year with the administration of the federal parliament (*Präsident des Deutschen Bundestages*). These annual reports cover completely the party organization (headquarters, regional branches and local chapters). They are tabled as parliamentary papers and published by the speaker of the Bundestag without attracting much interest among the public or the media. The data presented in the annual financial reports (*Rechenschaftsberichte*) of German parties cover the sources and the use of political funds as well as the financial situation (debts and assets) of each party.


German campaigns last only six weeks, and are run by parties rather than candidates. Over the whole election cycle campaign spending adds up to less than spending on staff, offices and internal communication. An important impact on this

⁸⁷ Retrieved from: <http://drucksachen.bundestag.de/drucksachen/index.php>


distribution among spending items is certainly caused by the fact that during a campaign for all states, the federal and the European parliament, public networks provide free airtime on radio and TV to all competing parties. German parties have estimated that less than 30 per cent of their total expenses are related to the use of media (billboards, advertising in newspapers and magazines, advertising with privately owned networks), which is quite important for campaign purposes. Even in 2009, a year with two nationwide elections (for the European and the federal parliaments), the six Bundestag parties spent between 41 and 50 percent of their total budgets on campaigning. Only the Bavarian wing of the Christian Democrats, the CSU, spent less, 32 percent of its annual expenses. A remarkable side effect of these government-funded, low-cost elections is that German politicians spend very little of their time fundraising (Niedermayer, 2013).

Charts 49 a, 49b, and 49c (below) document the different tier of contribution received by German MPs during their campaigns (party, donors, and private funds).


Berlin (N=224): 50a. Indicate, please, approximately, the percentage of the expenditure on media advertising paid by your party:



Berlin (N=224): 50b. Indicate, please, approximately, the percentage of the expenditure on media advertising paid by donors:



Berlin (N=224): 50c. Indicate, please, approximately, the percentage of the expenditure on media advertising paid by private funds:



Considering the median values for party contribution, represented in chart 49a (Berlin median values), it can be seen that 22.1% of the MPs in the high vote concentration layer, 14.4% % in the medium, and 16.3% in the low area received financial support from their parties for advertising on the media.

Chart 49a: Median values - percentage of expenditure on media advertising paid by party






Chart 49b: Median values - percentage of expenditure on media advertising paid by donors



By contrast, the median values for donors' contribution (chart 49b) reveal that 18.6% of the MPs in the high vote paid their media campaign with money from donation, against 24.4% of MPs in the medium layer, and 15.7% in the low vote range.

Median values for personal money (chart 49c) indicate that 16.2% of the MPs in high vote layer, 25.7% in the medium, and 23.3% in the low area, invested private funds in their media strategies.

Chart 49c: Median values - percentage of expenditure on media advertising paid by private funds



These figures show that German MPs in the high vote range have their media campaigns mostly paid by *party money* (22.1%), medium vote MPs are the ones who mostly invest *private funds* (25.7%), and MPs with fragmented votes receive most of the media money from *donors* (23.3%), the opposite trend found among Brazilian MPs.

3.13. Summary

In the previous sections, we analyzed and compared the perceptions of the Brazilian and German MPs regarding the various types of media and media strategies against two main variables: vote concentration and electoral formula. The vote concentration variable comprises three layers: *High concentration* if MPs received more than 65 % of the votes in the 10 first districts. *Medium concentration* if MPs received between 40% and 64% of the votes in the 10 first districts. *Low concentration* if MPs received less than or equal to 39 % of the votes in the 10 first districts. The electoral formula entails two types of votes adopted in the German mixed system: district and list vote.

Despite the limits of our research design, mostly based on descriptive statistics, exploratory analysis found variations in MPs' personal media strategies in many instances, depending on the degree of concentration of votes and the electoral formula.

High vote concentration, coupled with incentives for personal vote seeking emanating from the district election in Germany significantly increased MPs' emphasis on media strategy, and importance given to media visibility.

Chart 51a: Median vote concentration - Local TV and Radio




Chart 51b: Median vote concentration - Local Print Media




Chart 51c: Median vote concentration: National Print Media





Chart 51d: Median vote concentration: Internet and social media



It is worth remembering, that by interpreting the findings, we operate in an environment of uncertainty due, in large measure, to the complexity of the political world. The aim of this investigation is not to *explain*, but rather to *describe* a specific population, as it exists at one point in time. The concern is with looking at data and seeking out relationships between variables. In this specific case, the interest is with how the preferences of MPs in Brazil and Germany differ regarding the various types of media strategies, and how these variations relates to the independent variables, i.e., concentration of votes and electoral formulae. However, it is wise to be cautious about the possibility of *chance results* due to the limited sample drawn from a larger group of subjects. In such cases, there is always a possibility that misleading results may occur by chance. A useful check on our results is the significance test (*t-statistic*), which establishes whether two means collected from independent samples differ significantly.

A two-sampled *t-test* was conducted to check the difference in the scores for the independent variable (see appendix 3). A significant difference was found in the scores for concentration of votes for the Chamber of Deputies ($M = .85$, $SD = .04$) and for the German Bundestag ($M = .68$, $SD = .03$), $t(323) = 3.24$, $p = 0.005$. The *t-test* is not itself a measure of the strength of a relationship but rather, a check on how likely it is that a given measure is due to chance.⁸⁸

From what can be observed in the previous analysis, it may be concluded that despite the stark differences in the media and political systems, MPs that fall into the

⁸⁸ Given the small size of the data, the t-test for Minas Gerais and Bavaria proved statistically irrelevant (appendix 4).

category of high-vote concentration in Brazil and Germany tend to give more importance to media strategy than MPs in other layers of the vote distribution. In the following sections, other possible correlations between patterns of vote concentration and the media variables are explored further.

PART V: FURTHER EXPLORATORY DATA ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 1: DIMENSIONS OF MEDIA STRATEGY IN BRASÍLIA AND BERLIN

1.1. Introduction

In this section, the data is explored further using factor analysis (FA) as a scaling technique. actor analysis is used to generate hypotheses regarding casual mechanisms and to screen variables for subsequent analysis. FA is a generic term for a family of statistical techniques concerned with the reduction of a set of observable variables in terms of a small number of latent factors. The underlying assumption of FA is that there exists a number of independent variable (latent variables or factors), that account for the correlations among dependent variables all becoming zero. In other words, the latent variables determine the values of the dependent variables.

A correlational statistical method to determine meaningful clusters of shared variance, factor analysis assumes that underlying dimensions of factors can explain complex phenomena. It identifies small number of underlying factors or dimensions to represent relationships among sets of many interrelated variables. Responses to many questions might be submitted to a factor analysis, and the results would (a) indicate the most important underlying dimensions among that set of questions, and (b) show which questions were most highly related to which dimensions.

It begins by computing a correlation matrix for all variables. The correlation matrix (R-matrix) or a table of correlation coefficients between variables becomes the input for the factor analysis, which extracts the factors, the “latent variables”, necessary to represent the matrix. The extent to which each item is measured by a score is known as a *factor loading*. Factor loadings range from 0.0 to 1.0. Items having high loadings on particular factors are highly related to the underlying dimension or concept represented by that factor. In this manner, scales are developed by selecting variables that are shown to load highly on particular factors, normally, a factor loading of 0.500 or higher is required for the identification of variables to comprise a particular scale.

The current exploratory factor analysis applies to the entire population of interest. The sample used is the population, and so the results cannot extrapolate that particular

sample, i.e., the conclusions are restricted to the sample collected and generalization of the results can be achieved only if analysis using different samples reveals the same factor structure.

Three dimensions of media strategy were identified among German and Brazilian MPs: (1) *The traditional media-based strategy* refers to the predominant use of mass media. (2) *The internet-based strategy* refers to the use of so-called “self-mass-media” (Castells, 2009) or networked social media. (3) *The pragmatic promoter of local interests*, whose highest positive factor loading is on the use of benefits delivered to the electoral district as the most important mediums of attracting media attention coupled with a high negative loading on taking positions on controversial issues.

All items in the questionnaire that capture the communication between legislators and the public were selected. This includes both mediated and other channels of communication. In a first battery of questions, Legislators were asked to provide information about the media they use most frequently to contact their voters. The questionnaire items were standardized and offered four response categories: “not important at all”, “less important”, “important” and “very important”. Respondents were asked to rate the importance of (i) local television and radio as mediums of communication, (ii) national television and radio, (iii) the local press, (iv) the national press, (v) the internet and (vi) posters. In a second battery of items, legislators were asked to provide more precise information on the type of internet-based communication they use independent of their party’s internet presence. Legislators were asked to answer with “yes” if they used the relevant medium and “no” otherwise. They were asked whether they (i) maintained a personal website designed and maintained by their party, (ii) a personal website designed and maintained by their own campaign team, (iii) used mailing lists, (iv) used their own campaign spots accessible via the internet, (v) conducted on-line chats with voters and (vi) used a blog during the election campaign. Finally, legislators were asked to provide information on more traditional institutional ways of communicating and interacting with their voters. They were asked to indicate about the most important ways of attracting the interest of the media as legislators: (i) delivery of ‘pork’ to their districts, (ii) work in legislative committees, (iii) speeches in parliament and (iv) taking positions on controversial issues in public debates.

1.2. Internet-based strategy and traditional media-based strategy: pooled data

In a first step, an exploratory factor analysis was performed to discover any latent dimensions underlying these various activities. We used an Eigenvalue of 1.0 as a cut-off point for the identification of important dimensions. The factor matrix was rotated using a standard orthogonal Varimax rotation and the Kaiser normalization criterion. The factor analysis was conducted for the pooled sample of legislators from both chambers (N=324) and separately for the Chamber of Representatives (N=100) and the German Bundestag (N=224). The results are presented in Tables 1-3.

Table 1: Factor Analysis of important channels of communication of Brazilian and German national-level legislators (N=324)

Variable	Factor 1: Internet-based strategy	Factor 2: Traditional media-based strategy	Uniqueness
Media used most frequently to contact voters:			
Local TV and radio	-0.4337	0.5924	0.4610
National TV and radio	-0.1252	0.8114	0.3260
Local press	0.0400	0.4419	0.8032
National press	0.1222	0.7210	0.4652
Internet	-0.2079	0.0146	0.9566
Posters	0.1173	0.0279	0.9855
Use of internet tools in the last election campaign			
Personal website maintained by party	-0.0699	-0.1447	0.9742
Personal website maintained by own campaign team	0.3489	-0.0277	0.8775
Mailing lists	0.2278	0.0199	0.9477
Internet-based campaign spot	0.6487	-0.0498	0.5767
Online chats	0.6639	-0.0587	0.5558
Blog	0.5746	-0.0049	0.6698
Attracts media interest mainly by...			
Delivering government funds to district	-0.3122	0.069	0.8978
Work in legislative committees	-0.0453	0.1108	0.9857
Speeches in the chamber	0.1231	0.1131	0.9721
Taking positions in controversial debates	0.2100	0.1196	0.9416

Note: Factor loadings > 0.25 and < -0.25 in bold type

For the *entire sample*, two factors were extracted based on the Eigenvalue criterion of 1.0. These two factors captured 79.01% of the total variance. The first factor (capturing 39.6% of the variance) could be termed '*internet-based strategy*'. It shows *positive loadings* of over .33 for a number of internet-based mediums of communicating with voters and *loads negatively*, firstly, on the use of regional TV and radio stations as the most important form of communication and, secondly, to a strategy highlighting the delivery of 'pork' to the district. The second factor accounts for 39.41% of the variance and could be characterized as '*traditional media-based strategy*', which loads *highly and positively* on the use of regional television and, national television and radio, the regional press and the national press as primary means of communication. The highest loading is for *national TV and radio* as well as the *national press*.

1.3. Traditional media-based strategy and Internet-based strategy: The German Bundestag

Disaggregating these findings by parliament reveals interesting variations between the legislatures. If an Eigenvalue criterion of 1.0 is applied, two factors are extracted for the German Bundestag, which account for 73.16% of the variance. These correspond largely to the picture for the pooled data, except that the *traditional media-based strategy* accounts for 48.9% of the variance, whereas *the internet-based strategy* is clearly secondary and captures approximately 24.26% of the variance (table 2).

The first factor, the "*traditional media-based strategy*", loads *highly and positively* on the use of local (.75) and national (.83) TV/Radio, and on the local (.47) and national (.66) press as primary mediums of communication with voters. The second factor "*the Internet-based strategy*", loads negatively as mediums of communicating with voters, and positively with loadings for a number of internet tools used in campaign, such as *personal websites* (.41), *Internet-based campaign spots* (.52), *on line chats* (.44), and *blogs* (.49).

Table 2: Factor Analysis of important channels of communication of Members of the German Bundestag (N=224)

Variable	Factor 1: Traditional media-based strategy	Factor 2: Internet-based strategy	Uniqueness
Media used most frequently to contact voters:			
Local TV and radio	0.7511	-0.0794	0.4296
National TV and radio	0.8374	-0.0034	0.2987
Local press	0.4720	-0.0017	0.7772
National press	0.6697	0.0799	0.5451
Internet	0.0110	-0.1258	0.9841
Posters	-0.0701	-0.0657	0.9908
Use of internet tools in the last election campaign:			
Personal website maintained by party	-0.2212	-0.2213	0.9021
Personal website maintained by own campaign team	-0.0409	0.4191	0.8226
Mailing lists	0.0292	0.2020	0.9583
Internet-based campaign spot	-0.0929	0.5269	0.7138
Online chats	-0.1046	0.4407	0.7948
Blog	-0.1228	0.4958	0.7391
Attracts media interest mainly by ...			
Delivering government funds to district	0.0187	-0.0070	0.9996
Work in legislative committees	0.0481	0.0029	0.9977
Speeches in the chamber	0.0143	0.0476	0.9975
Taking positions in controversial debates	0.1648	-0.0503	0.9703

Note: Factor loadings > 0.25 and < -0.25 in bold type

1.4. Anecdotal evidence: Members of the German Bundestag (MdB)

In this section and in the next ones, the different dimensions of media strategy are illustrate with excerpts from the interviews conducted in the German Bundestag, the Bavarian Landtag and the Chamber of Deputies. The sample selection followed the criterion of “non-repetition”, i.e., each example corresponds to a cluster of cases with similar responses, which were omitted to avoid repetition. These samples are used as *anecdotal evidence*, which entails preferences, comments, and subjective views that do

not provide direct scientific proof per se, but may help better interpret the quantitative data.⁸⁹

The first dimension to be illustrated is the “*internet-based strategy*” found among German MPs elected for the Bundestag who use the online media as important mediums of communicating with voters. The following excerpts, taken from an interview with a list-elected member of the Bundestag, featuring low concentration of votes, elected by the SPD in upper Franconia (Bavaria) may illustrate this kind of strategy. Here, the Internet and social media play an important role as an alternative to the political bias of local media.

Q.: How did you build your Electoral career?

A.: *“My political experience began when I was a teenager. My father was the mayor of a small community, and used to take me to SPD meetings. While studying at the University, I organized student unions, strikes and protests. As a woman, I always had the passion for politics and sincerely wanted to change the world. This passion, I think, helped me to conquer many votes.”*

Q.: Do you have media staff?

A.: *“We do not have personal media staff. We rely on the party personnel for that.”*

Q.: What kind of media do you use most to keep in contact with your constituency?

A.: *“Political communication has changed dramatically in recent years, as the local citizens, especially the youth now get most of the political information from the Internet. Old people still pay much attention to local newspapers and radio stations, but more and more they are migrating to online information, and we politicians have to adjust to this technological change”.*

Q.: How important was media visibility for your electoral success?

⁸⁹ The author recorded, classified, and translated into English all the interviews made with MPs in Brazil and Germany. The original audio files in German and Portuguese are available for scientific purpose.

A.: *“The coverage in the local media has been extremely difficult due to the political hegemony of the CSU in Bavaria. In upper Franconia, the media is very parsimonious towards the opposition parties, especially the SPD. Therefore, we have to rely on the Internet, on SPD brochures and websites. Most importantly, we need to promote local events and be members of local associations. For me the second vote (list) was important, because I could rely more on the party label and less on media coverage”* (Interview with the author: Kulmbach, 27.07. 2012).

Another list-elected MP (CDU/Hessen) with low concentration of votes reports similar problem with local media. He explains his experience with the dynamics of local media vs. local politics in the state of Hessen, and the way he circumvents the media gap:

Q.: How important is the local mass media in mobilizing the members of your party in your district?

A.: *“Of course, any story on our party published in the local media is always welcome! Yet, it is not so easy to find space for it in the print local media, for example. We always feed the newspapers and broadcasting media with articles, reviews and press releases, but few are actually published. Party politics is not a topic of interest to the local media, except when it comes to local issues, such as the construction of a new bridge or the repair of the railroad tracks.”*

Q.: What kind of media do you use most to keep in contact with your constituency?

A.: *“I use all types of media available online as an alternative for the blockade of the mass media. I have a webpage on the Internet, use all social networks, and feed the Twitter with comments all the time. I think all this effort is necessary, but I don't have any illusions as to the effect on voters. Despite all the online strategy, I am sure, I will never reach all my supporters; much less conquer new voters only through the digital media or even the mass media. That to me is a truism! The only chance to win new voters is keeping direct contact with people, through door-to-door visits, participation in clubs and neighborhood associations, and taking part in philanthropic activity. The party's grass roots comprise old people, sixty and above, who represents the majority of*

our voters. To them I still need to send letters by post. We do not use e-mail, much less social networks, since most of them are either suspicious of the 'new media' or simply are unable to use them" (Interview with the author: Rüsselsheim, 25.07.2013).

A list-elected MP (The Left/Berlin), with low concentration of votes, explain the importance of posters for his campaign:

Q.: How did you build your electoral career?

A.: *"I built my political career through the Unions. Labor and wage issues are the major themes that guide my parliamentary action, in a region where wages are increasingly suffering the pressures of globalized finance capitalism, unemployment is increasing, and with it the social injustice."*

Q.: What kind of media do you think was more important for your political campaign?

A.: *"We used a lot of posters and billboards in our last campaign. For me, it is still the best way to introduce our candidates to the public. Through posters, people come to know who is competing in a simple and direct way. This is crucial, especially in small towns, where everyone knows everyone. Of course, the mass media and the Internet are important, but for me the rule is 'no posters, no political campaign.'"*

Q.: How important was media visibility for your electoral success?

A.: *"Zero! Without the Party label and grass-root mobilization, I could never be elected!"* (Interview with the author: Berlin, 17.07.2013).

A directly elected MP from Stuttgart (Green Party), with medium concentration of votes, explain why local print media remain important, although more and younger people no longer read newspapers in Germany:

Q.: How important was local print media for your campaign?

A.: *"Although more and more young people no longer read newspapers, the local print media remain very important because people who care for politics search in the*

local papers what MPs do for their region. These stories normally do not appear in the broadcasting media, but on local newspapers. Hence the political importance of the local press.”

Q.: What kind of media do you use most to keep in contact with your constituency?

A.: *“I use the internet a lot, because young people no longer read print media. I have my own homepage and actively participate in social networks, through which I can reach circles of people that would normally be outside the scope of my work as a parliamentarian.”*

Q.: What is the alternative when local mass media refuse to report on your campaign?

A.: *“When the local media is silent, the alternative is to go to the streets. The Green Party is a party of the streets and public squares, where we set up our booths for distributing leaflets and advertising material. We love the personal contact with the crowds, event promotion and mass protests in defense of the environment. So that there are no barriers to our work with the media or without them.”*

Q.: Why are posters so important in German campaigns?

A.: *“Posters are much more important to district candidates, who need to show a face to voters, than to list candidates, whose election depends on the rank in the list and on the amount of votes given to the party label. The role of posters is to convey the idea, ‘es gibt Mich’ (I do exist). Without posters, I think district candidates have no chance to win an election. It would be a ‘faceless’, a ‘ghost’ candidate!”* (Interview with the author: Stuttgart, 06.08.2013).

A list-elected MP from Frankfurt (Green Party), with low concentration of votes, explain why local mass media is more important for direct candidates, and list candidates profit more from the national media:

Q.: How important was local mass media for your campaign?

A.: *“The local media was important, but did not play a central role. At least for the list candidates in Hessen, the regional and national media are much more important. I could only reach my constituency through the regional media, and our party, the Green party, receives much more coverage in the national media than in local media, which, with few exceptions, are monopolistic and more politically biased than the big media.”*

Q.: What kind of media do you use most to keep in contact with your constituency?

A.: *“I am very active in the social media. I don’t have a staff to do it for me, so I do it myself. I think people appreciate more when the representative posts the comments and take part in the forum of discussion, than when someone else does it. It sounds baloney for many”* (Interview with the author: Frankfurt, 21.08.2013).

A directly elected party leader (Green Party/Augsburg) in the Bundestag, with medium concentration of votes, explains her party strategy to circumvent local mass media bias in Bavaria:

Q.: How important was local mass media for your campaign?

A.: *“Among all the different types of media, the local print and broadcasting media played a central role in my campaign. In my district, there are several public local and regional TV and radio stations, which are more politically independent than the local press, because they are accountable to a democratically elected Board of Counselors representing all parties and organized groups in society. The main two public broadcasters in Germany are ARD and ZDF. The problem is that their audience is gradually fading away, as the young generation has gone online, are politically uninterested, and watch the pop-oriented channels, like RTL and Luxemburg TV. By contrast, the local traditional newspapers in Bavaria, with rare exceptions, are party oriented and very biased in terms of what candidates to support. They exert a huge influence on the mass of CSU voters, who are in their 60s, and always vote for the same candidates. This demographic and political scenario has triggered the emergence of an alternative print media in Bavaria that aims to fill the gap of local political information, by giving voice to opposition candidates. This alternative press played an important role in my campaign.”*

Q.: How important was the online campaign?

A.: *“Very important! I think the Green Party is the party with representation in the Bundestag, which most use the Internet in campaigns. Twitter, of course, but also a whole range of Websites and Wikis, where we discuss our programs and proposals, and voters can actively participate by sending questions and suggestions, and influence the direction of our policies through participation in online polls and referendums. We even offer the possibility of 'pre-elections' through which our voters decide, by voting online, who will be the party's candidate in their district. It's a very interactive medium that keeps us in permanent contact with our supporters. It's also a wonderful means of mobilization.”*

Q.: What is the alternative when local media refuse to report on your campaign?

A.: *“Besides the online communication tools, we use 'Anzeigenmagazine' (magazine ads), 'Kino spots' (cinema ads), which are very ironic, and we go door-to-door, the most effective means of communication with voters. No media can ever replace the personal contact with people. We simply knock on doors, and start a brief explanation about our campaign. We normally don't enter the building. It's simple, very effective and the impression upon people is long lasting. It creates a 'snow-ball effect', as normally family members tend to follow mom's or papa's party preference in Bavaria. It's also common that people ask for a print in and request the 350-page version. This shows a deep interest in our proposals”* (Interview with the author: Augsburg, 23.08.2013).

The following are excerpts from the interview with the Editor-in-Chief of the *“Nordbayerische Kurrier”* (50 thousand copies daily) from Bayreuth (Bavaria), in which he explains the strategic importance of local papers in Bavaria:

Q. A number of MPs who responded to our survey expressed a special preference for the local press. In some cases, this preference outweighs the Internet and social media. How do you explain this phenomenon?

A.: *“Firstly, the local press in Bavaria has a highly politicized readership. They are voters-subscribers who are interested in public policies affecting the local*

communities. I would say that local newspapers target the 70% of the electorate who come to the polls in Bavaria. The younger voters who do not read or do not have money to buy newspapers also are not interested in politics, so politicians know well the strategic importance of the local press. It should be noted, however, that the digital version of the newspaper is much visited, and that the long-term trend is toward digitalization, but the print copy, like books, will always play an important role in the preference of certain types of readers.”

Q. Many politicians also complained against the so-called “media bias” in the local press. According to them, most small and medium size local papers lack editorial independence and are very selective when it comes to what party or candidate to support. What say you about it?

A.: *“This is a common complaint on the part of politicians: the CSU complains when the local newspaper is committed to the SPD and vice versa. It is an endless debate! However, my experience points to a more complex and nuanced reality. We all know that objectivity in journalism is an ideal type, a value to be pursued, but in practice, it does not exist. There are 30 editors in our newspaper, each one with a different political preference, with an ideological hue that is impossible to control. This idea that the editor-in-chief sets the editorial line, and everyone else should follow, was a common practice in the former DDR, but never in the unified Germany”* (Interview with the author: Bayreuth, 12.09.2103).

1.5. The Pragmatic promotion of local interests as media strategy: The Chamber of Deputies

The case of the Chamber of Deputies is somewhat more complex. Three factors are extracted, accounting for 83.91% of the variance. The first factor, accounting for 30.33% of the variance, is similar to the first factor in the German Bundestag and characterizes *a traditional media-based strategy*. Interestingly, it also shows relatively high and positive factor loadings on *parliamentary speeches* as the most important mediums of *attracting media attention*. The second factor, accounting for 45.87% of the

variance, seems puzzling. It loads *highly and negatively* on the use of the internet as important *channel for the MPs communication with voters* and, seemingly paradoxically, *positively* on the use of a personal website designed and maintained by the legislator's own campaign team, the use of mailing lists, own campaign spots accessible via the internet, on-line chats with voters and blogs. There are also *negative loadings* for *speeches in parliament* and *taking positions on controversial topics*. It would seem that this strategy could be termed as one of an "*indirect internet-based strategy*", which does not use the new web-based media as an important medium of communicating with voters, but still has an extensive internet presence – most likely to project a modern image or to communicate with persons in their own networks. It is also possible that this factor reveals an indirect media strategy. The third factor, accounting for approximately 23.8% of the variance, could be termed as strategy of a '*pragmatic promoter of local interests*'. The highest positive factor loading is on the use of benefits delivered to the electoral district as the most important mediums of *attracting media attention* coupled with a high negative *loading on taking positions on controversial issues*. There are also relatively high positive factor loadings on the *use of local and regional TV*, radio stations and newspapers as well as the use of personal advertisements and – as the only internet-based channel of communication – a personal website maintained by the party.

Table 3: Factor Analysis of important channels of communication of Members of the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies (N=100)

Variable	Factor 1: Traditional media-based strategy	Factor 2: Indirect internet- based strategy	Factor 3: Pragmatic promoter of local interests	Uniqueness
Media used most frequently to contact voters:				
Local TV and radio	0.4578	-0.2280	0.3650	0.6052
National TV and radio	0.7992	0.0273	0.0824	0.3538
Local press	0.4094	-0.2161	0.4140	0.6143
National press	0.7805	0.1371	0.1006	0.3619
Internet	-0.0176	-0.5952	0.1784	0.6136
Posters	0.2681	0.0724	0.4802	0.6923
Use of internet tools in the last election campaign:				
Personal website maintained by party	0.0063	0.1462	0.3541	0.8532
Personal website maintained by own campaign team	0.0156	0.7305	-0.0208	0.4657
Mailing lists	-0.0914	0.3600	0.0300	0.8612
Internet-based campaign spot	0.0138	0.6283	0.1859	0.5704
Online chats	0.0465	0.3465	0.1187	0.8637
Blog	0.3092	0.3558	0.0484	0.7754
Attracts media interest mainly by ...				
Delivering government funds to district	-0.0438	-0.077	0.6874	0.5196
Work in legislative committees	0.2393	0.0263	-0.1424	0.9218
Speeches in the chamber	0.4165	-0.3692	-0.1978	0.6511
Taking positions in controversial debates	0.1931	-0.3002	-0.5776	0.539

Note: Factor loadings > 0.25 and < -0.25 in bold type

1.6. Anecdotal evidence: Members of The Chamber of Deputies

In this section, the dimensions of media strategy are illustrated, based on the factor analysis discussed above, with excerpts from the interviews conducted in the Chamber of Deputies in May 2013. These samples are used as *anecdotal evidence*, which entails preferences, comments, and subjective views that do not provide direct scientific proof per se, but may help better interpret the quantitative data.

The first dimension to be illustrated is the “*indirect internet-based strategy*” found among Brazilian MPs who do not use the new web-based media as an important

medium of communicating with voters, but still, have an extensive internet presence, most likely to project a modern image or to communicate with persons in their own networks. The following excerpts, taken from an interview with a high-vote concentration MP (PSDB/SP), may illustrate this kind of strategy: here, Internet and social media play an important role for the MP's accountability, yet the radio appears as the most important means of communication to keep in contact with voters.

Q.: How did you build your Electoral career?

A.: *Through the engagement in the student movement. My public career started when the people of Jundiai elected me for the City Hall. Then, they chose me to be the mayor, and today I am in the Chamber of Deputies, where I mainly focus on the problem of youth unemployment, which amounts to 60% of the young people between 18 and 24 years of age in my region.*

Q.: Do you have media staff?

A.: *Yes, of course! I invest 10% of my PR budget to keep a media staff in Brasília and Jundiai. They are responsible to feed the social media (Tweeter, Facebook, Orkut, and Flicker) with all aspects of our activities from speeches in the Chamber to amendments to the federal budget. I would say, most of the accountability of my mandate is done through the social media.*

Q.: What kind of media do you use most to keep in contact with your constituency?

A.: *Local radio stations! I have a weekly radio program through which I keep in touch with voters. Eventually, when the political agenda in Brasília affects local interests, I get more coverage in local newspapers and TV stations, but the bulk of my communication strategy with the grass roots relies on radio.*

Q.: How important was media visibility for your electoral success?

A.: *I would say the mass media played a very important role in my career, firstly because it helped to build my public image as someone who fight for the interests of the youth of my district, and secondly because without media there is no possibility of*

making the public know my activities in the Chamber of Deputies. (Interview with the author: Brasília, 15.05.2013).

Another example of “*indirect internet-based strategy*” comes from the interview with a high-vote concentration MP (PSDB/BA), a former mayor of a large city in the Northeast of Brazil:

Q.: How did you build your Electoral career?

A.: *The issue of public urbanization was very important for my election as mayor of Salvador (BA). I think, people liked my two terms in the City Hall, and then elected me for the Chamber of Deputies.*

Q.: Do you have media staff?

A.: *Yes, but nothing special...*

Q.: What kind of media do you use most to keep in contact with your constituency?

A.: *A little bit of everything! I spent a period without given much importance to Web 2.0, the social media, but now I have a blog and use the social media, especially Facebook and Twitter, although my visibility in the mass media is due to my work as a mayor. In that regard, I would say, TV was crucial for me to project an image of good administrator and reach out voters in the countryside of my state. You know, Bahia is the very large (567,295 km²), and not everyone has access to the Internet.*

The following excerpts, extracted from the interview with a medium vote concentration veteran MP (PR/RJ), may illustrate the “*traditional media-based strategy*”. Here, there is no mention of the Internet or even social media. Instead, the old radio appears as the reason for his electoral success:

Q.: How did you build your Electoral career?

A.: *My electoral career started thanks to my active participation in the movement for the defense of workers of the sugarcane plantations in the state of Rio de Janeiro.*

Q.: What kind of mass media do you use most to keep in contact with your constituency?

A.: *I use the microphone of a local radio station to mobilize support against the perverse working conditions of so-called "bóias-frias" (day laborers), who were treated in an inhuman manner by the landowners. Despite their opposition, I managed to put together a program on the local radio, which made me known in the region. Shortly after the radio program had captivated a large audience, I was elected for the Chamber of Deputies, and then for governor. Yet, I need to say, there is a fine distinction between a radio host and a politician using the radio to get votes. It is a great mistake to use radio for mere electoral purposes, and the audience knows intuitively the difference. I was and still am a radio host!* (Interview with the author: Brasília, 14.05.2013).

From an opposition leader (PSOL/RJ), featuring low-vote concentration, it was learned that the mass media still play an important role for political mobilization, albeit his party was the one to use most the internet-based strategy during the 2010 elections:

Q.: How did you build your Electoral career?

A.: *I do not see the representation in Parliament as a "career", but a "public service". In my case, I deem it a "biography of struggles" for the community and the rights of citizens, the dwellers of cities and streets. I started my engagement in politics working with Base Communities and citizens' mobilization for social justice. This does not make a "profession", but a history of struggles for justice, education and dwelling. That is why I do not consider myself a professional politician. I used to say, I am primarily a teacher, then a politician.*

Q.: How important was media visibility for your electoral success?

A.: *I fight hard against the monopoly of the media in Brazil, but this does not prevent me to say that, in a mass society like ours, mass media is a major factor in shaping public opinion. I would say the mass media played a very important role in the formation of my public profile. In a scale from one to ten, I would give a grade of seven for the mass media as a factor responsible for the development of the public image of*

someone who fight for the underprivileged (Interview with the author: Brasília, 16.05.2013).

The interview with a “Tele-evangelist” elected by the Green Party (PV/MG), with a medium concentration of votes, well illustrates the political use of religion as a springboard for electoral careers. TV and Radio emerge as a powerful means of enthralling a true and lasting audience that eventually turns into ballots:

Q.: How did you build your Electoral career?

A.: *This is my second term as deputy. I believe that the media, especially radio and television, were responsible for my election. I am a Tele-evangelist with two daily programs on Radio and Television, which just turned 10 years. Notice that I’ve never had exactly a political platform or program. My issue has always been the 'human being', the couple's problems, and psychological depression to which people are subject in the modern world. Such agenda fits perfectly into the Green Party's program, which aims at the sustainable development of a healthy relationship between nature and humans beings.*

Q.: How important was media visibility for your electoral success?

A.: *I’ve got a high visibility on the media, and became very famous and beloved by the public, because I deal with issues of human behavior and conflict among people in those programs. I have always had a great interaction with my audience. Thence to the vote, was just one-step! All it took was the public came to know that I was a candidate for the Chamber of Deputies. My election is a consequence of my presence on Radio and TV* (Interview with the author: Brasília, 15.05.2013).

CHAPTER 2: DIMENSIONS OF MEDIA STRATEGY IN MINAS GERAIS AND BAVARIA (LANDTAG)

2.1. Introduction

In this section, the results of the exploratory factor analysis to discover any latent dimensions underlying various media strategies amongst MPs from Minas Gerais and Bavaria is presented. Following the same method used in the previous analyses, an Eigenvalue of 1.0 was adopted as a cut-off point for the identification of important dimensions. The factor matrix was rotated using a standard orthogonal Varimax rotation and the Kaiser Normalization criterion. The factor analysis was conducted for the pooled sample of legislators from both chambers (N=183) and separately for MPs of Minas Gerais in the Chamber of Representatives (N=53) and the Bavarian Landtag (N=130). The results are presented in Tables 1-3.

All items in the questionnaire that capture the communication between legislators and the public were selected. This includes both mediated and other channels of communication. In a first battery of questions, Legislators were asked to provide information about the media they use most frequently to contact their voters. The questionnaire items were standardized and offered four response categories: “not important at all”, “less important”, “important” and “very important”. Respondents were asked to rate the importance of (i) local television and radio as mediums of communication, (ii) national television and radio, (iii) the local press, (iv) the national press, (v) the internet and (vi) posters. In a second battery of items, legislators were asked to provide more precise information on the type of internet-based communication they use independent of their party’s internet presence. Legislators were asked to answer with “yes” if they used the relevant medium and “no” otherwise. They were asked whether they (i) maintained a personal website designed and maintained by their party, (ii) a personal website designed and maintained by their own campaign team, (iii) used mailing lists, (iv) used their own campaign spots accessible via the internet, (v) conducted on-line chats with voters and (vi) used a blog during the election campaign.

Finally, legislators were asked to provide information on more traditional institutional ways of communicating and interacting with their voters. They were asked to indicate about the most important ways of attracting the interest of the media as legislators: (i) delivery of ‘pork’ to their districts, (ii) work in legislative committees, (iii) speeches in parliament and (iv) taking positions on controversial issues in public debates.

2.2. Indirect-internet-based strategy and traditional media-based strategy: pooled sample

For the entire sample (Landtag and Minas Gerais), two factors were extracted based on the Eigenvalue criterion of 1.0. These two factors captured 43.4% of the variance. The first factor (table 1), capturing 24.7% of the variance, could be termed the “*indirect-Internet-based strategy*”. It shows *positive loadings* of over .36 for a number of internet tools *used in campaign*, the highest loading being for *Internet-based campaign spots* (.78) and *on line chats* (.73). Yet, it *loads negatively* as mediums of *communicating with voters* (-.51). Is also *loads negatively* on the use of local TV and radio stations as the most important form of communication with voters (-.40). The second factor that accounts for 17.7% of the variance is the “*traditional media-based strategy*”, which loads *highly and positively* on the use of national television and radio as means of communication (.85), and on the national press as primary means of communication (.74).

Table 1: Factor Analysis of important channels of communication of MPs from Minas Gerais and Bavarian MPs: Pooled data (N=183).

Variable	Factor 1: Indirect-Internet-based strategy	Factor 2: Traditional media-based strategy	Uniqueness
Media used most frequently to contact voters:			
Local TV and radio	-0.4038	0.4815	0.3908
National TV and radio	-0.0751	0.8573	0.7244
Local press	0.1127	0.3711	0.1523
National press	0.0339	0.7471	0.5490
Internet	-0.5164	-0.0125	0.2613
Posters	0.2180	-0.1830	0.7802
Use of internet tools in the last election campaign			
Personal website maintained by party	0.1256	0.2414	0.7224
Personal website maintained by own campaign team	0.3691	-0.0630	0.3149
Mailing lists	0.5587	0.1278	0.3132
Internet-based campaign spot	0.7883	-0.0254	0.6049
Online chats	0.7380	0.0497	0.5384
Blog	0.5974	0.0423	0.3500
Attracts media interest mainly by...			
Delivering government funds to district	0.1273	0.0294	0.1445
Work in legislative committees	0.0810	0.0419	0.7730
Speeches in the chamber	-0.1259	-0.1280	0.2883
Taking positions in controversial debates	-0.1470	0.0379	0.1965

Note: Factor loadings > 0.25 and < -0.25 in bold type and

2.3. Traditional media and indirect-Internet-based strategy: The Bavarian Landtag

Table 2 documents the findings for the Bavarian MPs. If an Eigenvalue criterion of 1.0 is applied, two factors were extracted for the German Landtag. These two factors captured 37.5% of the total variance. The first factor, which captures 21.7% of the variance, is the “*traditional media-based strategy*”, which loads *highly and positively* on the use of national television and radio (.82) and on the national press as primary mediums of communication with voters (.78). The second factor, capturing 15.7% of

the variance, is “*the indirect-Internet-based strategy*”, which loads negatively as mediums of communicating with voters (-.46), and positively with loadings of over .26 for a number of internet tools *used in campaign*, the highest loading being for *Internet-based campaign spots* (.75) and *on line chats* (.46). These results contrast with the picture for the pooled data (table 1), as the loadings for “*Internet-based strategy*” were higher (24.7%) than those for the “*traditional media-based strategy*” (17.7%).

Table 2: Factor Analysis of important channels of communication of Members of the Bavarian Landtag (N=130)

Variable	Factor 1: Traditional media-based strategy	Factor 2: Indirect-Internet-based strategy	Uniqueness
<i>Media used most frequently to contact voters:</i>			
Local TV and radio	0.6798	0.0619	0.44906
National TV and radio	0.8245	-0.1653	0.69934
Local press	0.5107	0.2075	0.30422
National press	0.7890	0.000	0.61301
Internet	0.0213	-0.4698	0.21473
Posters	-0.1991	-0.2284	0.08515
<i>Use of internet tools in the last election campaign:</i>			
Personal website maintained by party	0.2598	-0.0284	0.62420
Personal website maintained by own campaign team	-0.0514	0.2697	0.72491
Mailing lists	0.1377	0.4498	0.21217
Internet-based campaign spot	-0.0790	0.7837	0.56438
Online chats	-0.0413	0.4689	0.21279
Blog	-0.0981	0.4190	0.17655
<i>Attracts media interest mainly by ...</i>			
Delivering government funds to district	-0.0730	0.1410	0.25510
Work in legislative committees	-0.1981	-0.1293	0.51004
Speeches in the chamber	-0.1937	-0.1260	0.51503
Taking positions in controversial debates	-0.0194	-0.0398	0.87005

Note: Factor loadings > 0.25 and < -0.25 in bold type

2.4. Anecdotal evidence: Members of The Bavarian Landtag

The following excerpts were taken from the interviews with members of the Bavarian Landtag (MdL) conducted from September 5th to October 17th, 2012. A list-elected, party leader, with low concentration of votes, is a good example of what we call the “*indirect-Internet-based strategy*”:

Q.: How did you build your electoral career?

A.: “*For 12 years, I was mayor of Kulmbach and chairperson of the SPD in Upper Franconia. People know that I am a politician who takes their concerns seriously, instead of resorting to political platitudes. My attitude is ‘talk the talk and walk the walk’. Voters in my district attach great importance to this kind of profile, and I fit in it perfectly. I am proud of being a politician on whom people can rely*”.

Q.: Do you have media staff?

A.: “*No. I use the party media and PR staff.*”

Q.: What kind of media do you use most to keep in contact with your constituency?

A.: “*During my 12 year-term in the City Hall, I invested heavily on TV and radio spots to promote tourism in the region, but not for my personal political career. Today, as a member of the Landtag, I prefer to invest money in promoting events where I can meet people directly. No media can substitute personal interaction with citizens in clubs, churches and associations. That is why I prefer to spend my money in sponsoring kindergartens, sports clubs and churches than in media propaganda. In general, I would say, I use the Internet, mostly e-mails, to organize events*”.

Q.: How important was media visibility for your electoral success?

A.: “*As an opposition leader (SPD), I received very poor attention from a CSU-dominated local media. Direct contact with voters and party label played a very important role for my electoral success.*” (Interview with the author: Kulmbach, 05.09.2102).

A directly elected MP (Freien Wähler/Independent), with medium concentration of votes, explains why he adopts a “traditional media-based strategy”:

Q.: What kind of media do you use most to keep in contact with your constituency?

A.: *“My constituency lives in the rural area of Bavaria. For me the Radio is more important than TV and even newspaper, because it is a very large area and I cannot cover it personally. I do my best to have a direct contact with people, but sometimes it is not possible. The party supporters are too old to use the Internet, and the young people who use it are not interested in politics”* (Interview with the author: Munich, 06.09.2012).

A directly elected MP (CSU/Nürnberg), with high concentration of votes, explains why local papers still play a central role in Bavaria:

Q.: What kind of media do you use most to keep in contact with your constituency?

A.: *“When I was elected for the first time, 23 years ago, the local press was the most important means of communication with my constituency. The national media was not so important, except for remote rural areas. Nowadays this picture has changed dramatically, as more and more people go online to get political information. The social media are booming, but I am an old-timer, I simply refuse to get along. I don’t need it! I still use the local papers to communicate with my supporters. There are three of them just around Nürnberg County. I may not reach everyone, but certainly, I do with the audience that is politically relevant for me”* (Interview with the author: Munich, 17.10.2012).

A *Fraktionsführer* (CSU/Donau-Ries), a directly elected faction leader, with high concentration of votes, explains his “recipe” for electoral success:

Q.: What kind of media do you use most to keep in contact with your constituency?

A.: *“The mass media still play a central role in politics. If you want to climb in your political career, you need to appear on TV and newspapers, because people are ‘visual’, they like to see pictures and images. The best way to do it is to work hard for*

local communities, and carry out events that naturally generates media coverage. Even so, I have no illusion: only media is not enough, may it be TV, press or even Internet. You have to build your reputation as a 'hard-working representative' along the years. You have to be with people, all the time, everywhere, and deliver a positive belief, a good public image. Otherwise, media is of no avail!" (Interview with the author: Munich, 17.10.2012).

The following are excerpts from the interview with a list-elected MP (Green Party), who features a low concentration of votes,

Q.: How important was the local mass media for your electoral success?

A.: *"I would say that the local mass media was more important than the national media, because of the resonance produced by local media coverage on the voters, especially when it comes to print media. In Bayern, there are still local papers, which belong to local and regional business, and are less dependent on the big media outlets. Normally, they cover fairly well all the political spectrum in the election time."*

Q.: What kind of media do you use most to keep in contact with your constituency?

A.: *"I use all online tools available, from Twitter to social media, to keep in touch with my supporters. I deem online politics complementary to off-line activity, and a good alternative to classical mass media. Between the mass media and the Internet, in some regards, I would say, the balance tilts toward the latter. Online communication is free not only from costs, but also from the barriers of traditional mass media. We can create our own message, and check what issues are important for our supporters. The internet is a striking (plakativ), fast, and wonderful medium to keep in touch with my grass roots."*

Q.: How important was the poster campaign for your electoral success?

A.: *"I didn't have much money to pay for posters, but I think posters are more a 'remembrance factor' than a 'decisive factor' to win an election"* (Interview with the author: Munich, 03.10.2012).

2.5. Traditional media-based strategy and promoters of local interests: Minas Gerais

Table 3 reports the findings for the MPs of Minas Gerais. If an Eigenvalue criterion of 1.0 is applied, three factors are extracted, which captured 52.10% of the variance. The first factor (table 1), capturing 17.8% of the variance, is the “*traditional media-based strategy*”, which loads negatively on the use of Internet (-.31) and posters (-.38), and *positively* on the use of national (.47) and local (.32) television and radio as well as on the local and national press (.36) as primary mediums of communication with voters.

The second factor, capturing 17.2% of the variance, is “*the pragmatic promoter of local interests*”, whose highest positive factor loading (.70) is the use of benefits delivered to the electoral district (pork barrel) as the most important mediums of attracting media attention. This factor underscores a negative loading (-.48) on taking positions on controversial issues. There are also negative loadings on the national press (-.30), but positive loadings on local TV and radio (.29), on posters (.40), and on the Internet (.25) as mediums of communicating with voters. As tools used in campaigns, there are positive loadings on websites (.49), and on Internet-based spots (.40).

The third factor, which accounts for 17.1% of the variance, could be termed as the strategy of an “*indirect promoter of local interests*”, whose highest positive factor loading is on work in *legislative committees* (.57) and *speeches in the chamber* (.52) as the most important means of attracting media attention.

Table 3: Factor Analysis of important channels of communication of MPs elected in Minas Gerais (N=53)

Variable	Factor 1: Traditional media-based strategy	Factor 2: pragmatic promoter of local interests	Factor 3: Indirect promoter of local interests	Uniqueness
Media used most frequently to contact voters:				
Local TV and radio	0.3254	0.2921	0.0717	0.1908
National TV and radio	0.4781	-0.1002	0.4083	0.4006
Local press	0.3693	0.0875	-0.0315	0.1408
National press	0.3615	-0.3098	0.2998	0.3007
Internet	-0.3104	0.2597	-0.0196	0.1608
Posters	-0.3880	0.4075	0.3357	0.4105
Use of internet tools in the last election campaign:				
Personal website maintained by party	0.1364	0.4932	0.0575	0.2607
Personal website maintained by own campaign team	0.1307	0.2897	0.4053	0.2507
Mailing lists	0.5284	0.2302	-0.2896	0.4006
Internet-based campaign spot	0.1541	0.40	0.19	0.3007
Online chats	0.7195	0.0908	0.0445	0.5104
Blog	0.1775	0.0831	0.6593	0.4605
Attracts media interest mainly by ...				
Delivering government funds to district	0.1075	0.7089	-0.1673	0.5204
Work in legislative committees	-0.2357	0.0105	0.5797	0.3806
Speeches in the chamber	-0.0900	-0.1900	0.5286	0.3206
Taking positions in controversial debates	0.16	-0.4879	0.1531	0.539

Note: Factor loadings > 0.25 and < -0.25 in bold type

There are also positive factor loadings on the use of national TV and radio stations (.40), and national newspapers (.29) as well as the use of posters (.33). The internet-based channel of communication loads positively on blog (.65) and on personal website maintained by own campaign team (.40), and negatively on mailing list (-.28).

2.6. Anecdotal evidence: Members of the Caucus of Minas Gerais

As an example of “*The indirect promoter of local interests*” whose media strategy focuses on working in *legislative committees* and delivering *speeches in the chamber*,

the following excerpts are transcribed from the interview conducted with an MP featuring a highly fragmented vote pattern (PMDB/MG):

Q.: How did you build your electoral career?

A.: *“I built my career as deputy exploring the theme of the youth, with special focus on drug prevention and employment opportunities. I also dedicate myself to defend, in the Chamber of Deputies, the interests of the small towns of Minas Gerais. I do this through speeches in plenary and participation in Parliamentary Committees.”*

Q.: Do you have media staff?

A.: *“No, nothing!”*

Q.: What kind of media do you use in your campaign?

A.: *“No mass media, only Posters, banners, bumper stickers, and 'little saints' (small handouts featuring the candidate's photo, number, and party). A little bit of the Internet too.*

Q.: How important was media visibility for your electoral success?

A.: *“I have a good relationship with the local media, which usually reports on my job in Parliament. But I don't see myself as a 'media star' like Tiririca or Romario”*⁹⁰ (Interview with the author: Brasília, 21.05.2013).

The following excerpts taken from an interview with a MP (PSDB/MG) with high concentration of votes may fit into the profile of an *“indirect promoter of local interests”*:

Q.: How did you build your electoral career?

A.: *“Over four mandates, I've always adopted a line of action within the Chamber of Deputies focused on the issue of budgetary oversight and accountability. It's useful to draw a distinction between the strategies I used to win a seat in Parliament, and the*

⁹⁰A TV comedian and a former football star, both in Parliament.

way I normally exercise the mandate conquered in the election. My goal as a representative has always been bringing improvements to my district. The way I reach this goal is through working in legislative committees, and in the area of law.”

Q.: What kind of media do you use most to keep in contact with your voters?

A.: *“The use of the media has changed a lot in recent years. Previously, we were limited to produce a newsletter, and sent it every four month to our supporters. That has changed completely! Today I have two press aides: one works in Brasilia the other stay in the district. Our database contains 100 000 names. Instead of printed newsletter, we now use e-mail and social networks to post news about our activities in the Committees and speeches in the House. Sometimes we feed the social media and the twitter up to five times a day. We also use the House’s official media (Radio and TV) to leverage our presence in the social and local media. All of this at a very low cost!”*

Q.: How important was media visibility for your electoral success?

A.: *“In a scale from one (unimportant) to ten (very important), I would say five!”*
(Interview with the author: Brasília, 23.05.2013).

Another MP (DEM/MG), with low concentration of votes, although adopting a *“traditional-media based strategy”* to keep in contact with voters, bestows low importance for the role the mass media played in his campaign:

Q.: How did you build your electoral career?

A.: *“I was elected to defend the reforms that Brazil needs: the political and fiscal reforms. The Parliament discusses a lot of offal and much superficiality, and avoid confronting the major issues that the country needs. That’s why I’m here!”*

Q.: What kind of media do you use most to keep in contact with your voters?

A.: *“We use all sorts of media available, from print media, radio and TV to the social networks. Yet, I need to say, our media staff is minimal. I keep a small base here*

in Brasília and another in our district. Sure, no communication, no way to keep in contact with voters. However, we do not need the mass media for that!”

Q.: How important was media visibility for your electoral success?

A.: *“In a scale from one (unimportant) to ten (very important), I would say the media collaborated with three, because we have other channels of direct communication with our constituent. I hardly used the mass media during the campaign!”* (Interview with the author: Brasília, 15.05.2013).

3.1. Introduction

In the previous sections, an exploratory analysis was conducted on the correlation between choices of different media strategies and patterns of vote-concentration of MPs at different levels of representation in Brazil and Germany. In this section, the strength of this correlation is investigated. The first battery of questions from the questionnaire was picked, which offers four response categories: “not important”, “less important”, “important” and “very important”. Respondents were asked to rate the importance of (i) local television and radio as mediums of communication, (ii) national television and radio, (iii) the local press, (iv) the national press, (v) the internet and (vi) posters. The respondents differ each in terms of concentration of vote at federal and state levels.

3.2. Methodology

In order to investigate a possible causal relationship between the main variables (media type/vote concentration), an econometric model was developed based on linear regressions using *Ordered Logit* regression analysis, in which the dependent variable is the preference on the use of media and the independent variable is the concentration of votes. The reason behind choosing a Logit model is that the dependent variable in this model is the MPs’ media choice, which is an ordered/ranked variable. For this purpose, the following equation was applied:

$$M_{ij} = \alpha + \beta C_j + \epsilon$$

Here M is the variable called *Media* (degree of use of a particular media) and it is a ranked variable, which can take values either: 1 = not important, 2 = less important, 3= important and 4= very important. C represents the concentration of vote and it is a categorical variable too. C can take three values 1 = low, 2 = medium, and 3 = high. However, in this analysis, because of the small sample size, the medium and high concentration have been merged into one. In this model, C is a variable that can take

two values: 1 = low or 2 = high. *Low concentration* was taken as our reference category. Here α is the intercept parameter and β is the slope parameter. ϵ denotes the random error which is normally distributed. In this model ‘i’ denotes the type of media viz. T.V and Radio (local), T.V. and Radio (national), print media (local), print media (national), Internet, and poster. ‘J’ denotes the four layers of the political institutions in Brazil and Germany.

3.3. The German Bundestag

Table 1 reports the results of the ordered logit regression analysis for each of the six media types for each category, and presents the marginal effects after logit.

Table 1: Marginal effect after logit for T.V and Radio (local): The German Bundestag (N=224)						
Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	0.0091209	0.04303	0.21	0.832	-.075218 .09346	0.373333
Less important	0.0040101	0.01865	0.22	0.83	-.032542 .040562	0.373333
Important	-0.0075303	0.03549	-0.21	0.832	-.077086 .062025	0.373333
Very important	-0.0056007	0.02618	-0.21	0.831	-.05692 .045719	0.373333

The regression estimates shows a *negative association* between T.V and Radio (local) and concentration of vote. The coefficients (table 1) reveal that the higher the concentration of vote, the lesser is the probability of the respondent to give importance to this type of media. In contrast, table 2 reports a *positive correlation* between T.V and Radio (national) and concentration of votes.

Table 2: Marginal effect after logit for T.V and Radio (National): The German Bundestag (N=224)						
Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	-.0645917	.06225	-1.04	0.299	-.186604 .057421	.373333
Less important	.0149505	.01419	1.05	0.292	-.012855 .042756	.373333
Important	.0241102	.02372	1.02	0.309	-.02237 .070591	.373333
Very important	.025531	.02566	0.99	0.320	-.024765 .075827	.373333

Tables 3 and 4 suggest a *positive correlation with concentration of vote* for local and national print media. A respondent with high concentration of votes has, on

average, higher chance of being in category 4 (very important) than a respondent with low concentration of votes.

Table 3: Marginal effect after logit for print media (local): The German Bundestag (N=224)						
Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	-.0015257	.00186	-0.82	0.411	-.005166 .002115	.373333
Less important	-.0117976	.00925	-1.28	0.202	-.029919 .006324	.373333
Important	-.0774667	.05801	-1.34	0.182	-.19116 .036226	.373333
Very important	.0907899	.06728	1.35	0.177	-.041086 .222665	.373333

Table 4: Marginal effect after logit for print media (national): The German Bundestag (N=224)						
Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	-.0200046	.03544	-0.56	0.572	-.089475 .049466	.373333
Less important	-.0140599	.02601	-0.54	0.589	-.06503 .036911	.373333
Important	.0204114	.03651	0.56	0.576	-.051149 .091972	.373333
Very important	.0136531	.02488	0.55	0.583	-.035115 .062422	.373333

Table 5 indicates a *negative correlation for the usage of Internet*: a respondent with high concentration of vote has, on average, lesser chance of giving importance to Internet compared to someone with low concentration of vote. In contrast, table 6 shows a *positive correlation for the use of posters*: there is 11% of chance for a respondent with high concentration of votes to give more importance to posts compared to a respondent with less concentration of vote.

Table 5: Marginal effect after logit for Internet: The German Bundestag (N=224)						
Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	.016311	.01261	1.29	0.196	-.008398 .04102	.373333
Less important	.0573753	.04036	1.42	0.155	-.021737 .136488	.373333
Important	-.0030034	.00934	-0.32	0.748	-.0213 .015293	.373333
Very important	-.070683	.0478	-1.48	0.139	-.164377 .023011	.373333

Table 6: Marginal effect after logit for Poster: The German Bundestag (N=224)						
Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	-.0359746	.01717	-2.10	0.036	-.069617 -.002332	.373333
Less important	-.0705302	.03252	-2.17	0.030	-.13426 -.006801	.373333
Important	-.0129155	.01435	-0.90	0.368	-.041037 .015206	.373333

Very important	.1194203	.05566	2.15	0.032	.010328 .228513	.373333
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3.4. The Bavarian Landtag

Similar analysis for Bavarian Landtag reveals somewhat different figures. Unlike the previous case (Bundestag), here the association between TV and Radio (local) and concentration of vote *is rather negative* (see table 7). The same is true for TV and Radio (national), and for both types of print media, local and national, as well as for Internet (see table 8, 9 10 and 11). In contrast, posters follow the same positive trend (see table 12) found in the case of the Bundestag. Here also a respondent with high concentration of votes has, on an average, 11% higher chance of being in the fourth category (very important) compared to the one with low concentration of votes.

Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	.1380645	.05364	2.57	0.010	.032927 .243202	.782946
Less important	.0804876	.04994	1.61	0.107	-.017399 .178374	.782946
Important	-.0881961	.0365	-2.42	0.016	-.159731 -.016662	.782946
Very important	-.130356	.06917	-1.88	0.059	-.265926 .005214	.782946

Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	.164932	.09226	1.79	0.074	-.015899 .345763	.782946
Less important	-.0540093	.02731	-1.98	0.048	-.10753 -.000489	.782946
Important	-.0598876	.03939	-1.52	0.128	-.137097 .017322	.782946
Very important	-.0510351	.03702	-1.38	0.168	-.123586 .021516	.782946

Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	---	---	---	---	---	---
Less important	.0139718	.01482	0.94	0.346	-.01508 .043023	.782946
Important	.0775632	.08237	0.94	0.346	-.083876 .239003	.782946
Very important	-.091535	.09583	-0.96	0.339	-.27935 .096281	.782946

Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	.0018689	.06118	0.03	0.976	-.118035 .121773	.782946
Less important	.0010501	.03463	0.03	0.976	-.066829 .068929	.782946

Important	-.0016133	.05286	-0.03	0.976	-.105226 .101999	.782946
Very important	-.0013057	.04294	-0.03	0.976	-.085475 .082864	.782946

Table 11: Marginal effect after logit for Internet: The Bavarian Landtag (N=130)

Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	.0498475	.05681	0.88	0.380	-.061491 .161186	.782946
Less important	.0291627	.04123	0.71	0.479	-.051637 .109962	.782946
Important	-.0448207	.05304	-0.84	0.398	-.148784 .059143	.782946
Very important	-.0341895	.04475	-0.76	0.445	-.121901 .053523	.782946

Table 12: Marginal effect after logit for Poster: The Bavarian Landtag (N=130)

Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	-.009508	.01066	-0.89	0.372	-.030393 .011377	.782946
Less important	-.0666269	.05843	-1.14	0.254	-.181138 .047885	.782946
Important	-.0416789	.02626	-1.59	0.113	-.093156 .009799	.782946
Very important	.1178138	.08622	1.37	0.172	-.051168 .286796	.782946

3.5. The Chamber of Deputies

The correlation between concentration of votes and different types of media is more consistent for The Chamber of Deputies. There is *positive association* between the first four types of media (TV and Radio and print media at local and national levels) and the concentration of votes.

Table 13: Marginal effect after logit for T.V and Radio (local): The Chamber of Deputies (N=100)

Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	-.0264997	.0294	-0.90	0.367	-.084126 .031127	.85
Less important	-.0692348	.06556	-1.06	0.291	-.197726 .059257	.85
Important	-.0482248	.03613	-1.33	0.182	-.119031 .022581	.85
Very important	.1439593	.12426	1.16	0.247	-.099579 .387497	.85

Table 13 documents that, a respondent with high concentration of votes has 14% higher probability of being in the fourth category (very important) for T.V and Radio (local) compared to a MP with low concentration of votes. The same applies for TV and Radio (national), which discloses that a high vote concentration respondent has 11% more chances to fall into the “very important” category than someone with low

concentration of votes (table 14). The marginal effects for print media (table 15, 16), although not statistically significant, implies a positive albeit weak correlation.

Table 14: Marginal effect after logit for T.V and Radio (national): The Chamber of Deputies (N=100)						
Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	-.0733807	.11757	-0.62	0.533	-.303822 .157061	.85
Less important	.0164928	.03562	0.46	0.643	-.053322 .086308	.85
Important	.0457686	.06809	0.67	0.501	-.08769 .179227	.85
Very important	.111193	.0164	0.68	0.498	-.021032 .043271	.85

Table 15: Marginal effect after logit for print media (local): The Chamber of Deputies (N=100)						
Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	-.000264	.01024	-0.03	0.979	-.020338 .01981	.85
Less important	-.0022561	.0873	-0.03	0.979	-.173371 .168858	.85
Important	-.0004399	.01658	-0.03	0.979	-.032941 .032061	.85
Very important	.0029601	.11412	0.03	0.979	-.220715 .226635	.85

Table 16: Marginal effect after logit for print media (national): The Chamber of Deputies (N=100)						
Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	-.1575271	.12334	-1.28	0.202	-.39926 .084206	.85
Less important	.0342872	.05121	0.67	0.503	-.066074 .134648	.85
Important	.0964027	.06344	1.52	0.129	-.027936 .220742	.85
Very important	.0268372	.0189	1.42	0.156	-.010209 .063883	.85

In contrast, tables 17 and 18 reports a negative correlation between concentration of vote and Internet and Poster. As the concentration of vote increases, the marginal effects of the importance given to these two types of media decreases.

Table 17: Marginal effect after logit for Internet: The Chamber of Deputies						
Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	.0028774	.00974	0.30	0.768	-.016217 .021972	.85
Less important	.0267975	.0914	0.29	0.769	-.152351 .205946	.85
Important	.0035092	.01822	0.19	0.847	-.032193 .039212	.85
Very important	-.0331842	.11844	-0.28	0.779	-.265315 .198947	.85

Table 18: Marginal effect after logit for Poster: The Chamber of Deputies (N=100)						
Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	.1062414	.06559	1.62	0.105	-.022321 .234804	.85

Less important	.0650156	.06086	1.07	0.285	-.054269 .1843	.85
Important	-.0793724	.05048	-1.57	0.116	-.178319 .019574	.85
Very important	-.0918846	.07704	-1.19	0.233	-.242884 .059115	.85

3.6. Minas Gerais

The results for the case of Minas Gerais discloses a negative pattern of relationship between the variables under scrutiny. Although there is a positive association between concentration of votes and the importance given to T.V and Radio (local), for the rest of the media types *no positive correlation* was found. Table 19 reports that, for a respondent with high concentration of votes there is almost 18% higher chance of falling into the “very important category” for T.V and radio (local) compared to a MP with low concentration of votes.

However, the remaining findings in this section (table 20, 21, 22, 23, 24) did not reveal any positive correlation between concentration of votes and media type viz. T.V and radio (national), print media (local), print media (national), Internet, and poster. It is important to note, nonetheless, that these findings are not statistically significant and do not necessarily imply causation. Because of the very small sample size, it could not be possible to examine the causation; rather it could be helpful to monitor the trend in the correlations that the results imply.

Table 19: Marginal effect after logit for T.V and Radio (local): Minas Gerais (N=53)						
Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	-.0324815	.03579	-0.91	0.364	-.10263 .037667	.773585
Less important	-.0966236	.08286	-1.17	0.244	-.259018 .065771	.773585
Important	-.0606401	.04397	-1.38	0.168	-.146821 .025541	.773585
Very important	.1897452	.14251	1.33	0.183	-.089563 .469053	.773585

Table 20: Marginal effect after logit for T.V and Radio (national): Minas Gerais (N=53)						
Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	.1318114	.11105	1.19	0.235	-.085842 .349464	.773585
Less important	-.0064492	.03744	-0.17	0.863	-.079832 .066934	.773585
Important	-.1103	.11298	-0.98	0.329	-.331746 .111145	.773585
Very important	-.0150621	.02184	-0.69	0.490	-.057863 .027739	.773585

Table 21: Marginal effect after logit for print media (local): Minas Gerais						
Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X

Not important	.0061552	.02117	0.29	0.771	-.035342 .047653	.773585
Less important	.0290001	.10059	0.29	0.773	-.168145 .226145	.773585
Important	-.0014978	.00837	-0.18	0.858	-.017908 .014913	.773585
Very important	-.0336575	.12191	-0.28	0.782	-.272596 .205281	.773585

Table 22: Marginal effect after logit for print media (national): Minas Gerais (N=53)

Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	.047315	.11153	0.42	0.671	-.171282 .265912	.773585
Less important	-.0079763	.01714	-0.47	0.642	-.04157 .025618	.773585
Important	-.0340735	.08766	-0.39	0.698	-.205893 .137746	.773585
Very important	-.0052652	.01469	-0.36	0.720	-.034062 .023531	.773585

Table 23: Marginal effect after logit for Internet: Minas Gerais (N=53)

Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	.0172753	.01767	0.98	0.328	-.017361 .051912	.773585
Less important	.2208142	.08568	2.58	0.010	.052891 .388737	.773585
Important	.1050697	.08292	1.27	0.205	-.057442 .267582	.773585
Very important	-.3431592	.15334	-2.24	0.025	-.643693 -.042626	.773585

Table 24: Marginal effect after logit for Poster: Minas Gerais (N=53)

Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	.0592746	.07903	0.75	0.453	-.095613 .214162	.773585
Less important	.0420994	.06962	0.60	0.545	-.094362 .178561	.773585
Important	-.0559446	.07707	-0.73	0.468	-.206991 .095101	.773585
Very important	-.0454294	.0713	-0.64	0.524	-.185165 .094306	.773585

CHAPTER 4: MEDIA VISIBILITY AND SUPPORT OF MAYORS: TRENDS AND CORRELATIONS

4.1. Introduction

The central question of this exploratory study is whether media visibility is equally important for all kinds of electoral careers. The expressions "media visibility" or "media presence" are used in reference to the amount of *positive media coverage* received by a political agent at a certain lapse of time. In the broad sense, it means the *usage of media* as part of MPs' public relation strategy to keep contact with the electorate and to conquer votes during electoral campaigns. According to Cain et al. (1987), "visibility is the cornerstone of an effective district strategy. Without visibility, representatives cannot have independent standing in the electorate's collective mind, and without independent standing they cannot anticipate personal success in otherwise unfavorable circumstances" (p. 27).

Samuel Popkin (1991) points out that a campaign event that occurs in isolation, but does not reach the public, is similar to a tree that falls in the woods: It makes a sound only if someone is there to hear it. According to Gelman and King (1993), the mass media play a crucial role on all phases of the campaign activities, such as speeches, conventions, debates, accusations, issue positions, and in the process of helping voters make "enlightened" choices. Yet, the specific degree of mediatization of political campaigns in Brazil and Germany, and MPs' best media strategies remains an empirical question.

Candidates for political leadership positions such as mayoral, gubernatorial or presidential offices all experience strong and growing individual media scrutiny, especially because they do not rely exclusively on their party to attract voters. Few political actors may neglect the development of communication strategies for the construction of their public image, which only reinforces the general tendency towards the internalization of typical media values, language and logic by the political field. Yet, our question asks whether all candidates for seats in elected assemblies (city councilors, state legislators, Congressmen), the so-called *backbenchers*, give equal

importance and emphasis in their campaign strategies to media visibility and public image building. This question suggests that there might be different kinds of electoral connections, not necessarily dependent on mass media, which may also account for the electoral success of *backbenchers* in Brazil and Germany. If on the one hand media presence may be crucial to achieve electoral success in most cases, on the other hand the multifaceted aspects of the electoral connections may compensate for poor media coverage.

In this section, the strength of the correlation between concentration of votes and two dependent variables: “support of mayors and city counselors” and “media visibility” needs to be tested. The first variable may suggest MPs’ profiles more akin to a “*promoter of local interests*”, who worries more about the demands of local leaders, than the second one, which may relate to a “*policy advocate*” type, more dependent on mass media to have their voice heard by the public, run a successful campaign, and win a seat in Parliament.

4.2. Methodology

We selected items in the questionnaire that capture the most important factors of electoral success according to the perception of the surveyed MPs in Brazil and Germany. Legislators from The Chamber of Deputies (N=100), Bundestag (N=224), Bavarian Landtag (N=130), and Minas Gerais (N=53) were asked to rate the importance of media visibility in contrast with the support of mayors and city counselors. The questionnaire items were standardized and offered four response categories: “not important”, “less important”, “important” and “very important”. Respondents were asked: “Choose, in order of importance, which factors contributed most to your electoral success: (i) Support of Mayors and Town Councilors; (ii) Relationship with Unions and Social movements; (iii) Consolidation of your Public Image; (iv) Media visibility.”

The interest here is in analyzing possible causal relations between the support of mayors and city counselors and media visibility, on the one hand, and the concentration of votes in all its layers (high, medium, and low) at the federal and state level in Brazil and Germany. The purpose of this part of the analysis is to investigate if there is any

relation between the independent variable (concentration of votes) and the dependent variables “*Support of Mayors and Town Councilors Mayor*” and “*Media visibility*”.

To investigate the causal relationship between the variables, an econometric model is proposed, which is the linear regression model. The “*preference*” placed by the elected representatives on the support of mayor and councilors vs. media visibility is the *dependent variable* in the model which might take any value ranging from 1 (unimportant) to 4 (very important). Since the dependent variable is ranked, *Ordered Logit* regression analysis was used.

$$S_{ij} = \alpha + \beta C_j + \epsilon$$

Here S is the variable called ‘*Support*’ in terms of either support from mayor and city counselors or media visibility. It is a ranked variable, which can take the following values: 1= not important, 2 = less important, 3 = important and 4 = very important. C represents the *concentration of vote* and it is a categorical variable too. In the actual questionnaire C can take three values 1 = Low, 2 = medium, and 3 = high. However, in this analysis, because of the small sample size, medium and high concentration have been merged to one. Therefore, in this model C is a variable, which can take two values: 1 = low or 2=high. For the analysis, we took low concentration as our reference category. Here α is the intercept parameter and β is the slope parameter. ϵ denotes the random error which is normally distributed. In this model, ‘ i ’ denotes the type of support preferred in relation to mayors and city counselors or media visibility. In addition, ‘ j ’ denotes the four layers of political institution, i.e., the German Bundestag, the Bavarian Landtag, the Chamber of Deputies and the caucus of Minas Gerais. We run ordered logit regression analysis for each of the media type for each layer and present the marginal effects after logit in the tables below.

4.2.1. The German Bundestag

Table 1 reports that, if the representative has a high concentration of votes then, he/she has on average *17.5% higher probability* of belonging to the group of MPs who consider the *support of mayor and counselors* “*very important*” compared to a representative with low concentration of votes. Their chances of belonging to the other

categories in the scale are negative compared to MPs with low concentration of votes. In other words, surveyed German MPs elected for the Bundestag *with high concentration of votes* is highly likely to give more preference to the support of mayors and city counselor (17.5%) as a factor of electoral success than to media visibility (3.8%).

Table 1: Marginal effect after Logit regression for support of mayors (Bundestag: N=224)						
Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	-.0523	.01738	-3.01	0.003	-.086361 -.018239	.373333
Less important	-.0893567	.02633	-3.39	0.001	-.140963 -.03775	.373333
Important	-.0336304	.02772	-1.21	0.225	-.087964 .020703	.373333
Very important	.1752871	.05154	3.40	0.001	.074275 .276299	.373333
Table 2: Marginal effect after Logit regression for media visibility (Bundestag: N=224)						
Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	98% C.I.	X
Not important	-.0017216	.00254	-0.68	0.498	-.006703 .00326	.373333
Less important	-.0259572	.03424	-0.76	0.448	-.093063 .041149	.373333
Important	-.0112062	.01698	-0.66	0.509	-.044495 .022083	.373333
Very important	.038885	.05267	0.74	0.460	-.064343 .142113	.373333

Table 2 documents that, if the representative has a high concentration of vote then, he/she has on an average *3.8% higher* chance of belonging to the group of MPs who deem *media visibility “very important”* for their electoral success compared to MPs with low concentration of vote. Their chances of belonging to the other categories in the scale are negative. In other words, MPs with high concentration of vote is highly likely to give preference to media visibility. Yet, this outcome is not statistically relevant as the P value is .46, which implies a less likely probability of correlation between the dependent and the independent variable.

4.2.2. The Bavarian Landtag

Table 3 shows that, there is a *positive trend* between concentration of vote and preference for the *support of mayors and city counselors* among surveyed MPs elected

for the Landtag. From the last row, it is found that MPs with high concentration of votes have *4% higher probability* of falling into the fourth category (“very important”) compared to MPs with low concentration of vote. However, this result is also not statistically relevant since there is a very high P value corresponding to this probability

Table 3: Marginal effect after Logit regression for support of mayors (Landtag: N=130)						
Category	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	98% C.I.	X
Not important	-.0158551	.03055	-0.52	0.604	-.075733 .044023	.782946
Less important	-.0220584	.04091	-0.54	0.590	-.102237 .05812	.782946
Important	-.0069233	.0108	-0.64	0.521	-.028089 .014242	.782946
Very important	.0448367	.07981	0.56	0.574	-.111587 .20126	.782946
Table 4: Marginal effect after Logit regression for media visibility (Landtag:130)						
Scale	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	98% C.I.	X
Not important	.0073759	.00682	1.08	0.279	-.005986 .020737	.782946
Less important	.0407741	.02777	1.47	0.142	-.013647 .095195	.782946
Important	.0942733	.07383	1.28	0.202	-.050425 .238972	.782946
Very important	-.1424232	.10324	-1.38	0.168	-.34477 .059924	.782946

Table 4 reveals a negative relationship between concentration of vote and preference to media visibility as a factor of electoral success. Landtag MPs with high concentration of votes are, on average, *14% less likely* to belong in the fourth category (“very important”) compared to a MP with low concentration of votes. It implies that Bavarian MPs with high concentration of votes give *less preference* to media visibility than to the support of mayors and city counselors.

4.2.3. The Chamber of Deputies

Table 5 reports a negative association between concentration of vote and preference given to mayors and city counselors. As can be seen from the last column of the table, if the person has a high concentration of vote then he *is 37.6% less likely to give importance to the support of mayor and councilors* compared to a person with lower concentration of vote. The coefficients in Table 6 also suggest a negative association between concentration of vote and preference given to media visibility.

However, here also there are very high P values, which implies a rather weak and negligible association between the variables.

Table 5: Marginal effect after Logit regression for support of Mayors: The Chamber of Deputies (N=100)

Scale	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	95% C.I.	X
Not important	.1147712	.03659	3.14	0.002	.043055 .186488	.85
Less important	.1563094	.04921	3.18	0.001	.059867 .252752	.85
Important	.1051845	.04586	2.29	0.022	.015307 .195062	.85
Very important	-.3762651	.10145	-3.71	0.000	-.575098 -.177433	.85

Table 6: Marginal effect after Logit regression for media visibility: Chamber of Deputies (N=100)

Scale	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	98% C.I.	X
Not important	.0195811	.04108	0.48	0.634	-.060928 .10009	.85
Less important	.0333414	.07429	0.45	0.654	-.112262 .178945	.85
Important	-.0183859	.03488	-0.53	0.598	-.086753 .049981	.85
Very important	-.0345366	.08103	-0.43	0.670	-.193355 .124282	.85

4.2.4. Minas Gerais

Although not statistically relevant, the results of Table 7 reports a *negative trend* between concentration of votes and preference given to mayor and city counselors. By contrast, table 8 suggests a *positive trend* between concentration of votes and preference given to media visibility.

Table 7: Marginal effect after Logit regression for support of mayors: Minas Gerais (N=53)

Scale	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	98% C.I.	X
Not important	.0293634	.05611	0.52	0.601	-.080614 .139341	.754717
Less important	.0364421	.07306	0.50	0.618	-.10676 .179645	.754717
Important	.010643	.02456	0.43	0.665	-.037502 .058788	.754717
Very important	-.0764485	.15163	-0.50	0.614	-.373632 .220735	.754717

Table 8: Marginal effect after Logit regression for media visibility: Minas Gerais (N=53)

Scale	Coefficient	Std. Error	Z	P> Z	98% C.I.	X
Not important	-.0042869	.03426	-0.13	0.900	-.071429 .062856	.754717
Less important	-.0143156	.11212	-0.13	0.898	-.234067 .205436	.754717

Important	.0067089	.0546	0.12	0.902	-.100305 .113723	.754717
Very important	.0118936	.09182	0.13	0.897	-.168067 .191855	.754717

4.3. Summary

The test of the correlation between concentration of votes and the dependent variable, “support of mayors/city counselors” has shown a positive probability of 17.5% among Bundestag-elected MPs, and only 3.8% for the variable “media visibility”. These findings suggest that (i) surveyed German MPs elected for the Bundestag with high concentration of votes is highly likely to give more preference to the support of mayors and city counselor as a factor of electoral success than to media visibility; (ii) these MPs are more akin to “*local promoter of interests*” than to “*policy advocates*”. By contrast, a negative association of -37.6% was found between concentration of vote and preference given to mayors and city counselors among surveyed Brazilian MPs.

At the state level, there is a negative correlation of -14% among high-vote concentration MPs and media visibility as a factor of electoral success, suggesting that Bavarian MPs in the high concentration layer give less preference to media visibility than to the support of mayors and city counselors, an opposite trend compared to their counterparts from Minas Gerais.

CHAPTER 5: MEDIA VISIBILITY, DISTRICT MAGNITUDE AND COMPETITIVENESS

5.1. Introduction

In this section, the interest is in exploring the importance of media visibility vis-à-vis that of district magnitude and election competitiveness. First, the major conceptual tenets of district magnitude and electoral competition are briefly discussed to set the theoretical framework against which the results of our survey with Brazilian and German MPs are analyzed.

District magnitude (M), the number of seats allocated in an electoral district, is one of the classic variables in the literature of political science. Maurice Duverger's (1951) assertion that "the simple-majority single-ballot system favors the two-party system" (p. 217) is widely acknowledged as one of the most durable and reliable hypotheses in political science. By providing structural constraints and their concomitant incentives, according to this view, the number of seats available in a district directly shapes the constellation of the political parties that can win, and hence that will attempt to compete for seats in the legislature. District magnitude is not the only determinant of the number of parties, but it is considered to be "the decisive factor" (Gallagher, 1991; Lijphart, 1994).

When a party features a number of candidates larger than the number of seats available, the electoral formula must specify a means for determining which candidates take the party's seats. Even when there is only one candidate per party per seat, like the SMD in Germany, the reason for there being only one candidate may rest in another feature of the electoral law: the granting to the party of the right to bestow the party nomination uniquely on a candidate of its own choice. How electoral formulas distribute a precious commodity, legislative seats, among the many candidates or prospective candidates seeking the commodity affects the extent to which individual politicians can benefit by developing *personal reputations* distinct from those of their party.

According to Carey and Shugart (1996), district magnitude has the unusual property to affect the value of *personal reputation* in opposite manners, depending on the value of the ballot. In all systems where there is intraparty competition, *as M grows, so does the value of personal reputation*. Conversely, in systems where there is no intraparty competition, as *M* grows, the value of personal reputation shrinks. Building personal reputation is frequently associated with securing pork barrel funding for projects that benefit specific districts, and providing services to solve individual constituents' problems with government bureaucracy. Yet, personal reputations can be valuable when politician's electoral prospects improve because of being famous and valued by voters. This kind of reputation draws upon something other than the ability to deliver pork, such as media visibility, celebrity status, and other endeavor *prior* to entering politics, such as national media celebrity enjoyed by TV and radio hosts or famous athletes can translate into valuable personal reputation in some countries, such as the case of Brazil.

The key determinant of how much a candidate must distinguish from co-partisans depends on the ratio between the numbers of candidates endorsed by the party and *M*, rather than directly by *M*. *The higher the ratio, the greater the need for personal reputation* (Carey and Shugart, 1996). One of the features that makes Brazilian candidates rely more on personal reputation than party label is that in Brazil parties may *nominate up to 1.5 times* as many candidates as there are seats. Each Brazilian candidate faces more co-partisans from which he or she must differentiate herself, even when the magnitude is the same.

On the other hand, *competitiveness* is usually measured as the winner's percentage of the votes, the percent margin of victory, and the raw vote margin of victory in elections. Margins of victory tend to be smaller in multiparty democracies. Put it simply, competitiveness encompasses the *difference* between the *winner* and the *runner* (Cox, 1988; Cox and Munger, 1989; Patterson and Caldeira, 1983).

Nicolau (2006) and Braga (2006) analyzed the internal dispute to the list and found that the dispute in Brazil is highly competitive, confirming the incentives provided by the electoral rules. In fact, the Brazilian open-list, proportional system in multimember districts fosters *strong competition* among candidates of the same list, and *weakens political parties*. It encourages candidates to focus their efforts spatially, as

they tend to build strongholds in which they would exchange votes for political support. This double dimension of the electoral competition in Brazil entails a sort of *built-in conflict*, whereby on the one hand candidates squabble among themselves for a position in the party list, intensifying competition, but on the other hand, they are encouraged to create areas in which they control the electorate, avoiding the dispute (Mainwaring 1991; Lamounier, 1989; Ames, 2001).

5.2. Methodology

In order to facilitate the analysis, the values of the scales “important and very important” for the questions on *media visibility* were selected, the data of the Chamber of Deputies and the German Bundestag were pooled, and the variables “district magnitude” and “competitiveness” were divided into categories. 324 observations encompassing both Parliaments were included in the analysis. The variable “magnitude of district” was divided into 8 categories. The first category ($M = 1$) just captures the effects of the single member district (SMD). The remaining 7 categories were sorted by intervals of 10 up to 70, which represents the greatest district magnitude (the state of São Paulo, Brazil).

Chart 52 reports how members of The Chamber of Deputies and The German Bundestag responded to the question, “*How important was media visibility for your election/re-election?*” according to the magnitude of the district where they were elected. Each observation shows MPs’ average of responses. Direct-elected, German MPs ($M = 1$) responded 2.96 on average (“important and very important”) to the question on media visibility. By contrast, MPs elected in *high magnitude districts* ($M = 50$ to 60) displayed considerably larger scores (3.52 on average) for the same question. These results show that *the greater the magnitude, the greater the media preference*, and are in line with Carey’s and Shugart (1996) findings according to which “as magnitude grows, so does the value of personal reputation” (p. 431).

From the previous section (4.2.1) it was learned that German MPs featuring high vote concentration have, on average, *17.5% higher probability of considering the support of mayor and city counselors* more important than media visibility. By contrast, Brazilian MPs featuring the same level of vote concentration are *37.6% less likely to*

give importance to the support of mayor and councilors (section 4.2.3). This may suggest two different ways of cultivating personal reputation: in Germany, where most of district-elected MPs (SMD = 1) exhibit high score of vote concentration, the support of *Bürgermeister and Stadträte* (mayors and city counselors) seems more important than media visibility. By contrast, their Brazilian counterparts apparently rely less on this kind of support to build their personal reputation.




Chart 52: Average of responses on the importance of media visibility vs. district magnitude [N=324]

As for competitiveness, an election is more competitive when there are more candidates than the number of seats available in the dispute. However, an election is not competitive if one candidate predominates over the others and gets the majority of votes. Thus, “*the smaller the margin of votes obtained by the strongest candidates in relation to the runner, the more competitive is the election in that district*” (Caramani, 2003, p. 417).

Electoral competition is a characteristic of the territory, not of politicians, and the measurement of the competition index refers to a particular district, not to the

system as a whole. The international literature adopts different parameters to measure the competition of an election. In general, scholars use the effective number of parties, the total of votes or seats obtained by the opposition or even the percentage margin of victory of the elected candidate.⁹¹ In our case, we calculated the percentage margin of victory of each elected MP in order to produce an index of competitiveness for each observation (N=324). Then, we classified those indexes in *six different layers*, which range from *zero* (the most competitive) to 53.4 (the least competitive).




Chart 53: Average of responses on the importance of media visibility vs. electoral competitiveness
[N=324]

Chart 53 follows the same logic as the previous one. This time comparing *media visibility* vs. *competitiveness* is desired. The most interesting finding here is that the average of responses to the question on media visibility tends to equalize around an average of two (2) in the fourth [26.7 to 35.6], fifth [35.6 to 44.5], and sixth [44.5 to

⁹¹ We recognize that these parameters operate properly in SMD districts, such as the case of the direct-elected German MPs. In the case of open-list, PR-elected Brazilian MPs, these parameters may be insufficient, since candidates can be elected even when they do not get more votes than other candidates do, simply because their list received more votes than the others did. Yet, we believe the procedure be sufficient for our comparative purpose.

53.4] layers, which are the least competitive ones. The most competitive layer is the second one [8.9 to 17.8], which displays an average response of 2.22. Based on these results, it may be concluded that *as competitiveness increases, so does media visibility*.

5.3. Summary

Exploring the importance of media visibility vis-à-vis that of district magnitude and election competitiveness, it is found that the preference for media visibility among the surveyed MPs increases as magnitude and competitiveness increase. These findings are in line with the international literature, which associates higher values of *personal reputation* (Carey's and Shugart, 1996) with higher district magnitude, and increased level of competition in the federal elections for deputies in Brazil (Silva, 2013) and Germany (Zittel and Gschwend, 2008).

VI - RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

6.1. Questions and hypotheses: an overview

Most fundamentally, this research questioned whether media visibility is equally important for all kinds of electoral careers. Sample of 507 observations with MPs in Brazil and Germany was used to test the hypotheses. The basis was the presupposition that individual candidates for political leadership positions such as mayoral, gubernatorial or presidential candidates experience strong and growing individual media scrutiny. Yet, despite all the leverage of the media, do all candidates for seats in elected assemblies (city councilors, state legislators, Congressmen) give equal importance and emphasis in their campaign to media visibility and public image building?

The hypotheses draw upon two variables: (a) the electoral formula and (b) the voting concentration pattern. On the one hand, it is assumed that the proportional representation (PR) coupled with open list of candidates reinforces personal vote seeking strategies. On the other, the “horizontal vector” projects into space the dimension of vote concentration. Differences in MPs’ media strategies according to incentives emanating from a territorial basis of representation were expected, which may introduce particularistic and parochial concerns into the policy-making and credit-claiming processes.

Indeed, the effects of electoral systems occur at the district level. This means that electoral laws relate directly to the district level and not to the macro level of the political system. Thus, geographically limited areas represent (a) the destination point of the electoral connection, (b) the arena where political competitions take place and MPs draw votes or seek coalitions. It is assumed that candidates choose different strategies of concentration or dispersion of its resources by territory. The decision of where to focus the campaign on a few or many municipalities/districts is generally associated with the political profile and the availability of each MP’s resources. Candidates with strong ties to a particular constituency tend to focus their campaign on a limited geographical area. Leadership with broader political ties, not geographically concentrated, may disperse their campaign resources along various constituencies.

Hypotheses were formulated as follows:

(1) Concentration of votes: MPs' media strategy varies according to (a) variation in the electoral formula and (b) in the horizontal vector. Electoral formulae that foster *personal vote seeking* reinforces personal media-oriented campaign strategies. Electoral formulae that encourages *party reputation* reinforces party-driven campaigns. Variations on MPs' personal media strategies according to the degree of concentration of votes were expected: high concentration of votes coupled with electoral formulae that foster personal vote seeking significantly increase MPs' personal media strategy and visibility.

(2) Candidature level/type of vote: It was assumed that media strategies among German MPs vary according to (a) the level of candidature (*Landeswahlen* versus *Bundestagswahlen*) (b) the type of vote (list versus direct seat). It was expected that direct personal visibility (*Medienpräsenz*) in the mass and social media might be a strategy that is more strongly visible among candidates running for the Bundestag (Federal elections) than among candidates running for the Landtag (State elections). It was also supposed that this media influence depends on the type of candidature (list and district): list candidates receive incentives derived from the proportional electoral formulae that encourages party-driven campaigns, whereas district candidates seek personal vote and rely more on media strategies.

6.2. The research design

The research's design called for a postal, elite, self-administered, census survey, the one which gathers information on all elements of the target population, i.e., the group of people to whom the survey intends to generalize. The survey was administered to all individuals of the population, because it targeted a very specific elite group (Members of Parliaments). In so doing, sampling and margin errors, and uncertainty in the estimate could be eliminated, and representation and response rate significantly increased. Precisely because it is not a representative sample of subnational and national lawmakers from Brazil and Germany, *the analysis and conclusions presented here should not be extrapolated beyond the group of interviewees.*

In Brazil, the target population was all members of the Chamber of Deputies (N = 513) as well as all MPs elected in the state of Minas Gerais (N = 53) in 2010. In Germany, the target population was all members of the Bundestag (N = 620) and all members of the Bavarian Landtag (N = 187). The lists of the MPs available at official websites was used to identify the target population. In this case, the failure to give some persons in a target population a chance of participating is minimal, since these lists capture the entire population and all individuals had the same chance to respond to the survey.

In Brazil, the data built upon the survey “Mídia e Carreiras Eleitorais” (Media and Electoral Careers) conducted in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies on two different opportunities, from May 5th to October 7th, 2011. In this first step, the parliamentary representation of the state of Minas Gerais in Brasília (“Bancada Mineira”) was targeted, and received 100% of responses (N = 53). In May and June of 2013, the same questionnaire was sent to all 513 members of the Chamber of Deputies (54^a Legislature), and received 20% of response (N = 100).

In Germany, the data was based on the survey "Medienpräsenz und Wahl" (Media Visibility and Election), which featured the same questions as the Brazilian version, plus some specific about the German mixed-member electoral system. The questionnaire was sent through the internal postal service to all members of the Landtag (16^a Legislature) between October 17 and November 14, 2012, and to all members of the Bundestag (17th Legislature) between March 13 and April 12, 2013. The response rate was 69% (N = 130) for the Landtag, and 36% (N = 224) for the Bundestag.

6.3. The first exploratory case: MPs from Minas Gerais

The first exploratory case focused on 53 observations generated by the survey “Mídia e Carreiras Eleitorais” (Media and Electoral Careers) conducted with the parliamentary representation of the state of Minas Gerais (“Bancada Mineira”) in the Chamber of Deputies. The analysis began using cross-tabulations to explore the relationship between the independent variable “vote concentration” (using a three-way split of high, medium and low concentration) and the dependent variables related to MPs’ media strategies. Variations on MPs’ personal media strategies were expected

according to the degree of concentration of votes: high concentration of votes coupled with electoral formulae that foster personal vote seeking significantly increase MPs' personal media strategy and visibility.

The results from this first level of analysis (cross-tabulation) partially confirmed the hypotheses suggesting an association between the variable "vote concentration" and different levels of concerns with media strategies. An increasing concern with media visibility and public image consolidation was found in the group of MPs with "medium concentration of votes", *but not in the high concentration area as expected*. For the confirmation of the working hypotheses in the case of MPs from Minas Gerais, more evidence was required.

In order to investigate a possible causal relationship between the main variables (media type/vote concentration), our analysis was deepened to a second level of complexity and an econometric model was developed based on linear regressions using *Ordered Logit* regression analysis, in which the dependent variable is the preference on the use of media and the independent variable is the concentration of votes. The reason behind choosing a Logit model is that the dependent variable in this model is the MPs' media choice, which is an ordered/ranked variable ("unimportant, less important, important, and very important").

The results for the case of Minas Gerais disclosed a *negative pattern* of relationship between the variables under scrutiny. Although there was a positive association between concentration of votes and the importance given to TV and Radio (local), for the rest of the media types *no positive correlation* was found. MPs with high concentration of votes have 18% higher chances to give more importance *to local TV and radio* compared to a MP with low concentration of votes. This result is in line with the positive loading (.47) found among MPs who adopt a "*traditional media-based strategy*" (see FA below). However, the remaining findings did not reveal any positive correlation between concentration of votes and media type viz. TV and radio (national), print media (local), print media (national), Internet, and poster. It is important to note, nonetheless, that these findings are not statistically significant and do not necessarily imply causation. Because of the very small sample size, it could not be possible to

examine the causation; rather it could be helpful to monitor the trend in the correlations that the results imply.

Aiming at further exploring the data on the case of Minas Gerais, factor analysis (FA) was used as a third level of analysis to screen the latent variables that account for the correlations among the dependent variables, and to determine meaningful clusters of shared variance. Three factors were extracted, which captured 52.10% of the variance for the MPs elected in Minas Gerais. The first factor, capturing 17.8% of the variance, was the “*traditional media-based strategy*”, which loads negatively on the use of Internet (-.31) and posters (-.38), and *positively* on the use of *national* (.47) and *local* (.32) *television and radio* as well as on the local and national press (.36) as primary mediums of communication with voters.

The second factor, capturing 17.2% of the variance, was “*the pragmatic promoter of local interests*”, whose highest positive factor loading (.70) was the use of benefits delivered to the electoral district (pork barrel) as the most important means of attracting media attention. This factor underscored a negative loading (-.48) on “taking positions on controversial issues”. There were also *negative loadings* on the *national press* (-.30), but *positive loadings on local TV and radio* (.29), on posters (.40), and on the Internet (.25) as mediums of communicating with voters. As tools used in campaigns, there were positive loadings on Websites (.49), and on Internet-based spots (.40).

The third factor, which accounts for 17.1% of the variance, could be termed as the strategy of an “*indirect promoter of local interests*, whose highest positive factor loading was on working in *legislative committees* (.57) and *speeches in the chamber* (.52) as the most important means of attracting media attention.

To sum up it could be said that MPs from Minas Gerais tended to relativize the hyper-media simplistic view according to which media variables are the most relevant in contemporary electoral processes. On the one hand, they clearly indicated the importance of media as a privileged space for political discussion as shown in the first level of this exploratory analysis. On the other hand, the same MPs avoided any optimism on the role that media factors played in their campaigns. Confronted with questions testing media-hype propositions, such as “Thanks to media visibility, I’ve got

electoral success”, the majority of the surveyed MPs (53.8%) only agreed conditionally, suggesting a nuanced perception on the role of media in their electoral careers.

These findings mirror the scientific literature on the issue: more than just “media visibility”, MPs demand a good “public image” associated with their profile. If on the one hand media presence may be crucial to achieve electoral success, on the other hand the multifaceted aspects of the electoral connections may compensate for the lack of media coverage. Few of the political actors may neglect the development of communication strategies for the construction of their public image, which only reinforces the general tendency towards the internalization of typical media values, language and logic by the political field.

6.4. The second exploratory case: The Bavarian Landtag

The second exploratory case draws upon 134 observations brought about by the survey, “Medienpräsenz und Wahl”, conducted in the parliament of Bavaria. The distinctive feature of the Bavarian electoral system is that, unlike what happens elsewhere in Germany, the second vote (PR) *is not cast for a party list*, but for one *specific candidate* within a party list, which is an *open list* similar to the Brazilian proportional system. Voters receive two distinct ballots in each constituency. The first one is small and includes only the name and party affiliation of each district candidate (FPTP). The second one is much larger and includes the names of all list candidates of the region (PR).

In the first level of analysis (cross-tabulation), an upward trend was found of importance conferred by Bavarian MPs to local print media: the importance given by MPs in the low range of vote concentration (17.1%) escalates in the medium range (27.9%) and peaks in the high concentration range (45%), thus confirming our working hypothesis. The role of local print media was also superseded by far those of local TV and Radio when it comes to keeping contact with voters in Bavaria. 62.8% of the respondents in all ranges deemed TV and Radio “not important” or “less important” for their political communication with constituency. By contrast, 96.2% of the respondents deemed local newspaper and magazine “important or very important” to keeping in contact with voters.

One possible explanation for the low ranking of TV and Radio in the perception of Bavarian MPs is the relatively short airtime granted by public and private radio and TV broadcasters to political campaigning. In Bavaria, the campaign spots of the public broadcasters run for a period of thirty-one days before the election. The same timeframe limits the private broadcasters of most of the states by a joint communication of the state supervisory agencies for private broadcasters. Thus, the campaign spots on the broadcast media may not appear a very sizeable benefit.

In the second level of analysis (logit regression), a *negative association* was found between preference for local TV and Radio (-.13) and high concentration of votes. The same was true for national TV and Radio (-.051), and for both types of print media, local (-.091) and national (-.001), as well as for Internet (-.034). By contrast, there was a *positive trend for posters* (.11). These results followed a *similar negative pattern* of association between the variables found in the case of Minas Gerais (see 6.3), except for one positive association: *local TV and radio for Minas Gerais* (.18) and *posters for Bavaria* (.11). These findings also partially confirm the second hypothesis according to which direct personal visibility (*Medienpräsenz*) in the mass and social media might be a strategy that is more strongly visible among candidates running for the Bundestag (Federal elections) than among candidates running for the Landtag (State elections).

As a third level of analysis, factor analysis (FA) was used to screen the latent variables to determine meaningful clusters of shared variance. If an Eigenvalue criterion of 1.0 is applied, two factors were extracted for the German Landtag. These two factors captured 37.5% of the total variance. The first factor, which captures 21.7% of the variance, is the “*traditional media-based strategy*”, which loads *highly and positively* on the use of *national television and radio* (.82) and on the *national press* as primary mediums of communication with voters (.78). The second factor, capturing 15.7% of the variance, is “*the indirect-Internet-based strategy*”, which loads *negatively* as mediums of *communicating with voters* (-.46), and *positively* with loadings of over .26 for a number of internet *tools used in campaign*, the highest loading being for *Internet-based campaign spots* (.75) and *on line chats* (.46).

6.5. The third exploratory case: The Chamber of Deputies

The third exploratory case draws upon 100 observations stemming from the survey “Media Visibility and Election” conducted in the Chamber of Deputies. In the first level of analysis (cross-tabulation), an *upward trend* of importance was found conferred by Brazilian MPs to local broadcasting media for their electoral strategies: 89.6% of the MPs in the high vote concentration layer, 73% in the medium, and 80% in the low concentration vote layers clearly confirmed the importance of local TV and radio for their election/re-election strategies as well as for keeping in contact with voters (87.5% high concentration, 81.1% medium, and 93.3% low concentration).

Despite the indisputable importance of TV in Brazil, it seems, however, that the regional/national factor moderates such importance in terms of MPs’ media individual strategy. Brazilian MPs expressed a very different perception regarding the national broadcasting media, as only 35.5% of MPs in the high vote concentration layer deemed it “important and very important”, a stark contrast with 89.6% at the local level. The other layers mirror the same reaction: 16.2% for the medium layer, in contrast with 73% at the local level, and 13.5% for the low concentration layer, in contrast with 80% of the previous question.

However, when it comes to “keeping in contact with constituency” this trend is reversed, as 60% of the MPs in the low vote area granted more importance to local broadcasting media than MPs in the high concentration layer (39.6%) and MPs in the medium layer (40.5%). These results were confirmed by the logit regression, in the second level of analysis. A *positive association* between preferences for local TV/Radio (.14), national TV/Radio (.11) was found.

These findings may suggest a split perception amongst Brazilian MPs regarding the role of broadcasting media: at the national level, they seem not so important for their individual campaigns, but important as a tool to keeping in contact with voters, above all for MPs with fragmented voting pattern. The legal restrictions on the free use of TV/Radio spots might explain this perception. The only alternative for candidates to have access to broadcasting media is to fight for an insertion of his/her name into the free-air time granted to parties in Brazil (HPEG).

The questions that tested the importance of *local print media* showed surprising results. In both cases, as election/re-election strategy and as means of keeping in contact with voters, local print media received high scores in all layers of vote concentration (85.4% high, 62.1% medium, and low 73.3%). The marginal effects (logit) for print media (.02), although not statistically significant, implied a positive albeit weak correlation between high concentration of votes and preference for this type of media. These results partially confirm our hypothesis, and certainly underscore the increasing importance of local print media for the surveyed Brazilian MPs.

As for the use of Internet, 83.3% of the MPs in the high vote concentration layer considered the Internet and the social media “important and very important” for their election/re-election, followed by 67.1 % of MPs in the medium range and 66.7% in the low range, thus confirming our hypotheses. However, the logit regression analysis found a *negative correlation* between concentration of votes and the preference for Internet (-.03).

This “maverick result” can be explained by the difference in methodology applied in both analysis. At the first level of analysis (cross-tabulation), we used two scales of the questionnaire (“important and very important”) to assess the results, whereas in the logit analysis only one scale (“very important”) was used as category of reference. The scores shown by the “very important” scale of the cross-tabulation report partial results opposite to our hypotheses, as only 25% of MPs with high concentration of votes considered the Internet “very important”, against 32.4% of MPs in the medium, and 40% in the low concentration layer.

The same reasoning is valid for the results on the preference for *posters*. The logit analysis found a negative correlation (-.09): as the concentration of vote increases, the marginal effects of the importance (“very important”) given to this types of media decreases. The cross-tabulation analysis confirmed this trend, as the strongest reception (“important and very important”) to *posters* came from MPs in the lowest vote concentration area (60%), the least in the medium layer (32.4%), and in the high range (39.6%).

These apparent conflicting results suggest that MPs featuring a *high concentration voting pattern* may tend to adopt an “*indirect internet-based strategy*.” Indeed, three factors accounting for 83.91% of the variance were extracted in the third level of analysis (FA). The first factor, accounting for 30.33% of the variance, was the *traditional media-based strategy*. It features relatively high and positive factor loadings on *parliamentary speeches* as the most important mediums of *attracting media attention*.

The second factor, accounting for 45.87% of the variance, seemed puzzling. It loads *highly and negatively* on the use of the internet as important *channel for the MPs communication with voters* and, seemingly paradoxically, *positively* on the use of a *personal website* designed and maintained by the legislator’s own campaign team, the use of *mailing lists*, own campaign spots accessible via the internet, *on-line chats* with voters and *blogs*. There were also *negative loadings* for *speeches in parliament* and *taking positions on controversial topics*. This is why this strategy was termed the “*indirect internet-based strategy*”, which does not use the new web-based media as an important medium of communicating with voters, but still has an extensive internet presence – most likely to project a modern image or to communicate with persons in their own networks. It is also possible that this factor reveals an indirect media strategy.

The third factor, accounting for approximately 23.8% of the variance, could be termed as strategy of a “*pragmatic promoter of local interests*”. The highest positive factor loading is on the *use of benefits delivered to the electoral district* as the most important mediums of attracting media attention coupled with a *high negative loading on taking positions on controversial issues*. There are also relatively high positive factor loadings on the use of local and regional TV, radio stations and newspapers as well as the use of *posters* and – as the only internet-based channel of communication – a *personal website* maintained by the party.

Data generated from the cross-tabulation analysis also indicated that MPs who more intensively used *pork* (“*inauguration of projects and allocation of funds to electoral districts*”) *to capture media visibility* belonged to the layer of *low concentration of votes* (73.3%). MPs in the high vote area (52.1%) were the ones to least use *pork* for that

purpose, followed by MPs in the medium layer (54.1%). These findings dovetail with the 93.4% of MPs in the low concentration range who considered the *support of mayors and town councilors* for their electoral success, in contrast with 64.6% of MPs in the high concentration layer, and 67.6% in the medium concentration area.

These results were confirmed by logit regression analysis that found a *negative association* between concentration of vote and preference given to mayors and city councilors. MPs with high concentration of votes are *37.6% less likely* to give importance to the support of mayor and councilors if compared to MPs with lower concentration of votes. These findings connote that MPs with *low concentration of votes* may tend to adopt the media strategy peculiar to a “*pragmatic promoter of local interests*”.

6.6. The fourth exploratory case: The Bundestag

The fourth and last exploratory case draws upon 224 observations derived from the survey, “Medienpräsenz und Wahl”, conducted in the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag). From the first level of analysis (cross-tabulation) it was learned that the German MPs showed a moderate preference for local broadcasting media as a *campaign strategy*: 48.9% for the high vote concentration layer, 30.1% for the medium vote, and 48.9% for the low vote layer. These results are almost the same for the question on the importance of local TV and Radio for *keeping in contact with voters*: 48.8% in the high vote concentration layer, 37.7% in the medium, and 43% in the low range. This moderate appraisal for local broadcasting turned even lower for the national TV and Radio, as only 25.6% of MPs in the high vote layer, 26.6% in the medium, and 27% in the low vote range manifested preference for this type of media. As for the type of vote, personal-vote seeking, *district elected MPs* expressed more emphasis on local TV and Radio (20.2%) compared to their counterparts elected by list vote (6.5%). List-elected MPs (27.7%) bestowed slightly more importance to broadcasting media at the national level than district-elected MPs (24.7%).

In the second level of analysis, logit estimates showed a *negative association* (-.005) between preference for local TV and Radio and high concentration of vote, and a *positive correlation* (.02) between preference for national TV and Radio and high concentration of votes. These results reflect the cross-tabulation scores for MPs in the

low vote concentration layer, which are *either equal* (48.9%) or *higher* (27%) than the scores for MPs in the high vote concentration area.

Local print media emerged from the cross-tabulation analysis as the most important media for German MPs, with scores of over 90% of preference in all vote concentration layers, and regardless of the type of vote. These results mirror the fact that the vast majority of print media in the Germany is regionally located, reflecting the country's federal structure, and the strong attachment of the population to the local press. The Logit regression found a *positive correlation with concentration of vote* for local (.09) and national (.01) print media.

As for the online campaign, 83.7% of MPs in the high vote concentration layer, 57.8% in the medium, and 75.2% in the low considered the *Internet/social media* ("important and very important"). These results apparently collide with the *negative correlation for the usage of Internet* (-.07) found by the logit analysis, which might be explained by the difference in methodology as explained before: the scores of the logit reference category ("very important") for the MPs in the low concentration area (34.3%) are higher than the ones for the MPs in the high concentration layer (18.6%).

In contrast, a *positive correlation was found for the use of posters* (.11) and high concentration of votes: there is 11% of chance for an MP with high concentration of votes to give more importance to *posters* compared to the one with low concentration of votes. This result mirrors the one found in the cross-tabulation analysis, which documents that 88.4% of surveyed MPs in the high vote concentration layer deemed *posters* "important and very important" for their election/re-election, whereas 75.5% of MPs in the medium layer, and 70% in the low area had a similar perception. The *upward trend from lower to higher vote concentration* confirms our hypothesis for the German Bundestag. Personal-vote seeking, district-elected MPs (82%) also put more emphasis on a poster campaign than party-driven, list-elected MPs (70%) further reinforcing expectations regarding the incentives emanating from the German electoral systems.

In the third level of analysis, applying an Eigenvalue criterion of 1.0, two factors were extracted for the German Bundestag, which account for 73.16% of the variance. The *traditional media-based strategy* accounts for 48.9% of the variance, whereas *the*

internet-based strategy is clearly secondary and captures approximately 24.26% of the variance. The first factor, the “*traditional media-based strategy*”, loads *highly and positively* on the use of local (.75) and national (.83) TV/Radio, and on the local (.47) and national (.66) press as primary mediums of communication with voters. The second factor, “*the Internet-based strategy*”, loads *negatively* as mediums of *communicating with voters*, and *positively* with loadings for a number of internet tools *used in campaign*, such as *personal websites* (.41), *Internet-based campaign spots* (.52), *on line chats* (.44), and *blogs* (.49).

A two-sampled *t-test* was also conducted to check the difference in the scores for the independent variable (see appendix 3). A significant difference was found in the scores for concentration of votes for the Chamber of Deputies ($M = .85$, $SD = .04$) and for the German Bundestag ($M = .68$, $SD = .03$), $t(323) = 3.24$, $p = 0.005$. The *t-test* is not itself a measure of the strength of a relationship but rather, a check on how likely it is that a given measure is due to chance.

The test of the correlation between concentration of votes and the dependent variable, “support of mayors/city counselors” indicated a positive probability of 17.5% among Bundestag-elected MPs, and 3.8% for the variable “media visibility”. These findings suggest that (i) surveyed German MPs elected to the Bundestag with high concentration of votes are highly likely to give more preference to the support of mayors and city counselors as a factor of electoral success than to media visibility; (ii) these MPs are more akin to “*local promoter of interests*” than to “*policy advocates*”. By contrast, a negative association was found of -37.6% between concentration of vote and preference given to mayors and city counselors among surveyed Brazilian MPs.

Before closing our analysis, it was desirable to test some of our dependent media variables against some independent ones taken from the classical electoral studies, such as *district magnitude* and levels of *political competitiveness*. Firstly, how members of the Chamber of Deputies and the German Bundestag responded to the questions testing the importance of media visibility for their electoral success vis-à-vis the magnitude of the district where they were elected was observed. The conclusion was that the greater the magnitude, the greater the media preference. Such results are in line with the

international literature, which found a positive correlation between district magnitude and increasing values of personal reputation.

Secondly, it was desirable to compare media visibility vs. competitiveness. We learned from the international literature that electoral competition is a characteristic of the territory, not of politicians, and the measurement of the competition index refers to a particular district, not to the system as a whole. The percentage margin of victory of each elected MP was calculated in order to produce an index of competitiveness for each observation. Then, we classified those indexes in six different layers, ranging from the most to the least competitive. Based on these results, the conclusion was that as competitiveness increases, so does media visibility.

CONCLUSION

The analysis presented in this research is obviously limited by its exploratory nature, scope, and design. The aim of this investigation was not to *explain*, but rather *to describe* a specific population, as it exists at one point in time. The focus was on the data collected in our field research, and the relationships between some variables were investigated. In this specific case, how the preferences of surveyed MPs in Brazil and Germany differ vis-à-vis the various types of media strategies was of concern, and how these variations relates to the independent variables, i.e., the concentration of votes and the electoral formulae, district magnitude and competitiveness.

The research's design basically called for a postal, elite, self-administered, census survey, one which gathers information on all elements of the target population, i.e., the group of people to whom the survey intends to generalize. Yet, the analysis and conclusions presented here should not be extrapolated beyond the group of interviewees. Thus, it could be compared to a "snapshot" (MPs' responses) of a "moving target" (media strategies). The analysis of longer electoral periods and bigger dataset would allow for more advanced techniques of statistical analysis and robust inferences.

From what could be observed in the previous analysis, it can be said that despite the stark differences in the media and political systems in Brazil and Germany, online politics is found to offer new opportunities for MPs to compensate for eventual offline disadvantages, such as lack of publicity and fewer financial and human resources. Yet, the traditional print and broadcasting mass media still appear more important for their election/re-election strategies as well as for keeping in contact with voters.

These findings connote that the surveyed Brazilian and German MPs tend to use the Internet as a communication tool that complements, but in no case replaces the off-line activities, especially the traditional voter contact and articulation of canvassers, as well as the use of print and broadcasting media. The so-called "Obama effect" appears to be a distant parameter, a far-away horizon rather than a political reality that is checking

and spreading in countries with different political and socio-institutional contexts. Far from replacing the “old” media, the Internet seems to consolidate them in a relation of complementarity, in which the logics of various technological and social media systems mix to form a *hybrid media system*. This may suggest that the debate on political communication should get over the split that separates “traditional” and “new” media systems, and move on to map how these systems interact.

The multilevel character of the election campaigns in Brazil and in Germany accounted for surprising differences in MPs’ media strategies. In Germany, top candidates for the federal level encompass political celebrities, whose main communication strategy rely on media, massive political advertisements, and large-scale rallies. Yet, what was found in our field research was a peculiar trend among surveyed MPs and candidates to rely more on the support of local politicians than on media coverage for their electoral success. The same tendency was observed at the state level, among MPs and candidates running for the Landtag in Bavaria. These findings are in line with the literature, which shows that incumbents in Germany actively cultivate personal vote through constituency service or by bringing government-funded projects to the district (Bawn, 1999).

The direct observation during the peak months of the German federal and state elections of 2013 revealed that both list and district candidates ran their campaigns in small constituencies, where they usually meet potential voters face-to-face on market squares and *Bier Garten*. Or they simply knock on front doors. By contrast, Brazilian MPs rely much more on media visibility than on the support of local politicians.

These findings suggest different ways of cultivating personal reputation, and justify our research question as to whether all candidates for seats in elected assemblies (city councilors, state legislators, Congressmen), the so-called *backbenchers*, give equal importance and emphasis in their campaign strategies to media visibility and public image building. The implication that there might be different kinds of electoral connections, not necessarily dependent on mass media, which may also account for the electoral success of *backbenchers* in Brazil and Germany, found confirmation in our research. To conclude, it could be said that media presence may be crucial to achieving electoral success depending on the incentives emanating from the electoral system, the

level of candidacy, and the nation's political culture. Yet, the multifaceted aspects of the electoral connections may compensate for poor media coverage, and crown with success the electoral careers of candidates to proportional seats in Brazil and Germany.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Brazilian Parties:

DEM - Democrats
PC do B - Communist Party of Brazil
PDT - Democratic Labor Party
PEN - Ecological National Party
PFL - Liberal Front Party
PHS - Humanist Party of Solidarity
PL - Liberal Party
PMDB - Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement
PMN - National Mobilization Party
PPB - Brazilian Popular Party
PPS - Socialist People's Party
PR - Republican Party
PRB - Brazilian Republican Party
PRP - Progressive Republican Party
PRTB - Brazilian Labour Renewal Party
PSB - Partido Socialista Brasileiro
PSC - Social Christian Party
PSD - Social Democratic Party
PSDB - Party of Brazilian Social Democracy
PSL - Social Liberal Party
PSOL - Socialism and Freedom Party
PT - Workers Party
PTB - Brazilian Labor Party
PTC - Christian Labour Party
PTdoB - Labour Party of Brazil
PV - Green Party

German Parties:

CSU – Christian Social Union
CDU – Christian Democratic Union
SPD – Social Democratic Party of Germany
FDP – The Liberals
FW – Free Voters
Bündnis90/Die Grünen – Alliance 90/The Greens
Die Linke – The Left Party

APPENDIX 1: THE BRAZILIAN QUESTIONNAIRE

Exmo (a.) Sr(a) Deputado(a):

Meu nome é Orlando Lyra de Carvalho Jr., pesquisador do Núcleo de Pesquisa em Comunicação Política da Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora (UFJF), Brasil, e de Política Comparada da Universidade Otto-Friedrich-Bamberg, Alemanha. Meu projeto de pesquisa, financiado pela CAPES/DAAD, tem como objetivo analisar o grau de influência das mídias na carreira e no sucesso eleitoral de parlamentares do Brasil e da Alemanha.

Pesquisa semelhante está sendo realizada com os membros do Parlamento Federal de Berlin e da Dieta (Landtag) de Munique do estado da Baviera. A fim de gerar dados que possam servir de comparação entre esses países, gostaria de solicitar a participação de V. Ex.^a nesta pesquisa, a qual tomará apenas 5 minutos de seu tempo. Basta responder o questionário anexo e enviá-lo para o seguinte endereço: Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora - Núcleo de Pesquisa em Comunicação Política - Caixa Postal 344 - CEP: 36001-970 – Juiz de Fora, MG. Se preferir, pode enviar uma cópia digitalizada do questionário para o seguinte e-mail: orlando.junior@stud.uni-bamberg.de

Em nome das mencionadas instituições de pesquisa, agradeço a contribuição de V. Ex.^a para o conhecimento científico.


Orlando Lyra de Carvalho Jr.

PESQUISA

MÍDIA E CARREIRAS PARLAMENTARES

Os Centros de Pesquisa de Comunicação Política da Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora (MG) e de Política Comparada da Universidade Otto-Friedrich-Bamberg (Alemanha) convidam Vossa Excelência para participar do Projeto de Pesquisa Internacional que avalia o papel dos meios de comunicação de massa na carreira de parlamentares brasileiros e alemães. Os dados aqui coletados destinam-se exclusivamente à pesquisa científica, sendo garantido o anonimato das respostas. Por favor, assinale as opções que mais convêm a sua experiência parlamentar.

1. Indique a sigla do partido e do estado da federação em que V. Ex.^a foi eleito:

Partido _____ Estado _____

2. Antes de ser eleito(a) para a Câmara dos Deputados, V. Ex.^a já havia ocupado algum outro cargo público?

Não

Sim, como Vereador/Deputado Estadual/Senador

Sim, como Prefeito/Governador

Sim, como Secretário da Administração Municipal/Estadual/Federal

Sim, como membro do Judiciário Estadual/Federal

3. Em que ano V. Ex.^a foi eleito(a) para a Câmara dos Deputados pela primeira vez?

4. Avalie quais meios de comunicação foram mais importantes para sua eleição/reeleição?

	Sem importância	Pouco importante	Importante	Muito importante
TV e Rádio (regional)				
TV e Rádio (nacional)				
Jornal e revista (regional)				
Jornal e revista (nacional)				
Internet/Redes sociais				
Outdoors e Pôster				

5. Qual tipo de mídia V. Ex.^a considera mais importante para manter contato com os eleitores?

	Sem importância	Pouco importante	Importante	Muito importante
TV e Rádio (regional)				
TV e Rádio (nacional)				
Jornal e revista (regional)				
Jornal e revista (nacional)				
Internet/Redes sociais				
Outdoors e Pôster				

6. Qual a importância da visibilidade na mídia para sua eleição/reeleição?

Sem importância
Pouco importante
Importante
Muito importante

7. Enumere, por ordem de importância, que fatores mais contribuíram para seu sucesso eleitoral:

	Sem importância	Pouco importante	Importante	Muito importante
Apoio de Prefeitos e Vereadores				
Relação com Sindicatos e Movimentos sociais				
Consolidação de sua Imagem Pública				
Presença na Mídia				

8. Com relação ao uso da Internet e Redes Sociais na campanha eleitoral, responda sim ou não:

sim não

Eu usei um Website projetado e mantido pelo meu Partido.

Eu usei um Website pessoal projetado e mantido por minha equipe de campanha.

Eu usei a lista de Mailing para informar e organizar as atividades de minha campanha.

Eu usei o Twitter para me comunicar com os eleitores.

Eu usei outras Redes Sociais para me comunicar com os eleitores.

Eu usei um Blog pessoal durante minha campanha eleitoral.

9. Por favor, avalie sua relação com a mídia local (Jornal e Revista, TV e Rádio):

Sem importância
Pouco importante
Importante
Muito importante

10. Que estratégias V. Ex.^a utiliza com mais frequência para capturar a atenção da mídia em geral?

Inauguração de obras e destinação de recursos para município:

Sem importância
Pouco importante
Importante
Muito importante

Participação em Comissões legislativas:

Sem importância
Pouco importante
Importante
Muito importante

Discurso em plenário:

Sem importância
Pouco importante
Importante
Muito importante

Tomada de posição em temas polêmicos:

Sem importância
Pouco importante
Importante

Muito importante

11. Quantas vezes, aproximadamente, V. Ex.^a teve o nome citado pela mídia local nos últimos três meses?

Mais de 10 vezes

Menos de 10 vezes

Não acompanho a repercussão na mídia

12. Por favor, avalie a afirmativa: "Foi graças à visibilidade na mídia que obtive o sucesso nas urnas."

Concordo enfaticamente

Concordo em termos

Não concordo

Discordo enfaticamente

13. Por favor, avalie a afirmativa: "O contato com meus eleitores depende sobretudo da mídia local."

Concordo enfaticamente

Concordo em termos

Não concordo

Discordo enfaticamente

14. Indique, aproximadamente, que porcentagem dos gastos com propaganda na mídia foi paga pelo partido, por doações de campanha e por verbas pessoais durante sua campanha eleitoral? _____

(5% - 10%) (11% - 20%) (21% - 50%) (51% - 100%)

Partido

Doações

Verbas pessoais

Fim

APPENDIX 2: THE GERMAN QUESTIONNAIRE

Sehr geehrte(r) Frau/Herr Abgeordnete(r),

mein Name ist Orlando Lyra de Carvalho Jr. und ich bin Politikwissenschaftler an der Universität Juiz de Fora in Brasilien. Ich beschäftige mich insbesondere mit dem Einfluss der Medien auf Karriereverläufe von Abgeordneten in Brasilien und Deutschland. In Brasilien konnte ich zu diesem Thema bereits eine Umfrage unter den Abgeordneten des brasilianischen Parlaments durchführen und erste wichtige Erkenntnisse gewinnen. Um mein Forschungsprojekt weiterführen zu können und um einen Vergleich zwischen deutschen und brasilianischen Karriereverläufen zu ermöglichen, möchte ich Sie bitten, an meiner Umfrage teilzunehmen.

Die Umfrage nimmt nur 5 min. Ihrer Zeit in Anspruch. Die von Ihnen gemachten Angaben werden anonymisiert und anschließend für wissenschaftliche Beiträge ausgewertet.

Sehr gerne informiere ich Sie über meine Forschungsergebnisse oder gebe Ihnen Auskunft über die Erkenntnisse, die ich aus der Umfrage unter den brasilianischen Abgeordneten gewinnen konnte.

Für weitere Fragen stehe ich Ihnen jederzeit zur Verfügung. Vielen Dank für Ihre Kooperation!

Mit freundlichen Grüßen


Orlando Lyra de Carvalho Jr.

MEDIENPRÄSENZ UND WAHL

Die Zentren für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft der Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg (Deutschland) und Kommunikationspolitik der Universität Juiz de Fora (Brasilien) laden Sie ein, an einem internationalen Forschungsprojekt über die Rolle der Massenmedien zur parlamentarischen Karriere teilzunehmen. Die in dieser Umfrage erfassten Daten werden zur Erstellung von Artikeln, Berichten und wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten im Bereich der Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft und Kommunikationspolitik verwendet werden. Sämtliche Antworten werden vertraulich und anonym behandelt. Bitte geben Sie diejenigen Antworten, die Ihrer Ansicht oder ihrer Situation als Mitglied des Parlaments am nächsten kommen.

1. Welcher Partei gehören Sie an?

CDU/CSU

SPD

BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN

FDP

DIE LINKE

2. Haben Sie vor der Kandidatur für den Bundestag ein anderes öffentliches Amt bekleidet?

Nein

Ja, und zwar für insgesamt 1 Jahr

Ja, und zwar für insgesamt 2 Jahre

Ja, und zwar für insgesamt 4 Jahre

Ja, und zwar für mehr als 5 Jahre

3. In welchen Jahren waren Sie Direktkandidat für den Bundestag und haben Sie in diesen Jahren den Wahlkreis gewonnen?

2009 2005 2002 1998

Wahlkreiskandidat

Wahlkreis gewonnen

4. In welchen Jahren standen Sie auf der Liste ihrer Partei für den Bundestag? Wurden Sie in diesen Jahren über die Landesliste in den Bundestag gewählt?

2009 2005 2002 1998

Listenkandidat (Bundestag)

Über die Liste gewählt

5. Wie wichtig waren in Ihrem Wahlkampf folgende Medien?

Nicht wichtig Weniger wichtig Wichtig Sehr wichtig

TV und Radio (lokal)

TV und Radio (überregional)

Printmedien (lokal)

Printmedien (überregional)

Internet/soziale Netzwerke

Plakat/Posters

6. Welche Medien verwenden Sie am häufigsten, um mit ihren Wähler in Kontakt zu kommen?

Nicht wichtig Weniger wichtig Wichtig Sehr wichtig

TV und Radio (regional)

	Nicht wichtig	Weniger wichtig	Wichtig	Sehr wichtig
TV und Radio (überregional)				
Printmedien (lokal)				
Printmedien (überregional)				
Internet/soziale Netzwerke				
Plakat/Posters				

7. Bitte bewerten Sie die Bedeutung Ihrer Präsenz in den Medien für Ihre Wahl / Wiederwahl:

Nicht wichtig
Weniger wichtig
Wichtig
Sehr wichtig

8. Bitte bewerten Sie die Faktoren, die am meisten zu Ihrem Wahlerfolg beigetragen haben:

	Nicht wichtig	Weniger wichtig	Wichtig	Sehr wichtig
Unterstützung von Bürgermeister und lokalen Parteimitgliedern				
Verhältnis zu Gewerkschaften und soziale Bewegungen				
Öffentliches Image				
Präsenz in den Medien				

9. Inwiefern haben Sie, unabhängig vom Internetauftritt Ihrer Partei, das Internet für Ihren Wahlkampf benutzt?

	Ja	Nein
Ich hatte eine eigene Webseite, die primär von meiner Partei entworfen und betreut wurde		
Ich hatte eine Webseite, die primär von meinem Wahlkampfteam entworfen und betreut wurde		
Ich benutzte Mailing-Listen, um zu informieren und um Aktivitäten zu organisieren		
Ich habe einen eigenen Wahlwerbespot im Internet bereitgestellt		
Ich führte Online-Chats mit Wählern durch		
Ich benutzte ein Blog während des Wahlkampfes		

10. Bitte bewerten Sie Ihre Beziehung zu den lokalen Medien:

Sehr gut
Gut
Vernünftig
Nicht so gut

11. Wie versuchen Sie hauptsächlich, die Aufmerksamkeit der Medien zu bekommen?

Einbringen von Landesmitteln für Ihren Wahlkreis:

Nicht wichtig
Weniger wichtig
Wichtig
Sehr wichtig

Teilnahme an legislativen Ausschüssen:

Nicht wichtig
Weniger wichtig
Wichtig
Sehr wichtig

Reden im Bundestag:

Nicht wichtig
Weniger wichtig
Wichtig
Sehr wichtig

Haltung zu kontroversen Themen:

Nicht wichtig
Weniger wichtig
Wichtig
Sehr wichtig

12. Wie oft wurde Ihr Name in den lokalen Medien in den letzten drei Monaten erwähnt?

Mehr als 10 mal
Weniger als 10 mal
Manchmal, aber ich weiß nicht, wie viele

13. Bitte bewerten Sie die Aussage: „Dank der Präsenz in den Medien hatte ich Wahlerfolg“.

Ich stimme vollkommen zu
Ich stimme überwiegend zu
Ich stimme teilweise zu
Ich stimme nicht zu

14. Bitte bewerten Sie die Aussage: „Meine Beziehung zu meinem Wahlkreis hängt von den lokalen Medien ab“.

Ich stimme vollkommen zu
Ich stimme überwiegend zu
Ich stimme teilweise zu
Ich stimme nicht zu

15. Können Sie in etwa sagen, welcher Anteil Ihres Medien Budgets von der Partei stammte, welcher Anteil aus Spenden und welcher Anteil aus privaten Mitteln?

(5% - 10%) (11% - 20%) (21% - 50%) (51% - 100%)

Parteimittel ca.

Spenden ca.

Private Mittel ca.

Im Namen der Universität Bamberg und der Universität Juiz de Fora bedanken wir uns für Ihre Zeit! Ohne Ihre Unterstützung wäre dieses internationale Forschungsprojekt nicht möglich. Über die Ergebnisse dieses Projektes werden wir Sie gerne informieren.

APPENDIX 3: *t*-TEST (CONCENTRATION OF VOTES)

T-test (Group 1 = the Chamber of Deputies; Group 2 = The German Bundestag)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

```

-----
Group |      Obs      Mean   Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
-----+-----
  1 |      100      .85    .035887    .3588703    .7787924    .9212076
  2 |      225      .68    .0311677   .4675162    .6185805    .7414195
-----+-----
Combined |      325   .7323077   .0245976   .443439    .6839166    .7806988
-----+-----
Diff |                .17   .0525324                .0666512    .2733488
-----

```

Diff = mean (1) - mean (2) **t = 3.2361**

Ho: diff = 0 **degrees of freedom = 323**

Ha: diff < 0 Ha: diff != 0 Ha: diff > 0

Pr(T < t) = 0.9993 Pr(|T| > |t|) = **0.0013** Pr(T > t) = 0.0007

APPENDIX 4: T-TEST (CONCENTRATION OF VOTES) – BAVARIA – MINAS
GERAIS

T-test Bavaria / Minas Gerais

Paired t test

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]
Bavaria	53	2.169811	.1068613	.7779621	1.955378 2.384244
MG	53	2.207547	.1122358	.8170889	1.98233 2.432765
Diff.	53	-.0377358	.161547	1.17608	-.3619036 .2864319

Mean (diff) = mean(con - con_01)

t = -0.2336

Ho: mean (diff) = 0

degrees of freedom = 52

Ha: mean (diff) < 0

Ha: mean (diff) != 0

Ha:

Mean(diff) > 0

Pr(T < t) = 0.4081

Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8162

Pr(T > t) = 0.5919

Not statistically significant

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