A segregação de funções no certame licitatório como política anticaptura: análise dos impactos da inserção do agente de contratação na Lei no 14.133/2021

Abstract

The New Public Procurement Law has placed greater emphasis on adhering to the principle of segregation of duties and on the role of the contracting agent in conducting procurement proceedings. These innovations aim to establish a regulatory public policy designed to strengthen the prevention of corruption—practices that date back to the regime under the now-repealed legislation. Focusing on this subject, the study employs exploratory, bibliographic, and interdisciplinary research methods. It also utilizes field research—specifically interviews with municipal officials regarding the impact of the innovations introduced by Law No. 14.133/2021—alongside primary and secondary sources and qualitative data. The research investigates the extent to which applying the principle of segregation of duties—manifested by replacing the permanent procurement commission with a single contracting agent as the standard for conducting the process from proposal submission to final ratification—effectively serves as a tool to combat corruption. The study posits that concentrating responsibilities in a single contracting agent, while intended to enhance procedural efficiency and speed, may weaken control mechanisms and facilitate corrupt practices by diminishing the collective decision-making previously inherent in procurement commissions. Ultimately, the study concludes that while segregating functions across procurement stages may theoretically hinder regulatory capture, the contracting agent still concentrates a significant portion of the duties related to conducting the process; this arrangement, in isolation, proves insufficient to prevent or curb potential acts of corruption.